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“… it is the successful experiment which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures 
which preceded it. More is learned from the single success 
than from the multiple failures. A single success proves it can be done.  
Thereafter, it is necessary only to learn what made it work.  
This, at least, is what I take to be the sociological sense of those  
revealing words of Thomas Love Peacock: “ Whatever is, is possible.” 
 
                                                            Robert Merton (1961) 
 
 i
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Only worth mentioning solo creation, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is the 
creation of this universe. Otherwise any work of creation is very much unlikely, if not 
impossible, with one person’s solo efforts. Similarly, the creation of this work owes 
heavily to several people whose guidance, support, encouragement, and cooperation 
proved instrumental in making this work possible.  
First and foremost, I am deeply indebted (and this is literal too) to the people of Pakistan 
and Higher Education Commission, Government of Pakistan, who with their generous 
four years funding made it possible for me to pursue my interests in the prestigious 
university of Heidelberg; where I was lucky to find a mentor like Prof. Subrata K. Mitra, 
who not only supervised my academic work, but also knew how to make me work in the 
right direction. Without his insightful guidance, constructive criticism and constant 
encouragement it would have never been possible for me to complete this dissertation. He 
looked after my academic development as well as supported and backed me on many 
occasions of dire need. I strongly hope that this work might prove the stepping-stone for a 
life long academic cooperation and intellectual union. I am also deeply grateful to Prof. 
Dietmar Rothermund who trusted in my abilities, provided me with his extremely helpful 
and timely recommendations and feedback, and supported me when it was most needed.  
I would like to express my gratitude to DAAD for their financial support and efforts in 
assimilating me into the German language and culture and for a smooth administration of 
my scholarship. I am also highly grateful to Gesellschaft der Freunde Universität 
Heidelberg for their generous support, during last six months, without which it would 
have been very difficult for me to complete this work in time. Besides, I am thankful to 
Rabail Baig for completing the editing work on such short notice.  
I am also grateful to many friends and well wishers, both in Pakistan and Germany, who 
helped me during the various stages of my research. Among these are Ali Hassan, 
Shahram Azhar, Ehtisham, and Hassan Saddi, who helped and assisted me enormously 
during a long tedious process of data collection; specially Saddi, who was instrumental in 
the finalization of my questionnaire for the survey. I am also grateful to many colleagues 
and friends from civil bureaucracy of Pakistan, who helped me in making possible this 
otherwise very unlikely task of collecting perceptions of civil servants regarding 
corruption. Few of these friends include, Kashif Noon, Musadiq Tahirkheli, Haroon 
Rafique, Tariq Mahmood, and Khushnood Akhtar Lashari (then Secretary Health). I am 
also especially thankful to many officers and officials of Motorway Police, who 
cooperated with an alacrity, completely unknown to me, especially Mr. Ehsan Tufail (SP 
North) and Mr. Rifat Pasha (then IG Motorway Police), whose kind help made the second 
part of fieldwork much easier and less time consuming. Furthermore, I am very much 
thankful to my brother and friend Dr. Asim Noor and Dr. Hassan Bashir for their timely 
suggestions and assistance at various stages of my data analysis and dissertation writing. I 
owe special thanks to Hassan, who introduced me to the academic world of conferences 
and publications and proved instrumental in enhancing my efficiency by providing me 
with a faster and safer machine for dissertation writing. 
I am very much thankful to my family, friends and colleagues from Germany, Ahmed 
Saeed, Ali Qasmi, Usman Butt and Siegfried Wolf for their consistent help and assistance 
in every hour of need. I owe profound thanks and gratitude to Reuther family: Dr. Wilma, 
 ii
 
Armin, and Sarah Reuther, whose sincere friendship, care and love for me and my family 
made the life in Germany not only much easier but truly a memorable one, it’s because of 
them that Germany feels like a second home to me. I am particularly thankful to Sarah 
for her consistent help and assistance in all the bureaucratic and library matters and her 
persistent encouragement on various difficult stages of my Ph.D. 
I am exceedingly grateful to my family in Pakistan, who helped and assisted me in every 
way possible; especially my parents who never let their love come in the way of my 
progress and growth and who happily bore my absence in the time when they needed me 
most. I am also awfully indebted to my bother Dr. Ahmed Naseer who mentored my 
intellectual growth, since the times I was unable to spell the word properly; and who 
envisioned avenues, destinations and targets for me, which for most of the time were 
beyond my imagination. I am also grateful for his, and his best half Jacqueline’s, 
extremely valuable suggestions and help in building various socio-psychological 
arguments during the course of this dissertation writing. To Jacqueline, I am extra 
obliged for the enormous effort she has put in enhancing the linguistic as well as 
contextual worth of my work through repeated readings.  
Last but not least, I am exceptionally indebted to my wife Gul, and my children Shaher 
Bano and Moosa for their understanding, care, love, and patience during last four years. 
Not only that my wife cheerfully accepted the usual capriciousness of a Ph.D. researcher, 
but she has also been a source of great help, encouragement, and assistance during the 
various stages of my dissertation: writing, editing, and proof reading. At the time these 
lines are being written she is relentlessly busy in proof reading the last few pages of my 
dissertation. This work would never have been possible but for the patience, love, and 
belief of her, who believes in my abilities and capabilities much more than I do. I 
dedicate this work to her. 
 iii
 
Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..............................................................................................I 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES............................................................................ VII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....................................................................................VIII 
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH........................................................................................ 2 
THE CASE OF PAKISTAN................................................................................................... 3 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 4 
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY.................................................................................................. 7 
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................ 9 
DATA AND ITS SOURCES ................................................................................................ 11 
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 13 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION................................................................................ 17 
CHAPTER 1.................................................................................................................... 19 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK................................................................................ 19 
1.1 THE PUZZLE ............................................................................................................. 20 
1.2 WHY PAKISTAN?...................................................................................................... 24 
1.3 THE CORE QUESTION ............................................................................................... 27 
1.3.1 Ideal Bureaucratic Model ................................................................................ 28 
1.3.2 Fundamentals of Structured Institutions.......................................................... 30 
1.4 HYPOTHESES............................................................................................................ 32 
1.5 THEORETICAL PARADIGM ........................................................................................ 34 
1.5.1 Theoretical Perspective of Corruption and Governance................................. 34 
1.5.1.1 Definition of Corruption? ......................................................................... 36 
1.5.1.2 Need Based Corruption (NBC)................................................................. 37 
1.5.1.3 Greed Based Corruption (GBC)................................................................ 39 
1.5.1.4 What is Governance? ................................................................................ 40 
1.5.2 Theoretical Modelling of Corruption............................................................... 41 
1.5.2.1 Principal-Agent-Client (PAC) Model of Corruption ................................ 42 
1.5.3 Theoretical Dynamics of Corruption as a Phenomenon.................................. 44 
1.5.3.1 ‘Otherness’ of the Institutions: Another Explanation ............................... 46 
1.6 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF CORRUPTION................................................................ 47 
1.6.1 Neo-Institutional Approach to Governance..................................................... 48 
1.6.2 Rational Choice Explanation of Corruption.................................................... 51 
1.7 THE MODEL ............................................................................................................. 53 
CHAPTER 2.................................................................................................................... 59 
LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 59 
2.1 THE PARADOX OF RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION........................................................ 60 
2.2 FUNCTIONALISTS OR REVISIONISTS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ...................................... 63 
2.2.1 Corruption as a Catalyst for Modernisation ................................................... 65 
2.2.2 Corruption as a Safeguard against Revolution ............................................... 67 
 iv
 
2.2.3 Corruption as Political Stabiliser.................................................................... 68 
2.2.4 Corruption as Grease for the Wheel of Economy............................................ 71 
2.2.5 Corruption as a Form of Political Influence ................................................... 76 
2.2.6 Control of Corruption ...................................................................................... 77 
2.2.7 Functionalist Critique of Moralists ................................................................. 78 
2.3 THE MORALIST SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ..................................................................... 79 
2.4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION .................................................................. 91 
2.4.1 Causes of Corruption....................................................................................... 93 
2.4.1.1 Government Size....................................................................................... 94 
2.4.1.2 Kinds of State............................................................................................ 94 
2.4.1.3 Institutional Quality .................................................................................. 95 
2.4.1.4 Political System ........................................................................................ 96 
2.4.1.5 Merit and Remunerations.......................................................................... 98 
2.4.1.6 Competition............................................................................................... 99 
2.4.1.7 Cultural Determinants............................................................................... 99 
2.4.2 Empirical Research of the Impact of Corruption .......................................... 101 
2.5 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 101 
CHAPTER 3.................................................................................................................. 106 
EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION ............................................. 106 
3.1 DEFINITIONAL EVOLUTION OF CORRUPTION.......................................................... 106 
3.1.1 Origin of Public Office................................................................................... 108 
3.1.2 Three Sets of Definitions................................................................................ 110 
3.1.3 Cultural Embeddedness of Corruption .......................................................... 112 
3.1.4 Moving Ahead of the old Debate ................................................................... 115 
3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF CORRUPTION....................................................................... 116 
3.3 MODES OF CORRUPTION ........................................................................................ 118 
3.4 CATEGORIES OF CORRUPTION ................................................................................ 120 
3.4.1 Legislative or Political Corruption................................................................ 121 
3.4.2 Executive or Bureaucratic Corruption .......................................................... 123 
3.4.3 Judicial Corruption........................................................................................ 124 
3.5 MODELS OF CORRUPTION....................................................................................... 125 
3.5.1 Agency Models of Corruption........................................................................ 126 
3.5.2 Resource Allocation Models .......................................................................... 128 
3.5.3 Demand and Supply Model............................................................................ 129 
3.5.4 Miscellaneous Models of Corruption............................................................. 131 
3.6 MEASURING CORRUPTION...................................................................................... 132 
3.6.1Business International (BI) Data .................................................................... 133 
3.6.2 World Competitiveness Report (WCR) .......................................................... 134 
3.6.3 Impulse Data.................................................................................................. 134 
3.6.4 Political Risk Services Incorporation ............................................................ 135 
3.6.5 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) ....................................... 135 
3.6.6 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ............................................................... 136 
3.6.7 Control of Corruption Index (CCI)................................................................ 137 
3.7 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 138 
 
 v
 
CHAPTER 4.................................................................................................................. 142 
CORRUPTION IN PAKISTAN .................................................................................. 142 
4.1 A PARADOX OF GROWTH AND CORRUPTION.......................................................... 143 
4.2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CORRUPTION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT ....................... 145 
4.2.1 Colonial Heritage of Corruption ................................................................... 146 
4.3 DECADE OF AUTONOMOUS CORRUPTION 1947-58................................................. 148 
4.4 THE PRAETORIAN CORRUPTION 1958-71 ............................................................... 158 
4.5 THE DEMOCRATIC CORRUPTION 1972-77 .............................................................. 161 
4.5.1 Civil Service Reforms of 1973........................................................................ 163 
4.6 THE ISLAMIST PRAETORIAN CORRUPTION 1977-88 ............................................... 165 
4.6.1 ‘Narco-Corruption’ ....................................................................................... 168 
4.7 DECADE OF KLEPTOCRACY 1988-98...................................................................... 170 
4.8 CORRUPTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1999-2008............................................... 175 
4.8.1 Current Situation ........................................................................................... 179 
4.9 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 180 
CHAPTER 5.................................................................................................................. 185 
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION: PREVALENCE AND CAUSES ................... 185 
5.1 MEASURING CORRUPTION: HOW VALID ARE PERCEPTIONS? .................................. 186 
5.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF PERCEPTION AS A PROXY OF CORRUPTION................................. 189 
5.3 PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION............................................................................... 190 
5.3.1 Prevalence of Corruption .............................................................................. 192 
5.3.2 Variation in Perceptions ................................................................................ 193 
5.3.3 Cultural or Institutional Problem .................................................................. 196 
5.3.4 Social Attitude towards Corruption ............................................................... 198 
5.3.5 Age, Gender and Geography ......................................................................... 199 
5.3.6 Corruption Variance in Different Institutions ............................................... 200 
5.4 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION........................................................................................ 204 
5.4.1 Primary Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption ................................................ 205 
5.4.1.1 High Frequency Causes .......................................................................... 206 
5.4.1.2 Low Frequency Causes ........................................................................... 208 
5.4.2 Institutional Causes of Corruption ................................................................ 209 
5.4.3 Economic Causes of Corruption.................................................................... 211 
5.4.4 Developmental Causes of Corruption............................................................ 212 
5.4.5 Social Causes of Corruption.......................................................................... 213 
5.4.5.1 Co-relational Analysis of Social Causes................................................. 215 
5.5 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 217 
CHAPTER 6.................................................................................................................. 222 
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH............. 222 
6.1 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS & MOTORWAY POLICE ...................................................... 224 
6.1.1 Origin and History......................................................................................... 224 
6.1.2 Organisational and Administrative Structure of the Motorway Police ......... 226 
6.1.3 Institutional Features of the Motorway Police .............................................. 226 
6.1.4 Performance of Motorway Police.................................................................. 228 
 vi
 
6.1.5 Training and Spreading the Right Ethos ....................................................... 231 
6.1.6 Social Image of the Motorway Police............................................................ 232 
6.2 PERCEPTIONS OF MOTORWAY POLICE.................................................................... 234 
6.2.1 Motorway’s Perceptions Regarding Institutional Corruption....................... 234 
6.2.2 Institutions for Fighting Institutional Corruption.......................................... 236 
6.2.3 Indigenous Tools for Fighting Corruption .................................................... 241 
6.2.3.1 Effective Accountability ......................................................................... 242 
6.2.3.2 Rewarding Honest Conduct .................................................................... 245 
6.2.4 Exogenous Tools against Corruption ............................................................ 246 
6.2.4.1 Financial Remuneration .......................................................................... 247 
6.2.4.2 Honest Leadership .................................................................................. 248 
6.3 SELF-ASSESSMENT OF MOTORWAY POLICE ........................................................... 249 
6.3.1 Performance of Motorway Police.................................................................. 250 
6.3.2 Societal Elements in Controlling Corruption ................................................ 251 
6.3.3 Institutional Tools for Controlling Corruption.............................................. 253 
6.3.4 Structural Tools for Controlling Corruption ................................................. 255 
6.3.5 Institutional Culture of Motorway Police ...................................................... 257 
6.4 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 259 
CHAPTER 7.................................................................................................................. 263 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 263 
HYPOTHESES REVISITED .............................................................................................. 269 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY..................................................................................... 272 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 276 
APPENDICES............................................................................................................... 282 
SAMPLE FILLED QUESTIONNAIRE................................................................................. 282 
ADDITIONAL SECTION FOR THE MOTORWAY POLICE’S QUESTIONNAIRE..................... 287 
LIST OF DEPARTMENTS SURVEYED.............................................................................. 288 
CORRELATIONS: AGE, LENGTH OF SERVICES AND PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ........ 289 
CORRELATIONS: SOCIAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION ...................................................... 290 
SALIENT FEATURES OF MOTORWAY POLICE................................................................ 291 
MANDATE OF MOTORWAY POLICE’S TRAINING INSTITUTES........................................ 292 
ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS IN PAKISTAN SINCE 1947 .................................................... 293 
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................... 295 
 vii
 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
FLOW CHART 1 ESTABLISHED SOCIETIES OR DEVELOPED WORLD.................................................................45 
FLOW CHART 2 TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES OR DEVELOPING STATES..............................................................46 
FLOW CHART 3 OPTIMISED DECISION-MAKING IN STRUCTURED ENVIRONMENT...........................................51 
FLOW CHART 4 AN INSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR CONTROLLING CORRUPTION...............................................58 
 
TABLE 1 LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH ASIA............................................................................................ 8 
TABLE 2 LEVEL OF GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH ASIA .......................................................................................... 9 
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF NBC AND GBC.....................................................................................................39 
TABLE 4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE ............................................................49 
TABLE 5 CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX OF SOUTH ASIA.........................................................................144 
TABLE 6 RESULTS OF INITIAL SCREENING IN 1959 AND 1960 OF CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVANTS ..........................................................................................................................................158 
TABLE 7 PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ACCORDING TO THE HIERARCHY OF BUREAUCRACY ......................196 
TABLE 8 CULTURAL VS INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM I ....................................................................................197 
TABLE 9 CULTURAL VS INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM II...................................................................................198 
TABLE 10 INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS IN TERMS OF CORRUPTION..........................................................203 
TABLE 11 SOCIAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION.................................................................................................214 
TABLE 12 INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION IN BUREAUCRACY AND ACTIONS TAKEN ........................................244 
TABLE 13 INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION IN MOTORWAY POLICE AND ACTION TAKEN...................................245 
 
FIGURE 1 EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION...........................................................................188 
FIGURE 2 COMPARATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF BUREAUCRACY AND MP ...........................................................193 
FIGURE 3 VARIATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION.............................................................................194 
FIGURE 4 HIATUS IN PERCEPTION ................................................................................................................198 
FIGURE 5 MOST CORRUPT INSTITUTIONS .....................................................................................................200 
FIGURE 6 LEAST CORRUPT INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................................................202 
FIGURE 7 CAUSES OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION ....................................................................................206 
FIGURE 8 CAUSES FOR CORRUPTION IN MOST CORRUPT INSTITUTIONS.......................................................209 
FIGURE 9 REASONS FOR LESSER CORRUPTION .............................................................................................210 
FIGURE 10 PERCEPTIONS REGARDING INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION ...........................................................235 
FIGURE 11 REASONS FOR LESSER CORRUPTION IN MP ................................................................................236 
FIGURE 12 INSTITUTIONS FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION.................................................................................237 
FIGURE 13 INDIGENOUS TOOLS FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION .......................................................................241 
FIGURE 14 EXOGENOUS TOOLS FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION .......................................................................246 
FIGURE 15 SELF-ASSESSMENT OF MP..........................................................................................................250 
FIGURE 16 SOCIETAL INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION ....................................................................................252 
FIGURE 17 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES IN MP...............................................................................................253 
FIGURE 18 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF MP ..............................................................................................255 
FIGURE 19 LEVEL OF EDUCATION ................................................................................................................256 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
ADB  Asian Development Bank  
BI  Business International 
BPI  Bribe Payer’s Index 
CCI  Control Of Corruption Index 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index              
CSP  Civil Services Of Pakistan  
CVC  Central Vigilance Commissions (India) 
DCO  District Controlling Officer 
DEA  Drug Enforcement Administration  
DMG  District Management Group 
GATT  General Agreement On Trade and Tariff. 
GBC  Greed Based Corruption 
GCB  Global Corruption Barometer 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HFC  High Frequency Causes 
ICAC  Independent Commission Against Corruption (Hong Kong) 
ICITP  International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme   
                        (USA)     
ICRG  International Country Risk Guide 
IFL  Ittefaq Foundation Limited  
IG  Inspector General  
IMD  Institute for Management Development 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ISI  Inter Services Intelligence 
LFC  Low Frequency Causes 
MP  Motorway Police 
NAB  National Accountability Bureau 
NACS  National Accountability Corruption Strategy 
NAO  National Accountability Ordinance 
NBC  Need Based Corruption 
NGO  Non Governmental Organization  
NH&MP National Highway & Motorway Police 
OED  Oxford English Dictionary 
OPSTIB Operasi Tertib (operation correct conduct of Indonesia) 
PAC  Principal Agent and Client Model  
PERC  Political And Economic Risk Consultancy 
PML  Pakistan Muslim League 
PPP  Pakistan Peoples Party 
PRS  Political Risk Service 
SPSS  Statistical Package of Social Sciences. 
SS  Significance Score 
 ix
 
TI  Transparency International 
UN  United Nations 
USA  United State Of America 
WB  World Bank 
WCR  World Competitiveness Report 
WEF  World Economic Forum 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
WVS  World Value Survey  
WWGI World Wide Governance Index 
WWII  World War II 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
Introduction 
 
Governance and corruption are two interdependent concepts, mutually ensconced in one 
another. Which precludes the other, however, is debatable. The general assumption in 
political science is that corruption is one of the various indicators of the level of 
governance in a state.1 Variations in the level of governance, in the sense of orderly rule,2 
across time and space and different regions, have been explained by two prominent 
scholarly approaches: that of evolutionary institutionalism by Huntington (1968) and the 
rational choice, the neo-institutionalist approach by Mitra (2006). While the former 
proposes the solution to the problem of governance, in the process of social change and 
concomitant evolution of the institutions of the state, the latter suggests the prevalence of 
order as a result of a rational choice, made by both the parties to a transaction, 
considering their perceptions of associated losses and gains. This current inquiry into the 
study of governance from the perspective of controlling corruption, builds on the latter 
approach; assuming that the higher degree of order will ensue from a lower level of 
corruption in a state. 
Building on the rational choice; the neo-institutional theory of political science, and the 
agency theory of economics and public administration (Eisenhardt, 1989), this study 
develops a neo-institutional theory for controlling corruption.  
The theory maintains that agents are rational actors and their decision to go corrupt or 
otherwise is determined, not by cultural determinants, but rather by their perceptions of 
risks and rewards attached with available alternative choices. Moreover, agents have a 
propensity to adapt to any institutional milieu provided they foresee an advantage in 
doing so. This study tests these claims, on the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan, and finds 
that agents behave remarkably different in different institutional settings. The disparity in 
their behaviour is empirically explained in terms of agents’ perceptions of the allied gains 
and losses of available choices. These findings have been empirically explored, with the 
                                                 
1 World Wide Governance Indicators include Control of Corruption as one of the six basic indicators of 
governance along with Rule of Law, Regularity Quality, Government Effectiveness, Voice and 
Accountability, and Political Stability. 
2 Many scholars of the subject have interpreted essentially a contested concept, governance, differently. 
These interpretation would be discussed later in Chapter 1; however, during the course of this research the 
concept of governance has been used as ‘orderly rule’ as done by Mitra (2006).   
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help of qualitative and quantitative data, collected from real stakeholders3 of any corrupt 
transaction. The underpinning theme of this inquiry is to assess, the role that culture and 
institutions play in the unenviable state of affairs, in terms of high corruption and low 
governance in most of the developing world. 
This research argues that widespread corruption and low governance in the developing 
states, like Pakistan, is attributable to inherent inadequacies in the public institutional 
structures, which can be controlled through restructuring. Attributing widespread 
corruption of the transitional societies to their cultures is a misinterpretation of reality. Its 
genesis can rather be located in badly designed institutional structures and unfulfilled 
physiological needs, latter compelling and former permitting the agent to do corruption. 
A public policy focusing on any of them in isolation is bound to fail; effective and 
sustainable corruption control is only possible through a simultaneous attack on both the 
fronts. 
 
Objectives of the Research 
The inspiration for purer theory relies exclusively on the concern for, and appeal of, 
applied problems, observed a scholar, maintaining that theoretical ideas are best 
explained with the assistance of real world examples (Schelling, 2005). Drawing 
inspiration from the notion, the fundamental concern of this study is to develop a theory 
for controlling corruption in transitional societies and developing states, and to testify the 
validity of the developed theory, by employing any real world example from the 
developing states. Building on the tenants of rational choice, the neo-institutional 
approach, this research envisages a neo-institutional theory and develops a model for 
identifying the causes and suggesting the means to control corruption and enhance 
governance through ameliorating the performance of non-elected public sector of the 
developing world. 
This research specifically deals with bureaucratic corruption in the public sector and its 
significance for the effective and efficient governance of the developing states and 
                                                 
3 The term ‘stakeholder’ is used throughout this study to denote those members of the society, who also 
belong to the non-elected public sectors of the developing world and are often considered as perpetrators in 
the study of bureaucratic corruption. 
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transitional societies. This research assumes that mere academic debate regarding the 
concept, causes, and consequences of corruption, and exogenous doctrines and policies 
imported from outside, cannot foster any palpable change in the attitudes of the 
stakeholders, and is unlikely to bring forth valuable dividends without catering to the 
endogenous ratiocination and motivations of the perpetrators. Hence, one of the major 
objectives of this research is to identify the causes and means of controlling public sector 
corruption according to the perceptions and concerns of the stakeholders, and to 
formulate practical recommendations for the policymakers of the developing world, 
based on the prioritisation of various factors, according to the views and wishes of the 
stakeholders.  
 
The Case of Pakistan 
Corruption has been studied from the perspective of the developing as well as the 
developed world.4 Though, the volume of the former is significantly more than the latter5, 
yet there is a dearth of serious academic endeavours focusing on South Asia, with the 
exception of India. A significant amount of serious academic work has been done 
focusing on one or the other developing state; few of the more prominent of such studies 
include: India (Monterio 1966; Myrdal 1968; Kholi 1975; Wade 1982; Palmier 1985; 
Reddy and Haragopal 1985), Nigeria (Wraith and Simpkins 1963; Leys 1965; Eker 
1981), Indonesia (Palmier 1985; Scot 1972), Zaire (Gould 1980), Hong Kong (Palmier 
1985), Ghana (Werlin 1972; Price 1975), Haiti (Scot 1972), Mexico (Wilkie 1967) and 
Thailand (Scot 1972). Interestingly, there is hardly any serious academic work on 
Pakistan, with a focus on corruption. 
A comprehensive study of corruption in Pakistan is more than overdue considering the 
geo-strategic importance of Pakistan in general, and her socio-political significance, in 
today’s world of extremism and terrorism, in particular. It is quite surprising that such a 
far-reaching phenomenon, like that of corruption, has not been fully investigated in the 
case of a country like Pakistan. Corruption causes, inter alia, misappropriation of funds, 
                                                 
4 There are numbers of historical studies of corruption in USA, Britain, and Europe. For detailed reference 
of such studies refer to Chapter 2. 
5 A detailed account of these studies has been given in chapter 2 dealing with the review of the existing 
body of knowledge on corruption. 
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misallocation of resources and is closing doors of opportunity on many, especially, the 
already marginalised sections of society. This leads to unequal distribution of wealth, and 
minimises the chances of decent survival for the common man; breeding frustration, 
cynicism, anger and repressed hostility in him, which generally, finds its vent in shape of 
intolerance, extremism, religious fanaticism, and ultimately, terrorism. To our mind, 
besides fighting the Taliban in Northern Pakistan, fighting corruption in Pakistan, should 
be significantly high on the US’s agenda as far as its ‘war on terror’ is concerned, if it 
really aims and wants to win this war. This link between corruption and security can 
easily be understood if we look at the role corruption of the ruling elite plays in the 
persistence of illiteracy and economic inequality in a state like Pakistan.  
Apart from the lack of a meaningful study on Pakistan, another important reason for 
choosing Pakistan was the nature of the study, which proposes a theoretical model for 
controlling corruption in developing states, and Pakistan represents, from the perspective 
of decaying governance and increased corruption, one of the worst examples of such 
states. Whatever could go wrong with any developing state has already gone wrong in 
case of Pakistan. If any theory or model can hold grounds in case of Pakistan, the 
probability of its successful replication in other developing states will be much higher. 
 
Historical Background 
Corruption is probably, as old and as universal a phenomenon as the oldest profession 
known to man. As early as around fourth century BC, Kautilya in his famous work on 
statesmanship, Arthasastra, analogised this human behaviour, in the following manner: 
‘Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that finds itself at the tip 
of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit 
of the king’s revenue. Just as fish moving underwater cannot possibly be found out 
either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the 
government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves)’ 
(Shamasastry, 1960:70) 
Though, corruption is archaic, yet academic interest in the subject is as new as the late 
20th century. It was not very long ago that scholars and researchers have started to point 
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out the need for a meaningful and serious research on corruption. Gunnar Myrdal, one of 
the early scholars, who alluded to the need for scientific investigation of corruption, in his 
epic Asian Drama has asserted, ‘The true research task is, however, to establish the 
general nature and extent of corruption in a country, its incursion upon various levels and 
branches of political and economic life, and any trends that are discernible’ (Myrdal 
1968:942).  
This was the time, when the functionalist school of thought6 (Dor, 1974) was in 
ascendance in the field of corruption research; corruption was brushed aside as a 
transitory phase, which was inevitable and, in some cases, even necessary for the 
development of transitional societies of newly independent nation states. Any specific 
study of corruption in the developing world was scarcely given serious attention due to 
the culturally loaded nature of the subject. Myrdal once again contested the notion of 
futility associated, with the study of corruption in the developing world, as a serious field 
of research, by indicating that ‘the fact that in the United States corruption has for 
generations been intensively and fruitfully researched should counter the notion that 
nothing can be learnt about this phenomenon’ (Myrdal, 1968:942). Functionalist 
considered corruption, as a natural corollary of the transition from traditional to modern 
(Huntington, 1968) and deliberated, that like puberty, corruption is a phase, which occurs 
naturally in the maturity cycle of every nation.  
Nevertheless, towards the end of the 20th century, research on corruption, specially in the 
developing world, gained considerable momentum, which has now turned into an almost 
independent academic genre. A major reason for this shift was the end of the Cold War. 
Policymakers, academics, and the donors of the first world, mainly due to political 
necessity during the Cold War, had ignored the evils prevailing in various allied 
developing nations and states. However, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the 
Soviet empire, not only witnessed various newly independent states, with weak 
economies, fragile political structures, and higher vulnerability to corruption, but also 
ushered in a need to recognise corruption as a socio-economic malady for the developing 
world.   
                                                 
6  Functionalists being the proponent of utility of corruption for the developing countries proposed various 
economic, social, and political benefits of corruption. A comprehensive analysis of functionalist thinking is 
given in Chapter 2.  
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Various agencies like the World Bank, United Nations, USAID, and Britain’s 
Department of International Development, started to attach conditions, demanding 
transparency and reduction of corruption in the recipient country, with their financial 
assistance programmes (Williams and Doig, 2001). At the same time, with the 
appearance of various corruption scandals in the developing world like Italy, Germany, 
and England, it dawned on the policymakers as well as the academia that corruption, like 
a malignant tumour has a capacity of recurrence, and the best solution is to always be on 
guard. Economic neo-liberalism, which supported decrease in the role of government, 
and increase in deregulation and privatisation of government functions, has proved 
ineffective in controlling the surge of corruption, as privatisation itself proved 
instrumental, in spread of mega corruption in most of the cases. Policymakers have 
realised that instead of reducing government, the need is to reform the government (ibid). 
This research, being a part of this academic evolution, underscores the need for 
reformation of the public sector for controlling corruption, and endeavours to determine 
the chances of controlling widespread bureaucratic corruption, in the developing world, 
with the help of institutional restructuring. 
As narrated above, academic interest in corruption is not very old, yet this neglect was 
not always accompanied by a lackadaisical attitude towards the ills of the phenomenon. 
Dangers of corruption were noticed and reported by various classical thinkers. While 
talking about bribery in The Laws, Plato remarked that ‘the servants of the nation are to 
render their services without any taking of presents’, he further goes on to advise the 
public servants, ‘Do no service for a present’ (Klitgaard 1988:7). In, The Discourses, 
Machiavelli goes on to warn that ‘a corrupt city living under a prince, even though that 
prince with all his race is destroyed, can never bring itself back to freedom’ (Shumer 
1979:11). In late middle ages political thinkers and writers were denouncing corruption in 
strongest terms; ‘Dante placed bribers in the deepest parts of Hell, reflecting the medieval 
distaste for corrupt behaviour’ while writers like ‘Shakespeare gave corruption a 
prominent role in some of his plays’ (Tanzi 1998: 560). Speaking of its deleterious 
consequences for the state, Montesquieu in his magnum opus, The Spirit of Laws, 
asserted, ‘once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the 
growing evils, but by removing the corruption and restoring its lost principles; every 
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other correction is either useless or a new evil’ (Hussain 2002: 219). Apparently an old 
apprehension, yet it holds true even today. 
 
Context of the Study 
Notwithstanding the fact that corruption is a universal phenomenon, that it was and is 
present - though in varying degrees - in all the cultures and societies of the world,7 its 
ubiquitous nature in the under developed or developing societies of the present day world 
cannot be denied.8 Ghosh, while mainly analysing the Indian corruption, has made the 
assertion that ‘Global comparisons reveal that while in developed countries corruption is 
a violation of the rules of the game, in most parts of the third world and the former 
second world it is the game itself’ (Ghosh 2002:23). Though, corruption is rampant in the 
developing world of Africa, South America, and Asia, yet as a region, South Asia could 
presumably be labelled, as the most corrupt region of the world. Speaking about the state 
of affairs in South Asia, Myrdal has maintained in the same study: ‘concerning first the 
general level of corruption, it is unquestionably much higher than in the western 
developed countries (even including the United States) or in the Communist countries… 
causes of corruption; they are clearly much stronger in South Asia than in the other 
groups of countries mentioned’ (Myrdal 1968:942).  
The following table, based on the last eight years rating of the region by Transparency 
International, can help in ascertaining the trend and level of corruption, in the regional 
context of South Asia. TI’s grading establishes the level of corruption in ascending order, 
signifying the least corrupt country at rank 1 and so on. It is more enlightening if the 
ranking of each country is viewed considering the total number of countries surveyed in a 
particular year.  
 
                                                 
7 Even in today’s world of literacy, democracy, rule of law, and social justice, no society or state is 
completely corruption free, even countries like Finland, Switzerland, and Denmark have reported one to 
two percent of cases, in which individuals were involved in corrupt transactions (Global Corruption 
Barometer 2007). 
8 This statement could be supported by the fact that in almost all the indices measuring corruption, 
developing or under developed states wholly occupy the complete lower part of the ratings. Most well 
known of such indices is CPI of Transparency International; and according to their latest report of 2008 
lowest half of total 180 positions is held by such states. 
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Table 1 Level of Corruption in South Asia 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Countries 
surveyed 
90 91 102 133 145 158 163 179 180 
Bangladesh - 91 102 133 145 158 156 162 147 
Pakistan - 79 77 92 129 144 142 138 134 
Nepal - - - - 90 117 121 131 121 
Maldives - - - - - - - 84 115 
Sri Lanka - - 52 66 67 78 84 94 92 
India 69 71 71 83 90 88 70 72 85 
Bhutan - - - - - - 32 46 45 
Source: Data complied from the Corruption Perception Index9 
 
Even a cursory glance through the above table, makes it clear that though generally quite 
high, the level of corruption varies considerably among the different countries of the 
region. The most interesting disparity is between Pakistan and India, which despite 
having the same historical, colonial, social, and cultural background acquire far apart 
positions on this index. One can also observe that this hiatus between the comparative 
positioning of India and Pakistan has grown considerably in last five years, indicating 
that impressions and perceptions regarding states can both ameliorate and deteriorate in a 
relatively short span of time. This also shows the much publicized anti corruption crusade 
of last military government in Pakistan has failed to alter, at least, the popular perception. 
It further indicates that perception of corruption in India has gone down with her rapid 
economic growth. However, establishing the direction of the causality is yet open to 
debate.  
Similar trends emerge, if we compare the level of governance in the region, calculated by 
the World Wide Governance Indicators, which assign the rank in descending order, 
means higher average score indicates a higher level of governance in the state: 
                                                 
9 Corruption Perception Index data used in this table can be viewed at the Transparency International’s 
website: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/ 
 
 9
 
 
 
Table 2 Level of Governance in South Asia 
Country Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Average 
Score 
Bangladesh 28.8 8.7 22.3 20.9 24.8 9.7 19.2 
Pakistan 18.8 1.0 28.4 28.6 19.5 21.3 19.6 
Nepal 22.6 2.9 21.8 26.7 31.0 30.4 22.6 
Maldives 22.1 48.1 49.8 52.9 54.8 23.7 41.9 
Sri Lanka 38.6 5.8 47.4 51.5 55.7 57.5 42.3 
India 58.1 17.8 57.3 46.1 56.2 47.3 47.2 
Bhutan 23.6 68.8 56.9 25.2 63.8 80.2 53.0 
Source: Data compiled from World Wide Governance Indicators10 
Comparing tables 1 and 2, brings forth a definite and unambiguous negative correlation, 
between the level of corruption and the level of governance in South Asia; suggesting 
that the higher level of corruption is associated with the lower level of governance in a 
state, and vice versa. 
 
Importance of the Study 
Theory, without empirical verification, has mere academic and no practical value; while 
analysis of applied problems sans any sound theory can lead to only case-specific results, 
which are hard to generalise. The primary significance of this study is, its ability to 
engage in the question of governance and corruption, from both theoretical as well as 
empirical perspectives, bringing forth a theoretical paradigm, which is corroborated by 
real world examples. Subject research makes important contributions on the all three vital 
aspects of social science research: the theoretical, the empirical, and the methodological 
front. 
Subject study underscores the significance of institutional culture, instead of societal 
culture per se, and undermines the so-called scholarly view of ‘cultural embeddedness of 
                                                 
10  Data available at the World Bank’s website: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 
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corruption’.11 This study proves, with an applied example that traditional cultures or 
transitional societies are not inherently corrupt; and a general atmosphere of corruption, 
prevailing in such societies or states, is a result of certain structural features or lacunas in 
the design of the institutions, existing in these societies. This research shows that when 
the institutional features of the developed world are properly applied on the institutions of 
the so-called developing world, they (developing world’s institutions) have the ability to 
transform into equally efficient and least corrupt institutions as their counter part in the 
developed western world. This leads us to the conclusion that the flawed institutional 
structures, and polluted institutional environment prevailing in the so-called non-western 
developing world, and not their culture, are responsible for prevalent high level of 
corruption and low level of governance in such states. The structures and environment 
existing in institutions of the developing world are likely to produce equally corrupt and 
inefficient outcomes regardless of their geographical placement.  
The most distinctive feature of this research is the employment of the real agents’ 
perceptions, for the purpose of analysing their behaviour. This research, for the first time, 
collects, analyses, and presents the views of real stakeholders, i.e., public servants, who 
work in the evidently most corrupt institutions and therefore, have been actively or at 
least passively exposed to corrupt transactions. These agents’ views have been collected, 
regarding the causes of their deviant behaviour; asking them, why agents indulge in 
corruption and corrupt practices and, under what circumstances agents are most likely to 
change their attitudes and stop exploiting the state and their clients? 
Another important feature of this research is its ability to either refute or substantiate a 
number of existing theories of corruption and governance. This study corroborates the 
findings of Mitra (2006) that actors decisions to follow the rules are determined by their 
perceptions of the reward and punishment, attached with the given choices, and not by 
their culture or context; and of Easterly (2001) who states: that Pakistan is an ideal 
example of growth without development. Simultaneously, this study questions some of 
the assumptions and findings of Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard (1988) that 
principal’s inability to monitor agents is because of the costly nature of the activity; and 
                                                 
11 Term was first used by:  Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry in to the Poverty of Nations. 
Vol. II. New York: Pantheon A Division of Random House 
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Tirole (1996) that collective bad reputations of the agents obstruct their way to 
improvement; and further more Van Rijckeghem and B. Weder (2001) that increasing the 
financial remuneration is not an effective way to reduce corruption. 
The hiatus, between the level of corruption and governance, amid different states, could 
be attributed to different socio-political and economic reasons, but the gap between the 
level of corruption in the different institution of one state is hard to define, and calls for 
further in-depth inquiry of the various multiple factors involved. A singular and unique 
feature of this study is that it identifies and explores the disparity between the levels of 
corruption among various institutions of a state, which is generally perceived to be 
among the most corrupt states of the world. This intra-systemic comparison of various 
institutions helps identifying the structural factors responsible for this disparity. 
Presuming each department/institution, investigated during the course of this research, as 
an independent country, and plotting the level of corruption in each institution 
(ascertained with the help of public servants’ perception in Chapter 5 & 6) against the 
level of corruption in the different states of the world (assessed by the CPI 2008 of 
Transparency International), brings forth some very interesting results. We noticed an 
extreme disparity in the level of corruption in different institutions of Pakistan. Perceived 
level of corruption in some institutions is even more than the level of corruption in 
Somalia (which is rated as most corrupt country by CPI 2008), but there also exists an 
institution, which is as ‘clean’ as the least corrupt country of the world (i.e., Denmark). 
Such inconsistency, within one culture, begs for detailed investigation and in depth 
analysis of the reasons. This study offers a detailed account of the various structural 
elements responsible for this disparity. 
 
Data and its Sources  
This research has employed qualitative and quantitative data, obtained from both primary 
as well as secondary sources. Secondary sources used during the course of this research, 
consist of a large number of books, journal articles, investigative reports of corruption 
watchdogs, reports from international agencies working against corruption, internet 
sources, and newspaper articles. Primary qualitative data was selected from various 
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reports, documents and proposals from: World Bank, National Accountability Bureau of 
Pakistan, National Anti-corruption Strategy of Pakistan, Central Board of Revenue of 
Pakistan, Planning Commission of Pakistan and interviews with higher government 
officials of Pakistan done by the author. 
Major sources of primary quantitative data was two different surveys conducted by the 
author during the three months long field work in which firstly 145 government officers 
belonging to 32 different governmental departments, ministries and divisions were 
surveyed/interviewed.12 In the second survey 105 officials/officers belonging to the 
Motorway Police of Pakistan were surveyed. Some, of the 250 filled questionnaires, were 
rejected due to various ambiguities and technical reasons like wrong entries or 
incomplete responses, and 237 survey results were used for the purpose of data analysis. 
This sample of primary quantitative data represents the federal civil bureaucracy or the 
non-elected public sector of Pakistan. 
Instruments of data collection were prepared with the objective of obtaining maximum 
but relevant information; due care was taken to make the instruments, technically sound, 
according to the standards of scientific research. These instruments were used to collect 
the views of actors or public servants, regarding the prevalence, causes, consequences, 
and control of corruption, with the help of both open and close ended questions.13 
However, the perceptions, regarding the consequences of corruption have been under 
utilised, being beyond the scope to this research. 
Despite the fact that anonymity of the respondents was ensured and despite the author 
himself belonging to the circle of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy, it was not always easy – 
and that is understandable, considering the nature of the issue under investigation – to 
persuade the bureaucrats to divulge their views and opinions about the prevalence of 
corruption in the civil bureaucracy of the country. For obtaining the views from the 
respondents of bureaucracy, determined persistence, enormous persuasion, and incessant 
reassurance had to be employed.  
 However, respondents from the Motorway Police displayed alacrity and a friendly 
cooperation in answering the questions. The difference, between the response and attitude 
                                                 
12 List of the departments surveyed could be seen at Appendix 3. 
13 Instruments of data collection employed for both set of respondents could be seen at Appendix I and II at 
the end of this dissertation.  
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of both sets of respondents was glaring; one could be described at best as sceptic, 
unwilling, and reluctant, while the other were positive, keen and prompt in extending 
their cooperation.  
 
Methodology 
This research employed both qualitative and quantitative, as well as discursive 
approaches to research, for studying the above-mentioned puzzle. Here, we will explain 
the methods employed during the course of this research, in keeping with the rules and 
conditions forwarded by King, Keohane and Verba (1994). According to which, primary 
methodological concern of any scientific research is the relevance of the research 
problem to both, the real world and the scholarly literature. The puzzle of governance and 
corruption is very much a real world problem, as it is a major concern of most of the 
developing societies. Its relevance to the real world is evident by a plethora of research 
done on the subject.14 Moreover the subject study contributes, significantly to the existing 
body of knowledge, as it introduces a neo institutional theory for controlling corruption, 
which focuses on the institutional culture instead of the individual; second, this study 
obtains and incorporates, for the first time, quantitative data, based on the perceptions of 
the stakeholders; and third, it focuses on the institutional comparison within the same 
settings, and identifies, in the words of Klitgaard (1988), the role of ‘successful 
performers’, in the fight against corruption. Concerning the testability of the research 
problem, this research employs a comparative analytical approach for studying the causes 
of corruption in one set of institutions and simultaneously, investigates the reasons for 
lack of corruption in another institution in the same setting, permitting valid descriptive 
and causal inferences for higher or lower level of corruption. 
The institutional theory and model for controlling corruption, developed during the 
course of this research are, concrete, falsifiable, internally consistent, conditionally 
independent, have the leverage to explain, are free from variable bias and do not include 
any irrelevant variables. Our theory states in concrete terms, the conditions under which, 
the probability of any public institution to go corrupt are minimal; moreover, the theory 
                                                 
14 Chapter 2 entails the overview of the research done on corruption and its different causes. For further 
detailed reviews one can refer to Bardhan (1997); Jain (2001); and Lambsdorff (2005).  
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would prove incorrect or false, if the Motorway police gets as corrupt as other public 
institutions in Pakistan, or if other public institutions, without any institutional 
restructuring, miraculously turned as corruption free as Motorway police. This theory is 
internally consistent, as it avoids the problem of endogeneity; the value our explanatory 
variables (financial remunerations, level of accountability, professional training, peer 
pressure, and role of leadership) take, is a cause and not a consequence of our dependent 
variable, i.e., the level of corruption. Furthermore, this theory strives for ‘explaining as 
much as possible with as little as possible’ (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:29) by 
concentrating on the few above listed explanatory variables, and analyses in detail their 
impact on the level of corruption in any institution.  
This research has also taken care of the fact that no significant variable, which has any 
strong influence on the dependent variable, should be omitted and on the other hand, no 
irrelevant variable should be included in the final analysis. Variables like age, education, 
gender, hierarchical rank, number of dependents, geographical background, were 
carefully studied to assess their relationship with the dependent variable. 
The next stage in any scientific research is defining the population or the universe of the 
cases; the data obtained from this population is then used for testing the theory. The 
collected data meets the criterion of unit homogeneity, and the conditional independence; 
which identifies that ‘all units with same value of the explanatory variables have the same 
expected value of the dependent variable’ (ibid: 116), and moreover the values of 
explanatory variables, are not determined by the dependent variables. Secondly, data 
collected from both the sources i.e., bureaucracy and Motorway Police is perfectly 
comparable as both belong to same socio-political milieu and both are a part of the 
country’s larger public sector. 
Another related problem with the universe of data is the sufficiency of the cases and 
observations, used for data analysis. This research used 237 surveys conducted with the 
general bureaucracy and the Motorway Police. Sometimes respondents were asked to 
enlist their three best choices/options, subsequently under certain categories, number of N 
reaches to around 700. Considering the size of the population under investigation, and to 
avoid intentional selection bias, we employed a random selection method, in which 
officers of all ranks (from Basic Pay Scale 17 to 22) from 32 different departments, 
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ministries, and divisions of the government of Pakistan were surveyed/interviewed.15 The 
author conducted these surveys/interviews from March to June 2007 in Islamabad, 
Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Muzaffarabad and Faisalabad with the 
help of electronic mail, conventional post and personal visits. 
In order to ensure maximum variations in the explanatory variables, the data was 
collected from both male and female sections of the population; 10 per cent females in 
case of bureaucracy, which sufficiently represents the total percentage of females in the 
civil bureaucracy of Pakistan. Furthermore, the data also represents all the four provinces 
of Pakistan, in a way, which is considerably similar to their original share in the total 
population of the country and the bureaucracy. Similarly, in case of Motorway Police, 
officials/officers serving in all the four sectors of the force, covering the whole 
jurisdictional area of Motorway Police, were interviewed/surveyed. Selecting, on both the 
independent and dependent variables, due care was taken that no such variables should be 
chosen, which are either known to vary together in ways consistent with the hypotheses 
of the study or are constant in a fashion that no variation in dependent variable could be 
attributed to any explanatory variable. 
While collecting data the three aspects of validity, reliability, and replicability were kept 
in mind. A careful and deliberate designing of instruments of data collection ensured 
validity of the collected data. Data was collected to measure the perceptions of public 
servants, regarding prevalence, causes and control of corruption in the bureaucracy of the 
country; and the collected data provided the exact information, which was intended to be 
measured. Adherence to the principals of scientific data collection ensures the reliability 
of the data and guarantees that applying the same procedures will produce the same result 
any time in future, if the situation remains the same in Pakistan. Similarly, if someone is 
willing to replicate the above-mentioned procedures, the same data can be acquired 
producing the similar results. 
In order to avoid stand-alone data, identical instruments of data collection were used in 
case of both bureaucracy and Motorway Police, however, a separate section, consisting of 
ten questions, particularly related to the institutional culture and functioning of MP was 
incorporated in the questionnaires of MP. After successful completion of data collection, 
                                                 
15  List of surveyed departments is placed at Appendix 3 at the end of this dissertation. 
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every filled questionnaire was meticulously analysed to remove ambiguous, incomplete 
or wrongly filled questionnaires. Subsequently, all the data was converted into a soft file 
by transferring it to the Microsoft Excel and later into Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS), for the purpose of data analysis.  
The gathered information was divided into three broad categories: prevalence, causes and 
control of corruption. Causes of corruption were primarily analysed, according to the 
perceptions of respondents belonging to the bureaucracy, wherever required, views of the 
respondents from MP were also analysed and incorporated. While analysing the 
mechanisms for control of corruption a conscious effort was made to concentrate on the 
explanatory variables, which appeared to be of primary importance as causes of 
bureaucratic corruption, for example, economic deprivation, lower accountability, weak 
leadership and peer pressure. The measures for controlling corruption were assessed, as 
per the prevailing structural novelties of the Motorway Police, and the perceptions of 
their respondents, regarding the causes of low level of corruption and higher level of 
efficiency in the institution. In order to avoid complex and obscure statistical 
interpretations, basic and simple statistical concepts, which can be understood by the 
majority of the readers, like means, averages, correlations, and frequencies were 
employed for the purpose of data analysis. To enhance the understanding of the causal 
inferences drawn during the course of this research, achieved results have also been 
offered, in an easy to understand graphical presentations.  
Maximum effort was made to avoid case selection bias; however, like every social 
science research it is impossible to claim the success in doing so with 100 per cent 
certainty. Despite all the efforts there still exists the possibility of a selection bias in 
favour of the Motorway Police being the model efficient institution under investigation. 
Secondly, since all the measurement is imprecise based on the perceptions of the 
respondents so evaluation of the achieved results with five per cent measurement error 
and uncertainty would not be wrong.  
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Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into three basic sections. The first section builds the 
theoretical foundation of the research and locates its position in the current body of 
scientific knowledge. The second section develops the concept of corruption and 
governance and evaluates the genesis and evolution of both in case of Pakistan; the last 
section deals with the quantitative part of the research and entirely focuses on the analysis 
of the data collected during the fieldwork. 
Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical aspects of the study, and discusses in detail, the core 
question, allied investigative lines, and hypotheses of the study. The Chapter further 
discusses the rational choice neo-institutional approach to governance and corruption and 
on these bases, develops a neo institutional theory and model for controlling corruption. 
The model explained at the end of Chapter 1, is based on the concept of structured and 
unstructured institutions, with the help of Weberian characterisation of bureaucracy. 
Chapter 2 analyses the existing body of knowledge on the issue of corruption. It 
examines, in detail, the two divergent approaches to the study of corruption, which have 
dominated the field for last 50 years, i.e., functionalist and moralist school of thoughts. 
Apart from analytical dissection of these schools, the empirical body of knowledge with a 
special focus on the causes of corruption is also analysed.  
Chapter 3 deals with the conceptual evolution of the term corruption, along with a 
succinct account of the definitional debate, going on since decades. The chapter also 
delineates the basic characteristics, which render any transaction corrupt, and separate it 
from various other form of malfunctioning. The chapter further describes various modes, 
categories, models and measuring techniques of corruption.  
Chapter 4 revolves around the evolution of corruption in South Asia, in general and 
Pakistan, in particular. Tracing its origin in the region, back to the times before Christ, 
the chapter chronologically delineates the history of this phenomenon to the present day. 
The nexus between civil-military bureaucracy and the landed aristocracy in the 
development of this occurrence in case of Pakistani society and the bureaucracy is given 
special attention. 
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Chapter 5 deals with the quantitative part of the study and analyses the public servant’s 
perception, regarding the prevalence of corruption in the country and bureaucracy. This 
chapter further assesses the significances of reported causes according to the priority 
given to the each cause by the agents. The chapter provides the empirical validation of 
the theoretical model, developed in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 6 discusses the issue of controlling corruption and investigates, in detail the 
institutional structure of the Motorway Police. The chapter also analyses the causes of 
low corruption and higher efficiency in MP, with special emphasis on its structural 
features, embedded in the institutional cultural of the Motorway police. This analysis 
further substantiates the canons of institutional theory for controlling corruption, with the 
help of empirical evidence, collected from the data based on the perceptions of actors, 
belonging to the Motorway Police.  
A detailed conclusion encompasses the whole debate, about, either the culture of the 
institution or the culture of society being primarily responsible of widespread corruption 
in public sectors of the developing world and transitional societies. The contribution of 
this research to the existing body of knowledge has also been recorded in the conclusion, 
along with the practical recommendations for policymakers, interested in devising 
policies for controlling corruption. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This chapter builds the theoretical foundations of this research and focuses on the rational 
choice neo-institutional model to analyse the relationship between governance and 
corruption with a special emphasis on the transitional societies of the developing world. 
Without compromising the generalisability, the theory focuses on the interplay of 
traditional societies and modern states of the developing world. This chapter asserts that 
cultures of less developed or transitional societies are not corrupt inherently; it is rather 
their susceptibility to insecurity, triggered by multiple socio-psychological reasons, 
which predominantly determines the choices of individuals. Their decision ‘is not in any 
way determined by culture or context but necessarily involves their perception of 
potential rewards, risk and the comparison of likely outcomes, leading to choice’ (Mitra 
2006:2) 
The chapter discusses and analyses in detail the core question along with the investigative 
lines on which this research has been conducted. Building on the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy, the chapter also delineates the vital features of a structured institution. 
Besides theoretically conceptualising the terms corruption and governance, the chapter 
also develops two fundamental categories of corruption and further proposes an 
institutional theory of corruption building on the Agency theory and the rational choice 
new institutional approach of governance. The prime objective of the chapter is to 
formulate a model, based on the above-mentioned rational choice neo-institutional 
approach of governance, and in the process delineating the decision-making process of 
the actor or agent apropos of the alternative options available to him, which ultimately 
lead to individualistic or personal and collective or impersonal choices resulting in 
corruption and higher level of governance respectively. 
Though being essentially contested concepts, both governance and corruption are 
interdependent on each other16. Increase in one is inversely proportional to decrease in 
                                                 
16 Walter Bryce Gallie first introduced the term ‘essentially contested concept’ in his article: W. B. Gallie. 
1955. ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVI: 167-198. An 
essentially contested concept is the one where there is a general agreement on the abstract core notion but 
an equal disagreement about the realisation of that notion. In the words of Gallie, they are ‘concepts the 
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the other. The higher the level of governance, the lower would be the level of corruption 
and vice versa. 
Within the realm of political science, the state is conceived as the guardian of collective 
interest, which it achieves through governance or, in the words of Mitra (2006), ‘orderly 
rule’, to avoid the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ which would inevitably lead to ‘war of all 
against all’17. The significance of controlling corruption for achievement and 
maintenance of governance in a state is vital. A higher level of corruption renders the 
state physically crippled, morally weak, and mentally imbecile, consequently challenging 
the very legitimacy of its existence as the guardian of collective interest. The better these 
collective interests are pursued and achieved, the higher is the level of governance in the 
state. State is the custodian of life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness of its 
subjects18. Corruption in a society hampers the pursuit of these major objectives of the 
state through misdirecting the resources, breeding inefficiency and unfairness, 
destabilising the property rights, instilling inequity of wealth, and usurping the 
opportunities available to the already marginalised sections of society. Eventually in its 
utmost manifestations, high level of corruption, swamping out a variety of equitable 
institutions, could even threatens the legitimacy of the state. 
 
1.1 The Puzzle 
The central puzzle this research intends to disentangle is: whether the governance 
mechanism of the state or the internal forces of transitional societies are responsible for 
widespread bureaucratic corruption – which is the dependent variable in this study - in 
                                                                                                                                                 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ 
(1955: 169). For a detailed debate about the essentially contested concepts see: Maclntyre, Alasdair. 1973. 
‘The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts’, Ethics. Vol.84. No.1: 1-9; Macdonald, K.I. 1976. 
‘Is ‘Power’ Essentially Contested’, British Journal of Political Science. Vol.6, No.3: 380-382; Clarke 
Barry. 1979. ‘Eccentrically Contested Concepts’, British Journal of Political Science. Vol.9, No.1: 122-
126; Grafstein Robert. 1988. ‘ A Realist Foundation for Essentially Contested Political Concepts’, The 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol.41, No.1: 9-28. 
17 ‘War of all against all’ is the literal translation of the Latin term ‘Bellum omnium contra omnes’, which 
Thomas Hobbes used in the preface of his book De Cive (1642). This term was used by him for describing 
the ‘state of nature’, which he deliberated more in detail in his book Leviathan (1651). 
18 ‘Life, liberty and pursuit of happiness’ is considered as the ‘inalienable rights’ of human beings by 
Thomas Jefferson, the author of United States Declaration of Independence, however, phrase was based on 
the writings of John Locke who considered ‘life, liberty and property’ as the basic rights of every man. 
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the developing world; and why, despite being placed in the same socio-political milieu, 
governance prevails in some institutions better than in others? 
Post-World War II era witnessed a large number of successful independent movements 
resulting in the birth of new nation-states, many of which are still going through a 
transition from a traditional society to a modern state. With the passage of time, such 
states (mostly known as underdeveloped, less developed, developing and South) and 
societies have become a major focus of socio-political and economic research mainly 
because the juxtaposition of traditional society and modern state has given birth to 
multiple concepts, problems, and conundrums hitherto unfamiliar to the academia as well 
as the policymakers. Few of the many such novel concerns include: acceptance and 
universal application of laws, vision and implementation of developmental policies, 
dynamics of social change, rationale of coalitions and party politics, and the dilemmas of 
effective governance. 
The academic world, international agencies, and national or trans-national organisations 
unanimously agree on the prevalence of corruption and lack of governance being major 
problems of transitional societies or developing countries.19 Transitional societies 
belonging to diverse geographical locations of the world, like South America, Africa, and 
South Asia, are equally suffering from this malice. Initially, it was believed that 
corruption is a stage en route to modernisation, which will pass with the subsequent 
modernising of such societies (Bayley 1966; Dwivedi 1967; Huntington 1968). It was 
thought as a stage of maturation cycle of the nations; in the words of Robert Williams 
(2000a: ix), corruption ‘like adolescence, is a phase which countries go through before 
they reach maturity’. 
Later, in the backdrop of the Cold War, corruption was considered as ballast for the 
vulnerable ship of the developing countries, which keeps them from sinking into the path 
of revolution, and ultimately, though not explicitly mentioned, communism (Needler 
1961; Bayley 1966). Another approach suggested corruption as a catalyst for political 
development of the transitional societies by contributing to the economic progress, 
                                                 
19 There is a plethora of research, from the academic world as well as the international organisations like 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Fund, and trans-national organisations 
like Transparency International, which holds rampant corruption as a major contributor of the woes of the 
developing world. For details refer to Chapter 2. 
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national integration and the governmental capacity of such states (Nye 1967). Finally, 
corruption was promised as grease for the rusty wheel of the developing countries’ 
economy; and a tool to remove the bureaucratic ‘red tape’, so widely prevalent in the 
bureaucracies of the less developed world (Leff 1964; Leys 1965; Bayley 1966; 
Huntington 1968). 
The test of time has proved the above-mentioned assumptions to be rather naïve and 
simplistic interpretations of transitional societies’ very nature and character, as after a 
lapse of more than fifty years of independent life, corruption is still rampant and 
pervasive, and governance is low in most of such societies and states. Numerous scholars 
have forwarded multiple cures for this malfeasance of transitional societies, like: time 
and economic progress (Wraith 1963), cultivation and acceptance of western standards of 
public service (Braibanti 1962), and inculcation of the ideals of national interest and 
elimination of economic inequalities (Leys 1965). Yet, the disturbing fact remains the 
same that corruption in transitional societies is still on rise, with very rare exceptions20. 
Presently it appears that either the adolescence of such states is unexpectedly long or it is 
no adolescence at all. Resilience of corruption is sometimes attributed to its cultural 
embeddedness in the traditional norms, like gift giving, familial responsibility and tribal 
or class affinity of the transitional societies. Klitgaard (1988), while discussing the 
evolution of cultural embeddedness of corruption remarked that European’s typical 
reaction, to newly discovered societies of Asia, America and Africa, was to indicate 
excessive corruption and lawlessness of these societies. Commenting on the more current 
scholarship he asserts that, ‘but even in more recent time writers have argued that non-
western cultures or peoples are more prone to the venal pursuit of private gain, even at 
the expense of public duty, despite what seem to be strict, traditional codes of behaviour 
(1988: 23). 
While delineating a structural model of corruption, Waseem (2002: 140) goes on to 
remark that ‘the fact that such behaviour is rampant in the Third World has sometimes 
led to an anthropological approach couched in cultural relativism which sees corruption 
                                                 
20 One of the rare examples of successfully fighting against corruption is the case of Hong Kong, which has 
remarkably controlled this menace in 1970s and is still pursuing the right track. Evidence of this success is 
the Hong Kong’s persistent place, since last many years, among the top twenty cleanest countries of the 
world in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 
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as a cultural attribute of these societies’. This cultural relativism is significantly 
prominent in various theories of corruption like the one forwarded by McMullan: 
In considering the relationship between corruption and traditional society… 
observers often isolate the customary exchange of gifts as the element in 
traditional life which has led to growth of corruption in modern times…it is, in 
my opinion, wrong to isolate one feature of traditional life in this way. There were 
and are many features of the traditional way of life which, in the context of 
colonial and post-colonial society contribute to corruption.  
(McMullan 1961:186) 
Subject research challenges this conception of cultural embeddedness of corruption and 
tries to prove both qualitatively and quantitatively that culture is not a determinant in the 
scale and level of corruption and decay of governance in transitional societies. 
The research asserts that cultures of less developed or transitional societies are not 
intrinsically corrupt; rather the weaknesses entrenched in the institutions of these states, 
coupled with multiple socio-psychological reasons, make them feeble and vulnerable to 
insecurity, and are consequently rendering the individualistic choices dearer than the 
collective ones. 
Therefore, it is important to have a closer look at the causal chain of corruption, which 
does not begin with a corruption-susceptible society that breaks down an otherwise 
theoretically functioning state. Rather it is the neglect of the affairs of state, triggered, 
inter alia, by the lack of means needed for the enforcement of law, which introduces an 
institutional culture conducive for corrupt practice. The review over this study’s sample 
country in Chapter 4, will illustrate this point in detail in the context of developing states. 
This research endeavours to explore the reasons for lack of effective governance and 
widespread corruption in transitional societies or developing states by focusing on 
Pakistan. Featuring a conventional traditional society and a modern state based on West 
Minister style of governance, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan offers an ideal exemplar of 
a society in the process of transition. 
Though bureaucratic and political corruption is intertwined and difficult to disentangle, 
this study focuses primarily on bureaucratic corruption. Investigating the causes of low 
governance and high corruption in Pakistan, along with the analytical quest of effective 
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policy framework for controlling the bureaucratic corruption, constitutes the bulk of this 
doctoral research. This research further investigates whether there is any bright corner 
available in an otherwise dark, thick and ‘black forest’ of inefficiency, maladministration, 
patronage, and venality; and if yes, what are the factors responsible for such aberration; 
and what are the chances for emulation of any such example on macro level? 
Amidst the fire of corruption blazing in the corridors of power, both political and 
bureaucratic, it is astonishing to find any institution which is widely known for honesty 
instead of corruption, efficiency instead of ineffectiveness, competence instead of 
ineptitude, and public service instead of ruthlessly ruling the public. One such anomalous 
institution, the National Highway & Motorway Police of Pakistan, was identified in the 
entire bureaucratic set up of Pakistan, and has been thoroughly investigated during the 
course of this research to ascertain both the cultural and contextual elements vital in the 
shaping of this institution. While the general police is consistently known for being the 
most corrupt institution not only in Pakistan but also in most of South Asia21 
(Transparency International 2002), the Motorway Police, despite being a policing 
institution, is a unique example of an efficient, merit based and impersonal bureaucratic 
institution. Why this is the case, is the central puzzle, this research tries to solve. This 
study employs comparison of these divergent examples, which is excessively useful from 
the point of scientific research as two sides of the study maximise the variance in 
dependent variable, i.e. perceived level of corruption. 
 
1.2 Why Pakistan? 
The reasons to choose Pakistan as an exemplar of transitional societies and developing 
countries were multiple. Pakistan as a post-colonial independent state contains most of 
                                                 
21 Refer to the survey of five South Asian countries conducted in 2001-2 by Transparency International in 
which police was unanimously rated as the most corrupt institution in all the five surveyed countries. This 
survey revealed that 100 percent of the respondents who came in contact with Police in Pakistan had to pay 
a bribe. This trend is neither national, or regional rather it’s, to a greater extent, a global trend. According to 
TI’s Global Corruption Barometer 2007, police is generally perceived as among the most corrupt institute 
in the 60 surveyed countries; one of every four citizens of the world who came in contact with the police 
were asked to pay a bribe. In Pakistan, according to the same report, general public considered police to be 
the most corrupt institution with a score of 4.3 on a scale of 1-5 (where 1 is completely clean, and 5 is 
extremely corrupt).  
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the traits, which are the hallmark of such transitional societies.22 Pakistan has a strong 
traditional society juxtaposed with a modern state. It has suffered equally under the 
autocratic as well as democratic rulers. A strong coalition of civil-military bureaucracies 
along with influential landed aristocracy forms the political establishment. The 
Bureaucracy is the second most organised and influential institution after the military and 
plays a vital part in the running of the state affairs since the very inception of the state. 
Gross and ever increasing income disparity, low literacy level, rising birth rates, and poor 
health and sanitation facilities are the permanent features of Pakistan’s society. A 
considerable part of the more than 164 Million23 citizens is living at the border of or 
below the poverty line (estimations according to the figures of 2005-6 is 24 per cent; 
while the Human Poverty Index value for Pakistan is 36.2, and is ranked 77th in 108 
developing countries, reported by the UNDP)24. The Nation acutely suffers from ethnic, 
regional, linguistic, sectarian and religious divisions. Compared to other South Asian 
countries Pakistan has a strong state apparatus, but an aid dependent and corrupt 
government. Affluent business and the political elite class are not providing the trickle 
down effect needed to strengthen society as a whole. In the words of a prominent scholar 
on Pakistan affairs ‘corruption is understood to be running at a very high level, involving 
billions of rupees, scores of politicians and bureaucrats from top to bottom as well as 
various sectors of social life, ranging from politics, administration, judiciary, economy, 
education health and sports’ (Waseem, 2002:139). 
According to the Transparency International’s latest Global Corruption Barometer 2007, 
Pakistan falls in the top quintile of the countries most affected by bribery, where more 
                                                 
22 Various authors and disciplines define the scope of the term ‘postcolonial’ differently. Some authors 
include former settler as well as non-settler colonies in the term. While others specifically used the term for 
the former colonies and try to distinguish between the post colonial and post imperial. Some people suggest 
that Pakistan cannot be a postcolonial state, as Pakistan was born after the end of British rule in India. But 
the term does not only refer to the period after colonialism, rather it alludes to the continuity and impact of 
the processes and policies, initiated during the colonial rule, on the socio-political lives of the newly 
independent states. The term postcolonial is used here to refer to the study of the attempted transformation, 
successful and otherwise, of former colonies in the context of changing imperial conditions. 
 
23 Population of the country, according to the government of Pakistan sources 
(www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/index.html), is around 164 Million in October 2008; while international 
sources (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html#People ) quoted this 
figure to be more than 172 million is July 2008. 
24 Figure taken from Human Development Report of 2007-8, available at: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html 
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then 32 per cent of the respondents had to pay bribe in last year. In this quintile Pakistan 
is placed with Cameroon, Cambodia, and Nigeria in terms of bribe paying frequency, and 
is second only to Cambodia in the list of countries belonging to Asia Pacific region. In 
Pakistan, 44 per cent of the total sample had to pay bribe during 2006 for obtaining any 
of the eleven public services surveyed, while the regional average was 22 per cent and the 
figure for India was 25 per cent. Repeated failure of different governments in their so 
called anti-corruption drives has inculcated a rather pessimistic approach among the 
populace: almost 90 per cent of the respondents believed that in the coming three years 
level of corruption would either remain the same or will increase. Regarding the 
effectiveness of the governmental anti corruption efforts, 52 per cent of the respondents 
considered them ineffective, while only 22 per cent were satisfied with the level of those 
efforts25 (Transparency International 2007). One of the respondents of our survey quoted 
the following incident indicating the level of efficiency of the government agencies in 
fighting corruption in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, in the face of such a high level of corruption and lack of governance the 
Pakistani state has shown a resilient character after the separation of the eastern wing in 
1971. After the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, there were widespread speculations that 
the remaining Pakistan, with an apparently dysfunctional state apparatus, will disintegrate 
                                                 
25 GCB 2007 complete report can be viewed at the Transparency International’s website: 
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2007 
I was personally involved in investigating the corrupt practices of an 
officer who issued more than 300 refund vouchers worth 30 million 
rupees in 3 days after his transfer from the post. The officer took 30-
35 per cent of the amount and rest went to the pockets of tax lawyers, 
bankers and few others. The matter was conveyed to Federal 
Investigation Agency (FIA), who recovered some of the amount (2.0 
million rupees) from various bank accounts and much went to the 
pocket of investigating inspector of FIA. Later the officer upon the 
report of investigation wing of Central Board of Revenue (CBR) was 
removed from service. 
 
A young, mid-level male officer of Income tax service recorded his personal 
experience in above incident while filling the questionnaire in Karachi during the 
survey of civil bureaucracy in May 2007. 
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into various smaller states. Despite all the shortcomings, the very existence of the state of 
Pakistan is a remarkable achievement. Rather a paradoxical fact is that from 1950-99 
Pakistan’s per capita growth was a decent 2.2 per cent per year and it has tripled its per 
capita income in this period which was higher than a third of the world countries in 1999 
(Easterly 2001). Pakistan was never lagging behind much in growth but ‘development’ 
was and still is dearly missing. In the developmental economics circles, Pakistan is 
considered an ideal example of “growth without development”,26 and one of the main 
reasons for this imbroglio is persistent, entrenched and systemic corruption.  
The above-mentioned factors, coupled with lack of any systematic study of Pakistan from 
the perspective of governance and corruption, make Pakistan a case worth investigating. 
It is not only important to investigate the causes of public sector corruption in Pakistan 
but even more important is to suggest means to control or at least minimise this menace. 
Recommendations, based on the views of the real stakeholders, are imperative for 
bridging the gap between the exogenous policies and endogenous ground realities. It is 
equally important to achieve such results – employing rigorous qualitative and 
quantitative investigative techniques – which will be equally applicable to most of the 
developing world and transitional societies as corruption is a common thread, which runs 
through whole of the developing world. 
 
1.3 The Core Question 
The above-explained predicament regarding the pervasive and resilient nature of 
corruption in the transitional societies, leads the research to the following core question: 
Given the widespread corruption in the developing world, is it possible to control 
corruption and ensure order in a state through institutional restructuring? 
The very nature of the questions demands rigorous scientific inquiry and detailed 
investigation, which was conducted with the help of following complementary questions: 
If generally expressed assertions regarding the prevalence of wide spread corruption in 
the transitional societies and the developing states are true, then: 
                                                 
26 This is the title of Easterly’s (2001) study of Pakistan. 
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- Can one believe that this is a result of traditional culture of the transitional societies or 
are the institutional structures of such states more responsible for this unenviable state of 
affairs? 
- To what extent an actor’s decision to participate in a corrupt transaction is influenced, 
by his perception of available risk and rewards? 
- How important is monetary remuneration and reward, and how significant is the 
perception of risks in determining the scale of corruption in any institution. 
- Why are some institutions less corrupt than others, despite being placed in the same 
socio-political milieu of a developing state and transitional society? 
- How much the ‘collective bad reputation’ of agents, determines their future decisions 
regarding being corrupt or otherwise in their dealings? 
- Do factors like image, social anticipation, pride in the institution etc. also contribute in 
the integrity index of the institutions? 
- If these factors are important, how could the state incorporate or induce such intangible 
elements in different institutions? 
The research analyses and examines each question thoroughly with the help of both, 
qualitative as well as quantitative data, collected, compiled and analysed during the 
course of this study. Singular answers achieved for each question are then compounded 
together, by placing the pieces together in the model developed later in the chapter, 
enabling us to answer the above raised questions with a certain degree of confidence, 
clarity, and precision. 
 
1.3.1 Ideal Bureaucratic Model 
The nature of the core question necessitates an unequivocal understanding of the nature 
and characteristics of the bureaucracy as an institution. Further, to understand the concept 
of structured or unstructured institutions or to fully comprehend the idea of institutional 
restructuring it is imperative to elaborate a set of conditions against which structured-ness 
or unstructured-ness of these institutions could be measured. Since this research basically 
deals with the issue of governance and bureaucratic corruption, we will employ the 
criteria forwarded by the Max Weber (1864-1920), regarding the true characteristic of a 
bureaucracy and the essential position and workings of the bureaucratic officials, as a 
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standard against which performance of any bureaucratic institution or an official could be 
measured. 
Bureaucracy, according to Max Weber, is, compared to its precedents like charismatic 
and traditional dominations, a more rational and efficient organisation (Weber 1991). The 
following discussion about the true nature and characteristics of the bureaucracy and its 
officials is largely inspired from the Weber’s characterisation of the bureaucracy and its 
officials in his essay ‘On Bureaucracy’ translated in English by H. Gerth and C. Mills and 
first published in 1948. 
Weber had delineated following six clear characteristics of the bureaucracy: 
Bureaucratic authority constitutes mainly of fixed jurisdictional areas in which regular 
activities are distributed as fixed official duties; authority is delegated in a stable way 
with special limitation imposed to avoid the indiscriminate use of the authority. To ensure 
continuous fulfilment of those duties only people with required qualifications are 
employed. 
There exists a system of vertical hierarchy and graded authority, where every lower 
official is supervised by the higher one; this offers a possibility of appealing against the 
decision of a lower official to the higher one. 
Bureaucratic business is conducted, on continuous basis, in shape of written documents, 
which are preserved and could be referred to at any later stage. 
Bureaucratic work is a specialised field; therefore, thorough expert training is usually a 
prerequisite for office management. 
Bureaucratic activity demands a full working capacity of the official, which means full 
time occupation, irrespective of the limited office hours of the bureaucratic officials. 
Bureaucracies are managed with the help of general rules, which are stable, exhaustive, 
and which could be learnt. 
The above characterisation of bureaucracy reveals certain essential elements of any 
bureaucracy, which include: fixed responsibilities and controlled authority, vertical 
hierarchy and continuous supervision ensuring redress of abuse, documentary processing 
of the official business, well-trained officialdom, full time employment, and conduct of 
business according to certain rules. Apart from this Weber has further emphasised on the 
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impersonal conduct of business by the bureaucracy to an extent that he calls it the 
dehumanised feature of bureaucracy (Weber 1991). 
 
1.3.2 Fundamentals of Structured Institutions 
Considering the underlined theme of this research – the structured institutions as a 
deterrent to corruption and a catalyst for better governance – we enlist here the vital 
features of a well-structured institution, which according to our understanding have not 
changed much since the time Weber had proposed his thesis of bureaucracy. In fact a 
well-structured institution is the one, which is designed more or less on the lines 
envisaged by Weber more than a century earlier. 
The first fundamental feature of a well-structured institution is that it offers reasonable 
pecuniary compensations, which are sufficient to meet the basic needs of the officials. 
Having different fringe benefits does not undermine the agent’s need and desire for 
sufficient financial means to meat his daily needs. On the role of financial remuneration 
in the life of a bureaucratic official Weber has commented that, ‘the relatively great 
security of the official’s income, as well as the rewards of social esteem, make the office 
a sought-after position’ (Weber 1991: 203). 
The second important feature of a structured institution is training. Not only a kind of 
training, which makes the official fully adroit in the discharge of his official duties, but 
also inculcates a sense of responsibility, professionalism, positive identity and pride in 
the officials. According to Weber, bureaucratic office holding is a vocation, which 
requires successful completion of a specialised examination and a prescribed course of 
training as basic prerequisites for selection. This office holding according to him is ‘not 
considered a source to be exploited for rents or emoluments’ (Ibid: 199). Trainings 
designed to teach the officials that the public office, its allied assets and property is a 
sacred trust, which should remain separate from their private dealing or, as Weber 
describes, that ‘public monies and equipment are divorced from the sphere of private life’ 
(Ibid: 197). 
Linked with the second feature of training is the third element of positive self-image, 
which is as important as the positive actions. Humans have an inherent desire to feel good 
about themselves. According to the self-esteem maintenance theory of social psychology, 
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‘humans have a need to see themselves as generally intelligent, sensible, and decent folks 
who behave with integrity’ (Aronson 1994: 143). They desire social recognition of their 
good deeds and tend to secure the positive social image created by them. According to 
Weber, an ‘official always strives and usually enjoys a distinct social esteem as compared 
with the governed’ (Weber 1991: 199). A structured institution not only creates that 
positive self-image of its officials, of course based on their performance, but also 
recognises and enhances that image. Social anticipation plays a major role in the 
decision-making process of the bureaucratic officials, and they are anxious to rectify their 
image as soon as an opportunity is offered. 
Yet another feature of structured institutions is the role of leadership. The officers at the 
helm of affairs should be thoroughly professional, impersonal, and characters known for 
higher integrity. Only an honest and dedicated leadership can demand and inspire the 
similar qualities from the subordinated official force. It is almost impossible to have an 
efficient, professional and honest institution without having the morally and 
professionally correct kind of leadership in place. 
The last and most important feature of a structured institution is impersonal, unbiased and 
across board accountability of its officials. Social status along with the permanent nature 
of the bureaucratic positions, or tenure for life in the words of Weber, increases the 
susceptibility of the officials to abuse of power and corruption. Commenting on the 
permanence of bureaucratic positions Weber remarked that, ‘where legal guarantees 
against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are developed, they merely serve to guarantee a 
strict objective discharge of specific office duties free from all personal consideration’ 
(Ibid: 202). Structured institutions tend to follow the above quoted classical approach in 
the matters of permanence of officialdom and make it conditional on the efficient and 
objective discharge of duties beyond any personal consideration or motives. Security of 
official income and position are the two major distinctions of public bureaucracy. But to 
ensure smooth and efficient operations of the institution, both of these have to come 
under some kind of threat to discourage personal consideration in the discharge of official 
duties. All the above-discussed features of structured institution lose their significance 
and viability in the absence of this last feature of strict and universal accountability of all 
the constituents of the institution. 
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1.4 Hypotheses 
Considering the very clandestine nature of the phenomenon, and the allied quest for 
stealth by the parties involved in the transaction, assessing the true level of corruption in 
any society or the state is a rather troublesome and challenging task. Academicians as 
well as practitioners of government, public administration, public policy and political 
science use the perception of corruption as the reasonably true assessment of the 
prevalence of corruption. However, this perception is generally collected from the 
perspective of the client or the general public. Never, to the best of my knowledge, level 
of corruption has been determined basing on the agent’s perception of corruption. 
The major tools of policy studies are indeed depending on the reliability of accessible – 
mostly official – documentaries and on the count ability of phenomena and cases. 
However, this study aims not merely at assessing the prevalence of corruption in a certain 
field, rather, embarks from such an assessment onto disclosing its socio-political genesis. 
As much as a medical diagnosis of an affected organ is scientifically not merited without 
a biopsy of the tissue, the human factor of our subject cannot be understood without 
collecting data from where corruption has its seeds. Due to the presumption that 
representatives of agencies, which are generally considered as the perpetrator in the case 
of corruption, are unlikely to disclose its prevalence, this internal perspective has until 
now been ignored. This research assumes that, if asked, Agents are willing to give their 
true perception regarding the prevalence of corruption. (H1) 
It is a general impression that youth being more vibrant and rebellious in nature will have 
a more categorical and critical view of themselves and of the system of which they are a 
part. Logically it could be inferred, that with age and experience would follow a change 
in one’s perception and view about an issue like corruption. But the direction of change is 
hard to determine. However, this research asserts that, length of experience of public 
servants has a negative correlation to their perception of corruption in the state and 
bureaucracy. (H2) 
Ways and means for controlling corruption is a huge debate in the corruption and 
governance studies. The concept of cultural embeddedness of corruption is still in vogue 
in some academic circles. However, as already explained this research asserts that culture 
and context is not a determining factor in the decision-making process of the agent. 
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Instead of the culture of society, the institutional culture is more significant when it 
comes to control of corruption. Subsequently, this research maintains that given the right 
institutional frame, the probability of reducing the corruption is very high. (H3) 
Despite corruption being an intrinsically economic transaction, there is dearth of research 
investigating the relationship between financial remuneration of the agents and their 
susceptibility to indulge in corrupt practices. Moreover, whatever research on the issue is 
available fails to establish the relationship in unequivocal terms.27 This research 
investigates the issue in depth especially from the agent’s perspective and assumes that, if 
provided with reasonable financial remuneration, agents will prefer to avoid 
corrupt dealings. (H4) 
Apart from reasonable compensation the second vital aspect for controlling corruption is 
effective monitoring and supervision of the agent. Principal-Agent-Client theory rates 
lack of monitoring as the major cause of agent’s corruption (Klitgaard 1988). However, 
at least theoretically, every institution has its own accountability mechanisms, efficiency 
rules and disciplinary laws. Here, the question arises that if all these mechanisms are in 
place, then why do they fail to deter the agent from indulging in questionable 
transactions? One answer this research proposes is that despite being stated by the 
institution, the impact of these repercussions is minimal on the agent, because due to his 
general observations and past experience, he does not perceive the threat as real. This 
research believes that, if faced with credible threats of dire repercussions, agents will 
not indulge in corrupt practices. (H5) 
Institutions like military and bureaucracy are known for the Esprit de corp. running 
within the institution. But it is a general belief, that in institutions like the bureaucracy, 
the decision-making process of agents is not much affected by the consideration of the 
public opinion or the pressure of colleague’s expectations. However, this research 
expects that, if peer pressure is high, it will induce self-policing and self-censorship 
among the agents, leading to low incidence of corruption. (H6) 
Agents belonging to various institutions of civil bureaucracy are generally assumed to be 
having a sense of pride on being a part of that organisation. It can be frequently observed 
                                                 
27 Refer to chapter 2 for detailed analysis of research related to causes of corruption especially the question 
of sufficient financial compensations and the probability of being corrupt. 
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that such sense of belonging does not contribute much in curtailing the corrupt activities 
of the agents belonging to such institutions. This research points out that if any 
organisation has a positive general image and if corporate identity is higher within that 
institution, likelihood of corruption will be low in that institution. (H7) 
 
1.5 Theoretical Paradigm 
Any social science research sans strong theoretical basis is not more than a story. 
Qualification of being ‘scientific’ cannot be achieved without a plausible theory as bases 
of the whole research. A sound theory is a foundation according to which validity, or 
otherwise, of the hypotheses could be tested. It consequently helps in drawing inferences 
from the available data. According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994), a good theory 
has the following compulsory characteristics. First, it should always be open to 
falsification, as a lot more can be learnt from wrong theories than of those, which are 
stated too broadly to be contested. Second, to achieve such objective a theory should be 
‘capable of generating as many observable implications as possible’ (1994:19, italics in 
original). Third, a good theory should be as concrete as possible, because ambiguous or 
vague theories do nothing but to confuse the mind and future research. 
Continuity of the scientific research and necessity to avoid duplication demands a 
consummate knowledge of the already conducted research on one’s field of interest. 
King, Keohane and Verba assert that, ‘In fact we can not develop a theory without 
knowledge of prior work on the subject’ (Ibid). Though comprehensive review of the 
academic literature is done in the next chapter, yet to facilitate the understanding of the 
research model, a brief overview of the relevant terms and theories is presented here. 
Only those theories will be delineated here, which have a direct bearing on the current 
research or which are somehow related to the theory developed later in this chapter. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical Perspective of Corruption and Governance 
Politics is quintessentially about the collective well being of the larger number of people 
under one political rule. Corruption being a perverted form of politics, stymies the 
achievement of this very objective. Political theorists vary considerably not only in their 
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perception regarding the ability of politics or political rule to achieve the aim of 
collective good, but they also differ in their perception regarding the utility of 
corruption.28 
Methodologically most of the present political science research regarding corruption 
could be divided into two basic approaches i.e. moralist or functionalist approach. The 
next chapter delineates in detail the major arguments as well as the theories of these two 
divergent approaches. Here, however a brief reference to the underlying basic themes of 
the theories under these two approaches will suffice to facilitate the understanding 
regarding the positioning of the current research in the body of knowledge available on 
the subject. 
The moralist approach looks at corrupt behaviour from moral standards, and the 
underlying theme of this approach is that corruption is a harmful, bad, and condemnable 
phenomenon regardless of any time and space consideration. It is an immoral deviant 
behaviour with detrimental impact for the social, political and economic stability of the 
state. According to this approach ‘corruption is blamed for lowering of national respect, 
for reducing administrative efficiency, hindering economic development and for 
undermining political stability. It is ‘… a cancer on society which must be removed if the 
patient is to survive’ (Williams, 1976:43). Though never put unequivocally, one can 
safely infer from the moralist’s theories that corruption has a major contributory share in 
the low level of governance in the transitional societies and developing states. 
On the other hand, proponents of functionalist approach try to avoid moralising and 
concentrate more on the utilitarian qualities of corruption. These theories argue that, if 
corruption was so detrimental, it would not have existed.29 Specifically considering the 
prevailing conditions in the transitional societies or the developing world, functionalists 
view corruption as a compensation for the insufficiency of the political and 
administrative arrangements available in such societies and states. Functionalists consider 
corruption as a mean to cut the red tape, improve administrative efficiency, reduce 
political friction, substitute for reforms, avoid revolutions, lubricate the rusty wheel of the 
                                                 
28 For a complete account of the utility of political rule see Philp (1997); for a comprehensive view of the 
different approaches regarding utility of corruption refer to sections related to Moralist and Functionalist 
approach in the next chapter dealing with review of the literature. 
29 Argument was made by: Werlin, H. 1972. ‘The Roots of Corruption: The Ghanaian Case’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 10 (2): 247-266. 
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economy, and make demands on otherwise inaccessible political and administrative 
systems of the developing world. It could be argued that in functionalist’s view 
corruption is a form of recompense for lack of governance, as most of the so-called 
positives of corruption are essentially the indicators of lower level of governance. 
There is hardly any other subject matter so multidisciplinary in nature as the subject of 
corruption. Various academic disciplines like: Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology, 
Public Administration, Public Policy, Political Science, and finally Economics, have 
investigated and researched the topic from their own specific perspective. The upsurge of 
interest in corruption as a field of academic research in 1990 coincides with the 
economists’ interest in the issue. Economists interpret the functions of government and 
state working as akin to private business monopolies (Williams 1999). Numbers of 
empirical studies of corruption use a single case example to propose theories of 
corruption. Though these theories do not provide for hypotheses testing in a systematic 
manner, yet they provided sufficient material for the existing body of knowledge and 
future research that is more extensive.30 
 
1.5.1.1 Definition of Corruption?31 
 This research mainly deals with the bureaucratic corruption, which is specifically related 
to the abuse of public office, therefore, we have employed the World Bank’s definition of 
corruption, according to which ‘corruption is abuse of public office for private gain’. The 
office is a position of trust, where one acts on behalf of the institution through power or 
authority delegated to one. Corruption means charging an illicit price for a service, which 
one is suppose to provide anyway, or using the power of the office to further illicit aims. 
Corruption can entail acts of omission or commission and can involve legal as well as 
illegal activities. It can be internal to the organisation or external to it. A corrupt 
transaction has normally the following salient attributes:32 
                                                 
30 Few of the more prominent among many of such studies are: Wade (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
and Olson (1995). 
31 Detailed discussion about the concept of corruption is presented in chapter 3. 
32 Inspired by the seven attributes of corruption given by: Almann von Ulrich. 1995. ‘Corruption in 
Germany the Debate in Politics and Political Science’, Paper prepared for the IX Jornadas de Filosofía 
Práctica, organised by the Facultat de Dret Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona May 25 and 26, 1995 at 
Tossa de Mar.  
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- Involves a seller or provider of a service or commodity. 
- Seller has the legal right to provide that service or commodity. 
- Involves a buyer who is willing to buy that service or commodity. 
- An illicit price or a promise of such price, in cash or kind, is involved. 
- One way or the other any socially recognised moral code is broken. 
- Both try to keep the transaction secret, especially the seller. 
- Somebody’s interest, other than the seller’s, is compromised. 
Four different modes inherently ensconced in the concept of corruption are: bribery, 
extortion, nepotism, and kickbacks. Theoretically corruption could be divided into two 
broader subgroups or subcategories: need-based corruption, and greed-based corruption. 
 
1.5.1.2 Need Based Corruption (NBC) 
Need based corruption is the corruption done to acquire or fulfil the necessities of the life. 
When financial remunerations of public officials are too meagre to meet the basic 
amenities, they resort to charge illicit prices, in addition to the legal ones, to satisfy their 
basic needs. They start charging illicit prices for the services they are suppose to provide 
free of cost. Corruption is primarily motivated by circumstantial necessity; it is more an 
issue of economics than morality. In the less developed world the major share of 
corruption, in quantitative terms, belongs to this category.  
But this lowered moral tendency is not irreversible, as we can infer from Maslow’s 
theory of the ‘hierarchy of needs’ (Maslow 1943).33 The guru of modern management has 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
33 Maslow (1943), the father of modern management, in his groundbreaking theory of human motivation 
has divided the human motivations according to five different categories of needs: physiological, safety, 
love, self-esteem, and self-actualisation needs. Physiological needs involve hunger, thirst and sex. Safety 
needs refer to human need to be safe from unexpected dangers like any wild animal, extremes of 
temperature, criminal assault, murder, tyranny etc. Love needs signify human’s desire to have affectionate 
relations like friends, beloved, children and a desire to give and receive love. Self esteem needs further 
divided into two categories: first, relates to a need for strength, achievement, confidence, independence and 
freedom; while second, refers to a desire for reputation, prestige, recognition, importance and appreciation 
from others. Self-actualisation is the highest form of needs and relates to ones desire to do what one is fit 
for; like a musician must make music and a painter must paint. ‘What a man can be, he must be’ (page 
382). These different stages of need determine human motivation accordingly; for a hungry and thirsty 
individual the strongest motivation would be to satisfy his hunger and thirst. Clear emergence of these 
blocks of needs depends on the prior satisfaction of the preceding needs. It is only after the satisfaction of 
physiological needs that individual will be motivated by the need for safety. Need for love will motivate the 
person once first two blocks of need are satisfied, so on and so forth.  
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ordered the needs, which motivate human behaviour from basic to higher levels and 
finally self-actualization. Satisfaction of physiological needs is followed by the need of 
social security, which again has to be relatively satisfied, before energy can be put into 
the arising needs of belonging and self-esteem. Maslow observes that a new arousal is 
usually accompanied by significant changes in the set of values. Personal rationale and 
ideals are being reshaped in accordance with, what is required to be a safer more 
respected person. From this we can infer for our subject study that an agent who resorts 
to corruption to fulfil his basic needs has a diminished psychological censure for 
corruption; it will be unwise to expect from a need based corrupt agent to operate 
according to the higher stages of motivation. With the satisfaction of his basic needs, by 
legal means, his resistance to corrupt behaviour would be enhanced.   
Where the majority of the lower and middle level public agents are most of the time busy 
in fighting the battle for their survival, resorting to corruption is a mean to that end. This 
process cannot be controlled without ameliorating their economic conditions. Following 
views from one of the respondents substantiate the above point very clearly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bribery and extortion is the major mode of such corruption, which is petty in most of the 
cases. This sort of corruption is not very expensive in terms of value for the client but it is 
lethal for the image and reputation of the institution and the state. It is lower in value, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
An official left me speechless when he explained the reason for 
corruption. His 7 years old daughter is suffering from bone marrow 
cancer. Under the rules he cannot get reimbursement, as out door 
treatment facility is not available to his cadre. He can either prepare fake 
documents for admission in the hospital, which is quite difficult. In 
addition, he is compelled to grease the palm of all intermediary 
personnel, which includes his own department and account department. 
Another official (it was generally considered he does not have the brains 
to think) requested he might not be required to sit late in the office. 
Explaining the reason he stated that he along with his wife had to work 
late night for extra income. Mind you, his salary was Rs2,000. He had 
two young kids and lived in a rented house. 
 
A male, mid-level officer (BPS18) of Income Tax service shared this personal 
experience with the author, while filling the questionnaire during the survey in May 
2007. Respondent was a married young man from Punjab and he himself had four 
dependents 
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higher in incidence and more damaging to the society, but not extremely hazardous for 
national economy. 
 
1.5.1.3 Greed Based Corruption (GBC) 
Greed Based Corruption emanates from the insatiable desire to have more than is needed 
for survival. Actors involve in such corruption, mostly have sufficient means, for a 
reasonable living, but insufficient moral character. Avarice instead of need is the bases of 
such corruption, and luxury instead of necessity is the objective of their pursuits. Actors 
indulging in GBC mostly belong to the higher echelons of the public sphere and usually 
enjoy a sense of impunity against any kind of reprehension or repercussion of their 
actions. Such corruption falls within the category of mega corruption and often involves 
senior bureaucrats and influential political elites. 
Despite having the low visibility to society at large, impact of this sort of corruption for 
the national economy is enormous, which affects society as a whole. Latin proverb, 
corruptio optimi pessima – the corruption of the best is the worst (Werner 1983: 150), 
signifies the deleterious nature of this form of corruption. 
The monetary value of this corruption, for the client, is usually high. The average number 
of occurrence is significantly less than that of NBC. GBC is generally extremely 
damaging for the national image as it more often than not involves the international 
clientele. Control of this kind of corruption is almost impossible without indiscriminate 
and ruthless accountability. Following table compares the salient features of both kinds of 
corruption: 
Table 3 Comparison of NBC and GBC 
 Actor Clientele Monetary 
Value 
Rate of 
Incidence 
Social 
Impact 
Economic 
Impact 
Control 
Mechanics 
NBC Low & Mid 
Level 
General 
public 
Low High High Low Economic 
GBC High Level Business 
Industry 
MNCs 
High Low Low High Administrati
ve 
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1.5.1.4 What is Governance?  
Governance is a vast concept, spread over an entire range of inter- and intra-institutional 
activities concerned with governing. Governance is all about managing the economy and 
society in a manner acceptable and profitable to the maximum number of people. Being 
an all encompassing concept, governance covers social, political, and economic aspects 
of the state; ‘thinking about governance means thinking about how to steer the economy 
and society, and how to reach collective goals’ (Pierre and Peters 2000:1). In other 
words, governance is the means to achieve the fundamental goal of the state i.e. pursuit of 
collective good. The ways employed by the state for achieving its primary objective are 
known as good governance. Governance is quintessentially the means to achieve the ideal 
ends of the state and corruption is one of the major obstacles to the achievement of those 
ends. ‘In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good 
governance, our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is 
still in its infancy’ (Adsera et. all 2000: 5). 
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed the simultaneous emergence of both 
governance and corruption as the key concepts at the stage of social sciences. It is rather 
hard to pinpoint which preceded the other; whether it was the academic interest in 
governance, which fostered the detailed investigations of corruption or the other way 
round. The concept of governance has often been used in multiple ways; it is hard to 
think of governance in terms of a monolithic phenomenon, in fact, it will not be wholly 
without merit to suggest that the concept has gained as many meanings as the number of 
scholars who have attempted to study it. International institutions like the World Bank 
and the IMF adopted good governance as a major reform objective since the early 1990s. 
Some authors see governance as coordination of different sectors of economy (Campbell 
et al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994); others explain the concept in terms of corporate 
governance (Williamson, 1996), and some as policy networks (Rhodes, 1997). Another 
face of governance is that of public-private partnerships (Pierre, 1998), and the steering 
of society by the state (Pierre and Peter, 2000). Last but not the least, governance has 
been defined as orderly rule (Mitra, 2006), a concept which has been furthered in its 
implication during the course of this research. 
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When daily interactions and transactions among individuals and the state institutions 
cannot be fulfilled without compromising one’s self respect, integrity and personal 
freedom, it is an indicative of moral and political decay. This decay renders the orderly 
rule of society next to impossible. If the orderly rule in a state goes kaput, the problem of 
governance ultimately becomes a problem of politics. Marred interaction between the 
state and society ultimately leads to a low level of governance in the state. 
Historically speaking, the explanation of this decaying orderly rule has acquired three 
different approaches: institutional, moral and economic. The institutional approach 
stipulates that old and archaic institutions cannot meet the expectations of an ever-
increasing population whose values and demands have changed enormously since the 
time these institutions were built. The moral approach sees undesirable moral changes 
resulting in a valueless population, which places unwarranted demands on the 
institutions. Lastly, economic interpretation views unequal distribution of wealth and 
power as the key factor, unleashing the forces responsible for estrangement between the 
population and the state leading to social collapse (Dobel 1978). 
The latest approach to study the dynamics of orderly rule is based on the neo-institutional 
rational choice model, which emphasises the role institutions can play in ensuring the 
environment of high governance and stable orderly rule in the state. This approach 
focuses on the rational behaviour of the actors and maintains that their decision to play by 
the rules of the game is determined by their perception of available risks and rewards, but 
not by any other consideration like context or culture (Mitra 2006). This research also 
employs the neo-institutional rational choice theory to explain the corrupt or responsible 
behaviour of actors in any given transaction. 
 
1.5.2 Theoretical Modelling of Corruption  
Theoretically, corruption is mostly explained with the help of the Agency theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989), which focuses on two actors: a principal, who delegates work to some 
one else, i.e. the agent. The relationship between the principal and agent is inherently a 
contractual one (Gormley and Balla, 2004: 53, 54). This theory focuses on the resolution of 
two problems attached to this contractual arrangement: first, problems arise when the 
goals of principal and agent are in clash, especially as ‘it is difficult or expensive for the 
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principal to verify what the agent is actually doing’; and second problem arises ‘when 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards work’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). The 
principal, according to this model, is the policy maker/higher up of any organisation or 
institution. He could be any Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the bureaucratic head of 
any public department, political elite, or a high level executive like the president or the 
prime minister, depending upon the discipline employing this theory, and the scope of the 
case under analysis. The agent, as per agency model, is the one delegated to take 
decisions and implement the policies made by the principal i.e. a corporate executive, 
street level bureaucrat, ministerial desk officer, or policy executioner field expert. The 
relationship between the both is based on an implicit mutual trust. Agency theory is based 
on certain assumptions: first, it assumes that individuals seek their self-interest, have 
bounded rationality,34 and have certain risk aversion; second, it assumes that there exists 
a goal conflict among the members of any organisation; and last, it sees information as a 
commodity, which can be bought (ibid). 
Corruption occurs when the agent breaches the contractual trust and instead of principal’s 
interest acts explicitly or implicitly either for his own benefit, or the advantage of any 
other person or group associated with the agent, or accords any other third party 
advantages in exchange for a reward, in kind or cash, from that third party. 
 
1.5.2.1 Principal-Agent-Client (PAC) Model of Corruption 
One framework based on agency theory, which is of special relevance to this research, is 
the Principal-Agent-Client or PAC model.35 This model introduced Agency theory, with 
the addition of a third party known as Client or general public, into the realm of 
corruption studies. While its application to the study of political corruption is not beyond 
doubts, PAC model is specifically useful for the analysis of bureaucratic corruption 
(Johnston 1996). Prior to its introduction, it was believed that it takes two parties for a 
                                                 
34 The term ‘Bounded Rationality’ was coined by one of the most influential social scientists of the last 
century, Herbert Simon (1916-2001). This term refers to the rational choice that takes into account the 
limitations of both knowledge and cognitive capacity. This idea of bounded rationality asserts that most 
people are partly rational and partly irrational or emotional, and that purely rational decisions are mostly 
not feasible because of the limited resources available to the decision maker. For detailed explanation see: 
Simon, Herbert. 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol.1 & 2. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
35 For a comprehensive presentation of PAC framework see Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard (1988). 
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transaction to qualify it as corrupt: a corrupter and one who is corrupted (Galtung 1998). 
Klitgaard (1988) deviated from this traditional notion and pointed out that there are not 
only two but always a third party, i.e. the public, involved in any corrupt transaction. 
According to this PAC model, the principal plays the most vital role. He selects the agent, 
assigns powers to the agent, defines the relationship between the agent and the client, and 
chooses the incentives and penalties for the agent. 
Agency theory views human behaviour as predominantly rent seeking and suggests that 
human beings tend to maximise their self-interest. If government officials or state agents 
are given the opportunity to involve illegal practices to achieve this aim, they will do so 
unless they are closely supervised and effectively monitored. Klitgaard (1988), 
employing Agency theory, specifically emphasised on the various dimensions of 
institutional structures. According to this theory the level of corruption, C, could be 
expressed in terms of the following equation: 
C = M + D – A  
Where M refers to monopoly powers, D discretion of the officials, and A the level of 
accountability within an institution. 
According to the PAC framework, the pursuit of self-interest supersedes the contract 
between the principal and the agent and corruption occurs, ‘when an agent betrays the 
principal’s interest in pursuit of his own’ (Klitgaard 1988:24). This model asserts that 
corruption happens because effective monitoring of the agent is too costly for the 
principal (Ibid: 72). Another well known scholar of corruption, who used agency theory, 
states that ‘while superiors would like agents always to fulfil the superior’s objectives, 
monitoring is costly, and agents will generally have some freedom to put their own 
interests ahead of their principals’ Rose-Ackerman (1978: 6,7) (italics added by the 
author). 
Apart from bringing economics in to the field of corruption research, this theory shifted 
the focus from the debate about whether a certain act is corrupt or not, to the interaction 
and interrelations of state institutions and agents, which cause corruption. This research 
also employs the PAC theory in combination with neo-institutional rational choice theory 
of governance. However, certain modifications have been made to enhance the 
congruence of the PAC framework into the realm of political science instead of 
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economics. More importantly, current research questions and challenges one of the major 
postulates of the PAC theory of both Rose-Ackerman and Klitgaard that state corruption 
occurs because meaningful monitoring is too costly for the principal. Our research 
asserts, with examples from the field, that effective monitoring of the agent is not as 
costly as it is generally perceived, and corruption happens not because effective 
monitoring is too expensive but due to lack of will on the part of principal.  
 
1.5.3 Theoretical Dynamics of Corruption as a Phenomenon 
The PAC model is useful in a number of ways but its dependency on the principal leads 
to various difficulties regarding reform, because any move towards transparency and 
enhanced accountability will lead to reduction in the discretion of the principal and 
ultimately erosion of political power (Galtung1998). This research interprets the 
principal-agent relationship as a relationship between the two rational political actors. In 
the words of Lord Acton (1834-1902), Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, so is the case with principals and agents involved in corrupt transactions. Our 
interpretation of this PAC model suggests that the principal has the power, which he 
delegates to the agent who, motivated by self-interest, abuses that power. Being a rational 
entity, the agent abuses the power as long as he can be sure of minimal repercussion. The 
agent will stop abusing the power if, (a) he feels that his self-interest is legitimately taken 
care of, though not as good as it could be in case of abuse of power; (b) he perceives a 
credible threat to his source of power in case of continued abuse of power. 
One way out of PAC quagmire is shifting the balance of power equation in such a manner 
that the troika of principal, agent, and client shares almost equal power. Ideally the 
client’s share of power is marginally bigger than the respective shares of agent and 
principal. This is precisely the reason for relatively less corruption in established 
democracies, where the agent is controlled by, and is answerable to the principal, who in 
turn is answerable to the client. It is the client who, due to his ability and capacity to 
change the principal, whenever he is not satisfied with his (principal’s) performance, is 
the real power holder in this equation. Client in these societies is educated, knows his 
rights, and duties of the principal and agent; and can trust the judicial system in case of 
any conflict of interest. Besides, in developed Western societies the space between the 
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individual and the state is filled by established institutional structures; employed by the 
client, if necessity arises, to influence the decisions of the principal. Elaborating such 
structures of developed societies, Reddy and Haragopal (1985: 1154) pointed out that, ‘in 
western societies this role is played by well-organized lobbies - the institutionalized 
forms of various pressure groups present in the socioeconomic system’. In such societies 
it is in the self-interest of the principal to monitor and ensure the smooth working of the 
agent, because otherwise his own position is at stake. Being rational actor, principal 
wants to retain his position, which he does by ensuring the proper functioning of the 
agents. The following flow chart illustrates how both principal and agent are answerable 
to the client: 
Flow chart 1 Established Societies or Developed World 
 
 
However, this solution is unfortunately not readily available for most of the transitional 
societies of third world or developing countries. Rather in developing states or 
transitional societies, principal and agent collude with each other, both abuse their power 
and both join their forces when the client demands his or her rights. In most of 
developing states colonial legacy, which accentuates the gap between the ruled and the 
ruler, is still dominant in the public institutional structures. Absence of any formal 
institutional link between the client and principal or agent has given birth to the informal 
institution like ‘Pyraveekar or fixer’ in such states.36 Notwithstanding their utility, mostly 
                                                 
36 For a detailed account of such fixers and the role they play in the rural India refer to Reddy and 
Haragopal (1985) and Manor (2000). However, to facilitate understanding here we will just give the 
definition of the Pyraveekar who, ‘is a middleman possessing professional skills in exerting pressure on the 
administrative system … that is, the art of approaching officials for favors and making the wheels of 
administrative move in support of such favors’ who do not hold any formal political or administrative 
position (Reddy and Haragopal 1985: 1149) 
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such institutions also contribute in the manipulation and exploitation of the client. (Ibid: 
1150-1160). 
Lack of true democratic process and its concomitant power sharing attributes results in 
the supremacy of principal and agent over the client. Or if a democratic apparatus is in 
place, as in case of India, prevalent lack of education among the masses coupled with the 
socio-economic dominance of ruling elite, and the cumbersomeness of the judicial 
process leaves the client with little hold over principal or agent. Principals or agents in 
such societies are not irrational. Rather they act purely rational (not necessarily from a 
long term generational perspective) and strive to ensure their interest, which is 
maximised by indulging in corrupt transactions. Clients in such societies and states 
completely lack or have little power to influence the principal, which results in an 
unrestrained abuse of power in the shape of corruption, by both principal and agent. The 
following flow chart explains the balance, or rather the imbalance of power equation in 
transitional societies or the developing world: 
Flow chart 2 Transitional Societies or Developing States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3.1 ‘Otherness’ of the Institutions: Another Explanation37 
In the endogenous and exogenous nature of institutions lies another explanation of this 
distinction between the established democracies and developing or post-colonial states. 
Institutions, their procedures, rules and laws in established democracies or the developed 
societies have evolved through hundreds of years of experimentation. Consequently, their 
rationale and existence is beyond any doubt in the eyes of both agents and clients. It is a 
                                                 
37 Othering or otherness is basically a way of defining one’s own identity by means of stigmatizing the 
‘other’.  This term is used here to describe the dissociation masses of post-colonial developing states feel 
towards the administrative and bureaucratic system of their countries; which, in the collective memory of 
the masses, are associated with their former colonial masters. 
Client 
General 
Public 
       Agent 
Policy 
Executioner 
Middle/Lower 
Level 
Bureaucrats/ 
Desk Officers 
Principal 
Political Elite 
Policy Makers 
High  
Level 
Bureaucrats 
 47
 
general observation that humans abide by the laws, more easily and regularly, which they 
intrinsically believe to be beneficial for them. In developed societies both the public as 
well as private actors believe in the utility and rationality of the institutions and their 
laws. This renders the task of the principal i.e. ensuring the transparency and efficiency 
within the institution, relatively less complicated.  
However, in case of transitional societies or underdeveloped states, institutions are 
mostly exogenous. They have not evolved through centuries of actions, interactions and 
experimentation; rather mostly colonial masters have imported them in finished form 
from outside. This exogenous nature of the institutions makes their rationale and 
justification of existence very much questionable in the minds of both client and agent. In 
the case of exogenous institutions, the agent and sometimes even the principal have an 
apathetic and indifferent attitude towards their institutions and the laws that govern them. 
Furthermore, the state institutions and their rule, regulations and laws have little 
connection to the individual memory of the agents and the collective memory of society. 
In certain situations image of these institutions, laws and procedures are associated with 
the bitter memories of the colonial or imperialist past, making it very difficult for the 
individuals to respect them. This feeling of ‘otherness’ and scepticism regarding the 
utility of the laws and the institutions, to which these laws belong, makes it rather 
complicated to maintain rule of law in society. Resultantly, in such states political will of 
the principal, to ensure transparency and efficiency, becomes more vital for proper 
functioning of these institutions; and lack of will is a major cause of high corruption and 
low governance in such less developed states  
 
1.6 Institutional Theory of Corruption 
The puzzle of effective governance, with reference to controlling corruption in 
transitional societies, is the major focus of this research. As already mentioned, 
governance like corruption is an essentially contested concept, which signifies multiple 
images for different minds. In his latest study of the phenomenon in India, Mitra (2006) 
defines governance as ‘orderly rule’. He has employed the number of murders and riots 
per hundred thousand persons as an indicator of effective governance or lack of it; 
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asserting that the higher the ratio of murders and riots, the lower is the level of 
governance and vice versa. Employing the same theoretical paradigm of rational choice 
neo-institutionalist approach and using the same definition of governance this research 
uses another yardstick for the measurement of governance, namely: perceived level of 
corruption. Though significance of corruption as an indicator of governance or lack of it 
is sufficiently well known38, yet any in depth study, measuring the level of governance 
through the prevalence of corruption in the developing world, is still missing from the 
academic literature of political science. 
The proposed institutional theory for the control of corruption analyses the phenomenon 
of wide spread corruption and lower level of governance in transitional societies of the 
developing world, with a dual lens of neo-institutional and rational choice approach of 
political science. It proposes the both micro and macro level investigation of the problem, 
focusing on the individual or the agent and the factors influencing his selection of 
available choices, along with the detailed investigation of the tools, which could be 
helpful in guiding the agents in making right choices, available to every institution. This 
theory maintains that Agents, both in developing as well as developed world, are rational 
actors who seek to maximize their gains. Structured institutions developed on the lines of 
Weberian Bureaucratic Model (hallmark of developed world) ensure maximization of 
agent’s net gains in honest and efficient conduct. While, on the other hand non-structured 
institutions (trademark of developing world) offer maximization of agent’s net gains in 
corruption. Hence, probability is very high that same actor A will be corrupt in 
unstructured institution and honest and efficient in a structured institutional environment 
regardless of his geographical and cultural origin, orientation and placement. 
1.6.1 Neo-Institutional Approach to Governance  
This research claims that persistent and entrenched corruption in the developing world is 
a major reason for lack of effective governance in such states. Though governance 
                                                 
38 When Mitra in his elite interviews asked a question about the symptoms of low governance, 70 percent 
of the respondents rated widespread corruption as the extremely important indicator of low governance in 
their state. (Mitra 2006:39). Furthermore, World Wide Governance Indicators also uses ‘Control of 
Corruption’ and ‘Voice and Accountability’ among their six indicators of governance. Six indicators used 
by WWI are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. 
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indicators and the corruption perception indices show a clear association between the 
level of corruption and the level of governance in a state, yet it is hard to establish the 
causality between the two. Following table compares the latest Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) scores and the World Wide Governance Indicators (WWGI) scores for six 
countries, representing both developing and developed state, ranging from lowest to 
highest level of governance. CPI uses 1-10 scale, where 1 stands for most and 10 for least 
corrupt. WWGI employs a percentile rank of 0-100 according to which a higher score 
corresponds to a higher level of governance and vice versa. Higher CPI score indicates a 
lower level of perceived corruption in the state, while WWGI score is an average of the 
scores for all the six indicators of governance and high average score signifies higher 
level of governance in the state. Both CPI and WWGI are composite indices based on 
multiple surveys and most widely used indicators of the level of corruption and level of 
governance in a state. 
Table 4 Relationship between Corruption and Governance 
 CPI score WWGI score (average) 
Bangladesh 2.0 19.2 
Pakistan 2.4 19.6 
India 3.5 47.2 
France 7.3 84.9 
Hong Kong 8.3 87.9 
Denmark 9.4 96.3 
Source: Based on the data gathered from the CPI 2007 and WWGI 2007.39 
 
Even a cursory glance through the table reveals that the scores in both of the columns 
directly correspond to each other. This symmetrical relationship between the CPI score 
and WWGI score signifies that corruption and governance correlate strongly with each 
other. Considering the vastness of the concept of governance one can assume that 
                                                 
39 Figures are obtained from the following web sites of Transparency International and the World Bank: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 and 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp. WWGI score has been calculated by taking an 
average of scores for all the six indicators measured by WWGI. 
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causality runs from prevalence of corruption to lack of governance and not the other way 
round. One can argue that if that was not the case, then all the institutions should be 
uniformly corrupt in a badly governed state. However, we have found out that the level of 
corruption, even in badly governed states, not only differs in different institutions, but 
rather some of them are astonishingly less corrupt. Different levels of corruption in 
various institutions could lead to a general atmosphere of low governance but not vice 
versa.  
The proposed institutional approach for controlling corruption asserts that contrary to 
some scholastic belief, corruption in transitional societies is not a culturally embedded 
phenomenon but rather an institutional problem. In addition, it can be contained, to a 
reasonable degree, by institutional restructuring. Regarding control of corruption in the 
developing world, this theory supports a top-down or institutional restructuring approach 
instead of a bottom-up or societal reformation approach.40 Institutional analysis approach 
of governance asserts that resistance to change, though present, is less found in the 
institutions as compared to society as an entity. While discussing the role institutions can 
play in the development of governance culture Pierre and Peter (2000) have noted: 
…Whether the best strategy …is to build civil society or to construct the 
institutions of governance. The institutionalist answer is, of course, that the more 
effective course of action is to emphasise building the institutional structures 
needed for governance…. This strategy is likely to be effective if for no other 
reason than that institutions are probably more malleable than is society.  
(2000:44) 
Similarly, the proposed theory and research also concentrates on institutional change or 
institutional restructuring in the bureaucratic institutions of the developing world and 
asserts that widespread corruption in the transitional societies is not a cultural problem; it 
is rather the problem of the institutional culture. Notwithstanding the importance of 
societal culture, this research asserts that the surge of corruption could be brought at least 
under control. Every successful policy comprises of immediate, mid-term and long-term 
                                                 
40 According to the latter approach the cycle of reformation should move from society to the state that 
means efficient and better members of society will make better members of various institutions, ultimately 
making them better institutions. While according to the first approach, which is the institutional approach 
of governance and which this research also employs, effective leadership at the top of institutions will have 
a trickle down affect on the whole of state’s institutions 
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solutions. To contain corruption, laws can be immediately implemented in institutions. 
By applying them rigorously the institutional culture will be reshaped with time. 
Changing the ethos of the society regarding corruption is the long-term solution that 
guarantees the sustainability of the previous efforts on the long run. 
 
1.6.2 Rational Choice Explanation of Corruption 
The level of corruption, in certain institutions or bureaucracy in general, in the 
developing world could best be explained with the help of the methodological 
individualism of rational choice theory; arguing that the level of corruption is a 
consequence of the decisions made by the individual members of the group under 
analysis. Furthermore, the decisions of the actors are influenced by their goal-oriented 
behaviour. While goals are being set, by taking into account: the economic, social, 
political, and institutional constraints. The realisation of available constraints, in 
achieving the set goals, forces actors or agents to choose the best of the available means 
to achieve those ends, consequently underscoring the need for optimised decision-
making. 
Flow chart 3 Optimised Decision-Making in Structured Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As constraints affect the decision-making process of the actors, so does the change in the 
constraints. Resultantly, in the language of rational choice theory, the level of corruption 
can be altered by influencing the decision-making process of the agents through changing 
the constraints available to the agent. This decision-making process of the actor or the 
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authority to affect the range of possibilities available to any actor for making a decision. 
Hence, institutions hold the key to the level of corruption or governance in any society. 
Rational choice theorists consider ‘approval’ and ‘money’ as the two main motivating 
factors for social and economic transaction or exchange respectively. Corruption being an 
economic exchange is motivated by money but nevertheless, it is a social exchange also, 
which should be motivated by social approval and deterred by the lack of it. However, 
the extent of corruption in developing states indicates that either corruption is not 
deterred by the lack of social approval or it has the social approval. If the former case is 
true then phenomena of corruption should be regarded as an exception to rational choice 
theory, and will require further in-depth investigation from rationalist point of view. And 
if the latter reason appears to be the cause, this would require more than ordinary 
measures on part of not only the state but also the civil society to redress the issue.  
Klitgaard (1988:63) pointed out that ‘corruption is a crime of calculation, not of passion’, 
so another possible explanation could be that corruption is deterred by social disapproval 
but at the same time it is motivated by the monetary gains. An agent’s decision to indulge 
in any corrupt transaction largely depends on his perception of the cost and benefit 
involved, and his perception regarding the likelihood of being caught. An agent goes 
corrupt when this attraction or motivation for incentives becomes stronger than the 
deterrence of restraints: i.e., social disapproval and institutional repercussions.  
Institutional penalties could be multiple in nature, like: financial (return of the corrupted 
amount), material (confiscation of property and assets) or official (reprimand, suspension, 
demotion, or removal from service). A rational actor or an agent will decide to go corrupt 
only when the incentive involved in a corrupt transaction is higher than the allied cost of 
restraints. 
Gain of corruption > Cost of corruption  
The above equation very clearly offers two alternative routes for controlling corruption: 
first, reduce the gains of corruption; and second, increase the cost of corruption. The first 
route of reducing the gains of corruption could be very difficult and complex. The 
alternative option of reducing corruption – and enhancing governance – through 
increasing the cost of corruption, is more practical and within the range of instruments 
available at the disposal of institutions. The costs of corruption can be increased in two 
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ways: first, through increasing the social disapproval by mobilising society, and second, 
by increasing the punishment or penalty of corruption.  
How an agent views these dynamics of gain and loss, and how much value he attaches to 
each ingredient is a question of perception. If agents were mainly deterred by social 
disapproval it would be logical to mobilise the resources in that direction; but if they are 
more concerned with institutional repercussions it would be advisable to improve those. 
Prior to starting any anti corruption derive, one must know what will work best in a given 
social and institutional set-up. Devising any effective counter strategy without having this 
insight would not only be difficult but also costly. Imported doctrines from outside are 
unsuitable for addressing the issue in an effective manner, until and unless they take 
internal perception of the problem into account. Plethora of research has been conducted 
about the perception of clients regarding prevalence of corruption; the novel aspect of 
subject research is its focus on the perception of public servants or the agents regarding 
the causes and control of corruption.  
 
1.7 The Model 
The fundamental question today, facing every public actor in the developing world or 
transitional society is ‘to be or not to be, corrupt’. The model developed later in this 
chapter will assist the policymakers in facilitating the resolution of this dilemma for a 
rational actor. 
Based on the above introduced institutional theory of corruption two alternative models 
could be constructed for controlling corruption; one focuses on the gains of corruption 
and the other on the cost of corruption. Alternative modes to control corruption would be: 
either to reduce the incurred profit for the agent from corrupt transactions, or to increase 
the cost of corruption for the agent. The model developed for this research belongs to a 
third category; it focuses on increasing the cost of corruption, but at the same time 
emphasises on increasing the gains of rejecting or denouncing corruption.  
Theoretically, this model assumes that agents are rational actors and their decision to be 
corrupt or otherwise is influenced by their perception of available incentives and 
constraints, or in economic terms by their cost-benefit analysis and not by their ‘culture 
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or context’. Haines, as early as 17th century, has pointed out the significance of this 
aspect of human nature, with specific reference to rational decision-making, when he 
observed that ‘interest is a thing that governs all people in the World, both good and bad. 
A good man knows ‘tis his greatest interest to live honestly and uprightly, in the sight of 
God and man; because then he believes a blessing attends him. A bad man though so 
foolish as not to regard his future happiness, will yet act honestly too when it is for his 
advantage so to do’ (Haines 1678:5). 
Whenever an agent is faced with the dilemma of being corrupt or not, mathematically he 
has two options available to him: option A: remain honest; option B: go corrupt. For 
controlling corruption, it is imperative to change the values of these options for the 
Agent, in other words, change the equation of available risks or rewards to an agent. One 
way is to increase the risk or cost of corruption (penalty in case of detection), changing 
option B; the other way is to enhance the reward for not being corrupt, empowering the 
agent to chose and abide by option A.  
If not generally, then mostly in developing world, financial remuneration for public 
sector positions are relatively less as compared to the similar level positions in the private 
sector. This leads to the logical question that what makes public sector employment so 
dearly sought after especially in the developing world. The answer lies in its stability or 
permanence and social approval or prestige attached with the position. As Weber had 
pointed out that the tenure for life, security and social esteem makes the bureaucratic 
positions extremely sought after. Braibanti (1966), while discussing the effects of civil 
servants screening of 1959 in Pakistan had remarked that ‘security of position had 
traditionally been one of the advantages of government service, and there were few 
alternate employment openings in the essentially agrarian economy of the nation’ 
(1999:293). Considering the uncertain economic conditions and higher unemployment 
rates of developing states, the most attractive feature of public sector employment is the 
life term security of the job. This job security is the Achilles’ heal of the public servants 
in developing world. Targeting this factor, in the sense that it is not guaranteed in case of 
abuse of power, would be the most effective deterrence against the spread of corruption. 
This approach will force the Agent to choose option A. 
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Increasing the risk is the half solution; the other half is to increase the reward for being 
honest and efficient. Acknowledgement and increase in reward of honest conduct would 
have two pronged implications for the decision-making process of the Agent. First, due 
rewards for rejecting option B will increase the incentive for doing so; second, attaching 
both financial as well as social gains with the option A will make the maintenance of the 
position more dear to him, resultantly, he would willingly opt for option A.  
 This research assumes that agents do not exist in a vacuum; they are not only the units of 
the institutions, but also the foundations on which institutions are built. It is true that 
agents are influenced by the culture or environment of the institutions. One agent M 
could face the same options A and B in a well structured as well as in an unstructured 
institution; but the cost-benefit equation attached with both options could be entirely 
different in both institutions. This disparity is at times so vast and so significant that 
option B in case of an un-structured institution would have all the charms and pluses, 
which are a distinction of option A in a structured institution. A chaotic and un-
transparent working environment gives an agent all the reasons to be corrupt, the 
correspondent culture of the working place (where posts are prioritised according to the 
corruption potential associated with each post; where lucrative posts are sold and bought 
on heavy prices; and where an honest officer is transferred ten times in three months as a 
reward of her honesty)41 makes the choice of option B much more attractive for him - to 
almost an extent which puts his rationality under question in case of not availing the 
opportunities of corruption. Similarly, it would be almost irrational for an actor to choose 
option B in a well-structured institution (where there is no concept of prioritisation of 
posts; where each posting in made on merit; where honesty is rewarded both financially, 
professionally, and socially; and where corruption is looked at derisively and is punished 
accordingly). 
Adopting the Weberian characterisation of bureaucracy we have identified the life long 
tenure, a secure pecuniary compensation, and the social esteem as the three basic 
ingredients of a public sector position, which make it dear to the position holder. 
According to our institutional theory for controlling corruption, it is imperative to attack 
these three basic elements for developing any successful campaign of effective 
                                                 
41 An income tax officer quoted all these facts to the author during an interview with her. 
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governance through reduced corruption. In the following equation, which juxtaposes the 
present situation in structured versus unstructured set-ups, X, Y, Z denote financial gain, 
social approval, and job security respectively; whereas Xx, Yy, Zz respectively represent 
financial loss, social disapproval, and job risk. 
Option A signifies the conditions in case an agent decides to remain honest; while Option 
B is the representation of the conditions if agent decides to go corrupt. The mathematical 
representation of available choices to an agent in a structured and un-structured 
institution would be as following: 
 
Structured Institution  
Option A = X + Y + Z   
Option B = X + Yy + Zz  
Unstructured Institution 
Option A = Xx + Y + Z  
Option B = X + Yy + Z 
Comparative Option A in both types of institutions 
X + Y + Z = Xx + Y + Z 
X = Xx + Y + Z – Y – Z  
X = Xx 
Comparative Option B in both types of institutions 
X + Yy + Zz = X + Yy + Z 
Zz = X + Yy + Z – X – Yy  
Zz = Z 
In case of a structured institution, option A – to remain honest – offers, financial gain, 
social approval and job security to the agent; while the option B in the same set-up offers, 
financial gain, but results in social disapproval from the colleagues, peers and the risk of 
losing job in case of being caught. 
However, when the same options are examined in case of an unstructured institution it is 
evident that the decision to remain honest, meaning option A, offers financial loss along 
with social approval and job security. The decision to go corrupt in an unstructured 
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institution, option B, represents financial gains and job security plus a minor degree of 
social disapproval from a minority of honest peers and colleagues. 
When option A is compared in the backdrop of two different kinds of institutions, it 
becomes clear that financial gain in one set of institutions is equal the financial loss in 
case of other type of institution. This means that in case of choosing to be honest the 
agent faces the exact financial loss in an unstructured institution, which he gains by 
rejecting corruption in case of a structured institution. Similarly, when option B (decision 
to go corrupt) is compared in both sets of circumstances, it reveals that the chances of the 
agent losing his job in one situation are equal to the probability of his retaining the job in 
the other situation. Jeopardising ones job is the gravest risk the agent takes in case of 
opting for corruption in a structured institution, while the security of not losing ones job 
in an un-structured institution, despite being corrupt, contributes heavily in the agent’s 
decision to go corrupt. 
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Flow chart 4 An Institutional Model for Controlling Corruption 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Despite being an archaic phenomenon, the body of knowledge on corruption is almost 
half a century in age. The coming chapter overviews the progress this body of knowledge 
has made, over a period of the last 50 years. Considering the multidisciplinary nature of 
the issue, covering the whole spectrum of knowledge about the subject from all different 
angles would go too far; here an effort is made to incorporate the academic works, which 
contributed significantly in the evolution of the knowledge in general, and to the field of 
political science research in particular.  
The chapter thoroughly analyses the two fundamental schools of thought, which 
dominated the whole body of research on the issue since 1960s: the functionalist and the 
moralist school of thought. This chapter critically evaluates the functionalist’s arguments 
regarding the utility of corruption as: a tool of modernisation; an instrument of preventing 
revolution; a mechanism of political stability; a mode of political influence; and as a 
lubricant for the rusty machine of economy. The chapter questions the utility argument of 
functionalists and asserts that finding positives of corruption is like searching for a needle 
in the heap of hay. With the help of moralists’ point of view, the chapter asserts that the 
functionalist argument is, flawed, suffers from selection bias and based on anecdotal 
evidence.  
Beyond analysing the functionalist/moralist debate, the chapter also reviews the plethora 
of empirical research done by multidisciplinary researchers since 1990. The empirical 
research on the causes of corruption has been analysed according to the major 
investigated reasons of corruption like: size and kind of government, institutional quality, 
competition, merit and recruitment, political system; and cultural determinants affecting 
the level of corruption. The chapter is divided in to three sections: the first section dwells 
on the detailed view of functionalist school of thought regarding the utility of corruption; 
the second section entails an overview of the moralist approach to the study of 
corruption; and the third section deals with the academic progress, so far made by 
empirical research in investigating the causes of corruption. 
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2.1 The Paradox of Research on Corruption  
The research on corruption suffered from a bias treatment, especially from the hands of 
western scholarship. While western social scientists never hesitated from exposing the 
presence of this malice in their political, social or administrative sphere,42 yet they 
displayed an apathetic disinterest in the presence of the same problem in the less 
developed societies. It was not long ago that corruption in South Asia, despite being a 
widely discussed theme in public debate, was almost a taboo as a research topic and was 
rarely mentioned in the scholarly endeavours of the American and the western scholars. 
This indifference on the part of western academic intelligentsia was attributed to a 
general bias characterised as ‘diplomacy in research’, according to which embarrassing 
questions were avoided by ignoring the problems of attitudes and the institutions. Wide 
spread corruption in the region was rationalised by certain sweeping assertions: that it is a 
universal phenomenon; that considering the colonial and pre-colonial institutions and 
attitudes it is natural in the South Asian context; that it is a lubricant for the rusty political 
and administrative machinery of the region; and that the public outcry, in the countries of 
the region, is an exaggerated expression of a situation which is not as worse as it appears 
(Myrdal 1968:938-939).  
                                                 
42 There are a number of historical studies of corruption and corrupt practices in Britain, Europe and 
inquisitional studies of United States. A very well known study of the first sort is: Gash, Norman.1953. 
Politics in the Age of Peel. London: Longmans; Wraith, Ronald and Edgar Simpkins.1963. Corruption in 
Developing Countries. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. can also be included in this genre as half of 
the book is devoted to the historical study of corruption in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain and 
how the Victorian England succeeded in destroying the system of corruption. Also relevant in this regard 
are: Swart, K.W.1949. Sale of Offices in Seventeenth Century. The Hague: Nijhoff; Mayes, R. Charles. 
1975. ‘The Sale of Peerages in Early Stuart England’, The Journal of Modern History, XXIX. 1. Robinson, 
R.M. 1953. ‘The Lynsky Tribunal: The British Method of Dealing with Political Corruption’, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol.68 (1): 109-124; Gwyn, B. William. 1962. Democracy and the Cost of Politics in 
Britain. London: The Athlone Press. Some of the more prominent studies on corruption in Europe include: 
Brasz, A.H. 1963. ‘Some Notes on the Sociology of Corruption’, Sociologica Neerlandica, Vol.1 (2): 117-
125; Eschenburg, Theodor. 1964. Zur politischen Praxis in der Bundesrepublik. Munich:Piper. Much of the 
literature related with corruption in United States has been reviewed in: Key, V.O.1961. Politics, Parties, 
and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell. Other relevant works on American corruption include: Ford, J. 
Henry. 1904. ‘Municipal Corruption’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.19: 673-686; Wilson, Q. 
James.1966. ‘Corruption: The Shame of the States’, The Public Interest, Vol.2: 28-38; Speed, J.G. 1905. ‘ 
The Purchase of Votes’, Harper’s Weekly, Vol.49 (1): 386-387; Hofstadter, R.1955.The Age of Reform 
.New York: Vintage; Hutchinson, J.1970. The Imperfect Union: a history of corruption in American trade 
unions.  New York: Dutton; Gardiner, A.J.1970. The Politics of Corruption: organised crime in an 
American city.(New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Some of the more recent works include: Alt, E. James 
and Lassen, D. David. 2002. The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States. 
Copenhagen: EPRU. 
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Apparently this inattention was attributed to the underlying assumption on the part of 
western scholars that corruption is a problem peculiar to the transitional societies and as 
these societies will eventually move towards their logical goal i.e. the emulation of the 
western democratic system this problem will eventually disappear by itself. Paul 
Heywood described it as: 
Much western political science in the 1960s and early 1970s was characterised by 
a certain confidence, bordering on condescension, in regard to high level political 
corruption: essentially a problem of under-developed and non-democratic nations, 
its control and eradication depended upon institutional design, with liberal 
democracy providing the model towards which developing nations would make 
(inevitable) progress. 
(Heywood 1997: 435) 
Corruption being a social, psychological, economic and political phenomenon has not 
received much attention, even today, from any of the mentioned academic disciplines 
except economics; as major bulk of the available research on corruption is related to the 
economic dimensions of this universal phenomenon. During the last two decades, 
considerable research has been done on the causes, consequences and the impact of 
corruption from the developmental economic perspective. It is rather difficult to 
investigate corruption owing to the inherent elements of secrecy and stealth associated 
with the phenomenon. Probably that is one of the reasons for the scarcity of the literature 
on the very nature of the problem. The socio-psychological investigations of this human 
behaviour are still far from exhaustive. Similar is the case regarding the realm of political 
science, which has paid limited attention to this subject, which in its extreme forms can 
even be a potential threat to the very existence of the state. This so far neglected approach 
will be expatiated upon in detail during the course of this dissertation. Commenting on 
the lack of attention from the political scientists, Joseph Nye stipulated, ‘Corruption, 
some say, is endemic in all governments. Yet it has received remarkably little attention 
from students of government’ (Nye, 1967:417). He has attributed this deficit to the 
moralistic strings attached with the topic along with the fact that the issue deals with the 
sphere, where the interests of politicians and political scientists are likely to clash. David 
Bayley also expressed his surprise on the lack of attention, given to the role and the 
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effects of corruption within the developing world and pointed out, a ‘perverse pleasure’ 
which, both the western as well as the local observers derive by brooding upon the 
amount of prevalent corruption in the developing societies and having a tendency of 
being content only with deploring its existence. He observed that ‘there has been a 
significant absence of analysis about the effects which corruption has in fact upon 
economic development, nascent political institutions, and social attitudes’ (Bayley, 
1966:719) 
Most of the earlier research about corruption has dealt with the issue more from a holistic 
angle trying to simultaneously analyse all the three vital aspects of: the causes, the impact 
and the control of corruption.43 It was not until late 1980s that specific research on the 
above-mentioned three aspects of corruption individually became the topic of the 
academic research. A significant start in the direction of exclusively focused studies was 
Klitgaard’s 1988 book ‘Controlling Corruption,’ which specifically concentrated on the 
practical ways and means of combating corruption effectively and efficiently. Since then 
numerous studies have been conducted, dealing with the one vital aspect of corruption at 
a time.44  
Scholarship on corruption, in the discipline of political science, can easily be divided into 
two opposing school of thoughts: functionalists or revisionists and their opposing group 
moralists or post-functionalists. While the former school, led by scholars like Leff 
(1964), Bayley (1966), and Huntington (1968), emphasises the possible positive role of 
corruption, the latter school of thought, championed by scholars like Myrdal (1968), 
Alatas (1968), Klitgaard (1988), Alam (1989), and Mauro (1995) challenges the 
functionalist for their opportunistic rationalisations and believes that the accumulative 
detrimental effects of corruption in a society, grossly outweigh its beneficial side effects, 
if there are any. 
                                                 
43 Prominent studies in this regard are Wraith and Simpkins (1963), Monterio (1966), Myrdal (1968), and 
Palmier (1985). 
44 There have been numerous such studies, especially within the discipline of economics, but few of the 
more important one includes Mauro (1995 & 1997), Ades and Di Tella (1997), Kaufmann (1998), Rose-
Ackerman (1996 & 1997), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Murphy et al. (1991), Johnson et al. (1997), and 
Gupta et al. (1998). 
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2.2 Functionalists or Revisionists School of Thought 
The Functionalist or revisionist school of thought was developed in the 1960s, mostly 
through literature on political and economic development of changing or the transitional 
societies. The Functionalists had a sympathetic view of corruption and regarded it to be 
an inherent feature of the normal life cycle of these societies. They considered corruption 
as a functional dysfunction and challenged the moralists’ beliefs of corruption being a 
malady, ultimately destructive for the fabric of society and the development of the state. 
The Functionalists believed corruption to be an outcome of the conflict between the 
indigenous traditional values and the alien norms of the modern bureaucracy. Most 
prominent followers of this school include: Myron Weiner (1962), Nathaniel Leff (1964), 
David Bayley (1966), Joseph Nye (1967), and Samuel Huntington (1968). The 
Functionalist or Revisionists did not propagate or support corruption, they rather 
disagreed with the moralistic strings attached with the phenomenon of corruption and 
challenged the axiomatic belief of the moralists’ that if corruption has to have any effect 
on the development of socio-economic systems, it has to be negative. The Revisionists 
believed on the possibility of otherwise; and tend to emphasise on the positive side of 
corruption by suggesting, ‘corruption serves in part at least a beneficial function in 
developing societies’ (Bayley 1966:719).  
The Revisionist scholarship of political science can be traced back to the structural-
functionalist school of sociology and anthropology of the 1950s. Robert Merton (1949), a 
well-known sociologist, particularly influenced the development of revisionist school of 
thought in 1960s. While discussing the raison d’être of the corrupt political machines in 
the mid 20th century United States, Merton observed, ‘the functional deficiencies of the 
official structures generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfil existing needs 
somewhat more effectively’ (1961:73). He further enlisted some important functions 
performed by these corrupt machines in the United States. First, in a detached society it 
humanises and personalises the assistance to those in need; second, it serves as an 
interface for the relations between the public and the private business; third, it provides 
alternative channels of social mobility for the otherwise disadvantaged groups and 
sections of society. Concluding the discussion on the manifest and latent functions of 
corrupt machines and the inefficacy and often-transitory life span of the political reforms, 
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he observed, ‘any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing 
adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the 
abolished organisation is doomed to failure’ (Merton 1961:81). Later it will be discussed 
how these functionalist ideas of Merton influenced the thinking of some prominent 
political scholars like Bayley (1966) and Scott (1969).  
Scholars of the revisionist school, further influenced by the developmental approach of 
the 1960s, believed that corruption is just a price, which has to be paid for certain 
advantages. The Functionalist’s interpretation of this social phenomenon is based on four 
basic theoretical premises: first, corruption is inevitable during the process of 
modernisation and development; second, corruption is a functional influence in the 
political and economic development; third, it is an individual action committed by the 
few immoral officials for their individualistic gains; and finally, it is a self destructive 
process (Werner 1983:146). 
Nathaniel Leff (1964) along with Samuel Huntington (1968) is among the most well 
known and widely quoted scholars of the functionalist school of thought. Leff was 
probably the first writer who had unequivocally presented the positive side of corruption 
in his famous article Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption. He 
defined corruption as ‘an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain 
influence over the actions of bureaucracy’ (Leff, 1964:8). Another important 
functionalist, Joseph Nye, who attempted to evaluate the consequences of corruption, 
defined corruption as a ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence’ (Nye 1967:419). Though Leff analysed only bribery – which he defined as ‘the 
practice of buying favours from the bureaucrats’ – (Leff 1964:8) as the most prominent 
manifestation of corruption, yet the conclusions he had drawn were very interesting as 
well as influential. He is of the view that the little data available about corruption is 
mainly provided by declared opponents of corruption, and this widespread condemnation 
of the issue has made its objective analysis very difficult. Questioning the chain of 
reasoning central to the moralist view of corruption i.e., development- bureaucracy- 
efficiency- probity, he indicates that for both the bureaucracies and the governments of 
 65
 
the developing countries, economic development might not be of top most priority. He 
further argues that most critique on corruption stems from this assumption that 
‘government and civil service of underdeveloped countries are working intelligently and 
actively to promote economic development, only to be thwarted by the efforts of 
grafters,’ which might not always be the case (Leff 1964:10). 
 
2.2.1 Corruption as a Catalyst for Modernisation 
According to the functionalist school every modernising society is susceptible to 
corruption, as was the case with most of the developed societies of the West, which had 
reached the pinnacle of moral improbity during the process of their modernisation. 
Functionalists like Huntington – who defined corruption as a ‘behaviour of public 
officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends’ – believed in 
the inevitability of corruption during the process of modernisation in the transitional 
societies (Huntington 1968:59). He forwarded three major reasons for why modernisation 
breeds corruption. First, modernisation changes the basic values of society causing a 
conflict between modern and traditional norms thus providing ‘opportunities for 
individuals to act in ways justified by neither’. Second, the modernisation creates new 
sources of power and wealth; the relationship of these sources with the politics is 
undefined in the traditional norms, and the dominant classes of society hitherto do not 
accept the modern norms concerning this relationship Resultantly, corruption may 
become the means for the integration of these new groups in the political arena by 
irregular means. Third, modernisation contributes to corruption by expanding the 
authority of the government and the ‘multiplication of the activities subjected to 
governmental regulation’; thus the increase in laws in modernising societies enhances the 
possibilities of corruption in such societies (Huntington 1968: 59-62). However, though 
he proposed corruption to be rampant during the modernising process, yet he claimed that 
the modernisation would ultimately bring an end to the very phenomenon of corruption. 
The developing countries, therefore, were assumed to permit corruption as a usual part of 
the national maturation cycle (Werner, 1983:147).  
In his study of the bureaucratic corruption in the developing nations another functionalist 
Dwivedi (1967) tried to answer the questions that whether corruption is a catalyst during 
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the course of modernisation and whether it has some constructive character. Though he 
examined these questions particularly from the Indian perspective, yet the conclusions he 
had drawn could be generalised to other developing countries as well. Based on his 
analysis of a series of restrictive laws, passed by the legislatures in India, in an attempt to 
regulate individual monopolies, divulging financial structure of the press, and to regulate 
the syndicalism, Dwivedi argued that corruption helps in the survival of the voluntary 
organisations and interest groups (1967:251). These groups would have disappeared from 
the social scene – had there not been the opportunity to work their way through improper 
means – due to the strict and literal implementation of the laws by the bureaucracy; 
notwithstanding the fact, that these laws and regulation were originally passed by the 
colonial legislators to regulate the individual monopolies and the freedom of association. 
Furthermore Bayley (1966), while elaborating the utility of corruption for the transitional 
societies suggested that people of such societies might have more trust in a system they 
can manipulate than the one they do not know how to influence. Thus corruption can be a 
necessary transitional device for such societies. 
Huntington (1968) also proposed an interesting theory of corruption as an exchange of 
political action for the economic wealth. According to this theory in the societies where 
there are multiple opportunities for the accumulation of wealth, and few positions of 
political power, the pattern would be to use the wealth for obtaining the political power; 
as has been the case in the United States, where wealth has normally been used to obtain 
the political influence. In such societies the rules against using the public office to obtain 
the private profit, are much harsher and more generally adhered to than those against 
employing the private wealth to win the public office. In modernising or transitional 
societies, the reverse is usually the case. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth 
are limited because of the traditional norms, monopoly of the economic minorities or the 
foreign investors and companies. In such societies ‘politics becomes the road to wealth’ 
thus, opening enormous avenues of corruption for political actors (Huntington 1968:66). 
Wraith and Simpkins (1963) in their moralistic study of corruption in Africa, have also 
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discussed the relationship between corruption and wealth in great detail and have 
identified, power, wealth, and status as the three major contributors of corruption.45  
 
2.2.2 Corruption as a Safeguard against Revolution 
The bulk of Functionalist literature was produced in a period when the Cold War was at 
its hottest, and the containment of the communist expansion was the sine qua non of the 
every capitalist governmental policy. Revolution, per se, was considered as an indicator 
of the communist predilections in society. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all 
the functionalist writers have considerably emphasised on the relationship between 
corruption and revolution. Huntington argued that corruption could be an alternative to 
reform, and both reform and corruption could be an alternative to revolution, as the 
opportunities of corruption, seen as a compensation for otherwise lack of legitimate 
options for the economic well being, could mitigate the violent emotions of the aggrieved 
sections of society. He went on to argue that ‘corruption serves to reduce group pressure 
for policy changes, just as reform serves to reduce class pressure for structural changes’ 
(Huntington 1968: 64). A similar argument was made by Bayley (1966), who maintained 
that nepotistic job allocations in underdeveloped countries tame down the large number 
of half-educated unemployed masses, who otherwise would have a considerable 
revolutionary potential. Needler (1961) had also noted the important role corruption had 
played in the transition from the violent phases of a revolution in Mexico, to its less 
violent and more stable institutional forms. He had described how the heavy oil of graft 
in Mexico lubricated the clashing gears of interest, and how graft taking had facilitated 
the transition to the stable and orderly politics of the country. According to him, bribery 
or graft has been performing the same function in the earlier history of the United States 
and the 18th century England. He suggested that trouble-making potentials of a 
revolutionary leader could be controlled, by allowing him to profitable, not necessarily 
legal activities, as ‘those who have benefit by the status quo are hardly likely to seek to 
overthrow it’ (Needler 1961:311). A ploy still used by the present day military dictators, 
to ensure the unflinching support of the clique of generals, the political elite, and the civil 
                                                 
45 Wraith and Simpkins basically belong to Moralist school of thought; for detailed discussion of their 
thesis and the major findings of their study please see the next section of this chapter. 
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bureaucracy. Huntington made similar assertion when he noted ‘He who corrupts a 
system’s police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the 
system’s police station’ (1968:64). Dwivedi (1967) who primarily supported corruption 
as a catalyst for modernisation also favoured corruption as a means to avoid revolution: 
As long as businessmen and villagers can obtain what they want from local 
administration through the payment of money, there is less likelihood of the 
revolution of rising frustrations than if those who can and wish to offer money 
discover that ascriptive considerations are more decisive.  
(Dwivedi 1967:253) 
Viewed in the light of rational actor model, developed earlier in this dissertation, such a 
situation will leave the agent to choose between ‘money’ and ‘approval’; and agent’s 
decision will be determined by his perception of both in a particular setting. According to 
Dwivedi, agent’s preference for money will be less detrimental, as compared to his 
penchant for ascriptive considerations in the form of approval from his clique, for the 
maintenance of social order and avoidance of revolution.  
 
2.2.3 Corruption as Political Stabiliser 
Expounding the relationship between corruption and political stability, Huntington (1968) 
had suggested that it depends upon the incidence of corruption. Generally, the scale of 
corruption (value of corruption) increases with the upward movement in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, while the incidence of corruption (frequency of corruption) varies from society 
to society. Mostly the incidence of corruption is higher at the lower level of bureaucracy, 
while in some societies it remains constant or even increases as one moves up the 
bureaucratic ladder. In such societies, stability depends on the chances of vertical 
mobility; as long as the lower level officers can see the chances for moving up and 
sharing the bounty of corruption, they will support the system, but if there is no such 
prospect, they will try to overthrow the system. He further pointed out that in the 
developed world and in some developing societies like India, the scale and the incidence 
of corruption are inversely linked. An important factor for such societies is the presence 
of a fairly strong national political institution that trains the upcoming political leaders 
into a code of values. This pattern enhances the stability of the political system.  
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Huntington’s emphasis on the chances of vertical mobility as a prerequisite for political 
stability appears, somewhat similar to the above quoted argument of Needler, (1961) 
asserting that the beneficiaries of a system are very unlikely to try to destabilise the 
system. In addition, for Bayley (1966), one of the important benefits of corruption is the 
political stability. According to him corruption, by means of a common interest in the 
spoils, breeds political unity among the political players; moreover, when political 
channels are blocked corruption provides access to the government’s affairs and such 
opportunity to access is essential for the stability of the system. 
 Ascertaining the relationship between corruption and the political development Nye 
(1967) observed that corruption can be beneficial in the political development by 
contributing to the solution of three major problems vital to the issue: economic 
development, national integration, and the governmental capacity. He outlined three 
general prerequisites, which have to be present, for the positive effects of corruption to 
outweigh the negatives in any society. First, a tolerant culture along with the power of the 
group who is tolerant towards corruption, second, the degree of security for the part of 
the members of the elite being corrupted46 and third, the existence of societal and 
institutional checks on corrupt behaviour. Nye observed that high-level corruption could 
prove beneficial for the development of the traditional societies if: the forms of 
inducements involved in corrupt transactions are modern, like money; and if the 
deviations, made from the generally accepted code of conduct, are not very conspicuous. 
He developed an extensive cost-benefit matrix of corruption, and analysing the pros and 
cons related to the issue, concluded that ‘it is probable that the cost of corruption in less 
developed countries will exceed its benefit except for top level corruption involving 
modern inducements and marginal deviations and except for situation where corruption 
provides the only solution to an important obstacle to development’ (Nye, 1967:427) 
                                                 
46 Similar point was also stressed by, Scott, C. James. 1969. ‘ The Analysis of Corruption in Developing 
Nations’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 11(3): 315-341, when he observed that 
insecurity of tenure paves the way for rapacious chaos and renter behaviour of profit maximisation in a 
limited time regardless of the long-term effects. Quoting from the experiences of urban political machines 
of United States he has cited the example of Chicago at the turn of last century where ruling elite were not 
sure about their length of tenure leading to chaos of such proportions that it threatened the ‘goose that laid 
the golden egg’. While at the same time the Ashbridge Machine in Philadelphia having a broader time 
horizon had effectively control and directed corruption to safeguard its own long run interests, showing 
some concern for the health of the goose as well. P-338 
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Huntington condoned the bureaucratic corruption on the grounds that, if channelised in 
the interests of political parties, such corruption could be an instrument of the strong 
political organisations, which are an inevitable prerequisite for the eradication of 
corruption. He asserted that the strong political parties are either developed through the 
revolution from below or through the patronage from the bureaucracy, like the Congress 
party in post-colonial India and Republican Peoples Party in post First World War 
Turkey. Though bureaucratic corruption is rationalised in favour of the strong political 
institutions, yet it has a self-destructionary relationship with the political organisations as 
‘corruption varies inversely with political organisation, and to the extent that corruption 
builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence’ (Huntington 1968: 71). 
A similar argument was forwarded earlier by Nye (1967) who argued that corruption may 
act as a facilitator for the development of supporting institutions of the government, like 
political parties, by solving their vital problem of the insufficient finances, which could 
cause the ruin of the political parties and ultimately the decay of the political culture. 
While developing his argument in favour of corruption as a catalyst for promoting 
integration among the elite and non-elite segment of society Nye had observed that it 
might reduce the divisions between the two different groups of elites: one based on power 
and the other based on wealth. Corruption could also promote integration and 
assimilation among the non-elite segment of society by softening the relationship 
between the officials and the general public, secondly it can lessen the overwhelming awe 
for the government representatives held in the hearts of common man (Nye 1967:420). 
From a socio-political angle, corruption according to Bayley is a means for reducing the 
alienation of the individuals and groups, otherwise excluded from the power struggle, by 
giving them a stake in the system.47 He further argues that, corruption supplements the 
                                                 
47 James Scott (1969) made a similar point by indicating that when a minority is discriminated they may 
find corruption of politicians and bureaucrats as an effective mean to safe guard their interests without 
jeopardising the little political standing, which they might have. Scott has quoted the example of the 
Chinese business community in Thailand who, by the fact of being a minority, were impelled to make 
payments to the strategically placed power holders for protecting and furthering their business interests (P-
327). However, both Scott and Bayley seem to be influenced by the sociological structural-functionalist 
ideology of the Robert Merton who, while describing the functional nature of American corrupt political 
machines, observed “A third set of distinctive functions fulfilled by the political machine for a special 
subgroup is that of providing alternative channels of social mobility for those excluded from the more 
conventional avenues for personal advancement” (Merton 1961:76). 
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political system by allowing non-violent entry into the government affairs.48 Likewise, in 
highly striated transitional societies, common interest in corruption works as a cohesive 
force between the members of a political party ensuring political unity. And finally 
corruption increases the political stability by enhancing the awareness and responsiveness 
of the generally closed bureaucracy to the individual and group needs, resultantly joining 
the bureaucracy with politicians in a network of self-interest. 
Dwivedi (1967) asserts that an outside incentive or financial inducement helps softening 
the extremely centralised decision-making process, which is normally based on very 
stringent rules and regulations, suppressing the ability of individual initiative within the 
ranks of bureaucracy. He has condoned corruption if it helps in solving the problem of 
regional and communal representation in public service and educational institutions in 
developing countries. Citing the example of Pakistan he has suggested that ‘merit-cum-
ascriptive criteria’ should be adopted for recruitment in government service, if 
marginalised regions and classes are to be integrated in the political process of these 
countries. 
 
2.2.4 Corruption as Grease for the Wheel of Economy 
The most conspicuous aspect of the functionalists, which renders novelty and uniqueness 
to their approach, is their belief in the utility of corruption as a lubricant for the rusty 
wheel of transitional economies. They have forwarded multiple arguments in the defence 
of above narrated thesis. Among other things, functionalists presume true that the 
practices like speed money provide the corrupt individuals with the incentive to work 
harder and with celerity. Furthermore, corruption can contribute to the economic 
development of the state, when resorting to corruption can cut bureaucratic red tape. 
Weiner (1962) while discussing the functions of corruption in India has suggested that by 
bribing the officials businessmen could get those things done which would have taken a 
long time otherwise. He further asserts ‘…that efforts to influence local administration, 
even through widespread corruption are not wholly detrimental to political, and perhaps 
                                                 
48 Views expressed by Huntington (1965) in his article, ‘Political Development and Political Decay’ were 
agreed and quoted by James Scott (1969), saying that those who considered that their vital interests are 
ignored or considered illegitimate in the formal political system may find it easy that their unrepresentative 
interests may enter unobtrusively through the back door.  
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even to economic, development’ (1962:235). Huntington believes that corruption may be 
one mean of ‘surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations, which hamper 
economic expansion’ (1968:68). Commenting on the same issue, Leys has observed that 
where bureaucracies are extensive and inefficient, the provision of some personal 
incentive to the bureaucrats to avoid the red tape may be the only possible way to do 
business in such societies (1965: 223). Regarding link between corruption and economic 
development, functionalists argue that corruption among the higher ranks of bureaucracy 
could improve the economic development, if the accumulated wealth by unfair means is 
reinvested in the same country (Leys, 1965, Bayley, 1966 and Nye, 1967). Josef Nye 
maintained that corruption has probably played a positive role in the economic 
development of both Russia and America. Regarding general positive impact of 
corruption on economic development, he suggested that corruption could contribute to 
economic development by facilitating capital formation, removing red tape, and by 
increasing the incentive for entrepreneurship (Nye, 1967:419-420). Referring to the 
corruption and capital formation, Bayley points out that the upper echelons of the public 
bureaucracy being the educated elite, might have a better ability and tendency to invest in 
the more productive enterprises than the common man who bribes them (Bayley 
1966:728). 
Both Nye and Bayley conditioned their arguments regarding corruption, as a source of 
capital formation on the fact that the capital accumulated through corrupt means should 
be reinvested in the same country, a condition hardly fulfilled by the mega corrupters of 
the present day developing world. These mega corrupters, who are fully aware of the 
fragility of the system they are working in and its susceptibility to disintegration, have 
developed a rather unanimous liking for the offshore Swiss accounts and investment 
opportunities in the more stable parts of the world.49 Emphasising the same trend and the 
                                                 
49 Between 1954 and 1959, three Latin American dictators, Peron, Perez Jimenez and Batista had been 
believed to have removed 1.5 billion dollars from their countries. A presidential commission appointed in 
Philippines estimated Swiss bank accounts held by Marcos at 5 billion dollars, see E.Lieuwen, Arms and 
Politics in Latin America (New York: 1960) p-149 and E. Mydans, “Manila’s No.1 Conglomerate: Panel 
Seizing Marcos Wealth”, New York Times (Feb.9, 1987): 1, both quoted in Alam, M. Shahid. 1989. 
‘Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment’, American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology, Vol.48 (4): 441-456. Two of the Latin American presidents had directly 
appropriated 700 million and 400 million dollars respectively. One deceased dictator had amassed an 
amount exceeding 1000 million dollars. Andreski, Stanislav. 1966. Parasitism and Subversion. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, quoted in Alatas (1968).  
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relationship between improperly accumulated wealth and the economic development of 
the country Colin Leys observed: 
… much will turn on how such wealth is redeployed. If political leaders try to buy 
security by depositing their wealth in the numbered accounts in Swiss banks it 
represents a wholly negative drain on the economy. (But perhaps they will buy 
farms and make them very productive.) 
(Leys 1965:229) 
Huntington holds somewhat similar views as Bayley and Nye about the link between 
corruption and economic development but he has not conditioned his argument on the 
lines of above two authors. He is of the view that corruption may be one method of 
prevailing over the conservative traditional laws or inflexible bureaucratic rules and 
regulations, which obstruct the economic expansion of the state. Discussing the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth, he has commented: 
In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, 
overcentralised, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralised, honest 
bureaucracy. A society which is relatively incorrupt – a traditional society for 
instance where traditional norms are still powerful – may find a certain amount of 
corruption a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernisation. A developed 
traditional society may be improved – or at least modernised – by a little 
corruption; a society in which corruption is already pervasive, however, is 
unlikely to be improved by more corruption. 
(Huntington 1968: 69) 
Moralist literature on corruption has often misquoted this passage of Huntington by 
referring to it out of the context in which it is really intended, resultantly portraying him 
as an ardent supporter of corruption. Moreover, statements like “corruption is the grease 
for the wheel of economy” or “corruption works as lubricant in economic growth” are 
often attributed to his name without much contextualisation.50 However, when viewed in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
   
50 Moralist literature on corruption has multiple examples where similar statements are attributed to the 
Functionalist or Revisionist school of thought, especially Huntington. Some of the more prominent ones are 
Ghosh (2002), Mauro (1995) and Alam (1989). 
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the proper context it is evident that even for a functionalist like Huntington more 
corruption in an already corrupt society is hardly an ideal worth defending.  
While discussing the positive side of corruption Leff (1964) viewed that considering the 
bureaucratic role in the economic enterprise of less developed countries, graft may not 
only induce the government to take steps favourable for economic growth but it can also 
provide the direct incentive needed for the mobilisation of the bureaucracy for 
meaningful actions on behalf of the entrepreneurs. Moreover, by reducing the risk and 
uncertainty of the whimsical decision-making and enhancing the predictability of the 
future policies, graft or corruption can increase rate of investment in a certain society. He 
further asserts that corruption could also facilitate the establishment of any innovator in 
the economic arena who otherwise would have to face serious opposition from the 
current or existing economic interests. He believes that corruption can also work as a 
shield against the ill-conceived policies of the governments and can ensure that not all 
would be lost in case a government keeps on pursuing in the wrong direction. Refuting 
the general assumption about corruption as an impediment to tax collection, which is 
necessary for the proper implementation of developmental policies, he argues that higher 
budgetary receipts are often used in non-developmental expenditure like buying military 
hardware. If an entrepreneur is a better investor than the government, the money evaded 
from the tax authorities is more of a gain than a loss to development (Leff 1964:12). 
Proposing corruption as a source of economic competition in the market, Leff says, that 
corruption is a transaction and its supplies are limited so a competition is generated 
among the aspirants of the favour, which must go ‘to the most efficient producers, for 
they will be able to make the highest bids, which are compatible with remaining in the 
industry’ (Ibid: 9). Consequently in the long run the favours will go to the most efficient 
producers as they will be able to make the highest bids (a thesis which was later refuted 
by various moralist studies)51 and losing firms will make efforts to increase their 
efficiency so they can generate resources to win the favour next time and to remain in the 
business. However, at the end he made his support for corruption somehow conditional 
when he says: 
                                                 
51 Please see Alam’s criticism of this allocative efficiency approach in the next section under Moralist 
School of Thought. And also in the same section see Dor’s critique on the economic-market argument of 
the functionalists.  
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… under certain conditions, the consequences of corruption for development are 
not as serious as usually assumed. At the same time, it may have important 
positive effects that are often over looked…. When the conditions of our model 
do not obtain, however, corruption will be an important barrier to development. 
(Leff 1964:13)  
Similarly elucidating the positive side of corruption David Bayley (1966) was probably 
the first one to enlist nine distinct beneficial effects of different corrupt acts. He 
maintains that governments do not have a monopoly upon correct decisions and they can 
do ‘stupid things’ (1966: 727). A similar argument was made earlier by Leff (1964) who 
is of the view that governments of underdeveloped countries are primarily concerned 
with maintaining the status quo instead of economic development. Bayley further 
elaborates that under such conditions; corruption may serve as a means for selection of 
better choices even in terms of the goals set by the government itself. In addition to this 
in a low public wages environment, corruption ensures the supply of able and talented 
public servants that, in absence of the opportunity of corruption, might have chosen any 
other field due to the lack of legal financial reward associated with the public service. 
However, Bayley refrained from passing any categorical judgment in favour of 
corruption, he rather concluded: 
…it is impossible to determine firmly and precisely how the positive and negative 
effects (of corruption) combine to produce an over-all thrust along either 
dimension. It is clear, though, that corruption is an accommodative device…. But 
the analysis has also shown that the net effects of corruption practices upon 
economic development are not always, or necessarily, of a baneful nature. 
  (Bayley 1966:730) 
Bayley (1966) had also established that corruption could be a mean for the people with 
economic power, facing an unfavourable person or regime, to make the system work in 
their favour by illicit influences. James Scott (1969) further elaborated this assertion by 
citing the example of the Chinese business elite in Thailand who by virtue of being a 
communal minority, are denied any formal position of authority; so, they have developed 
very stable ‘connections’ with the civil-military bureaucracy of Thailand to safeguard and 
promote their entrepreneurial concerns. However, Scott has also adopted a careful tone 
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while ascertaining the direct effects of corruption on the economic development of 
transitional societies: 
Determining empirically who gets what from corruption depends in large part on 
the nature of both political system and the political elite…. Quite clearly, it is 
impossible to ascertain the effects of corruption on political integration, income 
distribution or economic growth without first asking who benefits in what way 
from what kinds of corruption. 
(Scott 1969:340)  
 
2.2.5 Corruption as a Form of Political Influence 
Functionalists have also seen corruption rather, as one of the many forms of political 
influence than as a misuse of public office in violation of community norms. James Scott 
(1969) has elaborated in detail how corruption in less developed countries fills the 
vacuum created by the absence of pressure-group politics: political influence exerted by 
organised groups, to press policy formulation in a certain direction before legislation is 
passed. The influence at the enforcement stage has often been labelled as corruption and 
is being paid little attention to, as an alternative means of interest articulation. He has 
made a strong case in favour of corruption as an efficient mean for advancing one’s 
interest at the stage of policy implementation rather than the at the formulation stage. 
Corruption minimises the cost of exerting political influence in situations: where 
compressed loyalties or insufficient organisational skills impede the formation of any 
pressure groups, where attenuated links between legislation and policy implementation 
exist, and where a minority is discriminated and its rightful political demands are viewed 
as illegitimate by the governing elite and the rest of the majority. In less developed 
countries according to Scott, corruption is the means of representation for various 
excluded groups in ultimate policy results. Analysing the beneficiaries of corruption in 
developing nations he suggested that it is a complex task but it will largely depend on 
three factors: the openness or restrictiveness of access to corruption, the presence or 
absence of competitive electoral system and the stability and security of the political elite 
(1969:329). While distinguishing between ‘parochial corruption’ (where ties of kinship, 
caste, clan, etc. determine access to the favour of power-holders) and ‘market corruption’ 
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(where favours are accorded on impersonal grounds to those who pay), Scott observed 
that beneficiaries in the former would be the people with connections and the latter will 
most likely benefit from the wealth of the elites of theses societies (Ibid: 330). This 
classification holds true in case of Pakistan where ‘parochial corruption’ is prevalent in 
villages, small towns and cities benefiting the feudal and landed aristocracy; while 
‘market corruption’ is the norm in metropolitan centres where favours are generally 
extended to the highest bidder.   
 
2.2.6 Control of Corruption 
Regarding control of corruption, functionalists like Huntington maintain that corruption 
is a product of modernisation and particularly the increase of political consciousness and 
participation. Long-term control of corruption needs the organisation and structuring of 
that participation and the political parties could mainly perform this function. Leff (1964) 
believes that control of corruption not only requires competitive politics but also 
emergence of new centres of power outside the sphere of bureaucracy and such changes, 
if occurred, will happen only after long period of economic and social development. 
Bayley (1966) had offered three strategies for the control of corruption in transitional 
societies: passive, coercive and psychological strategy. The passive approach suggests 
that effort should be made to control the grosser forms of corruption while waiting for the 
changing circumstances to reduce or even eliminate the functional utility of such 
activities. The second option proposes that corruption may be eradicated immediately 
without any delay or regret and the state should be prepared for controlling the 
repercussion of such strong action. Finally, the psychological approach suggests that 
inculcating in the masses the ideas like national interest, sacrifice and dedication, in a 
way to reduce the temptation of corruption for both corrupter and corrupt may help in 
reshaping the public opinion and character. In a nutshell, this amounts to substituting the 
present particularistic set of values with a new more universalistic one. This rather 
simplistic approach fails to enunciate the means to achieve this desirable end; 
functionalist literature, per se, does not offer many answers to this query. 
According to functionalists, corruption is most prevalent in states, which lack effective 
political parties, and in societies where particularistic interest, i.e., interest of the 
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individuals, families, the groups or the clan predominates universalistic or collective 
interests. ‘Corruption will persist until universalistic norms predominate over 
particularistic attitudes’. (Leff 1964:13) In transitional societies the weaker the political 
parties would be, the higher would be the chances of corruption. Scott and Huntington 
share the same opinion regarding prevalence of corruption in transitional or developing 
societies; seen as an informal means of political influence, corruption is expected to be 
rampant in times, when a formal political system is unable to cope with the scale or 
nature of demands made on it (Scott 1969:328). 
 
2.2.7 Functionalist Critique of Moralists 
Functionalist criticisms of the moralist approach towards the problem of corruption 
concentrate on moralists’ believe of corruption being against the public interest; Colin 
Leys (1965), another functionalist, argues: but what is public interest? According to him, 
there is a possibility that public interest may sometimes need some of these corrupt 
practices. He is of the opinion that the political role of corruption is to bring together, the 
otherwise divergent element of a society into a body politic, in the early life of a nation, 
called ‘the persistent integrative needs of society’ (Leys 1965: 220). Arguing against the 
moralists believe that the economic price paid for obtaining any beneficial effect of 
corruption is too heavy to be considered; he maintains that spending public money 
properly is not a guarantee for it to be beneficial to the marginal sections of society. 
Furthermore, questioning the moralists’ concern, that anything that heightens inequality 
cannot be in the public interest, he argues by quoting the example of former Soviet Union 
– who had to forgo the ideal of equality in order to achieve development – that 
development and equality are incompatible ideals. However, he admits that not all sort of 
inequality produced by all kind of corruption is beneficial from developmental 
perspective. Nevertheless, he unequivocally challenges the moralists’ assumption that all 
sorts of inequalities are invariably detrimental to development, and maintains that it is 
natural but wrong to assume that the consequences of corruption are always both bad and 
important. 
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2.3 The Moralist School of Thought 
Notwithstanding all the inherent shortcomings of revisionist school of thought, its 
foremost contribution was that it paved the way to more serious and academic 
investigations regarding corruption by challenging the conventional mode of thinking, 
which was pejorative and based on outright condemnation of the phenomenon. Prior to 
emergence of revisionist school of thought, corruption as a subject was deemed 
inappropriate and not a very respectable topic for serious research. The functionalist 
school of corruption mostly developed in the 1960s and by the start of the 1970s, it 
started to come under severe criticism by scholars, mainly due to: its inadequate research, 
intellectual inconsistencies, extreme generalisation and the faulty line of reasoning. An 
anti-thesis of the functionalist ideology known as post-functionalists, developed in 1970s. 
This post-functionalist, generally known as moralist school of thought (mostly by the 
opponents of this approach), interprets corruption from moralistic point of view and does 
not believe in the possibility of corruption having any positive or desirable effect on the 
socio-political and economic development of any society. Contrary to functionalist 
believe of corruption as a functional and self-destructionary phenomenon, post-
functionalists consider corruption, dysfunctional and self-perpetuating in nature. Post-
functionalists argue that even assuming the functional nature of corruption, the question 
arises that at what point less developed countries will be developed enough that 
corruption would be no more functional for them (Dor 1974:68). Secondly, if corruption 
is indeed a catalyst for modernisation, then functionalist theory should also explain the 
actual dynamics of the evolution and the kind of these new norms (Caiden and Caiden 
1977:305). Moralists believe that functionalist’s claims are without any empirical 
evidence or foundation hence not trustworthy. They further suggest that functionalists’ 
ideology of corruption originates from two sources: the inability to see the systemic 
character of corruption and an unwillingness to analyse its consequences in a dynamic 
perspective (Alam 1989: 441). Gerald Caiden and Naomi Caiden (1977) while studying 
administrative corruption observed that despite its apparent appeal, revisionist’s ideology 
suffers from serious misconceptions that arise mainly because, though dealing with a 
social behaviour, revisionists still think about it in individual terms, failing to realise the 
presence and significance of systemic corruption. According to them new research on 
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corruption could be more fruitful ‘than the historically inaccurate assumptions and often 
unfounded assertions of the revisionists, who have confused individual and systemic 
corruption’ (1977:308). Post-functionalists exhorted the state, society and the academic 
world against the delusionary myth of functional corruption and urged them to develop 
multi-dimensional strategies for fighting this malice successfully. 
Although scholars of political science as well as public administration always exhibited a 
moralistic penchant, this perspective about corruption attracted more attention after the 
development of a counter ideology in shape of functionalist approach. The resurgence of 
the moralist school in the last decade of the previous century coincides with the 
rekindling of scholarly interest in the phenomenon of corruption as a subject worth 
further investigation and research. Though scholars falling under this category are 
numerous, the few notable among the moralists are: Simcha Werner (1983), Robert 
Klitgaard (1988), Shahid Alam (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Paulo Mauro (1995), 
Rose-Ackerman (1997), and Daniel Kaufmann (1999). 
Prior to 1960s, there was an impression in the academic world that the question of 
corruption has solely been taken up by moralists (Leys 1965:216). 1960s was the decade 
when academic interest was mostly focused on the political and economic developmental 
problems of transitional and changing societies; this trend in academic world produced 
the functionalist view of corruption. There are few known moralistic studies of corruption 
related problems in the developing world of that era; Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins 
(1963), John B. Monteiro (1966), Alatas S. H. (1968), and Gunner Myrdal (1968) were 
few of such prominent studies. Wraith and Simpkins (1963) tried to find out the solution 
for rampant corruption in 20th century Africa, especially Nigeria, by embarking upon a 
historical study of corruption in 18th and 19th century Britain and the factors, which led 
the Victorian England to achieve an unprecedented standard of public integrity. Authors 
investigated, without much conclusive results, any patterns in the triumph of Victorian 
England, which could serve as a meaningful resource for the former colonies of England 
in Asia and Africa in their fight against corruption. 
Discussing the public life of newly independent states Wraith and Simpkins maintained 
that ‘a scarlet thread of bribery and corruption’ runs through the whole society and there 
is a ‘jungle of nepotism and temptation’, which turns the young enthusiastic civil servants 
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into cynics (Wraith and Simpkins 1963:11). At the same time they admitted that those 
who are fortunate enough to be in a position to secure some job for their relative, kin or 
friend and who are under an obligation to do so, would find it hard to agree to their 
moralising approach. However, the authors have openly expressed their conviction that 
the effects of corruption and all its allied forms are serious and bad. Authors maintain that 
economic effect of corruption on a country might not be very considerable ‘but by far the 
most serious loss is the loss of self-respect and the growth of frustration and cynicism’ 
(Ibid 1963:16-17). Dilating upon the motives, they view avarice as the primary, but by no 
means the only, motive behind corruption. Jacob van Klaveren (1957:40) expresses 
similar views when he asserts that root of corruption lies exclusively in the appetitus 
divitiarum infinitus, – the insatiable avarice is one of the human weaknesses. According 
to Wraith and Simpkins, three main pillars of the building of corruption in any society 
are: power, wealth and status. Any one of the three or a combination of these objectives, 
according to the authors, is at the core of every corrupt transaction no matter when, where 
and how such transaction is taking place. In many developing countries, leaders were 
deprived of all the three highly desirable instruments and a sudden advent of democratic 
system – initiated by the decolonisation – provided them with enormous opportunities to 
purchase wealth and status instead of utilising their political power efficiently. 
Wraith and Simpkins though have taken a sympathetic view of the petty forced 
corruption – forced, because of multiple reasons like debts, low wages, intolerable private 
pressure, etc. – yet they are unequivocally critical of corruption by elected representatives 
and holders of well-paid public office, who are neither pressurised by traditional values 
nor they have any problem in adopting western values of probity if they want to. 
Explaining the cause of such behaviour, authors assert: 
The simple cause is avarice; the wrong that is done is done in the full knowledge 
that it is wrong, for the concept of theft does not vary as between Christian and 
Muslims, African and European, or primitive man and Minister of the Crown. 
(Wraith and Simpkins 1963:45) 
John B. Monteiro (1966) in his study of corruption had tried to analyse the anatomy, 
dimensions and causes of corruption in India. His basic suggestion for establishment of a 
broad anti-corruption agency was based on the analysis of the Santhanam Committee’s 
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recommendation.52 Monteiro asserted that maladministration precedes corruption during 
the process of administration, so to control corruption maladministration should be 
checked first and to meet that purpose, appropriate channels for settling the grievances of 
individuals against the state, should be in place. Author gave considerable importance to 
the establishment of such channels as he went on to build his case for creation of an 
Ombudsman office in India by analysing the examples of American congressional 
investigations, French conseil D’ Etat and British independent tribunals for redressal of 
private grievances against the public officials. He, however, agreed with the proposition 
of functionalists that prevalence and size of corruption in different countries depends, 
inter alia, on the level of political and economic development of the country. Regarding 
the state of corruption, its cost and the dire need for its control in India, in particular and 
the developing world in general author asserted: 
It is no use burying our heads in the sand and pretending not to see corruption 
around. Neither is it of much value to go by the bills of health given by people 
like Dean Appleby, since such opinions given in particular contexts do not stand 
much strain and use in other contexts…While there is no doubt that in developing 
countries opportunities and temptations for corruption are greater, it is equally 
true that they cannot afford the cost of corruption and they must tackle the 
problem in right earnest. 
(Monteiro 1966:292) 
Alatas (1968), while attempting one of the early sociological analysis of the nature, 
functions, causes and control of corruption, is among the early ones who evaluated and 
criticised the functionalist approach of corruption, which was quite in vogue at that time. 
He has pointed out methodological shortcomings in the Leys’ (1965) treatment of the 
problem, and criticised him for favouring a relativistic position on the issues like 
                                                 
52 A very famous report, named after the Member of Parliament who was heading the committee Mr. K. 
Santhanam, and often quoted in the corruption literature related with India. The Santhanam committee was 
set up in June 1962 and it submitted its report in March 1964 with the main suggestions like amendment of 
the article 311 of the Indian Constitution, establishment of a Central Vigilance Commission, amendment of 
the government servant Conduct Rules especially with reference to the reemployment of the retired 
government officials by the private businessmen and the amendment of the Defence of India Bill 1962. The 
report is mostly known for its exhaustive and bold commentary on the state of corruption and 
maladministration in Indian public service and the exclusive list of recommendations for the government to 
consider. 
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‘beneficial’, ‘bad’ and ‘development’. While challenging the Leff’s (1964) argument of 
allocative efficiency of corruption, Alatas has pointed out that ‘the fittest who survives is 
not always the most efficient and competitive’ (1968:38). Elaborating the successful 
industries and firms of the underdeveloped world he is of the view that these businesses 
are not successful because of the corruption they practice, but due to their ability to 
maintain an efficient and rational approach coupled by sufficient capital and dedicated 
professionals. Alatas has accused functionalists for being biased in their selection of data 
as well as not being able to link their analysis with the different stages of corruption. 
Addressing the functionalists directly he says: 
Those who suggest the positive function of corruption in underdeveloped areas, 
apart from ignoring certain dimensions in contextual analysis, have also been 
guilty of bias in their selection of data…when the total effect of corruption on 
afflicted societies, whether in the economic, administrative, political or judicial 
realms is considered, no stretch of sociological imagination could ever succeed in 
suggesting that it has some positive function in development, except in the 
development of exploitation, inequality, and moral and legal disorder. 
(1968: 28-30) 
Post-functionalist literature of 1970s started to evaluate critically the theoretical tenets of 
functionalist school. They questioned the veracity of the argument that corruption is the 
dependent variable of the development, and instead argued that corruption is universal in 
nature and can thrive within any society during any stage of development. Multiple 
studies were conducted to analyse the various aspects of corruption and its relationship 
with different socio-political as well as economic indicators. Ben Dor (1974) argued that 
patron-client networks that resemble corruption could flourish at any level of political 
development or institutionalisation and has not much to do with only under developed or 
developing societies. Further studying the impact of institutionalisation on the level of 
corruption he asserted that too little or too much institutionalisation can also enhance 
corruption. Varma (1974), while studying the corruption and political development in 
India, analysed the impact of governmental control on the level of corruption in the state. 
He concluded that too much as well as too little government control tends to increase the 
corruption in any given state. Dobel (1978) suggested that socio-economic or political 
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inequalities in a given society determine its susceptibility to endemic corruption. 
Investigating the same relationship, Wildavsky (1979) found out that in less developed 
countries expanded governmental functions, while in more developed countries extensive 
welfare programs, provide major avenues for extensive corruption. 
Among the above-mentioned post functionalist literature most important is the analysis 
and critique of Ben Dor (1974) who has divided the functionalist school into three broad 
branches or categories according to their perceptions and treatment of corruption. The 
first category is strongly influenced by the Merton’s structural-functionalist school of 
sociology, the second is the group who treats corruption as an allocative market 
mechanism, and the third and the most significant school of revisionists is represented by 
Huntington and is termed as “Intuitionalists”. Ben Dor observes, while analysing the 
revisionist theses, that revisionists have undoubtedly improved over the earlier moralist 
school as they have connected the phenomenon of corruption to a crucially important 
element of time. However critically evaluating the different propositions of the 
functionalists Dor discusses, regarding Nye’s theses53 that at what level of development 
corruption will be no more functional. He points out that though less prominent, more 
discreet, and highly institutionalised, yet corruption is definitely present in the developed 
world and it seems to constitute a major political issue in developed countries like United 
States, Great Britain, France and Germany (Dor 1974:68). While reviewing the 
economic-market argument of Leff, Bayley and Scott in favour of corruption he asserts 
that none of their argument carries much weight, as their arguments are based on the 
assumption, which implies that corruption strongly correlates with the periods of rapid 
economic growth, yet that is not the case for economies like Japan and Germany. 
Furthermore, there is neither any evidence that capital accumulated through corruption 
goes into investment instead of consumption or further corruption, nor is there any 
indication that corruption facilitates the distribution of funds in a more imaginative, 
innovative or efficient manner. Denouncing the economic-market argument, of 
functionalist Dor observes that any such benefits of corruption “appear to be at best 
incidental rather than intended” (1974:71). 
                                                 
53 For detailed discussion of Joseph Nye’s argument regarding functionality of corruption during the early 
stages of development please see the previous section of the same chapter under the heading “Functionalist 
or Revisionist School of Thought”. 
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Arguing against the thesis that corruption furthers integration by preventing the alienation 
of various underprivileged groups from the government, by facilitating their participation 
in the political as well as decision-making process, Dor asserts that societal divisions are 
present in the developed world too. For this argument to hold ground the majority of 
corruption cases should involve the lower strata of society, furthermore after a certain 
degree of integration corruption should become dysfunctional. However, this does not 
appear to be the case, as most individuals involved in corrupt cases do not belong to the 
underprivileged section of society; rather they are policemen, politicians, businessmen, 
bureaucrats, and industrialists. This exclusiveness of the available opportunities of 
meaningful corruption rather intensifies the social divisions and aggravates the problems 
of integration instead of contributing to their solutions. Disagreeing with this integration 
argument of functionalists, Dor maintains that the facts indicate rather in the opposite 
direction (Dor 1974:74). 
While challenging the institutional argument of the functionalist like Huntington, Dor 
points out the fact that corrupt political machines functioned quite successfully in the 
developed countries despite the presence of an elaborate and developed party system. If 
Huntington’s thesis regarding corruption, being one measure of the lack of effective 
political institutionalisation, is taken as correct we would find it difficult to explain the 
existing – and at times even increasing scope and intensity of corruption in developed 
countries (Dor 1974:68). Dor admits that changing patterns of political participation 
might help in understanding the decreased tolerance of corrupt behaviours, but they fail 
to explain the reasons and character of corruption, existing prior to these new patterns of 
political participation. While analysing the functionalists’ institutional theory of 
corruption he argues, ‘It is most doubtful, therefore, that we can derive from the matrix of 
political development offered by Huntington a satisfactory explanation of continuing 
ubiquitous corruption.’ (Ibid: 76) He furthers his argument on institutionalisation by 
asserting that over institutionalisation – because of its very nature of too much self-
orientation, insulation from social forces and periphery’s inability to communicate with 
the centre – may also lead to different kinds of corruption. However, finally Dor also 
singles out the revisionist’s inability to see the dynamic nature of corruption when he 
concludes: 
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In all cases it seems that corruption plays very different roles at different stages of 
development and institutionalisation. However, the revisionist theories have by 
and large failed to account for the dynamic process by which corruption changes 
its character functions and dysfunctions at various stages of developmental 
continuum, nor have they been able to point out sharp discontinuities that 
delineate the boundaries of the stages of development as they relate to corruption. 
(Ibid: 81) 
Post-functionalists believed that corruption feeds on itself and hinders societal reform 
rendering it increasingly difficult to pursue those reforms, resultantly ‘more corruption is 
fostered as a remedy to existing corruption’ (Werner 1983:149). While highlighting the 
points of contention between functionalists of 1960s and post-functionalists of 1970, 
Simcha Werner (1983) offered some new directions in the study of administrative 
corruption. Corruption is not a stand-alone phenomenon, and its consequences on society 
should be viewed in totality. Following this theme Werner has enlisted tree kind of 
‘spillover’ effects of corruption: leader-follower spillover, dimensions of corruption 
spillover and institutional spillover. According to the first spillover effect the 
rationalisation of the corrupt behaviour increases its negative effects. Moreover corrupt 
behaviour of the leaders is certain to be emulated by his followers, notwithstanding that 
they are the members of his party or belong to the general public. The second spillover 
effect of corruption suggests that petty and borderline corruption, due to its ubiquitous 
prevalence, is often psychologically condoned and rationalised, which makes it a self-
perpetuating phenomenon. Resultantly this diminishing illegality of a certain type of 
corruption tends to contribute to the legitimisation of other types of corruptions in the 
long run. According to the third spillover effect, strong institutional corruption 
reproduces itself in other institutions because of the negligible substantive cost and 
considerable benefits associated with the action or as a successful competition tool. 
While analysing the political economy of underdevelopment Shahid Alam (1989) has 
authored a critique of functionalist literature on corruption. According to him 
functionalist fail to see that corruption tends to become the end of power and not only a 
means towards its continuance. Alam has classified corruption into four branches: cost-
reducing, cost-enhancing, benefit-enhancing and benefit-reducing corruption. He has 
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further described systemic corruption as a profit-sharing symbiotic nexus between 
bureaucracy and political elite of the developing countries. 
While challenging the Scott (1969b) argument which says that since legislation is based 
on universalistic terms, corruption at the enforcement stage, in favour of a particular 
group, is a means to meet parochial demands, Alam (1989) has observed that legislation 
is not always universal and can be designed to profit certain ethnic, religious or regional 
groups. Besides certain investment projects can be, and are, designed to concentrate their 
benefits on such groups. 
Alam has further analysed the often-quoted three supposed benefits of corruption: 
allocative efficiency (Leff 1964), promotion of capital formation (Leys 1965; Bayley 
1966; and Nye 1967), and substitution for a public works program (Bayley 1966). While 
criticising this allocative efficiency argument he has noted that the risk of detection will 
force the officials to restrict the entry into bidding to only those whom they can trust. 
And since there is no necessary correlation between productive efficiency and 
trustworthiness of the aspirants, such restriction will most likely prevent the favours to 
reach the most efficient producers. Second, corruption may automatically cull the 
efficient but honest producers of competition, who find the risk of detection too heavy to 
be accommodated. Third, in order to maximise the bribes, officials may introduce an 
artificial shortage or uncertainty into the supply of inputs; the loss incurred by such 
reduction in supply generally counterbalances any gains in efficiency from bribery. 
Fourth, competition among the group of officials, especially in the utility supplies, to 
extract maximum bribes may induce them to offer connections beyond their capacity, 
resulting in the deterioration of the quality of the supplied utility. ‘The loss in 
productivity resulting from such a decline could easily exceed the gain in output from the 
additional utility connections that result from corruption’ (Alam 1989:450). Furthermore, 
the highest bidder amongst the corrupt offers does in no way guarantee the highest 
efficiency, since cheating on the terms of the contract may be used as a tool to finance 
future bribes. This kind of corruption, according to Alam, could be very costly not only 
from the point of view of allocative efficiency but also regarding under fulfilment of the 
contract.  
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Discussing the functionalist argument that bribing the tax officials generates economic 
activity by reducing taxes, Alam, has suggested that this may not be true in the larger 
context, as government is most likely to increase the tax rates to compensate for the loss 
of tax revenue. Criticising another related argument that efficient producers are more 
likely to get tax reductions than others; he is of the view that efficient producers are less 
threatened by competitive pressures. Consequently they are less prone to engage in such 
activities than the dishonest and inefficient entrepreneurs who seem more likely to seek 
such reductions through corruption. Alam, however, has failed to counterbalance Leff’s 
(1967) argument regarding tax evasion, in which the latter had claimed that if the 
entrepreneur is a better investor than the government, then in such situation the evaded 
tax is more of a gain than a loss to the development of such countries. 
Analysing corruption as a stimulant for capital formation argument of the functionalists, 
Alam, has observed that this cannot be determined a priori, as it will depend upon the 
government’s predisposition to consumption as compared to the same proclivity of the 
beneficiaries of corrupt transactions. He further suggests that it is very unlikely that 
government officials will have a higher marginal tendency to save than the producers. 
Lastly, if the allocative inefficiency argument of moralists is true, then one should also 
take into account the loss of savings from reduced national income caused by allocative 
inefficiency before deciding the case for or against corruption as a source of capital 
formation. 
Confronting the functionalist argument of corruption promoting political integration 
(Bayley1966; Nye1967), Alam has observed that corruption, more often than not, serves 
the opposite purpose. Notwithstanding, whether one ethnic group or a small clique 
monopolises corruption revenues, in both the cases corruption will generate discontent 
and political instability. Arguing against the expansion of public employment through 
nepotism and political patronage as a welcome substitute for non-functioning public 
works system, Alam has suggested that ‘one must point to the opportunities for creative 
public employment that are foregone because of the politically motivated and 
unproductive expansion in public employment’ (Alam 1989:452). Finally he has 
consummately rejected the functionalist ideology when he concludes: 
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… the benefits of corruption are not apparent even where they are most 
confidently expected, i.e. market corruption does not improve allocative 
efficiency. Nor does corruption appear likely to generate net additions to capital 
formation; rather a reduction in investment is more to be expected. What these 
results suggest is that erosion in a government’s capacity to formulate and 
implement economic policies – as a result of corruption – cannot be a blessing in 
disguise. But corruption does not appear either to generate the political benefits 
claimed for it: rather than helping to bind disparate ethnic groups, regions, clans 
and families with narrow loyalties, it is more likely to exacerbate these divisions. 
To sum up then: corruption appears not to be beneficial for economic 
development, nor is it indispensable as a tool of political integration.  
(Ibid: 453) 
Leslie Palmier’s study of control of bureaucratic corruption in Asia (1985) was probably 
the first effort of its kind in which a focused investigation of bureaucratic corruption was 
made, by employing the comparative analysis of the institutions created and the measures 
taken for the control of corruption in India, Hong Kong and Indonesia. However, his 
study would also be categorised among those who believe on the detrimental nature of 
corruption as an a priori fact, as the author has not given any space to the issue of 
functionality or otherwise of corruption. The author discussed in detail the history, 
operations, and impact of Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) India, Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Hong Kong and the Operasi Tertib (Opstib) or 
Operation Correct Conduct of Indonesia. Drawing from this comparison he suggested 
that corruption should not be considered as a personal failing, but rather as an indicator of 
a larger group, all of whose members are equally engaged in one or the other kind of 
corrupt activities. Considering the remedies of bureaucratic corruption Palmier pointed 
out three main factors that appear to be most important: opportunities, salaries and 
policing. Elaborating the impact of available opportunities on the conduct of public 
servants he asserted “the more opportunities that are offered, the more will be seised”. 
Further describing the relationship of low wages with the probability of indulging into 
corruption he pointed out “poor pay is a powerful pressure towards corrupt gains.” 
(Palmier 1985:271) However, the author was quick to point out that bureaucratic 
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corruption does not seem to depend on any one of these three factors but on the balance 
between them. .  
Emphasising the anti-corruption role of communication media, especially in developing 
societies, Palmier asserted that corruption ‘thrives in secrecy and withers in the light’ so a 
vigilant media can not only expose corruption but can also bring about necessary changes 
in the values and attitudes of the general public (1985:279). Notwithstanding this 
assertion the author made clear that he does not subscribe to the belief that corruption 
cannot be reduced unless the values and attitudes of the public are altered first, but he 
admits that long term solution of the problem lies in an educated, organised and informed 
public demanding their rights from the state. 
Robert Klitgaard (1988) another noted scholar on corruption, opened a new avenue in the 
research on corruption by outlining practical policy analysis tools for any successful anti-
corruption campaign in his often cited book ‘Controlling Corruption’. Klitgaard has 
skilfully interwoven the different aspects of theoretical paradigm with the vivid empirical 
examples of applied problems faced by developing countries, which he draws from his 
extensive analysis of transitional societies. He theoretically delineated the genie of 
corruption according to the principal-agent model of economics and later explained and 
analysed the empirical evidence with the help of this model. Klitgaard also addressed 
practical questions like cost and effect of various forms of corruption and counter 
corruption measures, and what lessons can be drawn from success stories. 
Although Klitgaard propagates the idea that the “optimal level of corruption is not zero” 
(1988:24) yet he disagreed unequivocally with the functionalists belief that corruption is 
grease for the wheel of economics; he rather believes that corruption might be less 
harmful or even beneficial in certain peculiar situations but its general harmful effects 
outweigh the limited social benefits (1988:36). Instead of taking a usual moralist or 
revisionist approach against or in favour of corruption he took a more simple and 
practical approach suggesting that it is neither possible nor economically advisable even 
to try to eliminate or eradicate corruption completely. He rather argued that anti 
corruption efforts should be designed keeping in mind the optimal level of corruption and 
the marginal cost one could afford to incur in this activity. He suggested that different 
forms of corruption vary in terms of their deleterious effects and outlined ten practical 
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propositions for the policymakers to keep in mind while designing any counter-
corruption strategy to achieve a favourable cost-benefit outcome of the endeavour. 
An agent’s decision for being corrupt or otherwise, according to the Author, hinges on his 
monopoly plus discretion minus accountability (1988:75). He developed the usual 
principal-agent model a step further by offering range of policy measures available to 
principal which include: selecting agent, changing reward and penalties, gathering 
information, restructuring principal-agent-client relationship and changing attitudes about 
corruption.  
Contrary to Klitgaard, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in their study of corruption considered 
the principal-agent problem as a given fact and focused on the consequences of 
corruption for resource allocation. They presented two basic premises about corruption; 
first, that the level of corruption depends mostly on the structures of government 
institutions and political process, and secondly, the surreptitiousness and the illegality of 
corruption amplify the distorting effects of corruption and makes it much more expensive 
than taxation.  
Authors have divided the corruption of the public sector in to two categories: corruption 
with theft and corruption without theft.54 They further suggested that in a competitive 
market buyers indulging in corruption with theft will surely be better off, resultantly this 
competition between the buyers assures the spread of corruption with theft or cost 
reducing corruption. The authors suggested increasing the cost of corruption for buyers 
by reducing the possibilities of corruption with theft, through strict monitoring and 
effective accounting measures. Subsequently, if corruption without theft is the only 
option available, this will increase the cost for the buyer, actuating him to divulge such 
deals and officials.  
 
2.4 Empirical Research on Corruption 
Prior to 1990s there was a dearth of empirical studies on corruption, generally because of 
the surreptitious nature of the activity and the allied difficulties in obtaining scientifically 
valid data. Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties, there was hardly any attempt to 
                                                 
54 A detailed discussion about these two types of corruption and further description of the models proposed 
by Shleifer and Vishny is given in Chapter 3. 
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improvise and to conduct any meaningful study employing the available conventional 
tools of research. Bulk of the research, till then, was ‘less than systematic consisting 
mostly of anecdotal evidence available from news reports and, occasionally, official 
enquiries, case studies and results of surveys’ (Alam 1989:443). During this period 
several focus studies were conducted, though not systematic, concentrating on any of the 
less developed countries especially African or Asian.55 But interestingly there is hardly 
any systematic or even non-systematic study focusing on Pakistan. 
With the dawn of new century there started a wave of empirical investigation on the 
various aspects of corruption including the causes and the consequences of corruption. 
These investigations mostly based on the comparative evaluation of the level of 
corruption in different countries by employing cross-country analyses. Corruption 
assessments used by such studies consist mostly of the subjective indices, compiled by 
the various agencies to determine the country’s risk and sold to investors, banks and 
multinational corporations on commercial basis. Though the current data on corruption is 
mostly based on subjective perception and expertise yet it can be considered a reliable 
indicator of the actual level of corruption in any country56 (Lambsdorff 2005:1).  
                                                 
55  For studies on India see, Monteiro, B. John. 1966. Corruption: Control of Maladministration. Bombay: 
Manaktalas; Myrdal, G. 1968. Asian Drama. Vol.2. New York: Pantheon; Wade, R. 1982.‘The System of 
Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India,’ Journal of Development Studies, 
Vol.18 (3): 287-328: Wade, R. 1985.‘The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better at 
Development,’ World Development, Vol.13 (4): 480: Kholi, S. (ed.). 1975. Corruption in India. New Delhi: 
Chetana Publications: Palmier, Leslie. 1985. The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia. 
New Delhi: Allied Publishers (case studies in this book include Hong Kong and Indonesia apart from 
India). Another study including Indonesia, Thailand and Haiti is, Scott, J.C. 1972. Comparative Political 
Corruption. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs; For Nigeria, see Wraith, Ronald and Edgar Simpkins.1963. 
Corruption in Developing Countries. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd; Eker, V. 1981. ‘On the Origins 
of Corruption: Irregular Incentives in Nigeria’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.19 (1): 173-82; 
and Leys, Colin.1965. ‘What is the Problem about Corruption’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol.3 (2): 215-230; For Zaire, see Gould, D.J. 1980. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the 
Third World: The Case of Zaire. New York: Pergamon Press; For Ghana, see Werlin, H.H. 1972. ‘The 
Roots of Corruption: The Ghanaian Case’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.10 (2). 247-66; Price, 
R.M. 1975. Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana. Berkeley CA: University of California 
Press; For Mexico, see Wilkie, W.J. 1967. The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social 
Change. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
56 A detailed account of the validity of perceptions as a reliable indicator of corruption, ascertained by 
plotting experience against the perception of corruption, will be given in Chapter 5, where perceptions of 
public servants regarding the causes of corruption are analysed. Moreover, the question of validity of 
perceptions as a valid or invalid indicator of corruption is relevant in the studies trying to gauge the level of 
corruption in any country or state; as primary objective of this research is to investigate the causes and 
control of corruption employing the views of real stakeholders involved in the transactions, so this question 
is not relevant in case of subject study. 
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Though most of the empirical research falls within the ambit of economics as a 
discipline, but I think any meaningful political study of the phenomenon would not be 
complete without having cognizance of these empirical developments. During last forty 
years economists are making a slow but gradual contribution to the body of knowledge 
concerning corruption. The first economic study on the issue of corruption, which 
attracted major attention, was a study by Rose-Ackerman in 1975.57 More recently, a 
growing body of empirical knowledge has appeared on the international scene focusing 
on the various causes and consequences of corruption. Goudie and Stasavage (1999:148) 
divided the empirical material regarding research on corruption into three broad 
categories: 
1 Case studies, which are used to propose a theory about corruption. 
2 Case studies fundamentally descriptive in nature. 
3 Papers attempting to construct systematic tests for hypotheses about 
           corruption and growth. 
In the following section we will have an overview of the empirical research on 
corruption, mainly focusing on the causes of corruption. Though there exists an extensive 
amount of empirical research on the consequences of corruption, yet being out of the 
scope of this study it has not been included in this dissertation. 
 
2.4.1 Causes of Corruption 
Known causes of corruption are abundant, and there might be few, which are not known 
yet or with which causality has not been established yet. Empirical studies on the various 
causes of corruption are abundant; here we will mention only the most prominent ones. 
Some variables like GDP, inequality, low growth, and inflation are so much integrated 
with corruption that it is hard to ascertain whether they are the cause or the consequence 
of the phenomenon. So it should not be a surprise if some variables are assessed both as 
cause and effect of corruption. Following section contains a brief account of empirical 
studies on the causes of corruption under the headings: government size, kinds of state, 
                                                 
57 Rose- Ackerman, Susan.1975. ‘The Economics of Corruption’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.4 (2): 
187-205 
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institutional quality, political systems, merit and remuneration, competition, and cultural 
influences.  
 
2.4.1.1 Government Size 
It is a common perception that government’s involvement in the private sector is a major 
source of corruption. It is also believed that to reduce public sector corruption the 
simplest solution is to reduce the public sector. But multiple empirical investigations 
have shown that it is a rather simplistic presentation of the real situation.58 There is no 
simple empirical evidence to prove the case rather empirical findings suggest otherwise. 
Elliot (1997) conducted a study on a sample of 83 countries, and shows that size of 
government’s budget relative to GDP decreases with the levels of corruption. He 
concludes that government activities might be more important than the size of their 
budgets. Furthermore, there could be reverse causality between the two, as corrupt 
governments find it difficult to generate resources or obtain funding so this general lack 
of resources could be the reason for their small budgets. Types of government 
expenditure could be a potential major cause of corruption instead of total government 
expenditure, but this relationship has yet to be properly explored. 
 
2.4.1.2 Kinds of State 
Different forms of governments like unitary and federal could have varying degree of 
susceptibility towards corruption. Treisman (1999) reports significant evidence that 
federal states are more corrupt than the unitary or centralised states. He further suggests 
that in states where separate police forces exist at central and sub national level, the 
chances of overlapping authority increases, which leads to more corruption. With the 
addition of other variables, Treisman reports the decline in the significance level of the 
results but various other studies claim no shift in significance level even with the addition  
                                                 
58 Two major studies on these lines include: Husted, B. 1999. ‘ Wealth, Culture, and Corruption’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol.30 (2): 339-360; Gerring, J. and S. Thacker.2005.‘Do Neoliberal 
Policies Deter Political Corruption?’ International Organisation, Vol.59: 233-254. 
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of other variables.59 In a more recent study Gerring and Thacker (2004) observe a 
significant adverse effect of federalism on corruption. The authors distinguish between 
federal, semi-federal and non-federal states and report evidence favouring unitary 
governments since the federal form of government has been identified as one of the 
causes of corruption. 
 
2.4.1.3 Institutional Quality 
Institutions are supposed to facilitate the peaceful transactions among various interactive 
actors. They perform these functions applying various sets of risks and rewards, rules, 
regulations, laws and policies, each of which contain significant potential for distortion, 
misuse and corruption. Resultantly, institutional quality could be a major cause for 
corruption. Treisman (2000) observes a positive impact of state intervention on 
corruption, but in the presence of other variables the relationship becomes insignificant. 
The World Bank in its development report of 1997 reports a correlation between policy 
distortion and corruption. (1997:168). Ades and Di Tella (1999) have conducted a more 
detailed study of this relationship and conclude that policy intervention causes corruption. 
But they also warn that corruption may cause policy distortion and not vice versa, 
creating the impression that corruption and policy distortions can be one and the same.  
In a more complex study Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000), while investigating 26 
African countries, report a positive correlation between the level of corruption and the 
vagueness and laxity of government regulations. In a similar study Gatti (1999) states that 
diversified trade tariffs encourage corrupt behaviour while a uniform tariff reduces the 
public officials’ ability to extract undue fees from the importers. These results are 
significant as they focus on the application of regulations. It is a common perception that 
corrupt officials use complex regulations and procedures as a tool of harassment, 
bureaucratic discretion and unnecessary delays to drive maximum benefit out of their 
clients. 
                                                 
59 Studies supporting Treisman findings include: Panizza, U. 2001. ‘Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and 
Institutional Quality’, Economics and Politics, Vol.13 (3): 311-342; Goldsmith, A.A.1999. ‘ Slapping the 
Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets’, The American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, Vol.58 (4): 886-883; 
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The World Bank’s development report of 1997 as well as Ades and Di Tella (1996) focus 
on the quality of judiciary as an important determinant of corruption. Voigt, Fed and van 
Aaken (2004) have also investigated the impact of judicial independence on corruption. 
They have differentiated between de facto and de jure independence,60 and conclude that 
de facto independence decreases corruption, while de jure independence, as a lip service 
from executive, increases it. 
While ascertaining the value of free press in the fight against corruption Brunetti and 
Weder (2003) show that a free press deters corruption considerably. They use four 
relevant indices compiled by Freedom House and show that press freedom has a negative 
impact on corruption. They claim that the order of causality runs from free press to 
reduced corruption. 
 
2.4.1.4 Political System  
Few early studies report insignificant or weak impact of democracy as a political system 
on the level of corruption.61 But Treisman (2000) in his extensive study of the causes of 
corruption finds out a significant impact of democracy for a selection of 64 countries. He 
reports that while the current level of democracy does not, but the longer experience of 
democracy surely does help in reducing corruption. Various current studies support the 
assertion of Treisman and report that a moderate level of democracy is not an effective 
tool against corruption; rather its effectiveness appears only after a certain threshold of 
democratic experience has been achieved. According to Treisman, ‘had Portugal 
experienced uninterrupted democracy from 1950, the estimate imply, it would have been 
                                                 
60 De jure independence implies life tenure, appointment and promotion by others than politicians, lack of 
executive control on the appointment of a prosecutor in a specific case. While De facto independence 
means freedom from: forced retirement, frequent changes in legal foundation and decreasing income and 
budget of prosecutors. 
61 Goldsmith 1999, for complete reference please see footnote 16. Sandholtz, W. and W. Koetzle 2000. 
‘Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade’, Industrial Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.44: 31-50; Paldam, M.2002. ‘The Big Pattern of Corruption. Economics, Culture and the Seesaw 
Dynamics’, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.18: 215-240; Persson, T., G. Tabellini and F. 
Trebbi. 2003. ‘Electoral Rule and Corruption’, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol.1 (4): 
958-989. 
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slightly less corrupt by 1998 than Germany’ (2000:433). Similar results have been 
presented by some other studies too.62 
While studying the impact of electoral rules and the patterns of constituencies in more 
than 80 democracies, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) discovered that smaller voting 
districts have an increased susceptibility towards corruption as compared to large ones. 
Attributed to the fact that smaller districts have few representatives, and any attempt from 
a new entrant is stymied by this cult of representatives, reduced competition among 
candidates results in lowering their accountability towards the constituencies. Similarly 
increased competition in larger districts is instrumental in keeping corruption in limit. 
Authors further suggest that corruption is higher in democracies where candidates are 
elected from party lists rather than through individual candidacy. The reason for that, 
according to the authors, is the less individual accountability in such systems – an 
assertion, which is challenged by Chang and Golden (2004), who argue that closed-list 
voting should be separated from open-list voting.63 According to Chang and Golden in 
case of large voting districts closed-lists contain corruption while in small voting districts 
open-list limit corruption. 
In their above-mentioned study Gerring and Thacker (2004) also investigate the role of 
parliamentary and presidential systems of government in relation to the level of 
corruption. They conclude that parliamentary systems are less associated with corruption. 
Some other studies report similar results.64 Kunicova (2005) supports these findings for a 
sample of more than 100 countries. She suggests that presidential systems increase 
corruption significantly with the approaching end of term. Furthermore, powerful 
presidential office is another reason for escalation of corruption in these systems. 
This summary indicates that a significant amount of research has been done to establish 
the impact of democracy and the forms of government on the level of corruption in any 
                                                 
62 Gerring, J. and S. Thacker. 2005. ‘Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political Corruption?’, International 
Organisation, Vol.59:233-254. Montinola, G. and R.W. Jackman. 2002. ‘ Sources of Corruption: A Cross-
Country Study’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.32: 147-170; Sung, H. -E. 2004. ‘ Democracy and 
Political Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.41 (2): 179-193. 
63 Close-list votings are those where votes are caste only for the party while Open-list votings are those 
where voters both select a party and also rank candidates from the party of their choice. 
64 Lederman, D., N. Loayza and R. Reis Soares.2001. ‘ Accountability and Corruption. Political Institutions 
Matter’, The World Bank Working Paper No.2708; Panizza, U.2001. ‘Electoral Rules, Political Systems, 
and Institutional Quality’, Economics and Politics, Vol.13 (3): 311-342 
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country. Research suggests three main points: first, that a quasi and young democracy is 
not of much help against corruption; only mature and real participatory democracy is a 
strong check against corruption; second, presidential systems are more susceptible to 
corruption than parliamentary systems; and third, proportional representation is more 
associated with higher corruption than plurality rule with single-member districts. 
 
2.4.1.5 Merit and Remunerations  
Evan and Rauch (2000) have investigated the impact of merit-based recruitment on the 
level of corruption in 35 developing countries. Merit-based recruitment index is 
associated with the number of higher-level officers having a university degree or having 
entered civil service through a competitive formal examination. The authors state a 
negative association between the index and corruption in the studied countries. 
Surprisingly there is only one empirical study, by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), 
which focuses entirely on the link between public sector financial remuneration and the 
level of corruption.65 But the results of this study are not without a grain of scepticism, 
since the authors have employed Political Risk Service (PRS) data, which does not depict 
corruption directly but refers to political instability. The authors argue that low salaries 
force the public servants into corruption while at the same time higher salaries would 
increase the cost of being caught for the public servant. In a sample of 31 countries the 
authors find significant negative impact of civil service wages, in relation of 
manufacturing sector wages, regarding the level of corruption. They suggest that, ‘…1 
point change in relative wages (say from one to two times the manufacturing wages) 
leads to 0.5-point reduction in the corruption index’ (2001:10). They further suggest that 
fighting corruption solely by improving wages could be prohibitively expensive. 
                                                 
65 There are few theoretical studies discussing the issue of optimal government pay or the cost effectiveness 
of the public sector wage increase. This include: Besley, T., J. McLaren.1993. Taxes and Bribery: The Role 
of Wage Incentives. Economic Journal, Vol.103 (416): 119–141; Flatters, F., W.B. McLeod.1995. 
Administrative Corruption and Taxation. International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 2 (3): 397–417; 
Swamy, A., St. Knack, Y.Lee and O. Azfar.2001.‘Gender and Corruption’, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol.64: 25-55; Treisman, D. 2000. ‘ The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol.76: 399-457. Though the last two studies are empirical in nature but they 
have not exclusively studied civil service wages among the many causes of corruption. However, both 
studies have reported ambiguous and insignificant results for the impact of wages on corruption.  
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2.4.1.6 Competition 
Competition, rather lack of it, among the suppliers as well as the public service providers 
is considered as one of the major causes of corruption. Competition by virtue of lowering 
prices, decreasing the rents for private firms, leaves less for public servants to sell in 
exchange of bribes. Restrictions or government control on economic freedom reduces 
competition. Henderson (1999) argues that corruption is negatively correlated with 
various indicators of economic freedom. Goldsmith (1999) and Paldam (2002) support 
the above results for a sample of 66 and 77 countries respectively. 
 Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggest that a country’s openness, defined as the ratio of 
import to GDP, as an indicator of competition. Analysing the BI and IMD data for 55 and 
32 countries respectively they have concluded that economic competition measured by 
openness reduces corruption. However, using the TI index, Treisman (2000) reports no 
significant evidence for such an impact. Treisman argues that ratio of import to GDP is 
not a valid indicator of competitive market as big countries can afford to have a low ratio 
of import to GDP by having more competition within their country. The author finds 
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) measure of competition, i.e. the number of years a country 
has been open to trade, having a stronger and negative impact on the level of corruption.  
In a more recent study, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) report a significantly negative 
relationship between the length of country’s commitment to international organisations 
like UN, IMF, GATT and WTO, and its level of corruption. 
 
2.4.1.7 Cultural Determinants  
Significant research has also been conducted on the impact of different cultural 
determinants like trust, religion, response to authority, and family association, on the 
level of corruption. La Porta et al. (1997) investigated the level of trust among the 
bureaucrats and in their dealings with general public, and its impact on corruption. The 
authors state a significant negative impact of trust on corruption in a sample of 33 
countries. These results have been replicated by some other studies too.66 In contrast to 
                                                 
66 For detailed investigation of relationship between trust and corruption please see: Adsera, A., C.Boix and 
M. Payne.2000. ‘ Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government’, Inter-
American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper 438. Washington. ; Uslaner. E.2004. 
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these studies on trust, Lambsdorff (2002) suggests that sometimes trust can be a 
facilitator for corruption. He demonstrates that countries, where clients are confident that 
their favours will be reciprocated, display a higher level of corruption. 
In the above-mentioned study, La Porta et al. (1997) also investigate the role of religion 
in the different levels of corruption and observe that hierarchical religious groups like 
Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and Muslims have negative impact on civic engagement, 
resultantly favouring corruption. In 33 countries the authors observe a positive correlation 
between the level of corruption and the percentage of population belonging to 
hierarchical religions. In his already quoted study, Treisman (2000) observes a negative 
association between the percentage of Protestants and the level of corruption in a sample 
of 64 countries. While explaining this relationship between Protestantism and corruption 
he suggests: 
… a greater tolerance for challenges to authority and for individual dissent… 
renders Protestant societies more likely to discover and punish official abuses…a 
focus on the family rather than the individual in many traditions other than 
Protestantism leads to ‘amoral familism’ and nepotism… Protestant traditions – in 
which the separation of church and state is more pronounced than in, say, 
Catholicism or Islam – lead to a more vibrant, autonomous civil society that 
monitors the state more effectively.  
(Treisman 2000: 427-428) 
A numbers of researchers conducted similar studies investigating the role of different 
religions on the level of perceived corruption.67 In their recent study of two cultural 
dimensions, in former communist states, from the World Value Survey, Sandholtz and 
Taagepera (2005) measure traditional versus secular rational-authority attitudes and 
survival versus self-expression. This means the extent to which people are concerned 
with personal and economic security, or the personal self-expression and quality of life. 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Trust and Corruption’, in J.Graff Lambsdorff, M.Schreamm and M. Taube. (eds) ‘The New Institutional 
Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity’, London: Routledge: 76-92 
67 In an interesting study Lipset and Lenz (2000) have asserted that its not Protestants work ethic per se, 
that reduces corruption, rather, Protestantism reduces corruption because of its association with 
individualistic, non-familistic relations. Other significant studies include: Paldam, M.2001. ‘ Corruption 
and Religion. Adding to the Economic Model’, Kyklos, Vol.54 (2/3): 383-414; Sandholtz, W. and M. Gray 
.2003. ‘ International Integration and National Corruption’, International Organisation, Vol.57 (4): 761-
800; and Gerring and Thacker (2005). 
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Study suggests that African and Muslim countries have traditional and simultaneously a 
survival attitude due to their low income. Authors have found out that ‘a strong ‘survival’ 
orientation contributes twice as much as a strong ‘traditional’ orientation to higher levels 
of corruption’ (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005: 109). Commenting on combinations of 
states authors suggest that ‘giving up on god while still feeling insecure, unhappy and 
intolerant, is the realm of formerly and presently communist-ruled countries’ (Ibid: 117). 
Lipset and Lenz (2000) based on the responses to two questions of World Value Survey 
(WVS) constructed a ‘familism scale’, and found out that countries with familistic 
cultures are more corrupt than countries with individualistic cultures like most Protestant 
countries.68 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Research of the Impact of Corruption 
Empirical research on the impact or consequences of corruption has increased in recent 
past. Corruption primarily affects the income distribution and resource allocation in any 
society, but there are many secondary effects of corruption, which have been subject of 
various empirical investigations. A detailed analysis of empirical work done on the 
consequences of corruption is beyond the scope of this research, therefore, we will only 
enlist the major areas, which have been identified as being most influenced by the 
prevalence of corruption in any state. The current body of knowledge investigates the 
impact of corruption on issues like: domestic as well as foreign direct investment, 
growth, inequality, governmental functions along with international dimensions of 
corruption. It is imperative to keep in mind that there are multiple variables, which could 
both be cause as well as a consequence of corruption, and at times it is almost impossible 
to establish the causality, hence, flexible conclusions are preferable over rigid ones about 
such variables. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have sketched an overview of the body of knowledge developed so far 
on the issue of corruption. We traced back the evolution of the academic interest in the 
                                                 
68 Two statements of the WVS were: regardless of the qualities and faults of one’s parents, a person must 
always love them; and the second statement measured the percentage of people who think that divorce is 
unjustifiable. 
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phenomenon of corruption to the early 1960s. Though corruption exists since the time 
when public and private purse were not two different entities, however, academic interest 
in this socio-political as well as economic phenomenon emerged with the development of 
the Functional approach regarding the utility of corruption. Prior to that, the 
undesirability and abhorrence attached with the term appears almost tautological. 
Regardless of the inherent flaws and weaknesses, corruption owes its present status as a 
valid academic research issue and the current universal interest in the phenomenon, to the 
advent of functional school of thought. 
Robert Merton (1949), as a well-known American sociologist, particularly influenced the 
development of the revisionist school of thought in 1960s. Myron Weiner (1962), 
Nathaniel Leff (1964), David Bayley (1966), Joseph Nye (1967), and Samuel Huntington 
(1968) were the ones who introduced a functionalist approach regarding corruption in the 
realm of political science. Functionalists or Revisionists highlight the possible benefits of 
corruption by indicating that it can ‘grease the rusty wheel of economy’ in societies 
where bureaucracies are inefficient, cumbersome and obstructive. Leff was the first to 
express the economic utility of the corruption by suggesting that the pursuit of economic 
development might not be the top priority of governments and bureaucracies of the 
developing world, so corruption as a deviation from the stated policies of the state could 
be helpful in the development of de facto policies, more development centric than the 
policies evolved through de jure channels of the bureaucracy.  
Huntington views corruption as an incumbent part of transition from traditional to 
modern society. He believes that modernising breeds corruption but modernisation 
eliminates it, so rampant corruption during the process of transition has the seeds of its 
own destruction. According to revisionists’ corruption as a mean of interest in the spoils 
induces unity among the political players, thus promoting political stability in fragile 
societies. Revisionists also believe that corruption not only can buy political access for 
the socially excluded classes but can also be a pre-emptive defence against the emerging 
revolutions in socially fragmented societies. 
We have also seen that by contrast to the revisionist school, Moralists or Post-revisionists 
believe only in the detrimental effects of corruption. Moralists criticise the revisionist 
approach and charge them with inadequate research, intellectual inconsistencies, 
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fallacious reasoning and overgeneralisations. According to them functionalists fallacies 
germinate from their inability to see the systemic character of corruption and their 
reluctance to analyse its consequences in a dynamic perspective. Among the numerous 
moralist writers few of the prominent ones include: Gunnar Myrdal (1968), Robert 
Klitgaard (1988), Shahid Alam (1989), Paulo Mauro (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1997), 
Daniel Kaufmann (1999) and Vito Tanzi (2000).  
Moralists believe that corruption is not self-destructory but rather breeds on itself and is 
self-perpetual in nature. Moralists find it hard to locate any benefits of corruption. They 
rather believe that corruption neither increases allocative efficiency nor it facilitates 
capital formation rather it reduces investment. Corruption, according to moralists, is more 
of sand than grease to the wheel of economy; it increases inefficiency and obstructive 
nature of bureaucracy, and causes inequality of income and misallocation of resources. 
They further suggest that instead of uniting socially excluded groups, regions tribes, and 
families’ corruption is more likely to exacerbate these divisions. Moralists sum up their 
harangue of functionalist ideology by stating that: ’corruption appears not to be beneficial 
for economic development, nor is it indispensable as a tool of political integration’ (Alam 
1989: 453). Although the collective results are contradictory, yet this debate between 
Revisionists and Moralists has caused some very useful and interesting studies. After 
having a detailed view of both schools we have realised that in a way the debate has been 
interestingly asymmetrical. While Moralists insist on the harmful nature of corruption, 
Revisionists are dwelling on the possibility of positive or beneficial outcomes. 
Revisionists concentrate too much upon anecdotal evidence, hypothetical examples, 
simplistic generalisations, illusionary scenarios, and obscure relationship between 
corruption and possible positive social outputs. While at times, Moralists also suffer from 
displaying a priori knowledge about the consummate deleterious consequences of 
corruption and the superiority of the legitimately drawn policies over the ones conceived 
with somehow suspected motivations. Moralists also have a tendency to attribute an 
exaggerated amount of social problems to corruption (Johnston 1986:459). We have 
argued in this chapter that no doubt corruption has much negative impact for society and 
the state yet excessive moralisation about corruption is also not very beneficial for the 
practical concerns of the public policy in the developing world. 
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We have also discussed some of the general studies of corruption outside this debate of 
conflicting views regarding the utility of corruption. Such studies have mostly focus on 
any one developing country from Africa or Asia and try to delineate the prevalent trends 
of corruption and sometimes the measures taken to control the spread of this 
transpiration. But curiously, to the best of our knowledge, no such country-specific study 
focusing on Pakistan, (despite being notoriously known for her widespread corruption) 
does exist in the current body of literature. 
Considering the multidisciplinary nature of the core issue and the scope of this study we 
have also analysed the empirical studies of corruption that are conducted mainly under 
the auspices of economics as a discipline. Such empirical studies have been discussed 
mainly under causes of corruption. Numerous empirical studies have been conducted on 
numbers of variables considered to be causing corruption. Some of those variables are: 
government size, kinds of governmental systems, institutional quality, excessive and 
complex regulations, recruitment and salaries, role of judiciary, competition in the 
market, political systems, and cultural determinants like trust, reaction to authority and 
role of religion.  
The current body of knowledge on corruption is mainly linked with the question of utility 
of corruption, country specific studies, few theoretical explanations of the phenomenon, 
or the empirical investigations based on the different corruption indices. Of late, most of 
the research about corruption has one or the other way used anyone of the corruption 
perception indices. These indices unanimously are based on different subjective 
assessments, about the level of corruption, made with the help of elite business surveys or 
expert panels. Basically these assessments are the perceptions of business people, the 
experts, the common man, or the foreign investors, which they have about the prevalence 
of corruption in a certain country. Interestingly, despite being the target of this debate, 
there is no study investigating the perceptions of the bureaucracy or civil servants 
regarding the issue of corruption. Multitudes of academic studies are conducted every 
year asking why public servants do corruption. Or how they could be threatened or 
motivated not to do corruption. But literature is quiet silent if one wants to know the 
perceptions, thoughts, or the motivations of those individuals or institutions that are being 
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charged, rightly or wrongly, with the accusation of indulging in corruption and corrupt 
practices.  
How could these perceptions of public servant be obtained; and how could these 
perceptions be used for discovering the causes consequences and control of corruption, 
ultimately leading to better institutional quality and governance in any state? These are 
the questions we will be trying to answer during the course of this study.  
After establishing the dysfunctional nature of corruption, the coming chapter will discuss 
the empirical measurement of corruption. As different degrees of fever demand different 
responses, so to ensure proper treatment it is imperative to measure the fever correctly; 
similarly prior to embarking on any corruption eradication quest in any specific segment, 
society or state it is important to exactly measure the real level of corruption in that area. 
And as it is difficult to measure any phenomenon without understanding the phenomenon 
and its allied intricacies fully, so we will analyse the core concepts like: definitions, 
categories, characteristics, kinds, and models, prior to any discussion of measuring 
techniques and the generally utilised tools for measuring corruption. 
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Chapter 3 
Empirical Measurement of Corruption  
 
One of the major issues, related with the research on corruption, is of defining it. 
Apparently an innocuous one, this issue could affect the outcome of any investigation, as 
whatever is measured depends on what really is defined as corruption. Referring to this 
dilemma, one scholar quoted an interesting analogy according to which, corruption ‘is 
rather like the elephant – you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it’ 
(Hill 1997: 6). In the coming pages we will strive to define the elephant of corruption. 
In order to measure something scientifically it’s imperative to understand the various 
shades, forms, and qualities of the phenomenon. Consequently, in this chapter we will 
have a succinct overview of the decades old debate regarding the universal and 
comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. It is important to understand this debate, 
because without reaching a commonly agreed definition it is impossible to draw 
conclusions, which are generally recognised. In this chapter we will try to explain the 
evolution of the concept- especially as a field of scholarly interest - its cultural genesis, 
and various sets of popular definitions. Furthermore we will delineate the basic 
characteristics, various types and different modes of corruption, before analysing the 
measuring techniques and the tools employed for measuring corruption. In the end the 
various models and theories of corruption will be assessed and analysed. 
 
3.1 Definitional Evolution of Corruption  
The term ‘corruption’ has as many variegated shades of meaning as it has in terms of 
usage and is generally used for an extensive range of illegal activities. Various 
dictionaries offer multiple meanings or definitions of the term, ranging from physical 
destruction, moral perversion, and putrefaction to the inducement (as of a public official) 
by improper means (as bribery) to violate duty (as by committing a felony). According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the term ‘corrupt’ has originated from the Latin 
corruptus, which is the past participle of the verb corrumpere, which means to ‘mar, 
bribe, or destroy’. ‘Corrupt’ is being defined as a person who is: ‘willing to act 
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dishonestly in return for money or personal gain’. OED has placed the political context of 
the term ‘corruption’ as the second explanation – after moral deterioration – according to 
which corruption is the use of corrupt practices, especially bribery. 
Linguistically, the term corruption refers to adulteration, contamination, perversion, and 
destroying the wholesomeness of anything. Politically, this term has acquired various 
shades in different periods of history, but various giants of political theory have 
fundamentally assigned the same meanings to the term corruption. In Aristotelian view, 
man’s insatiable desire to get more is the bases of his corruption. Plato, too, associates the 
corruption of human nature and the city with the dominance of the avaricious part of the 
human soul. For Machiavelli, corruption is the decay of citizens’ virtue, and for Rousseau 
corruption is the natural corollary of the struggle for power.69 
Modern usage of corruption is quintessentially associated with misuse of public position 
or power for private gain. This misuse could be associated with both the political as well 
as bureaucratic actors and elites. The modern idea of corruption owes its genesis to the 
evolution of two basic concepts: first, a 19th century development of a clear distinction 
between private and public spheres, and second, the concomitant 20th century idea of 
impersonal obligations, which evolved with the Weberian notion of bureaucracy. As 
already mentioned, from definitional perspective, corruption like governance is an 
‘essentially contested concept’. Since last fifty years, various definitions of corruption 
from legal, social and economic perspective have been vigorously debated in the 
academic circles.  
While discussing the quest for a precise definition of corruption, Robert William 
(1976:41) noted that ‘there are nearly as many definitions of corruption as there are 
species of tropical plants’; questioning the utility of this exercise, he remarked ‘the point 
is that the search for the true definition of corruption is, like the pursuit of the Holy Grail, 
endless, exhausting and ultimately futile.’ He went on to argue that any definition is 
neither true nor false but rather ‘like a proposal of marriage; it may be accepted or 
rejected but the proposal itself cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to be true or 
false’. 
                                                 
69 A detailed account of the ideas of Aristotle, Plato, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Rousseau on the 
“corruption of body politic” could be found in Dobel (1978). 
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The political scholarship even at the beginning of 20th century had started to emphasise 
the need for developing a definite concept of the term; a definition, general in application, 
and encompassing the protean forms this phenomenon can acquire. According to Robert 
Brooks (1910) there is hardly any other term in the vocabulary of politics that is so 
frequently used without a clear understanding of the essential nature of the phenomenon. 
Discrediting the synonymous use of corruption and bribery, Brooks goes on to define 
corruption as ‘the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, or the 
unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less 
directly personal’ (1910:43). It is obvious that this definition does not confine the 
phenomenon to the public sector, such derelictions mentioned in this definition could 
very much occur both in public, as well as private spheres of life. The author chose this 
wide definition because he believes in the universality of corruption and argues that 
corruption is quite as possible elsewhere as in the state, however to adjust the definition 
to also cover the state corruption, Brooks has suggested to qualify the word ‘duty’ by the 
phrase ‘to the state’ (Ibid: 43-45).  
Scholars representing divergent schools of thought have proposed different definitions of 
the term depending on their line of argument. Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1978) had very 
skilfully summarised this whole debate about the multi faceted definitions of the term 
‘corruption’, by categorising the prevalent definitions into three broad groups: public-
office-centred, public-interest centred and market-centred definitions (Heidenheimer 
1978:4-6). The following discussion regarding these three groups of definitions is mostly 
based on the aforementioned commentary of Heidenheimer. 
The vague general impression, which emerges with the word of corruption, is somehow 
related to something unholy happening to the public office or perpetrated by the public 
officials. As this research specifically deals with bureaucratic corruption so, it would not 
be out of place to have a brief introduction of the concept of ‘public office’ prior to any 
discussion regarding the subtleties of corruption.  
 
3.1.1 Origin of Public Office 
Otto Hintze (1964) while describing the position of German Beamten has very aptly 
enlisted the characteristics of a public official: ‘…not only his working capacity but in a 
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certain sense his whole personality is claimed. He may not receive gifts, he may not 
exercise a profession, he may not have any side earnings at all without the permission of 
his superiors, as officeholder he is expected to devote all his working capacity to the 
state; the office is his only and exclusive calling’ (Hintze 1964:72). It is worth noticing 
that the level of disinterestedness and ‘self denying inhibitions’ associated with the idea 
of public office (especially in today’s West and in the non-West, at least theoretically) 
has not crept into these societies overnight, rather it has evolved over a passage of 
multiple centuries. Pre-bureaucratic systems were mostly based upon patrimonial 
domination, in which the ruler had unrestrained, unlimited power over his entire 
dominion, which he used to delegate to his officials, who in return enjoyed the same 
power over their subjects. Even if officials were utilising the resources for their private 
gains there was nothing corrupt in this, until they were not defying any specific 
instructions of the ruler. In case of defiance it was more a case of insubordination than 
corruption.  
In feudal Europe, office was more of a property than a place for fulfilling assigned duties. 
According to Weber, who sees this as a characteristic of both feudal system and early 
modern patrimonial bureaucratic state, ‘whatever traces of (an objectively defined official 
duty) there are disappeared altogether with the treatment of the office as benefice or 
property’ (1968:1040). In this early modern patrimonialism, rulers assigned the right to 
collect fees from his subjects to their favourites or to purchasers. The growth of 
permanent officialdom started very gradually after the decline of feudal systems; in the 
early sixteen-century officials started to be recruited out of academically trained young 
men as royal servants, who received fix salaries apart from being the collector of rich 
emoluments of office, with a certain share in the fees collected on behalf of the ruler.  
In continental Europe rulers, in order to meet the financial demands of costly military 
campaigns started the practice of selling offices in the 16th century, a custom that 
increased enormously in 17th and 18th century. Revolutionary France and Prussia started 
this shift of abolishing all kinds of benefices as income sources for public servants and 
replacing it with regularised fixed salaries, which was adopted gradually by the whole 
continental Europe. Initially higher officials received salaries commensurate with their 
social positions, but this tradition of favouring the higher officials decreased with the 
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passage of time. From 1800 to 1960 the differential ratio between the salaries of highest 
and lowest French officials decreased from 100:1 to 6:1 (Heidenheimer 1978:9-15). 
 
3.1.2 Three Sets of Definitions 
Now coming back to definitions of corruption, the first category i.e., public-office-
centred, contain definitions, which revolve around the concept of public office and the 
deviations, from the norms, rules, and procedures of those public offices, by their 
occupants. Definitions from mostly functionalist scholars like David Bayley (1966), 
Joseph Nye (1967), and Samuel Huntington (1968) fall under the public-office-centred 
category. According to the definition of Bayley ‘corruption, then, while being tied 
particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering misuse of authority as a result 
of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary’ (1966: 721). While 
Huntington has defined the same term as, ‘behaviour of public officials which deviates 
from accepted norms in order to serve private ends’ (1968:59). However, the major 
problem with such definitions is the fact that they consummately rule out any 
investigation of corruption in pre-bureaucratic systems. Scholars interested in such 
historical studies have mostly employed public interest or market centred definitions of 
corruption.70 
The second set of definitions is associated with the concept of public interest. Scholars 
under this category hold the view that public-office-centred and market centred 
definitions are, either too limited or too broad in their scope of the term ‘corruption’. 
Definitions under this second category hold the concept of public interest as vital to any 
definition of corruption, as the eventual sufferer at the hand of corruption is the common 
good or the public interest. Carl Friedrich (1966), Arnold A. Rogow and H.D. Lasswell 
(1963) are among the most prominent of the scholars under this category. Carl Friedrich 
holds that corruption is assumed to be present whenever a power-holder ‘who is 
responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally 
                                                 
70 For instance Jacob van Klaveren (1957) in his historical evolution of corruption has remarked that by 
definition corruption could not exist under monarchy and the states functioning on the constitutions built 
upon the idea of popular sovereignty. More over Bert F. Hoselitz (1959) in his historical study of 
performance levels and bureaucratic structures has also employed a market orient definition of corruption. 
Both of these studies are present in Heidenheimer (1978). 
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provided for induces to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and 
thereby damage to the public and its interest’ (1966:74). Similarly, Arnold Rogow and 
H.D. Lasswell maintain that ‘A corrupt act violates the responsibility toward at least one 
system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible (destructive of) any such 
system. A system of public or civic order exalts common interests over special interest; 
violations of common interest for special advantage are corrupt’ (1963:132). 
The third block is concerned with the definitions, which describe corruption in terms of 
the tenants of economics and market theory, without giving much consideration to the 
norms, values or morals governing the public office bearers. Among the definitions 
belonging to this category are the ones proposed by Jacob van Klaveren (1957), and John 
Leff (1964). While describing corruption, van Klaveren maintains: ‘a corrupt civil 
servant regards his office as a business, the income of which he will…seek to maximise. 
The office then becomes a “maximising unit”. The size of his income depends… upon 
the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s 
demand curve’ (1957: 39). John Leff, while expounding his famous and most influential 
economic interpretation of the phenomenon, has defined the term corruption as ‘an extra-
legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the 
bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups 
participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the 
case’ (1964:8). 
The public-office-centred definitions are criticised for being shallow in their 
interpretation, as the primary functions of the public office is to work for and to ensure 
the common good or public interest. Defining corruption from public office’s point of 
view is, in fact, to define it from public interest perspective. When Nye defined 
corruption as a deviant behaviour from the normal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding, he indirectly alluded to the public interest, which was being 
compromised because of the personal gains. Similarly public-interest-centred definitions 
are also accused of ‘confusing the phenomenon with its consequences’ (Philp 1997:440); 
as corruption directly undermines the common interest, jeopardised public interest is an 
impact of corruption and not the phenomenon itself.  
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Both the public-office and public interest centred definitions were criticised for being 
normative in their judgment about the scope of the public office or the nature of public 
interest. These definitions do not indicate what should be the character of the public 
office or what is the nature of public interest, which is supposed to be preserved. 
Secondly, who will decide the criteria on which the scope of public office and the extent 
of public interest can be measured? Mark Philp (1997) forwarded three main 
determinants for deciding these questions: public opinion, legal norms and the modern 
western democratic standards. But the choice of any of these determinants is also fraught 
with allied difficulties. First, whose opinion should weigh how much, secondly, all 
corrupt acts are not illegal, all the laws are not universal, and they could also originate in 
corrupt environment; and finally, applying western democratic standards in non western 
cultures could call for serious charges like censoriousness, and condescension on the part 
of western intelligentsia. 
Market centred definitions were blamed for being more concerned with the mechanics 
and circumstances of corruption than the actual definition of the phenomenon. The issue 
of illegality is also vital to many market-centred definitions of corruption as it is again the 
law or certain set of rules, which distinguishes between a free market and black market. 
This dependence on legal norms was once again challenged on the contention of non-
universality of the legal interpretations and applications; arguing that something illegal in 
one country might be legal in the other, rendering the same activity as corruption in one 
and perfectly acceptable in the other; secondly, it is also argued that legal codes are too 
narrow to view the phenomenon of corruption holistically from the point of view of 
political science (Heywood 1997:423). 
 
3.1.3 Cultural Embeddedness of Corruption 
As already pointed out debate about what really constitutes corruption is very old in the 
academic circles, especially those of political science.71 One of the major problems 
associated with the concept was that it was generally viewed through a prism of cultural 
                                                 
71 Early literature on corruption is filled with the definitional debates regarding corruption. For interesting 
early discussions of this topic please see Brooks (1910), David Bayley (1966), and Arnold Heidenheimer 
(1978), for a more recent view of the issue please see Paul Heywood (1997). For a detailed and exhaustive 
discussion about the definition of political corruption please refer to Mark Philp (1997). 
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values of society where it was being studied. It was often thought that behaviour, which 
is perceived as corrupt in one culture, might be perfectly acceptable in another. Judging 
non-western cultures and societies according to western norms and standards of probity 
was considered as inappropriate. This was quoted as one reason for the early lack of 
interest, which the western scholarship showed in the investigation of the phenomenon in 
the developing or transitional societies. While elaborating this problem Bayley (1966) 
remarked: 
It not infrequently happens, then, in developing non-western societies that 
existing moral codes do not agree with western norms as to what kinds of 
behaviour by public servants should be condemned. The western observer is faced 
with an uncomfortable choice. He can adhere to the western definition, in which 
case he lays himself open to the charge of being censorious and he finds that he is 
condemning not abhorrent behaviour, but normal acceptable operating procedure. 
On the other hand, he may face up to the fact that corruption, if it requires moral 
censure, is culturally conditioned.  
(1966:721) 
This perceived division in the moral codes of conduct is a primary reason, why such an 
archaic as well as universal phenomenon like corruption still lacks any universally 
accepted definition. It is rather a strong believe among the political analysts and scholars 
that is almost an impossible task to arrive at a generalised and uncontested definition of 
corruption.72 
With the advent of the functionalist approach of corruption in 1960s and ’70s, some 
scholars started to use western democratic standards for studying the degree of probity in 
the non-western societies and cultures.73 However, again towards the end of the last 
century, many political analysts questioned the imposition of the western standards on the 
non-western cultures; and argued that what is considered as a corrupt practice must have 
some reference to the acknowledged norms and general standard of behaviour within the 
community with which it is related. Resultantly, the political analysis of corruption 
                                                 
72 See Michael Johnston, ‘ The search for definitions: the vitality of politics and the issue of corruption’, 
ISSJ, Corruption in Western Democracies, pp.321-35 quoted in Heywood, Paul. 1997. ‘Political 
Corruption: Problems and Perspectives’, Political Studies, Vol. XLV: 417-435 
73 Among such scholars the few prominent one, which have already been mentioned in this study are 
Bayley (1966) and Braibanti (1962 and 1966). 
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remained entangled between the conflicting choices of ‘stipulative definition of following 
western norms, or a relativist appeal to local norms or standards’ (Philp 1997: 441-442). 
If the former choice of following western norms was abhorrent, from the personal point 
of view, the later option of employing a relativistic point of view could have rendered the 
cross-cultural analysis of corruption virtually impossible. 
Probably this reason coupled with the advent of empirical research on corruption - which 
heavily employs on the cross-country analysis – has considerably mitigated the debate, 
regarding the definitional issues of the corruption. In our view the question of ‘relativist 
appeal’ to local norms or the ‘stipulative definition’ following western norms does not 
arise in the first place, because undesirability of corruption is more or less a universal 
phenomenon. Notwithstanding the differences of social norms and cultural values, it 
could be safely assumed that non-western cultures may not be as intolerant towards 
corruption as the western cultures would be, but they (non-western cultures) certainly do 
not condone corruption. The gift giving traditions of some non-western societies should 
not be confused with approval of corruption as a completely acceptable behaviour. John 
T. Noonan in his epic history of bribery clearly demonstrates that no culture condones 
bribery; and further anthropological studies also indicate that local people are perfectly 
capable of distinguishing a gift from a bribe, and they condemn the latter (Klitgaard 
2000:14).  
Multiple reasons could be quoted as to why this argument of different values of non-
western cultures does not hold ground in the field of corruption research. Firstly, taking 
the plurality of the culture argument seriously,74 it can be counter argued that even in that 
case the only condonable manifestation of corruption would be nepotism; while other 
methods of corruption like bribery and rent seeking would be equally condemnable acts 
even in such plural cultures. Secondly, public sector corruption is associated with the 
bureaucratic or the political elites, and both of these segments of the non-western 
societies are most likely to have a complete knowledge of western standards of probity, 
as most of them would have foreign education (most likely western education), or would 
                                                 
74 Plurality of culture means that developing or traditional societies have close cultures mostly based 
around the notion of family, tribe, clan or clique. Actors belonging to these cultures are bound to take care 
of their familial, or tribal relations, and helping their family and friends, even illegally, would be 
considered as their responsibility, and refusal to do so could result in loss of respect for the one doing so 
and even could be made a social pariah in extreme cases.   
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have travelled to the West. Thirdly, in today’s world of globalisation, mass media, and 
Internet, it would be naive to assume that non-western public office holders would be 
unaware of the western standards of probity and transparency and the allied benefits 
attached with these standards in terms of social as well as economic development. 
Fourthly, bureaucratic corruption is the almost half of the total public sector corruption in 
developing world, and all the bureaucracies of the world are structured to follow certain 
rules and regulations, which are designed to protect the public interest. Resultantly, a 
cross-cultural analysis of any bureaucracy is very much logical and should not be 
deterred on the pretext of western or non-western values. 
 
3.1.4 Moving Ahead of the old Debate 
During the last decade a bulk of the research has employed the most widely accepted 
definitions of the Transparency International (TI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the World Bank (WB) without going into the intricacies of the norms and standards. 
According to the TI definition, ‘corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in 
the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and 
unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power 
entrusted to them’. Similarly ADB has also defined corruption on the same lines but 
made it more comprehensive by incorporating the unlawful influence, acquired through 
the office, on one’s peers for the benefit of oneself or one’s close clique, as corruption. 
Secondly, unlike TI, the Asian Development Bank has also brought private as well as 
public sector within the sphere of corruption. According to ADB’s definition ‘corruption 
involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public and private sectors, in which they 
improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others 
to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed.’  
 The World Bank started to take interest in the phenomenon of corruption with the start of 
1990s, when the Bank realised that corruption is one of the strongest impediments in the 
successful implementation of their developmental projects in the under developed or third 
world. The World Bank’s emphasis on the policy of good governance and their concern 
with corruption evolved almost simultaneously; as it dawned very early on the Bank that 
achieving the former was almost impossible without successfully tackling the later. The 
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Bank offers the most succinct, and most widely used, definition of corruption, according 
to which corruption is simply ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’. The WB has 
most probably derived this definition from the 1930s definition of Joseph J. Senturia, 
who had defined the phenomenon as ‘the misuse of public power for private profit’, but 
Senturia had added an important forewarning to this definition when he said: ‘Not all acts 
which benefit the office-holder at the expense of the people are corrupt, else the term 
would include all taxation by an absolute monarch to provide accustomed luxuries for his 
family and court, all sacrifices and gifts given to the priestly class in theocracies’( 
Heidenheimer 1978:9).  
As the outline of the discussion has revealed, there is no universally accepted definition 
of this phenomenon, yet the common feature, among most of the current and prevalent 
definitions, is the misuse of the office be it political or bureaucratic, for personal or 
private gain. Some of the illegal activities like: money laundering, fraud, black marketing 
or drug trades do not constitute corruption as misuse of public office or public power is 
not necessarily involved in these activities (Jain 2001:73).  
Apart from the above-discussed definitions there are certain characteristics, which help in 
identifying the phenomenon of corruption from general criminal behaviour. Corruption 
entails various activities like: kickbacks, bribery, nepotism, and extortion, which fall 
within the basic parameters of the definition of corruption, and can be regarded as 
different methods of corruption. Furthermore, corruption can also be divided into three 
major categories: political, bureaucratic and legislative corruption. Their different 
characteristics and the methods, which they employ, as well as the different prevalent 
models of corruption, will be discussed in the coming sections.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of Corruption  
Though their effects may be by and large similar, still corruption differs significantly 
from general criminal behaviour, maladministration and mismanagement of affairs. 
Alatas (1968) who provides one of the earliest social descriptions of corruption, has 
stipulated multiple characteristics of corruption, which still holds good for most of the 
prevalent definitions. The first characteristic is the need for more than one party to turn 
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any deal or transaction into a corrupt one. Secondly, stealth and secrecy are the inherent 
qualities of the phenomenon; corruption demands secrecy, unless it is so rampant and 
common place that, perpetrators do not bother to hide it. Third, there is an inalienable 
association between mutual obligation or bilateral benefit and corruption, which need not 
always be monetary. Fourth, perpetrators of corrupt activities usually seek any lawful 
justification as a smokescreen for their activities. Fifth, persons involve in corruption 
need definite decisions and they can influence those decisions. Sixth, corruption demands 
deception, of the public body or society as a whole. Seventh, betrayal of trust is an 
indispensable part of corruption. Eight, corruption involves a contradictory duplication of 
functions: this means the provision of a service, which an individual offers, is at the same 
time an act on behalf of his office and an action for self-enrichment. Lastly, any corrupt 
transaction undermines the concepts of duty and responsibility under the civic order 
within which it is taking place (1968: 12-15). Though this list of characteristics may not 
be exhaustive, yet it contains a sufficient set of criteria to identify the phenomenon of 
corruption from the acts of criminal behaviour, maladministration, mismanagement or 
inefficiency. 
Primary most characteristic of corruption proposed by Alatas, i.e. involvement of two 
parties to make a transaction corrupt, can be contested on some very specific grounds like 
legislative corruption or undue use of information obtained by virtue of one’s official 
position. For instance, a legislator can vote for or against certain legislation, without 
promise of any incentive from any second party but with the idea of personal advantage 
to his business or investment opportunities, sans consideration of common good or public 
welfare. Similarly, any higher official having the information of forthcoming public 
policy changes, with long-term fiscal implications, can buy or sell real estate or stock 
market shares. This practice is quite common in Pakistan, where political elite and high-
level bureaucrats, buy cheap real estate in the vicinity of any proposed developmental 
project site like construction of a new airport or a mega motorway project, and sell that 
real estate once the prices increase exponentially after the announcement of such projects. 
What at the time of the purchase appears to the outsider, as an innocuous business 
investment is in reality the extreme abuse of the public position for personal gain at the 
expense of thousands of ordinary citizens of the state. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that in both of these situations existence of a bribing party is not 
an imperative, yet it definitely involves unfair use of public position for private gain 
without any consideration for common good, which surely falls within the parameters of 
corruption. Now with impaired validity of characteristic no.1, a case can also be made for 
treating embezzlement in public funds as another mode of corruption. Embezzlement, 
though it does not qualify the characteristic under discussion, involves the extreme use of 
public office for private gain; secondly, it is a consummate breach of trust, thirdly, it 
demands acute secrecy, and finally, it severely violates the norms of duty and 
responsibility. However, for the sake of simplicity and avoiding confusion we would 
leave embezzlement out while discussing the various modes of corruption. 
 
3.3 Modes of Corruption 
Leaving the acts of stealing, embezzlement, and fraud aside, generally four major kinds 
of illicit activities, namely: bribery, extortions, nepotism and kickbacks, are contained 
within the parameters of the term corruption. Alatas (1968) was among the first scholars 
theorising the concept of corruption; he divided corruption into three types: extortive, 
manipulative and nepotistic. According to our classification these are the modes and not 
the types of corruption so these concepts are described in this section instead of the next. 
According to Alatas, extortive corruption is a condition where one is forced to bribe, to 
defend, or gain one’s rights or needs. Manipulative corruption refers to attempts to 
influence decisions in one’s favour in any area of life (1999: 49-50). Alatas description of 
nepotistic corruption is more or less similar to the dictionary meaning of the word and 
would be discussed later in this section. 
Most of the dictionaries refer to bribery as ‘the act or practice of offering, giving, or 
taking a bribe’ and the term bribe is defined as ‘something, such as money or a favour, 
offered or given to a person in a position of trust to influence that person’s views or 
conduct’.75 Bribery is the most widely recognised manifestation of corruption; in 
layman’s perception it is at times synonymous with corruption. 
                                                 
75 Bribe. Dictionary.com. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bribe (accessed: February 27, 
2008).  
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The second mode of corruption is known as extortion, which generally refers to the illicit 
use of one’s official position or power to obtain funds, property or patronage from the 
clients. Webster’s Dictionary of Law defines extortion as ‘the act or practice of extorting 
especially money or other property; specifically the act or practice of extorting by a 
public official acting under colour of office’.76 The significant difference between bribery 
and extortion is that the former could be initiated both from the public official or the 
client; while the later mode of corruption can only originate from the public official, as 
the use of force of the public position is not that significant part of bribery as it is of 
extortion.  
The third mode of corruption is nepotism, which means bestowing patronage or 
displaying favouritism to ones close friends, family or tribe for the appointment to public 
jobs without any regard to merit. The very origin of the word explains the true essence of 
this phenomenon. The term is derived from French word ‘népotisme’ or the Latin word 
‘nepos’ that means ‘grandson or nephew’. The term historically refers to the policy of 
some of the earlier popes of placing their relatives in the positions of responsibility and 
honour in the church. In the middle Ages it was originally used to refer to the privileges 
granted to a pope’s ‘nephew’, which was a euphemism for his natural son. In modern 
times it is defined as ‘favouritism shown to relatives, especially in appointment to high 
office’.77 Culture bound explanations of corruption normally refer to this mode of 
corruption which could have different interpretations or degrees of tolerance in different 
cultures.  
The fourth major mode of corruption, kickback, refers to an illicit payment made by a 
seller to a buyer for making a certain transaction possible. Public office holders engaged 
in public procurement obtain a certain share of the total transaction from the vendors for 
doing business with them. Negating principles like merit, strict quality control, and the 
lowest bid, is a natural corollary of this kind of corruption. Webster’s Dictionary of Law 
defines this phenomenon as ‘a payment (as of money or property) made to one in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
76 extortion. Dictionary.com. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. Merriam-Webster, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/extortion (accessed: February 27, 2008). 
77  nepotism. Dictionary.com. Online Etymology Dictionary. Douglas Harper, Historian. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nepotism (accessed: February 27, 2008). 
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position to open up or control a source of income for the payer, a kickback is specifically 
a payment for income received or to be received’.78 
These four modes of corruption are utilised to varying degrees in different types of 
corruption. For instance, nepotism would be relatively more common in political and 
bureaucratic corruption than judicial corruption; as politicians have to satisfy their 
constituencies and bureaucrats have the opportunity to oblige their families and cliques. 
One example substantiating this point is the induction of thousands of workers in various 
public sector jobs by different political governments in Pakistan. The Peoples Party, 
whenever came to power they rewarded their supporters with public sector jobs. 
Similarly, whenever The Muslim League was in power they ousted all the inductees of 
pervious government and rewarded their supporters with those positions. This has again 
happened in the current stint of Peoples Party’s government, which has reinstated 
thousand of political appointees, which were rewarded with government jobs during the 
last government of Benazir Bhutto and were removed from the service by the subsequent 
government of Nawaz Sharif.  
 
3.4 Categories of Corruption 
Corruption manifests itself in multiple forms and shades. The varieties are abundant, but 
for analytical facilitation corruption is divided into three major categories; each category 
covers a certain pool of public responsibility which is being polluted by the misuse of the 
power delegated to the actor endowed with that responsibility. The genesis of power in 
the modern state is embedded in the trinity of legislatives, executives and judiciary; and 
contamination of this trinity produces political, bureaucratic and judicial corruption. 
According to the concept of separation of power, the other two organs of the state should 
check corruption of the third organ, but our experience of the developing world indicates 
otherwise. Here question arises that if theory of separation of powers hold true, then why 
does the corruption of one organ of state is not checked by the other two organs? Answer 
probably lies in the relative division of power or the gradual but simultaneous decay in 
                                                 
78 kickback. Dictionary.com. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. Merriam-Webster, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kickback (accessed: February 27, 2008). 
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the standards of probity of the whole state system. More over, each arm of the state gets 
the due share in the booty so the motto ‘I scratch your back and you scratch mine’ rules 
the various sections of the state. An in-depth analysis of this problem is beyond the scope 
of this study but it can be a potential issue of further investigation in the field of 
corruption research. 
 
3.4.1 Legislative or Political Corruption 
In the prevalent corruption literature, legislative corruption normally refers to influencing 
the voting behaviours of the participants during a legislative process. Certain business 
class or interest groups can influence the legislators, by offering heavy bribes or huge 
personal dividends, to obtain legislations favouring the bribee. This category of 
corruption is linked with vote buying and vote selling. Political elites buy the votes in 
their constituencies to be elected and re-elected to the constitutional bodies, and then sell 
their votes in favour of or against certain legislations, to few influential beneficiaries of 
those legislations in return of enormous personal profit. As legislators are predominantly 
the political elite of society, it is logical to combine political and legislative corruption. 
Political corruption refers to the acts of omission or commission, with a mala fide intent 
of personal gain by the political elites of the state. They are charged with the 
responsibility of devising policies for the allocation of the resources of the state, with the 
objective of ensuring maximum good for maximum number of people. A corrupt political 
elite can divert the flow of resources in the directions best suited for its personal gains or 
for the benefit of families, friends, or cliques, with or without marginal consideration for 
the welfare of the general public. Without any standardised and prescribed set of rules for 
such resource allocation, political corruption could be as hard to detect, as it can be 
deleterious for the socio-economic growth of the state. Besides this, corrupt political 
elites can also influence the implementation of the certain policies for the profit of certain 
group, class or clan in lieu of dear returns both in cash or kind. The difficulty in political 
corruption is that with every policy formulation, implementation or resource allocation, a 
certain section of the community would be benefiting, making it hard to prove that 
dishonest intent or personal interest was the motivation behind those policies.  
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Political corruption is generally grand in nature, as it involves big sums of resources of 
the state and the hard earned money of the taxpayers. The perniciousness of such 
corruption, both for society and the state, is generally enormous. The greater the volume, 
the higher is the impact on the socio-economic fabric of society. Secondly, misplaced 
resources and misdirected national policies could have long-term detrimental 
consequences for society at large. As Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) maintain that such 
corruption not only affects economic growth by influencing the choices of projects but it 
can also lead to allocative decisions having negative effect on the growth and 
development of the country. Political corruption is a very plausible explanation for the 
predilection of most third world governments towards extensive infrastructure and 
defence projects as well as unique and expensive machinery and technology rather than 
the appropriate ones. The social cost of such misdirection of resources can enormously 
exceed the revenue generated through such corruption.  
In retrospect of above, indices for measuring corruption can employ an empirical tool to 
their methodology by correlating the expenses in the sectors which are highly corruption 
prone – like infrastructure and defence – with expenses in sectors like education, and 
health where relatively less investment would lead to high dividends for the ordinary 
people, but which are not being ambitiously undertaken since they do not promise much 
scope for illegal gains in the form of kickbacks etc.  
Political corruption can be found both in developed as well as developing societies. 
However, the legislative form is more common in developed than in developing 
countries. The resource allocative type of political corruption is much prevalent in 
developing or transitional societies. The vote-buying form of legislative corruption is a 
common practice in developing states while a rare phenomenon in developed societies. 
However vote-selling kind of legislative corruption exists comparatively more in 
developed cultures; probably because the change through legislation is a trait of more 
developed political cultures. While the developing or transitional societies, lacking 
resources, transparency, and a mature political culture, assign resources in much obscure 
manner.  
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3.4.2 Executive or Bureaucratic Corruption 
Bureaucracy is a state agency composed of the selected or appointed agents chosen by the 
state for the implementation or execution of its policies. Theoretically bureaucrats are the 
agents answerable to their principal, i.e., political elite, for providing services to the 
general public, which acts as client in this case. Bureaucratic corruption alludes to acts of 
omission or commission by the bureaucracy in their dealings with either the principal or 
the client. The most common form of bureaucratic corruption is illicit charges levied by 
the bureaucracy, on the general public, for provision of the services to the general public, 
which is entitled for those services. Smooth and timely provision of those services is one 
of the responsibilities of the bureaucracy. Charging speed money for expediting 
bureaucratic procedures, which is slowed down specifically for this purpose, is therefore 
another form of bureaucratic corruption. Providing services to someone who is legally 
not eligible, in exchange of some illicit benefit in cash or kind is another form of 
bureaucratic corruption. Apart from services, bureaucratic corruption involves in some 
cases the provision of potentially valuable information, to someone who is not entitled to 
that information, in return of personal benefits. Bureaucratic corruption could be both: 
petty and grand, sporadic and systemic, having short and long-term consequences, 
slightly harmful as well as poisonous for the organism of society.  
By virtue of its public-centric nature, bureaucratic corruption is the most visible form of 
corruption in any social strata, having deleterious consequences for the socio-
psychological well-being of society. Widespread manifestation of such corruption in any 
society could inculcate frustration, despondency, negativism, and apathy in the masses, 
triggering a vicious cycle of poverty, unequal distribution of resources and 
underdevelopment. Detection of this form of corruption is not as hard as the political 
corruption, but its eradication is equally difficult; as normally the shepherds belong to the 
very same bureaucratic flock, against which they would be working. 
A general impression is that bureaucratic corruption is much ubiquitous in less developed 
or transitional societies, and equally exceptional in established political cultures of the 
developed world. This is attributable to numerous factors, however, a few more 
prominent are: scarcity of education and public awareness, apathetic public attitude, 
concentration of powers in the hands of bureaucracy, and the dearth of political will. 
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3.4.3 Judicial Corruption. 
Manipulation of the judicial process in favour of or against someone in return of 
pecuniary or material benefit falls in the category of judicial corruption. This category of 
corruption works through delaying the judicial proceedings, affecting the judicial process, 
and influencing the judicial decisions; resultantly, subverting the very judicious spirit of 
the law and the state. The provision of fair, transparent and speedy justice to its subject, 
which is the sine qua non of the state, is significantly undermined by the presence of 
corruption in this third arm of the state.  
Cost of corruption depends on the probability of being caught and on the severity of 
resultant penalty. Judicial corruption or malfunctioning of this organ of the state, not only 
reduces the probability of being caught, for the perpetrator of corrupt practices, but also 
diminishes the severity or effectiveness of the penalties, resultantly reducing the over all 
cost of corruption significantly. Secondly, registered corruption cases, if there are any, 
goes to judiciary for decision and if organ itself is corrupt, the one seeking justice is 
likely to be left with nothing.  
Consequences of judicial corruption might not be very concrete in terms of its 
manifestation, but its subjective or discrete ramifications are enormous for society. 
Nothing contributes to the helplessness, frustration, antipathy, and malevolence of the 
common man, as much as the presence of this disease in society. Following extract, from 
a questionnaire filled by an official of Motorway Police; aptly describe the feelings of 
any victim of judicial corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Pakistan a whole political party – Pakistan Therke Insaf (Pakistan Movement for 
Justice) - was established with the sole motto of delivering justice to the people. 
A relative of mine was baselessly involved in a murder case. Here 
in Pakistan police arrests a person just on the basis of nomination 
by plaintiff. Now he has to prove himself innocent. It is a long 
process from police to jail and court. Every department, at all steps, 
is corrupt. It is too bitter to narrate the hardships, mental torture and 
high financial expenses involved.  
 
29 years old, male police officer of the Motorway Police from Rawalpindi 
quoted this incident of a close relative of his, in June 2007 while filling in the 
questionnaire for the survey. 
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Eradication of judicial corruption is a complicated issue, as often the lawmakers and the 
law enforcers are among the beneficiaries of the shortcomings of this institution. Extent 
of judicial corruption in Pakistan can very easily be assessed by the following views 
expressed by a respondent from the Motorway Police. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This category of corruption is again prevalent in the third world or developing societies, 
while the developed societies of the world are considerably free from this syndrome. 
Among the primary reasons for the absence of this kind of corruption in the developed 
world are: rule of law, public awareness, freedom of press, and the power of the 
electorate. While the scarcity of these very factors in the developing world is responsible 
for the reverse trends in transitional societies.  
 
3.5 Models of Corruption 
Different researchers and scholars, specially belonging to the discipline of economics, 
have tried, from time to time, to propose various models to explain the degree, effects and 
persistence of corruption in different societies of the world. Economic research, which 
has expanded many folds in last two decades, has mostly focused on the principal-agent 
model of corruption.79 This model concentrates on the relationship between principal and 
                                                 
79 Few of the prominent economic studies focusing to principal-agent model include: Becker, Gary S., and 
George J. Stigler. 1974. ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers’, Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol.3:1-19; Banfield, Edward.1975. ‘Corruption as a Feature of Government Organisation’, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.18: 587-605; Rose- Ackerman, Susan.1975. ‘The Economics of 
Corruption’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.4: 187-205; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1978. Corruption: A 
I started my profession as an advocate. In this profession I concluded 
that in our judicial system you can get merit or justice, but only by 
paying money day in and day out. In civil cases you have to pay on 
the very first day of entering a case and then on every adjournment; 
whereas, in criminal cases, you have to pay police, prosecution 
branch, and then staff of the judges. This is so common that I felt that 
it is legal, and we are bound to pay. In our judicial system corruption 
is very high on lower staff (staff of judges); whereas, majority of our 
judges are honest and impartial. 
 
Another young male officer of Motorway Police from Mianwali (a small city in 
Punjab) who was a lawyer prior to joining MP narrated his personal experience of 
judiciary during the survey of MP in June 2007.
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agents; in case of a true democratic society, the public functions as the principal and the 
political as well as the bureaucratic elite serves as agent to that principal. While in non-
democratic societies, which most transitional societies are, the political and bureaucratic 
elite assumes the role of the principal, while the middle and low level executioner are 
assigned the role of agents. Robert Klitgaard (1988) extended this approach further, by 
incorporating the general public as the client, and converted this bipolar nexus to a 
tripartite arrangement as principal-agent-client model, details of which will be explained 
later. The major purpose of these and various other similar endeavours, was to formulate 
some theoretical models on the basis of which the differential incidence and persistence 
of corruption can be explained; and reasonable generalisations can be drawn regarding 
the varied levels of corruption in different parts of the world. In the coming section few 
of such more significant models of corruption will be briefly explained. 
 
3.5.1 Agency Models of Corruption  
Agency models serve to explain high-level political and legislative corruption by 
analysing the motives behind the actions of political actors. Corruption influences the 
incentives and restraints available to political elites; an agency model analyses the impact 
of variation in those incentives on the decisions of the political elites. Agency theory 
suggests that public officials like any other human being, tend to maximise their self-
interest, and if they are provided with the opportunities to indulge in corrupt practices, 
they will do so unless they are closely monitored or supervised (Williams 1999:507). 
According to agency models the principal has to motivate and monitor the agent to ensure 
the protection of principal’s interest. Achievement of former is ensured through provision 
of incentives to the agent in shape of favourable contracts; but the fulfilment of the latter 
is considerably intricate, as it demands extensive informational infrastructure as well as 
resources. Apart from effective monitoring, the principal should also have the means to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Study of Political Economy. New York: Academic Press; Klitgaard, Robert. 1988. Controlling Corruption. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Klitgaard, Robert. 1991. Tropical Gangster. New York: 
Basic Books. 
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hold the agent accountable for his actions.80 The inability on the part of the principal to 
monitor the agent effectively or to reprehend the undesirable actions of the agent, breads 
the ground for corruption.  
Rose-Ackerman (1978) was the first to employ a similar model for understanding grand 
political and petty bureaucratic corruption. According to her model perfect information is 
a bane for the presence of legislative corruption; as legislators have to choose between 
their chances of re-election, which will diminish with the reporting of each of their 
undesirable act, and their gains through corrupt practices. However, situations of 
imperfect information, or where voters could be bought and sold, would bear great 
potential for corruption; as lack of proper information would not harm their chances of 
re-election as much as in the first case, so legislators would not hesitate to take their 
chances of making fortunes by corrupt means. Lack of information to principal or the 
general public significantly reduces the deterrence against the corrupt dealings of the 
agent or the political elites. In her later study Rose-Ackerman (1999) once again applied 
the agency model to analyse the behaviours of the leaders in democratic polities. 
According to this study three major sources of corruption in democratic societies are: ‘the 
existence of narrowly focused favours available for distribution; the ability of wealthy 
groups to obtain these benefits legally; and the temporal stability of political alliances’ 
(1999:132).  
In order to ascertain the level of corruption within a society Johnston (1997) also 
employed the agency model. According to him the level of corruption depends on the 
degree of interaction between the political and economic pressures in society. He holds 
that ‘first, a balance between the accessibility and autonomy of the political elite and 
second, a balance between wealth and power’ are strong determinants of the level of 
corruption in any society (1997:68). According to his model, an imbalance between 
                                                 
80 This question regarding the means of principal to hold the agent accountable for his action is addressed 
by numerous studies like: Klitgaard, R. 1990. Tropical Gangsters. New York: Basic Books; Jain, A.K. 
1993. ‘Dictatorship, democracies, and debt crisis’, in S.P. Riley (ed.), The Politics of Global Debt, New 
York: St. Martin’s Press; Kurer, O. 1993. ‘ Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources’, 
Public Choice, Vol.77, No.2: 259-273; Johnston, M. 1997. ‘ Public Officials, Private Interest, and 
Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet’, in K. A. Elliot (ed.), Corruption and the 
Global Economy. Washington Dc: Institute of International Economics; Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. 
Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 128
 
political and economic opportunities germinates four different kinds of corruption: 
interest group bidding, patronage machines, elite hegemony, and fragmented patronage.  
Apart from democratic societies some of the agency models have also studied the 
dictatorial behaviour with reference to the prevalence and persistence of corruption in 
such states.81 According to these models policymakers of dictatorships act like ravaging 
agents without any consideration for the interest of the principal or the general public, 
because re-election is not any consideration of autocratic rulers. However, there exists a 
controversy regarding the validity of this argument, as Bardhan (1997: 1327) has pointed 
out that ‘elections have become very expensive and to dispense favours in exchange for 
campaign contributions is a major source of corruption in democratic regimes’; according 
to him the extent of bribes is smaller in democratic systems as compared to the dictatorial 
ones ‘due to an externality that each democratic legislator’s vote potentially imposes on 
every other legislator, when they cannot coordinate their votes to demand a bribe which 
compensates them for that externality’. Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) in their study of 
rational legislators have modelled this very coordination problem in bribe collection of 
democratic systems. Theories of scholars who follow agency models have been 
corroborated by empirical studies like Mauro (1995, 1997) and Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997), which have shown results supporting the assertions of this model.82 
 
3.5.2 Resource Allocation Models  
Resource allocation models are best suitable to analyse bureaucratic and petty corruption. 
These models view corruption as a cost within a demand and supply framework, which 
affects the whole economy by influencing the inputs and outputs of the system. The 
application of these models is particularly valid for rent-seeking behaviour. Rents 
according to Robert William (1999:507) ‘are defined in economics as returns in excess of 
a resource owner’s opportunity cost’; while elaborating the rent seeking activity he 
                                                 
81 Jain, A.K. 1993. ‘Dictatorship, Democracies, and Debt Crisis’, in S.P. Riley (ed.), The Politics of Global 
Debt, New York: St. Martin’s Press; 1990. Klitgaard, R.1990.Tropical Gangsters. New York: Basic Books; 
Klitgaard, R. 1991. Adjusting to Reality: Beyond State Versus Market in Economic Development. San 
Francisco, California: ICS Press and International Center for Economic Growth; 
 
82 The result of such studies have been explained in chapter 2 section 2.3.2.1 
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asserts that rent seeking as an economic concept is driven on the assumption that human 
beings are basically driven by self-interest, which they strive to maximise. But the major 
draw back of this approach is that it does not provide any means to discriminate between 
corrupt and non-corrupt modes of maximisation of self-interest. We need to have a 
concept of public office and the norms associated with it to be able to make this 
distinction.  
Krueger (1974) was the first one to apply such a model on rent seeking behaviour, on the 
premise that rent seeking is also a kind of economic activity for which firms allocate a 
decent share of their budget. According to him a process of competitive bidding among 
the rent seekers, could result in the complete evaporation of rent. Discussing the 
astonishingly small magnitude of bribes in relation to the rent, which is supposed to be 
accrued for the briber, Bardhan (1997) has pointed out the same coordination problem 
among the legislators. Various studies have also applied resource allocation models to the 
intra-bureaucratic struggles for maximisation of their budgets.83 
Each model reaches to the same conclusion that ‘the extent of aggregate rent seeking, and 
hence the total social cost of seeking rent, is determined by the rent available to capture… 
and the number of players in the game’ (Paul and Wilhite, 1994:110). Further studies 
have analysed the impact of rent-seeking behaviour on the market structures and suggest 
that rent seeking might influence the market equilibrium by affecting the cost of 
resources.84 
 
3.5.3 Demand and Supply Model 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in their interesting study of corruption from an economic 
perspective consider the principal-agent problem as given, and then focus on the 
consequences of corruption for resource allocation. They present two basic premises 
about corruption; first, that the level of corruption depends mostly on the structures of 
government institutions and political process, and secondly, the surreptitiousness and the 
                                                 
83 Among such studies are: Faith, R.L. 1980. ‘Rent-seeking Aspects of Bureaucratic Competition’, in 
Buchanan et al. (ed.), Toward a Theory of Rent Seeking Society, Texas: A&M University Press; Katz, E. 
And Rosenberg, J. 1994. ‘ Rent-seeking for Budgetary Allocation: Preliminary Results for 20 Countries’, 
Public Choice, Vol.60: 133-144 
84 Zhou, H.1995. ‘Rent-seeking and Market Competition’, Public Choice, Vol.82 (3-4): 225-241 
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illegality of corruption amplify the distortionary effects of corruption and make it much 
more expensive than taxation. They further elaborate these premises according to the 
implications of how a corruption network is organised and why this organised corruption 
seems much more deleterious than taxation.  
The authors developed a model of petty corruption, which was first proposed by Rose-
Ackerman in 1978 considering demand, supply and cost of corruption (Jain 2001:88). 
The basic model assumes that the official, who has the monopoly over the supply of a 
good, sells it on behalf of the government. Calculating the marginal cost for the official 
for providing these goods, the authors suggest two possible scenarios: one without theft 
and other with theft. According to the former case the official deposits the official price 
in the government account and collects bribes beyond that official price. For example in 
land revenue departments, officials submit the governmental tax in the treasury, but 
charge extra amount from the client, apart from that tax, for provision of any service. An 
example of corruption with theft would be the customs office, which normally takes the 
bribes and let the imported items go through without levying any customs duty. The first 
scenario always increases the total price of the supplied goods or services. While the 
second case might decrease it, making corruption with theft more profitable for both the 
corrupter and the corrupted, creating a symbiotic relationship between the two, thus 
minimising the chances of detection by reducing the incentive for the buyer to inform on 
the corrupt official. 
In a competitive market buyers indulging in corruption with theft will surely be better off, 
resultantly competition between the buyers assures the spread of corruption with theft or 
cost reducing corruption. The authors suggest increasing the cost of corruption for buyers 
by reducing the possibilities of corruption with theft through strict monitoring and 
accounting measures. Subsequently, the only available option of corruption without theft 
will increase the cost for the buyer and actuate him to divulge such deals and officials. 
Delineating the structures of corruption networks the authors offered three models: first, 
where a unified monopoly provides all the goods; second, where monopoly suppliers of 
different goods act independently; and the third, where there is competition among the 
government suppliers for provision of goods and services. The level of corruption is 
lowest in the third case, medium in the first and highest in the second case. In the first 
 131
 
case a unified monopoly will keep the level of bribes to optimal, because of a centralised 
and unanimously agreed corruption pattern and network (e.g. Marco’s Philippines or old 
Communist Russia where a unified command had the monopoly over bribe extraction). 
While in the second case the supplier would not have any such consideration and every 
supplier will strive for maximisation of his share resulting in highest amount of total 
bribes (e.g., Africa, India and post-Communist Russia, where every one is free to collect 
as much bribe as possible without any central control or authority for regulating the 
amounts of bribes). In the third case competition between the various providers will bring 
the level of corruption or bribes down to zero (e.g. US passport office: since a citizen can 
get the service from any city or state, he could avoid the city office, which is demanding 
bribes and can refer to any other office; a corrupt official who wants to be competitive is 
unlikely to risk loosing his clients.) 
Resultantly ‘competition is the best; joint monopoly is the second best; and independent 
monopoly is the worst for efficiency’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1993: 608). The authors have 
concluded that introduction of competition among government suppliers for the provision 
of similar goods is the best mode for reducing corruption without theft, but this 
competition could trigger an increase in corruption with theft. Finally, the best policy 
would be to introduce competition while strictly monitoring for theft. 
 
3.5.4 Miscellaneous Models of Corruption 
Apart from the above-explained well-known models there are various other models, each 
analysing corruption from a different perspective. Andvig and Moene (1990) forward one 
such model, according to which, in case of being caught, associated penalties for 
corruption decrease with the increase in the number of corrupt officials, since it is much 
safer to be caught by a corrupt superior than an honest one. On the other hand, the 
bribers’ demand for corrupt services decreases with the increase in the size of the bribes 
and with the decrease in the ratio of corrupt officials. This model establishes a direct 
relationship between the dividends of corruption and its rate of incidence and explains 
how impermanent changes in the pattern of corruption may contribute to a permanent 
shift in the prevalence of the phenomenon 
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Raaj Sah (1988) forwards another interesting model of corruption based on the 
accumulated experiences of generations. According to this model both bureaucrats and 
citizens assess for themselves a subjective probability distribution, telling them the 
likelihood of meeting a corrupt partner in any given transaction. Corrupt individuals 
would prefer encountering a corrupt counterpart and vice versa. For every corrupt 
encounter the actors increase the subjective probability of meeting corrupt counterparts in 
the next interaction, and might not hesitate from initiating a corrupt act themselves. This 
way one’s past experience of the economic surrounding helps in building one’s belief 
about the nature of the environment and ultimately leads to the conservation of a culture 
of corruption. According to the author this is the way in which a steady state of economy 
is influenced by the history of the preceding economic life. However, author admits that 
there can be instances where the beliefs about the prevalence of corruption might not be 
in congruence with the actual incidence of corruption. 
Another very interesting generations-framework, focusing on past and future, is proposed 
by Tirole (1996), who is of the opinion that collective bad reputation of the preceding 
generations could be a partial cause for the persistence of corruption in any given society. 
Collective bad reputations are the stigmas, which are bequeathed to the new generations, 
which will find little incentive in being honest. This model studies the dynamics of 
individual and collective reputations and shows ‘that new members of an organisation 
may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after they are gone’ (1996:1). This 
implies that an upward surge in corruption could have lasting effects on the socio-
economic life of the group or society, because damaged collective reputation is very hard 
to repair or rebuild. Secondly, a one-shot reduction in corruption and a stringent anti-
corruption campaign might also not show any enduring effects, as ‘trust takes several 
periods to re-establish, after which the group’s reputation returns progressively to the 
good-reputation level’ (1996:18). It may take an uninterrupted period of several years, of 
less or no corruption, to return to an established and enduring phase of low corruption. 
 
3.6 Measuring Corruption 
Among the various considerations associated with any serious academic inquiry 
regarding corruption, are the questions of what exactly corruption is, and how it can be 
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measured. Definitional intricacies already discussed, leaves us with the problem of a 
reliable measurement of the phenomenon. Inherent surreptitiousness and clandestine 
nature of the phenomenon renders the task of quantitative measurement of corruption 
excessively demanding. A researcher has to quantify a phenomenon, which the agent, 
who knows most about it, desires to be left obscure, equivocal and veiled. This 
furtiveness is one of the primary reasons for early lack of academic interest in corruption 
as a researchable topic. Notwithstanding these complexities, there have been repeated 
attempts, though more for commercial gains than the academic value, to ascertain the 
extent of corruption in different parts of the world. These attempts, in shape of country-
risk datasets, are mostly undertaken by profit organisations to provide information to 
multi-nationals corporations, international banks, and institutional investors. The current 
body of empirical research about corruption is by and large based on such datasets.  
The noteworthy factor about the available data on corruption is that, owing to 
abovementioned difficulties, all this data is perception based. Commercial firms, non-
governmental organisations or international agencies like the World Bank collect data, 
regarding the prevalence of corruption in a certain country, through surveys and 
interviews, based on the perceptions of foreign or local investors and business people, 
country experts, local elites or to a very limited extent the general public. It is believed in 
the academic circles that this perception-based data, to a certain extent, represents the 
true level of corruption in any country. The founder of the Corruption Perception Index, 
Dr. Lambsdorff is of the view that ‘the data on corruption are thus based on subjective 
perceptions and expertise, but considered to be good indicators of real levels of 
corruption’ (2005:1). In the coming lines we will briefly discuss some of the more 
important ones of these datasets. 
 
3.6.1Business International (BI) Data  
The very first such data was collected by Business International which is now a 
subsidiary of Economic Intelligence Unit. BI published a number of ratings on several 
countries. The assessment of the level of corruption in the country was one of the 
criterions of those ratings. This data covers 68 countries for a period 1980-83. Corruption 
measure in this dataset is quite general and based on the opinions of the correspondents 
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of the firm, stationed in the countries under assessment. The correspondents had to grade 
the level of corruption in their country on a scale to 10, while assessing ‘the degree to 
which business transactions involve corrupt payments’ (Ades and Di Tella 1997:498). A 
similar methodology was employed by all the correspondents, to ensure the accuracy and 
comparability, factor assessment reports were further scrutinised at regional as well as 
headquarter level. Some of the major empirical studies of corruption have employed this 
data; among these are the well-known studies of Mauro (1995) and Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997).  
 
3.6.2 World Competitiveness Report (WCR) 
This report is a business publication of the World Economic Forum (WEF), Switzerland, 
and consists of a large attitudinal survey (known as Executive Opinion Survey) of the top 
and middle level managers of the dynamic firms in the countries covered under this 
report. Since 1989 the surveys, covering minimum 32 countries and almost a thousand 
executives, have incorporated a question about corruption. In 2005 a total of 10993 
responses were received and a cross-country raking for 117 countries was published 
including a number of developed countries (Knack 2006:7). The WCR data measure 
variables on a low scale of 1 to high scale of 7. The measure related with corruption is a 
small part of this attitudinal survey and asks about ‘the degree to which improper 
practices (like corruption) prevail in the public sphere’ (Ades and Di Tella 1997:498). 
Accuracy and suitability of this data for academic research, especially in cross-section 
studies, is seriously undermined by the apparent lack of a centralised office to check and 
consolidate the answers. However, according to Ades and Di Tella (1997), an advantage 
of this data over the BI data is the respondents’ intimate knowledge of the business 
practices prevalent in the country under assessment. 
 
3.6.3 Impulse Data 
Not very well known, this data was collected by a German publication Impulse in 1994 
and covers 103 countries. This data is based on surveys of German businessmen, who 
were doing business with the countries under investigation or assessment. On average 10 
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businessmen were surveyed for each country, and the minimum acceptable limit was 
three interviews. According to Jain (2001), no one else has used this data for empirical 
research except Ades and Di Tella, who name important advantages of this data as: less 
subjectivity involved, because respondents had to just give an estimate of the kickbacks 
per deal in each country; and the quantitative nature of the question answered by a 
homogeneous set of respondents having a practical business experience in each country 
covered under the survey. 
 
3.6.4 Political Risk Services Incorporation 
This is an annually updated index published in the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), and sold to potential investors all over the world. For the period 1982-95 ICRG 
data is available for 42 to 95 countries. ICRG data is updated monthly, and in March 
2005 it rated 140 countries. ICRG index assess the level of corruption through informed 
observers in shape of foreign investors and quantify the incidence of corruption on a scale 
from 0 (corruption free) to 6 (most corrupt). According to this index a higher level of 
corruption means that ‘high government officials are likely to demand special payments’ 
and ‘legal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government’ in 
forms of ‘bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, police protection or loans’ (Tanzi 2000:159). But there is certain scepticism 
about the results of the ICRG among researchers, because this measure does not depict 
corruption itself but the political instability, which increases with corruption (Lambsdorff 
2005:2). This index has been used by various empirical studies of corruption, including 
Knack and Keefer (1995) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). 
 
3.6.5 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) 
PERC is a Honk Kong based consultancy firm specialising in strategic business 
information for companies doing business in countries of East and Southeast Asia. PERC 
produces a number of risk reports on a number of socio-political variables like labour 
quality, intellectual property rights and corruption. The firm has published estimates of 
corruption in 12 countries of the region since 1993 through a collection of survey results 
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based on the interviews of the 100 regional managers of the banks and multinational 
companies operating in the countries under report. Lancaster and Montinola (1997) have 
also provided some details of this measure of corruption. 
 
3.6.6 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
CPI is a composite index (a poll of polls) based on multiple indices, usually more than 
ten, published annually since 1995 by Transparency International (TI), a Berlin based 
non-government organisation (NGO) devoted to fighting corruption on global level. 
Latest empirical studies of corruption very often employ Transparency International’s 
data. CPI is probably the most well-known corruption index both in academic as well as 
non-academic debates and the most quoted measure of global corruption in international 
media. The latest CPI of 2008 covers 180 countries and is based on data from 14 different 
surveys of different business people and assessments by country analysts from 12 
independent institutions. One important aspect about this year’s data is that all the 
sources employ a homogenous definition of the ‘extent of corruption’. CPI ranks 
countries in terms of prevalence of corruption among public officials and politicians and 
reflects the views of business people and analysts around the world including those 
experts living in the countries evaluated. CPI methodology is reviewed by an Index 
Advisory Committee consisting of leading experts in the fields of econometrics, 
corruption and statistics. 
Since each source uses its own scaling system, standardisation of the information is a 
crucial step in the formulation of CPI. The experts at TI are doing this in two steps. At the 
first step sources are standardised using matching percentiles of ranks and not of scores; 
after achieving standardised values within the reporting range (i.e. from 1 most to 10 least 
corrupt) a simple average from these standardised values is calculated. To avoid the 
elements of heterogeneity among the various sources, a more complicated 
standardisation, i.e., a beta-transformation is used at the second stage.85 (Lambsdorff 
2007:8). 
                                                 
85 Every year with the publication of new CPI, Transparency International issues the methodology 
document, which explains in detail, all the issues involve in the collection, compilation, and analysis of the 
data, obtained from different sources. For the latest index of 2007 this methodology document could be 
seen at the URL: http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI_2007_Methodology.pdf 
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At least three different sources of observation, i.e., information or scores from at least 
three sub indices should be available for inclusion of a country in the CPI. The reliability 
of CPI is attributed to the high degree of inter-correlation between the sub indices of 
which CPI is constructed. For the latest CPI of 2007 these correlations are reported 0.77 
at average (Lambsdorff 2007:9). The bias germinating from shared rumours or special 
experiences of the expatriates is not considered very serious as the sub indices, based on 
the information obtained from locals as well as expatriates or foreign experts, show a 
higher inter-correlation. Moreover, the high inter-correlations exist independently of the 
different ways the questions that are phrased in various sub surveys. (Andvig 2000:11). 
However, the World Bank researchers have shown considerable doubt about the 
authenticity and reliability of CPI and have developed their own ‘Control of Corruption 
Index’.86  
After the establishment of CPI as a valid index indicating the perception regarding the 
prevalence of corruption, Transparency International has also launched Bribe Payer’s 
Index (BPI) and Global Corruption Barometer (GCB). While the former focuses on the 
‘supply side of corruption’ by measuring the predilection of the firms from leading 
exporting countries to indulge in corrupt practices abroad, the later is more concentrated 
on the attitude and experiences of the general public towards corruption in their countries. 
 
3.6.7 Control of Corruption Index (CCI) 
A team of World Bank researchers, consisting of Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and 
Pablo Zoido-Lobaton developed the CCI-index in 1999 to replace the Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff CPI published by TI. CCI is a composite index based on an even larger 
number of indices than the CPI, also incorporating the works of reliable commercial 
country risk assessment organisations and NGOs. Further aspects of public governance 
that are highly correlated with corruption have expanded the list of indices. CCI has 
created an aggregate measure combining the three elements of governance: probity, 
bureaucratic quality and the rule of law. As corruption is a concomitant of governance the 
research on corruption can be extended to the concept of governance (Jain 2001:76). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
86 For detailed view of the criticism please refer to Kaufman (1998), Johnston (2000) and Knack (2006). 
 138
 
While using the same sources as CPI, noting their strong inter-correlation, and employing 
the same standardising techniques, CCI employs a different weighting procedure, where 
the indices with a lower degree of inter-correlation and higher degree of variance receive 
lower weights. CCI employs no restriction such as minimum three numbers of sources for 
every country for inclusion in the index. CCI also tries to improve on the statistical 
uncertainties in the CPI by computing a standard error as an indicator of uncertainty with 
each estimated point; unlike CPI, which provides the range and standard deviation among 
the sources. However, researchers have certain apprehensions regarding the validity of 
composite indices in general as an authentic representative of the level of corruption in 
any country.87 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we analysed various definitions of corruption and their evolution; 
characteristics, types and modes of corruption; various models of corruption, measuring 
techniques and tools employed for that purpose. We saw that definitions of corruption 
have been divided into three groups: public office oriented, public interest oriented and 
market based groups, but despite almost a century long debate about the issue, there is 
still no universally accepted definition of the term. However, in the current academic 
circles most widely employed definition is, ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’, 
which is probably derived from the Joseph P. Senturia’s definition of 1930s. We have 
also employed the same definition in this work, because of multiple reasons: first, the 
subject of this research specifically deals with bureaucratic or executive corruption in 
transitional societies, so employing a definition which concentrates on the use of public 
office is very much logical; second, to make this research compatible and comparable 
with the ongoing investigations in the field of political science, public administration and 
economics, it is imperative to use the similar yard stick which is employed by other 
works; thirdly, as this research is based on the perceptions of public servants – an 
important novelty of this research – using a definition which targets the same group is 
likely to yield more dividends than any other choice. 
                                                 
87 For a detailed discussion on the issue of measuring corruption please see Knack (2006). 
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Besides the definitional debate, we have shown how the concept of public office has 
evolved over the centuries from the times of pre-modern, pre-bureaucratic, patrimonial 
domination to the present days of highly complex, structured and regularised 
bureaucracy. We have also discussed various characteristics, which on one hand are 
required to render any transaction corrupt and on the other hand distinguish corruption 
from general criminal behaviour, fraud, maladministration, or inefficiency. We have 
forwarded the claim that corruption can take place without a second party being a part of 
the transaction. Discussing the four possible modes of corruption: bribery, extortions, 
nepotism, and kickbacks, we have seen the utility of different modes for different kinds 
of corruption.  
Three broader categories of public corruption: political, bureaucratic, and judicial, have 
also been dilated upon in this chapter. We have deviated slightly from the popular 
classifications of corruption, according to which political and legislative corruption are 
dealt as two separate kinds of corruption along with bureaucratic corruption, while 
judicial corruption is considered a part of bureaucratic corruption. We have based our 
categorisation of corruption on the three basic pillars of the state: executive, legislative 
and judiciary, arguing that aberration in the behaviour of any of these arms of the state 
results in shape of corruption. As in Aristotelian tradition perverted forms of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and constitutional republic, result respectively in tyranny, oligarchy, and 
democracy, (it should be noted that by democracy Aristotle does not mean the present 
democracy we know, he rather implies the government by the poor only); similarly, the 
perversion of these three pillars of state results respectively in bureaucratic corruption, 
political corruption and judicial corruption.  
However, political corruption can further be divided into ministerial and legislative 
corruption; the former deals with the function of politicians allocating resources, while 
the latter explains the behaviour of a political elite in terms of electoral vote buying from 
constituencies and legislative vote selling to industrialists, big business concerns and 
pressure groups. 
Among the various models of corruption presented by different scholars are: agency 
models, resource allocation models, demand and supply models, and the general models 
of corruption related to accumulated experiences of generation and the collective bad 
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reputations of institutions or nations. We also saw that agency models are mostly 
employed for analysing grand corruption or the ministerial or legislative corruption, 
while the resource allocation models are usually used for evaluating petty or bureaucratic 
corruption. The demand and supply model can also be employed to explain petty 
corruption along with the description of corrupt networks; while the other discussed 
models are more concerned with the overall prevalence and persistence of corruption in 
any given society. 
Lastly we have seen that, despite associated obvious difficulties, efforts are being made 
since the late 1980s to measure corruption. Though generally motivated by commercial 
and business concerns, yet these efforts have significantly contributed to the evolution of 
empirical research on corruption. We have also briefly discussed: the various 
organisations trying to measure corruption, the developed indices, and the methodology 
used by each of these indices of corruption. We have seen that Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, which is a composite index, based on 
multiple sources, is at the moment the most well known and extensively quoted index of 
corruption. CPI is not only an extensively quoted measure in the media but also in the 
current academic research on corruption. 
Prior to this chapter we had developed an institutional theory and model for controlling 
corruption in the developing world; and had in detail analysed the progression of 
academic research on corruption with a focus on the debate about the functionality or dis-
functionality of corruption. In this chapter we have thoroughly analysed various 
connotations of corruption, the specific characteristic of this ancient and universal 
phenomenon, and channels of social and economic interaction through which it works. 
We have also described the basic types of corruption and its modus operandi; and how it 
can be modelled for theoretical understanding of the phenomenon, and how and with 
what tools attempts can be made to quantify its degree or level in a given society. 
The above information was necessary to understand the coming chapters dealing with the 
historical narrative of corruption in Pakistan; perceptions of public agents regarding the 
prevalence and causes of corruption in Pakistani bureaucracy; and the perceptions of 
agents regarding effective means to control corruption. The next chapter provides an 
overview of the conditions in Pakistan as a representative of a transitional society and a 
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developing state. We will trace how various types, modes, and categories of corruption, 
discussed in this chapter, have operated in case of the post-colonial society of this newly 
born state. We will also try to ascertain the impact widespread corruption has made on 
the socio-political development of the state; moreover, we will discuss the peculiar 
conditions prevailing in Pakistan, which helped in the evolution of unabated corruption, 
as of today, and the simultaneous decay of governance. 
 
 142
 
Chapter 4 
Corruption in Pakistan 
 
Why civil-military bureaucracy has overwhelmingly dominated the vicissitudes of 
Pakistan’s political history, and how this development has contributed to the unabated 
spread of corruption, are the fundamental questions coming chapter will be dealing with. 
In this chapter we will analyse the conditions in Pakistan as an exemplar of a post-
colonial developing state with a quintessentially traditional society on the arduous path of 
transition. Facilitating the understanding of the phenomenon in the region, the genesis of 
corruption is traced back to the times of ancient India. Bearing in mind that corruption in 
post-colonial states was generally ensconced in the pre-independence settings. It is 
imperative, for a true understanding of the development of corruption in such states, to 
explore the colonial heritage of corruption in the region. Considering this, the coming 
chapter will analyse the emergence of corruption in the British India especially in the 
back drop of World War II. 
This chapter will further investigate the socio-political conditions at the time of partition 
and how they contributed to the development of a culture of corruption and malpractices 
in the country. The chapter will also explain how the trilogy of bureaucracy, military and 
the feudal aristocracy have contributed to the spread of various modes and forms of 
corruption. The chapter will further analyse the corruption of various civil-military 
governments starting from 1947 to 2008 and the impact these practices had on the state 
society relationship. An analysis of why different regimes repeatedly opted for 
individualistic policies instead of collective ones; and how this has contributed to the 
development of an ethos of corruption and inefficiency, will also be a part of this 
narrative. This chapter will also briefly dwell on the issue of the lip service paid by 
various governments regarding the reduction of bureaucratic corruption, and the largely 
unsuccessful measures taken by various administrations for arresting the spread of this 
disease. The chapter will analyse evolution, progress and the current extent of the 
problem, which is vital for understanding the coming two chapters that deal with the 
institutional perceptions regarding the causes and control of corruption in a developing 
country like Pakistan.  
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4.1 A Paradox of Growth and Corruption 
Over the years, corruption has grown into a deleterious and ubiquitous tumour, but its 
extreme malignant manifestations are found mostly in so-called third world or developing 
states and Pakistan unfortunately epitomises such states. Pakistan is generally referred in 
this study as it exits today; since socio-political development trajectory of Bangladesh 
does not transcend the same progression in Pakistan therefore, rendering the need to treat 
pre and post 1971 histories differently as superfluous. Historical description of pre 1971 
era, in this chapter, may be treated as concerning the present day state of Pakistan, which 
was born with a congenital deformity; as the cancer of corruption started to spread with 
the refugee’s settlement scams in 1947.  
Since then corruption is the only field, apart from the defence budget and population, 
which has shown a consistent upward surge. Pakistan touched the nadir of the 
transparency standards in 1996, during the second term of Benazir Bhutto, when 
Transparency International, rated Pakistan as the second most corrupt country in the 
world with a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of one.88 According to the latest 
Index released in October 2008, Pakistan is still at 134th position among the list of least 
corrupt countries with a CPI score of 2.5. Despite a much-publicised anti-corruption 
campaign by the military government of General Musharraf, Pakistan has still lost 0.2 
and 0.1 points on the CPI when compared with the indices of 1998 and 2002 respectively. 
The unprecedented decay of governance, fostered by religious militancy and concomitant 
worsening of law and order situation, coupled with an abysmal CPI score, as shown in 
table 5, is indicative of a further deteriorating image of the country from domestic as well 
as international investment point of view. Pakistan is the 46th most corrupt country among 
the 180 surveyed countries of the world, while at the same time Bhutan, India and Sri 
Lanka are 135th, 95th, and 88th corrupt countries respectively (Transparency International 
CPI 2008).  
 
                                                 
88 Corruption Perception Index, as already explained in chapter 3, is a composite index measured on a scale 
of 1 to 10, means the higher the CPI score the lesser the perception of corruption in a country. Score of 1 
indicates most corruption in a country, and 10 is indicative of completely clean country. For further details 
about the CPI refer to chapter 3, or visit Transparency International web site at the address:    
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
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Table 5 Corruption Perception Index of South Asia 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bangladesh    0.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Pakistan 2.7 2.2  2.3 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 
Nepal       2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 
Sri Lanka     3.7 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 
India 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.4 
Bhutan         6.0 5.0 5.2 
Maldives          3.3 2.8 
Source:http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/ 
 
Corruption is institutional, endemic, all pervasive, and deeply entrenched in Pakistani 
society. Successively, four elected democratic governments in 1990s were thrown out of 
office, inter alia, on the charges of corruption and corrupt practices. A survey of five 
South Asian states conducted in 1999 rated Pakistan as worst case in terms of prevalent 
corruption of politicians, law enforcement agencies and judiciary indicating that all the 
three organs of state; legislature, executive and judiciary, are most corrupt in the region. 
Transparency International’s countrywide survey of 2002 revealed the police, power 
supplies and revenue collection as the three most corrupt institutions in the country 
(Mitra et al. 2006:304).  
Corruption, though existing in all societies, varies in its rate of incidence in different 
societies, cultures, and times of history (Huntington 1968: 61). Incidentally, in Pakistani 
society, corruption is much prevalent and its incidence has grown considerably in the last 
three decades. Though a less developed and very corrupt state, Pakistan, if considered 
from the governance perspective, is an intriguing paradox, which makes its case worth 
further investigation. Pakistan has well-educated and prosperous elites, small business 
owners in industrial economies, skilled labour employed in the gulf states and high 
ranking officials in international organisations. According to a World Bank study, until 
2000 Pakistan has benefited from $58 billion foreign development assistance, 22 
adjustment loans, and lucrative Cold War and anti-terrorism alliances with the US 
(Easterly 2001: 2). With an average per capita growth per year of 2.2 per cent from 1950 
to 1999, Pakistan was never lagging behind in growth but still one can safely assume to 
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find its name towards the bottom of Human Development Index, Corruption Perception 
Index and any similar indices.  
While analysing the economic prospects of the country, Cohen (2004) has remarked that 
Pakistan’s economy is one of the great contrasts. It has grown on average at a spectacular 
rate of 6 per cent per year, but still the country is deeply indebted, lacks any significant 
manufacturing capacity, is agriculturally backward when placed with comparable 
regions, and suffers from a severe energy deficit. This paradoxical state of economy 
could be attributed to a number of factors including: the lingering effects, of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto’s nationalisation program of the 1970s; piling up of domestic debt under Zia ul-
Haq in the 1980s, and widespread corruption and irresponsible spending in the 1990s’ 
decade of democracy (2004:249). Nevertheless, despite all the inherent limitations, with 
systematic policy making and proper implementation (meaning through good 
governance) Pakistan had the potential to become a middle-income country from a low-
income in the 1980s (Burki and Robert 1984: 3). However, this dream did not come true 
and one of the major reasons for this imbroglio is, inter alia, persistent, entrenched and 
systemic corruption. 
 
4.2 Historical Evolution of Corruption in the Sub-continent 
Corruption in the Indian sub-continent is as old as in any other part of the world. Earliest 
accounts of this phenomenon are found in Kautilya’s Arthasastra: a brilliant treatise on 
the art of statecraft in which the author has described an amazingly modern account of 
different forms and manifestations of corruption. According to this fourth century B.C., 
Indian statesman, there are about forty ways of embezzlement and corruption: ‘What is 
realised earlier is entered later on; what is realised later is entered earlier; what ought to 
be realised is not realised;…what is collected is shown as not collected; what is collected 
is of one sort, while what is entered is of another sort; what is realised from one source is 
shown as realised from another; what is payable is not paid; what is not payable is paid; 
not paid in time; paid untimely; small gift made large gifts: the real donee is one while 
the person entered as donee is another; what has been taken into (the treasury) is removed 
while what has not been credited to it is shown as credited;… commodities of greater 
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value are bartered for those of small value; what is of smaller value is bartered for one of 
greater value; prices of commodities enhances;… inconsistency of transactions carried on 
with personal supervision; misrepresentation of the sources of income;… making use of 
false weights and measures;…’ (Shamasastry 1960:66-67). Apart from these open 
manifestations of mala fide intent on the part of public office holders, there has always 
been a discreet culture of offering gifts to the state functionaries and the rulers, in the 
name of customs and traditional values. Mukherjee (2006:79) while narrating the 
corruption milieu of India in the seventh century has described these gifts as shukrana 
(thanksgiving) and jabrana (levies), while the beneficiaries expected to receive dastoor 
(customary gifts), mamool (present in cash or kind) and hafta (weekly levies).  
Many scholars believe that the moral decay of ancient Indian kings was slower than of 
their Roman counterparts mainly due to the emphasis on the concept of raja-dharma 
(religious duty of righteousness imposed on the king) in ancient India. However, some 
other scholars propose that ‘it would be naïve to assume that the ancient Hindu 
civilisation was free from this malaise, and unhistorical to propound, as some scholars 
have tended to do, that the strong spirituality of Hindu philosophy succeeded in stopping 
the rot through its non-materialistic attitude to life’ (Mukherjee 2006:77). However, 
gradual moral degeneration of the Indian rulers resulted in a corresponding decline in 
their authority; which was exploited by the subsequent invaders like Huns, Mongols, and 
Mughals (Ibid: 79). Muslim rule in India was also marked with a similar process, starting 
from moral uprightness and higher values of the early rulers to the ethical decadence and 
moral debauchery of the later Mughals, which was aptly exploited by the British East 
India Company. 
 
4.2.1 Colonial Heritage of Corruption 
Although the early part of British rule in India was blemished by incidents of wide spread 
corruption and corrupt practices89, yet in the later years the British succeeded in 
establishing a government and civil service which was competent, efficient, and 
relatively free from corrupt practices. Corruption, until the start of World War II, was 
                                                 
89 Even some of the early rulers of British India like Robert Clive and Warren Hastings had to face 
impeachment on their return to England on charges of corruption and maladministration. 
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found in the lower level public officials, while the higher echelons of public 
administration remained comparatively free from this malevolence. However, with the 
start of war, the probity standards of the British colonial administration plunged to an 
unprecedented low level. Emergencies of war forced the British to delegation of powers, 
relaxation of rules and injection of huge resources into procurement of war supplies 
without due consideration of accountability and transparency. This resulted in wide 
spread corruption not only among the contractors, suppliers, and low-level public 
officials, but also among the highest levels of administration (Ibid: 81). Certain 
regulatory measures like: licenses, permits and rationing of commodities, adopted during 
the war times, further aggravated the situation and reduced the public aversion towards 
corruption. These regulatory measures, coupled with the wartime’s scarcity, provided 
abundant opportunities and incentives for bribery and favouritism. Referring to the 
impact of WWII on the colonial administration, the Santhanam Committee Report has 
observed, ‘it would not be far wrong to say that the high water-mark of corruption was 
reached in India as perhaps in other countries also, during the period of Second World 
War’ (Santhanam Committee Report 1964:11). Such eruption of a corruption volcano 
forced the British in 1941 to establish an investigative organisation on emergency basis, 
called Delhi Special Police Establishment, to detect corruption among the public servants 
dealing with war procurements.  
Apart from the emergencies of WWII, some of the scholars have openly questioned the 
impact of colonial rule on the post-colonial probity standards of the states.90 They are of 
the view that the very core of colonial policy was based on deceit, and exploitation, 
which cannot take place without corruption. Not to take anything away from the avarice 
of public servants, lack of integrity, soft norms, ill devised policies, and half hearted 
implementation of the post-colonial states, the roots of such wide spread corruption in 
states like India and Pakistan, can also be traced back to the policies of the colonial era. 
The self-righteous colonial masters, basking in the warm suns of their colonies, 
introduced policies, which had more long lasting and varied effects than they might have 
                                                 
90 For multiple examples of this line of argument, please see Monteiro, John B. 1966. Corruption: Control 
of Maladministration. Bombay: Manaktalas ; Wraith, Ronald and Edgar Simpkins.1963. Corruption in 
Developing Countries. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd; and May, R.J. and Ray, Binayak. (eds.) 2006. 
Corruption, Governance and Democracy in South Asia. Kolkata: Towards Freedom. 
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anticipated at that time. Wraith and Simpkins (1963), while elucidating the relationship of 
colonial policies to the prevalent corruption of the newly independent states of Asia and 
Africa, have analysed the impact of the transfer of British local government and 
administrative system to the British colonies in these words: 
…supposing in their blindness that plant which has only been known to flourish in 
the temperate, misty and kindly atmosphere of England and Wales could be 
transplanted to the harsh, exotic climate of African tropics… The adoption of British 
local government, with ultimate power in the hands of elected councillors, but short 
of restraints of British convention, compromise and mutual respect between elected 
representative and paid officials has amounted to an open invitation to corruption, an 
invitation eagerly if incredulously accepted.  
(Wraith and Simpkins 1963:19&20) 
Considering the very basis of their rule, the apathy of the colonial rulers towards the issue 
of corruption is understandable, but the antipathy of local ruling class towards the 
standards of probity and rational decision-making in terms of collective good is hard to 
explain. 
 
4.3 Decade of Autonomous Corruption 1947-58 
Corruption in India attracted more attention from both domestic intelligentsia as well as 
international academia91. Pakistan was studied mainly from the point of view of a nascent 
state in the process of the making, facing challenges like: state building, promoting the 
idea of nationalism, pacifying the ethno-linguistic diversities, and establishment of a 
centre based federation.  
                                                 
91 India is probably the most studied postcolonial state from the point of prevalent corruption. Some of the 
more prominent of corruption studies on India involve: Committee on Prevention of Corruption 
(Santhanam Committee). 1964. Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption. New Delhi: Ministry 
of Home Affairs, Government of India; Monteiro, John B. 1966. Corruption: Control of Maladministration. 
Bombay: Manaktalas; Varma, S.P. 1974. Corruption and Political Development in India’, Political Science 
Review, Vol. 13(1-4): 157-179; Palmier, Leslie. 1985. The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case 
Studies in Asia. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd; Alatas S.H.1999. Corruption and the Destiny of 
South Asia. Selangor Darul Ehsan: Prentice Hall (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
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Pakistan’s uniqueness as a state-nation92 instead of a nation-state compelled the domestic 
as well as international intelligentsia to focus more on the fragility, and the allied 
economic and security related problems of the newborn state. 
After Independence – contrary to somewhat naïve common believes – the situation of 
bureaucratic corruption, in both India and Pakistan, deteriorated further instead of 
ameliorating. Both India and Pakistan inherited a bureaucracy, which was self assured, 
competent and arrogant, as it enjoyed enormous powers under the aegis of the British 
crown. Bureaucrats were considered, revered and feared as masters by the general public, 
which was predominantly, illiterate, poor and overawed by the power of their white 
masters. Incontestable hold of colonial masters over their subjects and the inadequacy of 
the general masses, heavily contributed to this apotheosis of the bureaucracy, which in 
turn started to suffer from god syndrome. Political leadership in post partition India 
managed to relatively tame this wild horse of bureaucracy, mainly due to the presence of 
a strong and unified political party, like the Congress and the committed and influential 
leaders, like Ambedkar, Azad, Patel, and Nehru. In contrast to this, bureaucracy in 
Pakistan continued strolling along the familiar paths of unbridled power, unquestioned 
authority, and unconditional submission of the subjects. Resultantly, bureaucracy as an 
institution of the state played a major role in the socio-political and economic life of the 
country. The major factors leading to this inherently flawed development were: lack of 
strong political parties, scarcity of committed political leadership – especially in the 
backdrop of early demise of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan – and the singular status of the 
bureaucracy as the only relatively developed, professional and organised institution at the 
time of partition. 
Pakistan started on extremely precarious grounds and under a plethora of initial 
difficulties. The new state inherited: almost an empty exchequer, a poorly equipped army, 
the Kashmir issue, a week infrastructure, a largely agrarian economy, hardly any 
industrial base, and millions of refugees to take care of. Pakistan, had no more than a 
couple of textile and sugar mills in 1947, and received 1414 out of total 14,677 industrial 
                                                 
92 Pakistan shares the experiences of the transitional societies regarding the issue of nation building and the 
idea of nationality. In industrial world the body of citizens joined together as a nation strived to form a 
state, for protection and expansion of their rights, generally known as nation-states; while in transitional 
societies and the post-colonial world, state came first and the idea of belonging to a unified nation among 
the citizenry, of that state, came later. Thus making them state-nations instead of a nation-states. 
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enterprises (less than 10 per cent of the total) and 206,100 compared to the total of 
3,141,800 of the industrial workers (almost 6.5 per cent) at the time of partition (Rashid 
2004:180). Such was the plethora of problems, forcing scholars like Myrdal, to observe 
that considering the communal strife and the political and economic chaos in which 
Pakistan was born, the country’s mere survival was remarkable (1968:307). The trauma 
of partition, along with the ever-present threat from a comparatively strong and hostile 
neighbour, induced a permanent feeling of insecurity among the leaders as well as masses 
of the country.  
Despite all these pressing needs of a newly born state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father 
of the nation, in his keynote presidential address to the first constituent assembly of 
Pakistan on 11th August 1947, enunciated the foremost responsibilities of the state, listing 
eradication of widespread corruption as top most priority of the state, second only to the 
maintenance of law and order. He expressed in most unequivocal terms, the 
undesirability of phenomena like bribery, corruption and nepotism, to guarantee the 
smooth working of the state and the welfare of society. In his own words: 
…One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering – I do not say that other 
countries are free from it, but, I think, our condition is much worse – is bribery 
and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron 
hand… The next thing that strikes me is this: Here again it is a legacy which has 
been passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived 
this great evil – the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed 
relentlessly. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of 
jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. 
(Rashid 2004: 60-61) 
Nevertheless, Jinnah did not live long enough to actively pursue the fulfilment of his 
ideals in the newly carved state. And until today his topmost priorities - maintenance of 
law and order and control of corruption – have not been taken care of, jeopardising the 
very existence of the state. After him, wealthy and influential refugees groups (who had 
joined the Muslim League not long before partition), along with the landed aristocracy of 
northern India (which had not played any significant part in the struggle for 
independence), were the major players of early Pakistani politics. Members of these 
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classes, or their associates, also occupied strategic positions in civil as well as military 
bureaucracy (Waseem 1989). As already mentioned, at the time of partition bureaucracy 
as an institution had comparatively the best-trained professionals, who were educated, 
efficient, and adept in the Westminster form of administration. This nexus between the 
bureaucracy, the landed aristocracy and the businessmen proved instrumental in the 
spread of corruption, and civil servants started to join the ranks of a wealthy class of an 
otherwise very poor country. Analysing this nexus, former president and first martial law 
administrator, General Ayub Khan remarks in his autobiography (1967:49) that, ‘the 
politicians were naturally dependent on permanent services, but more powerful among 
the services had developed political ambition of their own. Every one seemed to have a 
group of his own and his sole occupation was to grind his own axe regardless of whether 
the country was ground to pieces in the process.’ 
The very raison d’être of the Pakistan movement was to avoid the majority dominant 
rule, after the departure of the Colonialists and to ensure self-government, not any social 
change. In the words of Humza Alavi (1997), at the very core of the Pakistan movement 
were the Muslim salaried class of India, who wanted a better share of government jobs, 
and were afraid of being left behind the Non-Muslims – who were more educated and 
had privileged positions in the government – in the race for government jobs in case of an 
undivided independent India. Non-Muslims advocated merit as the fairest criterion, while 
Muslims demanded quotas. However, it is ironical that after independence when the same 
Muslim salariat were in privileged positions against the rest of ethnic groups of Pakistan, 
they started the slogan of meritocracy against the demands of quota, by the less 
privileged ethnic groups; thus promoting a politics of ethnic rivalry (Alavi 1997:87). This 
blind race for the government jobs among the various ethnic segments of society 
promoted nepotism, patronage, and corruption as well as ethnic cleavages and a 
discrimination syndrome among the left out ethnic groups.  
Theoretically, public servants are accountable or answerable indirectly to the public they 
serve through political elites, who are chosen by the public and can be removed from 
their position, if they do not perform according to the wishes or expectation of the 
electorate. In case of early Pakistan, there were multiple missing links in this chain. First, 
political elites were not chosen by the public they were ruling; second, political elite were 
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using the public servants as a mean to avoid going through the process of election; third, 
instead of monitoring and ensuring the transparent working of civil bureaucracy political 
elite were themselves manipulating and abusing the institution for attainment of their 
personal ends. Commenting upon the nature of political leadership in early Pakistan, 
Bhambhri and Nair (1971:31) assert that ‘democratically elected representatives, who 
were to act as guardians of morality and integrity in public administration, themselves 
started indulging in corruption, nepotism and favouritism of worst kind’. This marriage of 
convenience between bureaucracy and politicians, unleashed the phantom of 
bureaucracy, which tasted the forbidden fruit of corruption in the very formative phase of 
the newly born, malnourished, under weight, and weak state of Pakistan.  
But this does not mean that the entire early bureaucracy was corrupt or inefficient, rather 
contrary to this a considerable number of bureaucrats were very dedicated, honest and 
hard working civil servants. The bureaucracy as an institution was better trained and held 
a considerable sense of superiority over the politicians, whom they considered as 
incompetent, corrupt and power hungry. Commenting on the efficiency of the Pakistani 
bureaucracy and inefficiency of the politicians, Kennedy (1987:12) maintains that the 
administrative competence of the civil service was far too ahead of the other political 
institutions of the new state, which made up for the shortcomings of the political elites. 
Burki (1993:6) asserts that the early crises in Pakistan, though serious enough to test the 
administrative capacity of many first world nations, were managed well through efficient 
use of the competent civil service inherited from the British. 
However, this competence of civil bureaucracy was in direct contrast to the corruption 
and incompetence of the politicians, which reinforced the colonial ‘administrative state’ 
bias inherited from the colonial masters (Khan 2007:226). Politics in Pakistan lost early 
grounds to other two main state institutions: bureaucracy and military. Bureaucracy, 
specially the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre, dominated the political body 
completely and its over development was directly proportional to the under development 
of the political institutions in the early phase of Pakistan. Dominance of CSP in the 
administrative machinery could be ascertained by the fact that by 1964, 89 per cent of 
federal secretaries, 65 per cent of provincial secretaries, 75 per cent of divisional 
commissioners, and 51 per cent of district officers, belonged to this cadre (Waseem 
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1989:176-177). Furthermore, with the creation of the post of secretary-general in 1948 (to 
look over the departmental heads of all the ministries), the entire government was 
centralised in a single hand, which firmly established the rule of generalist bureaucracy in 
the country.  
This ascendancy of the bureaucracy over the complete state apparatus resulted in 
concentration of power in one institution without affective checks and balances, paving 
the way for: abuse of power, political patronage, and nepotistic corruption. Later on, the 
military joined the bureaucracy in this equation, however, political institution was 
always, and still is, on the losing side of this troika. Commenting on the interplay of 
national, regional and international factors responsible for the underdevelopment of 
elected institutions in Pakistan, Jalal (1995) maintains that ‘the dominance of the non-
elected institutions was a result of a concerted strategy by the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy and the military to exploit the rivalries among Pakistani politicians and 
systematically weaken the political process by manipulating their connections with the 
centres of the international system in London and Washington’ (1995:54). Even today the 
non-elected institutions of military and bureaucracy are not only the sole players at the 
centre stage of Pakistani politics, they also have to share their bounties with the feudal 
class of political elite as well. In Stephen Cohen’s view (2004:93) ‘Pakistan’s socio 
economic order… has been dominated by a ‘triad’ composed of army, the bureaucracy, 
and the feudal landlords. Today this triad is known as Establishment… but powerful body 
has shifted away from bureaucrats towards the military’. 
Corruption in Pakistan started with the refugee’s rehabilitation plans in 1947. The exodus 
of over 7 million refugees from India to Pakistan put enormous strain on the already 
fragile economic and administrative set up of the newborn state. Resettlement of these 
refugees opened a dual way of corruption for the government officials as well as for the 
rich and influential. On one side, some of these refugees made inaccurate claims 
regarding their left over properties in India to obtain more than their rightful claim. While 
on the other side, much of the property of the migrating Hindus (who left for India) fell 
into the hands of local landlords and wealthy and influential refugee groups, instead of 
being utilised for the resettlement of deserving refugees.  
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Both kinds of these corrupt transactions were completed with the connivance and 
coordination of unscrupulous personnel in the civil bureaucracy and at the expense of 
hundreds of thousands of poor, homeless, and helpless refugees.93 Migrants, motivated by 
the fervour of the Pakistan Movement and the threat of Hindu persecution reached 
Pakistan, having lost family members, honour and property; they found it, at times, hard 
to cope with the callousness of the state and society. Resultantly, natural insecurity of the 
migrants coupled with a decade long rehabilitation process, set forth a culture of 
corruption in which every individual strived to get hold of whatever he could through 
whichever means, foul or fair, possible. In the words of Waseem (2002:156), ‘refugees 
relied on personal relationships based on kinship and ethnic loyalties for getting things 
done. All this led to a culture of corruption in terms of grabbing jobs and property 
through personal networking. The obvious casualty was public morality, rule of law, 
administrative efficiency and official credibility’. But the alarming factor is that the 
situation has not changed much rather it has grown worse as is evident from the 
following extract written by one of the female respondents, in answer to an open-ended 
question, during the survey of civil bureaucracy of Pakistan: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of the Muslim League ruling elites belonged to the non-Pakistan areas of 
colonial India; consequently they had little electoral support in the constituencies, which 
fell under Pakistan’s territory. These ruling elites were threatened by the idea of 
                                                 
93 The level of this kind of corruption could be ascertained by results of a field survey published in the 20th 
February 1959 Dawn newspaper, and quoted by Myrdal in his Asian Drama (1968:310), stating that out of 
5,27,535 “shelterless” people in Karachi, 84% were refugees. It should also be remembered that this was 
the condition after more than a decade of independence. 
I am a victim of corrupt officers/officials of land revenue and 
administration who by misusing their powers deprived me from my 
land after 32 years of ownership by reversing the entries in their 
record in favour of the land mafia/land grabbers. I knocked on every 
door for justice i.e., police, high-ups of administration, judiciary, 
NAB, and also sent applications to President and Prime Minister for 
redressal of my grievance.  
 
A mid-level female officer of Finance Division, who was working for the 
government for last 23 years, narrated this story to the author in Islamabad in May 
2007; emphasising the power of corruption mafia in Land Revenue department. 
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parliamentary form of government. Consequently, politics in Pakistan was from the very 
outset motivated by the desire of self-perpetuating rule instead of any democratic set up, 
based on the idea of public accountability. When in October 1954, Ghulam Muhammad 
dismissed the first Constituent Assembly, which was trying to curb some of his executive 
powers; he accused its members for delaying the constitution making to avoid facing the 
electorate. Though an inherently false pretence, his action was supported by ‘the fact that 
some of the assembly members were facing corruption charges under the public 
representative disqualification orders’ (Jalal 1995:52). Early politics in Pakistan was 
according to Myrdal ‘characterised by factional manoeuvring, chicanery, coercion and 
widespread corruption, all of which were so much part of the mores as hardly to need 
concealing’ (1968:319). Political elites often used civil bureaucracy, which was 
professional, efficient and well trained, for achievements of their personal ends to an 
extent that bureaucrats-cum-politicians like Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza had 
no hesitation to employ government servants to perpetuate their hold on power by 
making and breaking of political parties. Civil bureaucrats started demanding price for 
such collusive services, which they often received (Hussain 2002:225). Need for rapid 
economic activity, as well as industrialisation in the new state provided abundant 
opportunities for civil bureaucrats to demand illicit fees for issuing approval for 
establishment of any new industrial unit or any import export license.  
Myrdal attributed this professional as well as moral decay, of what initially was an 
efficient civil bureaucracy, to the prevalent corrupt political milieu of post partition era. 
According to him: 
…this unique position of civil servants occupied in an increasingly corrupt milieu 
ended to corrupt their own public morals. The extent to which the civil service 
became part of the wealthy classes in Pakistan was a visible measure of the 
deterioration of its standards. When, for example, import controls were imposed 
after 1952, the industrialists’ need for a permit often matched the officials’ need for 
a higher income. 
                                                                                                      (Myrdal 1968:320) 
The extent of corruption in public servants can be estimated by the fact that according to 
the records of the Special Police Establishment, in year 1951-52, of the 1134 persons 
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proceeded against under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act and the Hoarding and 
Black Marketing Act, 735 were government servants (Ahmed 1970:83). Commenting on 
the state of corruption in the, then, second largest province of Punjab, an inquiry 
commission in 1951 reported that bribery was widespread in every department of the 
Punjab administration (Jalal 1991:80). 
The majority of the new industrial class in Pakistan consisted of the rich and influential 
industrialists of India who had migrated to Pakistan from Gujarat, Bombay, and Calcutta. 
Among some of the more prominent of such business families were: the gold trading 
Habib family from Gujarat; Ispahanis and Adamjees of Calcutta, pioneers of successful 
jute industry in India; and the Saigols family from Punjab, whose expertise lay in leather 
industry. Apart from these major families, a large number of other business families 
belonging to the traditional trading communities settled in Karachi (Cohen 2004:50). 
These refugee groups had strong and mutually beneficial connections with the migrant-
dominated political elite and top bureaucracy. Consummate ascendance of refugees in the 
most powerful institution of bureaucracy can be established by the fact that despite being 
only 10 per cent of the total population, the refugees claimed almost 60 per cent of the 
seats in the recruitment for central services of Pakistan in 1951. Later a survey in the 
early 1960s revealed that 34.5 per cent of public servants were the residents of areas not 
included in Pakistan before partition in 1947 (Waseem 1989:113).  
According to most commentators of Pakistani politics, this nexus between business and 
ruling class proved vital in the spread of corruption in the country. The constituent 
assembly voted huge developmental expenditure, which benefited the political as well as 
the financial supporters of the ruling elite, but never accepted the taxation proposals, 
which were vital for the economic development of the country. Activities like tax 
evasion, black marketing, smuggling, and auction of licenses and permits were prevalent 
and unchecked. According to the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, as quoted by Myrdal, 
at the eve of martial law in 1958, from top to bottom, there was hardly any person who 
was not corrupt.94 Corruption had become almost a way of life in business and all this 
was openly discussed and deplored by the public (Myrdal1968: 321-323).  
                                                 
94 This statement was published in daily English newspaper, Pakistan Times, August 26, 1958, and quoted 
by Myrdal in his epic Asian Drama at page 321 Vol. I. 
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The Government took several steps for arresting the surge of corruption after the 
partition, which involved the promulgation of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and 
the creation of Special Police Establishment.95 The extent of corruption in early Pakistan 
can be ascertained by the fact that, by October 1953, over 5000 corruption cases were 
registered, though a small fraction, 358 and 224, actually resulted in conviction or any 
departmental punishment respectively (Callard 1957:298). This amounts to almost 1000 
registered cases of corruption per year in the first five years of the country’s life. 
Furthermore, Table 6 comprising of the data supplied by Braibanti (1966:293) in his 
study of the Pakistani bureaucracy, indicates the extent of corruption in the first decade of 
Pakistan’s existence. A total of 3549 public servants were penalised by the screening 
Committee of Ayub Khan’s martial law regime. Among the penalised ones, 1662 
belonged to the central or federal government while, 1887 were working for provincial 
governments. The distribution of penalties was quite asymmetrical between East and 
West Pakistan, as 544 public servants belonging to West Pakistan were punished, in some 
way or the other, in comparison to 1343 officers belonging to East Pakistan. However, 
the interesting statistical fact remains that the ratio of the harsher penalties (dismissal or 
removal from service) meted out in West Pakistan were considerably higher than the 
similar ratio in East wing of the country. As in the western wing out of total 544 penalties 
456 were the harsher ones while the same figure for East Pakistan was 314 out of 1304. 
Another very interesting disharmony was the punishment of compulsory retirement, as in 
the eastern wing 877 public servants were forced to retire prematurely, while in western 
Pakistan not a single official was forced to retire this way. However, the milder 
punishments like displeasure and warning were rendered only to Class I, II, and III 
officers but there was not a single incident of these in central governments of East and 
West Pakistan. This disharmony can be attributed to the fact that punishments in central 
government attract much more media attention and have stronger impact in terms of 
political value; consequently, the tenor of punishments was much harsher at central level. 
Such were the conditions at the end of the first decade after the birth of the new state, 
which ultimately led to the first of the, so far, four military rules of the country. 
                                                 
95 For a detailed list of the anti-corruption laws and regulations passed since independence, which proves 
the Latin proverb, “Corruptissima re publica plurimae leges” (when the republic is at most corrupt the laws 
are most numerous) very true, please refer to the Appendix 3. 
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Table 6 Results of Initial Screening in 1959 and 1960 of Central and Provincial 
Government Servants 
Penalty Class I 
 
Class II 
 
Class III 
 
Total W. Pakistan 
all cases 
E. Pakistan 
all cases 
Total 
Dismissal 4 14 110 128 214 254 596 
Removal 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
242 
 
60 
 
302 
 
Compulsory 
Retirement 
71 
 
68 
 
547 
 
686 
 
0 
 
877 
 
1563 
 
Reduction in 
Ranks 
8 31 163 202 - - 202 
Special Report 25 88 362 475 - - 475 
Increment 
Reduction 
2 5 0 7 88 152 247 
Warning 27 14 121 162 - - 162 
Displeasure 1 1 0 2 - - 2 
Total 138 221 1303 1662 544 1343 3549 
Source: Braibanti, Ralph. 1969. Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. Durham: Duke University Press: 
293 
 
4.4 The Praetorian Corruption 1958-71 
At the completion of first decade of the country, symptoms of an economic paralysis 
coupled with high inflation, distrust of new industrial class, rampant corruption and 
alienation in the eastern wing produced a general demoralisation of the public and a 
cynical mistrust of the political elite (Myrdal 1968: 323). In these perilous circumstances, 
then president, General Iskander Mirza declared martial law in the country in October 
1958. In a statement delineating his reasons for this action, he noted rampant corruption, 
quest for power among the politicians, food crises and the exploitation of the masses as 
the primary causes for his action (Cohen 2004:60). General Muhammad Ayub Khan 
blamed the ‘self-seekers who in the garb of political leaders have ravaged the country or 
tried to barter it away for personal gains’ for the existing chaotic conditions (Ahmed 
1970: 236). While stating his policy to deal with the current rampage by the corrupt 
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politicians and bureaucrats, he announced martial law regulations, ‘which will tighten up 
the existing laws on matters like malingering or inefficiency amongst officials, any form 
of bribery and corruption, hoarding, smuggling or black marketing, or any type of anti-
social or anti-state activity’ (Ibid: 238). In retrospect of the above-mentioned prevalent 
conditions in the country it can safely be assumed that such statements were not only 
rhetorical in nature, forwarded only to justify the military take over, rather they had some 
degree of credibility. Commenting on reasons of military take over in South Asian states 
Myrdal, while quoting Tibor Mende, had observed that ‘a few years before the military 
putsch of 1958 in Pakistan, probably no other symptom of Pakistani public life has 
contributed more to the demoralisation of the common man than corruption. Illicit 
practices had reached such proportions that their effect is likely to wipe out whatever 
benefits new economic projects might have secured for him’ (Myrdal 1968: 937). 
Probably this was the reason that the masses in general welcomed the first martial law 
regime of General Ayub Khan. 
However, as we shall see, the institutional culture of corruption, which had developed in 
the pre- martial law period, proved more tenacious than the common man’s desire for a 
free and just society. The nexus of corruption, which emerged during the first decade, got 
further strengthened during this second phase as the ruling elite and their close cliques 
started to acquire important positions in industrial arena through official patronage. In 
fact, the early establishment of the military government was more of a co-dictatorial 
setup consisting of a mixture of higher civil-military bureaucracy. Myrdal, while 
commenting on the level and cost of corruption during Ayub’s regime, asserted that ‘not 
long after the coup d’état the incorruptibility of the military junta came into question. It 
was not so much that speculation, black marketeering, tax evasion and other fraudulent 
practices had decreased, people were saying, as that the cost of bribery, because of 
greater danger, had increased’ (1968:340).  
Nevertheless, in pursuance of its martial law regulations, the military government took 
steps to purge the public officials of their corrupt behaviour and to reinvigorate them with 
a sense of discipline and morality. Screening of public officials was instituted for the very 
purpose, but in the end – like most of anti-corruption drives – this proved more of a tool 
for political arm twisting, than cleansing of the public servant, as only four civil servants 
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and two higher police officers were compulsorily retired as a result of this screening. 
Conviction for political patronage and for raising party funds were much higher than the 
punishments for financial corruption of the civil servants, which amounted to mere 
rustication in most of the cases (Ibid: 326). The early years of military government saw 
some reprieve for common man and a slight decline in the incidents of corruption, which 
could be attributed partially to the fear of screening process. However, In the opinion of 
Alatas (1999:64), ‘ the screening had the effect of preparing the soil for a more luxuriant 
growth’, as once the unscrupulous elements got through this process undetected, they 
acquired the prestige and status of being certified men of integrity, and taking advantage 
of this privileged position regenerated themselves with much more force than earlier.  
Considerable level of bureaucratic corruption during the first military regime is attributed 
to the overall strength of bureaucracy as an institution, as well as dependence of the 
military regime on the bureaucracy for effective running of the state machinery. Further, 
the relative economic prosperity of the decade along with the production based policies 
of the Ayub regime also provided the bureaucracy with relatively more chances for 
making illicit gains. According to Waseem (2002:157), the prevalent recruitment patterns 
of the civil service also made a crucial contribution to the emergence of corruption in 
Pakistani bureaucracy of 1960s and onward; as in 1964, 66 per cent of the officers came 
from a salaried background whose fathers were also government servants. These officers 
as children were kept in a protective environment and were always on move because of 
the routine postings of their fathers; so had little incentive for integration with the local 
communities and the realities of a commoner’s life. Grown up as government officers, 
they had an apathetic attitude towards the local’s needs and demands and their link to 
society were based at best on benign neglect. 
However, it should be noted that during the first military regime, if corruption was not 
sporadic it was certainly not at all pervasive. Most of the corruption allegations during 
the period were related to the grant of import and industrial licenses to the close 
associates of the military regime, or to the individuals who had bought it from the 
concern authorities on considerably high prices. Nonetheless, analysts have taken a 
lenient view of this kind of corruption considering the fact that majority of these licensees 
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made considerable contribution to the rapid industrial and economic growth of Pakistan 
during Ayub’s reign.96 
The second military ruler General Yahiya Khan also started a process of bureaucratic 
cleansing in his brief stay at the helm of affairs. He suspended 303 civil bureaucrats on 
the charges of corruption and subversive activities. The list also included 38 members of 
the civil service and 16 senior police officers. A high-powered committee was instituted 
to investigate corruption cases and the assets declared by the president down to joint 
secretaries. On the recommendations of this committee, 35 senior officers of bureaucracy, 
out of whom seven belonged to the civil service of Pakistan (including the advisor of 
former president, secretaries for finance and for family planning) were dismissed from 
service on the charges of corruption and malpractices (Bhambhri and Nair 1971:38-39). 
Though the bureaucracy was generally traumatised by these measures, yet it retained its 
structural features, like collective nature of policymaking and internal review system. The 
later feature provided the bureaucracy with the opportunity to dispense with the services 
of corrupt officers and yet retain its institutional integrity (Waseem1989: 253-254). 
Nevertheless, as the time revealed this was more of a measure to terrorise the civil 
bureaucracy to obtain their unconditional obedience in the face of military rule, than any 
serious attempt for arresting the endemic of corruption. It should be noted that until that 
time corruption was more in the shape of political patronage, nepotism, and favouritism. 
Hard core financial corruption or kickbacks were either less common or less reported 
than in the present day. 
 
4.5 The Democratic Corruption 1972-77 
 Minimum intervention of the state, in the operations of market, is considered to be an 
effective tool against corruption, but the first democratically elected government of 
Pakistan adopted the opposite policy (as was the vogue ideology in those times). State’s 
intervention in the market increased enormously due to the nationalisation policy of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Under this policy, large-scale industries, private commercial banks, 
                                                 
96 For an account of such analyses please see Governance, Corruption, and Development: Some Major 
Obstacles to Growth and Modernisation in, Burki, S.H. 1999. Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood. 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
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insurance companies, and even small agro-industries, like rice and oil mills were brought 
under the auspices of the state during, 1972 to 76. The level of state intervention in the 
market could be ascertained by the fact that by the end of his era, state’s share in the non-
agriculture Gross Domestic Product had increased from 24 to 51 per cent (Burki1999: 
177). Through his nationalisation policy, Bhutto placed these industries under the tight 
and cunning hold of state bureaucracy; as large public sector corporations were 
established to run these industries, and a new financial institution – National Finance 
Development Corporation – was built to establish, administer, and channelize the 
resources in to these public sector industrial corporations. Thus preparing the ground for 
the massive bureaucratic corruption, which became a permanent feature of the state 
machinery in the times to come (Ibid: 177-178). These ill-conceived policies not only 
opened enormous opportunities for bureaucratic corruption, but also affected the pace of 
industrial and economic growth of the country; as the average manufacturing out put of 
the industrial sector slowed down from 8.1 per cent of 1960s to 5.2 per cent during his 
democratic government (Ibid: 103). Economic policies of the regime, though they might 
not have been devised with this intention, proved significant in the development of a 
corruption culture in the bureaucracy.  
In the administrative sphere, one of the major and longer lasting initiatives of Bhutto’s 
government was the introduction of a quota system for recruitment in the civil service.97 
This allowed many candidates from lower middle class backgrounds, small towns and 
underprivileged ethnic communities to join the civil service of the country. Such public 
servants, with underprivileged socio-psychological background, were scarcely prepared 
to judiciously handle the considerable powers bestowed upon their shoulders. 
Consequently, they were more susceptible to the famous cliché that, ‘power corrupts and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely’. In view of Waseem, these public servants ‘tended to 
have a pretty bourgeois view of the state as an organisational matrix carrying absolute 
and legitimate authority in a Hegelian sense, on top of a system of rationing access to 
scarce resources. This view was accompanied by distrust of all public activity’ (Waseem 
                                                 
97 According to quota system, a certain percentage of posts in the central administration were to be 
allocated to the Rural Sindhis. The purpose of this system was to correct the preponderance of Muhajirs in 
the civil bureaucracy of the country.  
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2002:157). Once again, without questioning the intention, policy paved the way for 
furthering bureaucratic corruption in the country. 
Contrary to the popular belief that Bhutto, being a leader of the masses, would depend 
more on elective institution of the parliament and less on the bureaucracy, Bhutto found it 
more conducive, owing to his own authoritative nature, to employ non-elective 
institutions, like administrative bureaucracy rather than the representative institutions. 
Bhutto was quite wry of the power and influence of both military and bureaucracy in 
Pakistan. As a first step to rein the wild horse of bureaucracy, Bhutto too, like the last 
government of Yahiya Khan, dismissed 1300 bureaucrats on corruption charges. Pursuing 
his ends further, Bhutto removed the constitutional security granted to civil servants 
against removal from the service through the famous Civil Service Reforms of 1973. 
Under the aegis of these reforms, Bhutto dismissed or sidelined honest and independent 
minded civil servants and promoted those who were ready to follow his instructions in 
letter and spirits (Hussain 2002:226). 
 
4.5.1 Civil Service Reforms of 1973 
The civil bureaucracy of Pakistan, by the time of these reforms, had already acquired a 
reputation of notoriety for its image of insolence, patronage, corruption and being beyond 
reprehension, which made the masses in general to consider its reformation as imperative 
and inevitable. Although the professed reason, forwarded by the Bhutto government for 
these reforms, was to make insular and insolent civil service less elitist and less isolated 
from the general public, civil service was a service for the civilians only in name; in 
reality a civil servant was less of a servant and more of a tyrant lord for the humble 
public. Practically the primary objective of these reforms was not to remove the 
inefficiency or corruption of the civil bureaucracy, but rather to ‘control and curtail the 
powers and privileges of the CSP’ (Mitra et al 2006:303). Under the guise of these 
reforms around 600 service cadres, scales and grades were abolished and were replaced 
with a unified structure of 22 grades to ensure, at least in theory, an equal opportunity for 
upward mobility and horizontal movement between services on the basis of merit 
(Waseem 1989:317). As already mentioned constitutional security was removed and civil 
servants were subjected to normal legislative enactment; and the powers to arbitrarily 
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removing senior bureaucrats was given to the chief executive. The change made the civil 
servants more subservient to the political elite; however this resulted in a further corrupt 
and coercive style of administration, as the latter did not hesitate to use the former for 
suppressing the opposing centres of power. 
Furthermore, to redress the grievances of civil servants a new service tribunal was 
established and the powers of the planning commission were reduced down to a normal 
division of Finance Ministry. Furthermore, service titles like CSP, in order to efface the 
elite identity of the cadre, were changed into DMG (District Management Group). 
However, changing the title did not help much and the new cadre of DMG, soon acquired 
the elite identity associated with its predecessor, until the time that the very nature of its 
powers and responsibilities were altered in the favour of local bodies’ elected 
representatives, by the military government of General Musharraf. 
Prima facie criticising the old bureaucratic structure for breeding corruption and 
inefficiency, Bhutto introduced a long-term structural measure for arresting the power of 
civil bureaucracy through the system of lateral entry. This provision provided him with 
the opportunity to ‘penetrate the uni-linear structure of services through recruitment to 
relatively high positions without passing the examination of the Public Service 
Commission (Waseem 1989: 318). Bhutto is generally accused of employing lateral entry 
system to install party workers, which were not necessarily suitable for the posts, in 
higher post of civil bureaucracy. However, it might be inaccurate to attribute this trend 
solely to Bhutto, as between 1973 to 1975, of all the 514 lateral entrants 90 per cent were 
already government servants; making lateral entry more of a intra-bureaucratic 
phenomenon, which had marginal success in creating a pro-Bhutto constituency within 
the ranks and files of state apparatus (Ibid: 318). As it appears, Bhutto was not very 
successful in employing this tool of lateral entry to the maximum of his benefit; 
nonetheless, the later governments, both military as well as civilian, utilised this 
provision to the maximum of their advantage, causing considerable damage to the 
professionalism, efficiency and impersonality of the civil bureaucracy. An unbridled 
exercise of this provision by the later military governments, mainly to distribute the 
bounty among the various strata of military hierarchy, proved substantial in exacerbating 
the repressed antagonism in the one non-elected institutions against the other. 
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Various analysts described these reforms as the final blow to the already decaying 
bureaucracy of Pakistan. Shah (1997) has described these reforms as a ‘political purge’ of 
civil service. Khan (2007) while discussing the impact of these reforms goes on to say 
that ‘the death knell of Weberian professionalism in Pakistan Civil Service was sounded, 
ironically enough, in 1970s when Pakistan’s first democratic elected government… 
created the ‘lateral entry’ programme to staff all levels of the administration with party 
loyalists and remove suspect official’ (2007:228). However, the actual effectiveness of 
these reforms, in curtailing the powers of civil services was very limited, mainly due to 
the rapid expansion of the public sector, resulting from nationalisation policy of the 
Bhutto regime. Analysing the impact of Bhutto’s policies, Jalal (1995) has assigned little 
value to them, except in terms of creating opportunities for patronage and corruption. She 
concludes: 
Indeed virtually all of Bhutto’s popular policies – whether land reform, new 
legislation safeguarding the interest of the labour, the nationalisation of key 
industries, and extension of state control over the banking and insurance sector – 
provided immeasurable opportunities for graft and corruption. Notwithstanding the 
lateral entry system, the main beneficiaries of public sector expansion were for the 
most part the very civil bureaucrats whom the regime was supposed to be giving a 
much-needed dressing down. 
(Jalal 1995:82) 
Excessive reliance on the institution of bureaucracy and the concomitant inefficiency of 
the political elites resulted in structural evolution of the institution on the lines promoting 
lack of accountability, excessive discretionary powers, inefficiency and corruption in the 
institution. It was very hard for the later governments to build straight structure on 
skewed foundations. 
 
4.6 The Islamist Praetorian Corruption 1977-88 
Until the time of the second military coup in Pakistan, corruption was a social problem 
but it definitely was not the norm; some segments of social strata were still safe from this 
cancer, and social disapproval of corruption was still quite strong in society. However, 
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the dictatorial reign of Zia ul-Haq was instrumental in spreading corruption to those 
corners of society, hitherto unfamiliar with the malignancy of corruption. The primary 
reason for this was his desire and need to win legitimacy for his unconstitutional regime, 
while the associated secondary reason was the Afghan war, which brought in billions of 
unaccounted dollars along with: drugs, arms, and millions of insecure homeless refugees. 
The whole state apparatus along with all the resources was busy in fighting the so-called 
‘holy war’ in Afghanistan, at the cost of domestic social and economic development.  
During his reign, civil-military bureaucracy, along with ethno-religious leaders and their 
respective parties, enriched themselves enormously. Describing the traits of his reign 
Jalal says, ‘Zia remained as ringmaster of a subservient, fragmented, highly monetised, 
corrupt and violent political system (Jalal 1995:107). It was his reign, which presided 
over the spread of religious intolerance, sectarian violence, and ethnic cleavages in the 
country along with promoting and perpetuating an ethos of corruption in society.  
Every new coming ruler of Pakistan saw bureaucracy as a wild horse, which needs to be 
exhausted, and terrorised, prior to any attempt of domesticated use. Like his predecessors, 
General Zia ul-Haq too, initially terrorised the bureaucracy to tame it and then used it to 
his tunes. He did much more to terrorise the bureaucracy than his predecessor Z. A. 
Bhutto had achieved with all his cunning measures. In the political arena, following the 
restoration of quasi-democracy; legislators were given huge amounts of funds for so 
called development of their constituencies, which in popular perception were bribes doled 
out to the legislators in order to keep them happy with the so called democratic setup 
established in the country. Understanding the essence of this benevolence, majority of the 
political elites, opportunistic as they were, spent a small friction of the received sum on 
the developmental projects and siphoned away the rest of the funds without any scruple 
or fear of accountability (Hussain 2002:226). Furthermore, to win political legitimisation, 
Zia’s regime distributed enormous business and commercial loans to its supporters 
putting extra burden on the already dwindling financial reserves of the state. Prior to 
Zia’s reign the state had managed to keep the debt servicing charges within the revenue 
receipt, however by 1985 the interest payments were surpassing the revenue receipt of the 
state.  
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The state’s financials woes increased manifold once the logic of political system marked 
by repression and control started multiplying the avenues of corruption and frauds (Jalal 
1995: 107). Zia unscrupulously used the brutal force of martial law and the lucrative 
charm of American dollars, bestowed upon him by the US for containment of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, to discipline his foes and mollify his friends respectively. 
Summing up the political, economic and social policies of Zia, Jalal concludes: 
The consequences of his politically stabilising, economically revitalising and 
morally regenerating regime are there for all to see – seething hatred among 
linguistic communities despite the common bond of religion, economic chaos, the 
practical collapse of civil, police and judicial services and widespread corruption at 
every level of society. 
(Jalal 1995:108) 
According to various analysts of Pakistani socio-political development, Zia’s era was the 
darkest and the most corrupt of Pakistan’s history. During that time rulers distributed 
state property as personal gifts among their supporters and the banking system of the 
country was robbed off Rs130 billion in the form of loans to the various lackeys of the 
rulers. Everyone associated with the jihad against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan 
made millions for him or herself to an extent that most of the persons, appearing on the 
1997 Wall Street Journal’s list of Pakistani billionaires and millionaires in dollar terms, 
had accumulated their wealth during this period.98  
Here it would not be out of place to mention that Afghan war, which was fought mainly 
for the US and the non-communist Western states, cost Pakistan very dearly in terms of 
refugees, infrastructure and lack of resources for social development and education. The 
social cost of this war, which Pakistan is still paying in terms of radicalisation of jihadists 
who were trained to be adept in using gun instead of pen, was staggeringly enormous 
specially in terms of decaying governance. 
                                                 
98 Billionaires list includes, apart from many current politicians, personage like: Gen. Fazle Haq (Zia’s 
friend and governor of NWFP in his reign, was also involved in drug trade), Salman Farooqi (former 
federal secretary) and Gen. Aslam Beg (former army chief). For a detailed list of Pakistani billionaires 
please refer to,  Hussain, Ijaz. 2002. ‘Legal Control of Corruption and Money Laundering in Pakistan’, in 
de Silva, K.M., Peiris, G.H., de A Samarasinghe, S.W.R. (eds) Corruption in South Asia: India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. Kandy: The International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
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4.6.1 ‘Narco-Corruption’  
Corruption in Zia’s era took another form hitherto unknown to Pakistani society; this was 
the serendipitous advent of ‘Narco-corruption’ or drug related corruption. Partly owing to 
Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan war, the enormous expansion of drug trade resulted 
in the creation of a parallel underground economy. This black economy proved 
instrumental, in the spread of a criminal ethos in society; undermining the political 
process through affecting the centres of political power and infecting the vital state 
institutions, from the rank and files of law enforcement agencies to the higher echelons of 
the judiciary and bureaucracy. In the last 20 years the enormous revenue, generated by 
drug trafficking cartels, has made them the most powerful and influential economic group 
in the country. According to estimates, in 1992, the revenue from illicit drugs trafficking 
for Pakistan was around $1.5 billion (Rais 2002:208). These drug cartels used their 
illicitly acquired economic power to strengthen the prevalent plunder and patronage 
systems in the country. Analysts have attributed the failure of the state in reducing the 
influence of such cartels, to the corrupt administrative machinery and the economic 
power of the drug syndicates to buy off the law enforcement agencies.  
Drug related lawlessness and corruption has much more longer-term and deleterious 
ramifications for a country, than is generally acknowledged. It is a vicious cycle, which is 
much harder to get rid of as compared to other forms of corruption. In an already fragile 
and corrupt society, like that of Pakistan, marred with enormous unequal distribution of 
wealth, drug trafficking can create power islands in society and institutions of the state, 
which can virtually become ‘untouchables’ due to their enormous economic power, 
obtained through drug money and influential and trustworthy connections in the highest 
echelons of the state. This happened in Pakistan where drug trafficking was not limited to 
only criminal gangs, but rather, politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and even military 
officials have joined the bandwagon of drug trafficking. Analysing the problems of drug 
trafficking in Pakistan, analysts noted that drug-related corruption allegedly permeated 
the bureaucracy, judiciary and the army; however, no higher official was ever indicted. 
Quoting the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report of September 1992 on Heroin 
in Pakistan, Waseem (2002), has noted that by that time drug trade had contributed $32.5 
billion in the black economy of Pakistan. The report noted Zia’s Islamization campaign 
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and the Afghan resistance movement as some of the major contributors of this problem. 
The report also alleged the involvement of various sectarian and ethnic parties, which 
were created under the auspices of Zia, in the drug trade. Drug related sectarian and 
ethnic violence threatened and undermined the very essence of civil administration and 
political order of the country in the coming years. Such extensive level of drug trade was 
made possible, in the first place, with the cooperation of corrupt law enforcement and 
custom authorities (Waseem 2002:180). It is an open secret that many of Zia’s trusted 
friends and architects of the Afghan jihad were also involved in drug trafficking from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and to the rest of the world.99  
Even the ‘Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was implicated in promoting heroine trade, 
allegedly to cover its operations in Afghanistan’ (Ibid: 181). In the opinion of Jalal 
(1995), Zia’s support for the Afghan resistance, though brought in much needed foreign 
aid, but it also deepened the lines of social conflict, by creating a parallel drug and arms 
economy, generally believed to be associated with the army’s notorious ISI wing 
(1995:108). It needs further investigation, whether this drug trade was condoned to fuel 
the expensive war, for, and against a super power, or for the personal gains of the few 
chosen ones; but what is beyond any doubt is that its deleterious ramifications for the 
Pakistani society were much more, than the total worth of this trade for the national and 
international players.  
Apart from adverse economic impact, the political consequences of this huge drug trade 
were also enormous; as most of the drug barons were either themselves politicians or, 
somehow or the other, linked with the political elites of the country. Having countless 
money at their disposal, drug barons had little difficulty in being elected as the 
representative of the populace, generally living on the margin of poverty line. Once 
elected, obviously such political elite had little interest in controlling drug or corruption 
mafia and found little incentive in combating Narco-corruption in the various segments of 
society and institutions of the state. This criminalisation of politics resulted in lack of 
                                                 
99 Several persons close to top echelons of Zia’s government were involved in drug trades, some of them 
were even prosecuted later on, like: Governor of NWFP and a trusted friend of Zia, Lt.Gen. Fazle Haq his 
brother Fazle Raziq, Zia’s banker Hamid Hussain and another NWFP governor Ghafoor Hotti’s son 
Aurangzeb Hotti. 
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political will, so dearly needed, for the success of any social reformation movement, in 
general, and any anti-corruption campaign in particular. 
 
4.7 Decade of Kleptocracy 1988-98 
Ironically, rather unfortunately, the longest tenure of almost truly representative 
democracy in the country, decade from 1988 to 1998, also coincides with the most wide 
spread epidemic of corruption in Pakistan. By the decade of 1990, corruption in the 
public sphere was no longer sporadic, isolated or petty; it was systemic: corruption was 
the norm and honest behaviour of politicians or civil servants was rapidly becoming the 
exception (Khan 2007:230). This decade of kleptocracy saw four democratically elected 
governments, alternatively spearheaded by Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z.A. Bhutto, 
and Nawaz Sharif, a protégé of General Zia-ul-Haq. These two represented Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) respectively. Three of these 
four governments were prematurely dismissed by then presidents on the charges of mega 
corruption, mismanagement and bad governance; the fourth government was taken over 
by the army, under command of General Musharraf, quoting almost the same reasons. 
The significant change in the patterns of corruption during this decade was that unlike the 
pervious rulers who concentrated more on patronage, nepotism and clientelistic politics, 
the rulers in the 1990s were personally involved in several cases of mega corruption. This 
penchant of the top-most ruling elite for opportunistic politics and massive financial 
corruption had adverse effects both for the public and the public servants. It not only 
inculcated a sense of apathy towards any still present standards of moral probity among 
the public servants, but also promoted a defeatist psychological state and antipathetic 
attitude towards the state among the masses. Although widespread corruption, nepotism 
and maladministration were, inter alia, the major reasons for the dismissal of the three 
governments in 1990s, yet each successive government was more corrupt than its 
predecessor. Each incoming government started an accountability campaign, primarily 
targeting its predecessor, which the outgoing government blamed to be a media trial and 
a malicious attempt, motivated by political considerations of the current government to 
malign the opposition party. Such accountability drives normally ended with their 
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respective governments, without producing any significant result or any long-term 
implications against the corruption of future public servants. It is interesting to see that 
the trends of corruption in Pakistan, in the late 20th century, were exactly like the mid 
20th century experiences of West Africa, analysed in detail by McMullan (1961). 
According to his study (1961:182),‘much of the political history of some unfortunate 
countries could be told as the ‘ins’ being accused, correctly, by the ‘outs’ of corruption; 
popular indignation at the corruption causing replacement of the ‘ins’ by the ‘outs’, who 
in turn become corrupt and are attacked by a new group of ‘outs’. During the entire 
decade of kleptocracy in Pakistan, this cat and mouse play was as continuously staged as 
Agatha Christie’s Mousetrap, and was cynically watched by an indifferent audience. In 
this decade, the corruption of political elites and their families was so rampant and blatant 
that it almost overshadowed the corruption of the bureaucracy.  
Elucidating the extent of corruption in the bureaucracy of the country, in this decade of 
kleptocracy, Waseem (2002) has quoted Mahbub-ul-Haq, a well known World Bank 
economist and finance minister of Pakistan, according to whom the corrupt bureaucracy 
of Pakistan annually siphoned off Rs40 billion, i.e., 10 per cent of the total amount of 
transactions in the country (2002:156). This proves the point of functionalists like Leys 
(1965), Bayley (1966) and Nye (1967) regarding the value of corruption as a capital 
formation tool; but their assertion that corruption could facilitate economic development 
through such capital formation does not hold ground at least in case of Pakistan. Mainly 
because Leys apprehensions regarding the transfer of corruption wealth in the ‘numbered 
accounts in Swiss Banks’ (1965:229) holds true in most of the developing countries like 
Pakistan. This fact is substantiated by various analysts including Mahbub-ul-Haq, who 
remarked that corrupt politicians and bureaucrats prefer to keep their ill-gotten money in 
offshore accounts, instead of keeping it in Pakistani banks, let alone letting it flow into 
beneficial directions. The estimates of such wealth range from 40 to 80 billion US 
dollars, which is almost double of the entire foreign debt of the country (Rais 2002:190). 
Cohen (2004:252) while discussing the contours of this decade of democracy, goes on to 
mention that one of the well known minister, during Benazir’s first term, acquired the 
nickname of Mr. 5 Per cent, who subsequently matured into Mr. 10 per cent during her 
second term, referring to the commission, he reportedly used to ask for in lieu of 
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government’s approval of industrial projects. Interestingly, some other analysts of 
Pakistan have reported these percentages as 10 and 30 per cent respectively, during the 
first and second terms of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister.100 While discussing the role 
of political elites in drug trade, Rais (2002:209) quotes the 14th September 1997, Sunday 
Times report according to which ‘a confidential Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
informant taped a five hour conversation of the same minister, discussing how he could 
ship drugs to the American market’. Ironically, the same political elites, many of whom 
were kept in prison on corruption charges for many years and were also allegedly involve 
in drug trade, are still the most influential and powerful person in the political and 
administrative hierarchy of the country.  
In a notorious scandal involving the prime minister and her family, the media disclosed 
the purchase and renovation of 350 acre Rockwood mansion in Surrey, England, at a total 
cost of $5.5 million. Benazir Bhutto and her family were charged, while being in office, 
for: accumulating assets worth $1.5 billion, through different rice deals; sale of state 
owned lands; aborted purchase of aircrafts for $4 billion, involving a kickback of $200 
million; draining off money from governmental welfare schemes; allocating monopoly 
rights to a gold bullion dealer in lieu of a commission of $10 million; and many similar 
questionable deals (Waseem 2002:151). It was also alleged that Bhutto hired two 
international firms, involving a kickback of $170 million, to improve the revenue 
collection of the country according to the standards set by International Monetary Fund 
(Ibid). 
The economic team in the caretaker administration – spearheaded by cabinet ministers 
like Shahid Javed Burki and Hafiz Pasha – after Benazir’s second ousting from the office 
estimated the cost of poor governance and corruption during her term in the office. Their 
methodology was a simple one, according to which the team evaluated the damage 
incurred to the more important sectors of the economy like: commercial and investment 
banks, public sector insurance agencies and investment institutions. The estimate also 
includes dozens of public sector corporations, which had suffered heavy losses because 
of vast expenses on unnecessary projects, superfluous employment and procurement 
                                                 
100 For reference please see page 228 of: Hussain, Ijaz. 2002. ‘Legal Control of Corruption and Money 
Laundering in Pakistan’, in de Silva, K.M., Peiris, G.H., de A Samarasinghe, S.W.R. (eds) Corruption in 
South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Kandy: The International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
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pilferages as a result of corruption in the higher ranks of administrative hierarchy. 
According to their estimates, the cost to the country was around 20 to 25 per cent of its 
1996-7 gross domestic product, which amounts to around $15 billion (Burki 1999:174-
175). While assessing the cost of damage limitation, the same team estimated that it 
would have cost the government 10 to 15 per cent of the GDP of that year to deal with 
the banking sector crisis only. 
The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) government of this decade of kleptocracy was not 
any less than the Pakistan Peoples Party’s in siphoning off the public money. However, 
the marginal difference in theirs and PPP’s style of corruption was that along with 
political patronage and financial corruption, being business oriented, PML did not 
hesitate from enhancing their business pursuits by virtue of their office. This kind of 
business corruption is generally considered more harmful for the economy because of the 
damage it causes to other private as well as public enterprises. PML leaders owned heavy 
machinery manufacture business; it was reported that till 1989 all the sugar machinery 
manufacturing was done by the state owned Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila, while 
private manufacturers had no stake in such manufacturing. One year later in 1990, after 
PML’s ascent to power, the government sanctioned 23 new sugar mills instead of 13 
recommended according to official policy. Banks facilitated credit to the companies who 
placed their machinery manufacturing orders with the manufacturing units owned by 
PML leaders, resultantly by 1992, 11 out of 19 companies had placed their orders, for 
manufacturing of sugar machinery, with these manufacturers (Waseem 2002:152-153). 
This style of corruption has several repercussions for an economy in general: first, it 
deprives the state owned enterprises of a huge amount of business; second, it proves 
instrumental in creating monopoly and concentration of wealth; third, it concentrates the 
flow of capital in direction of one sector often starving the other more important sectors 
of the economy; and finally, it facilitates the contract placing to bidders, who are willing 
to abide by ‘certain conditions’ and who might not necessarily be the most efficient ones. 
The same leaders were also accused of illegal distribution of plots between their clique 
and friends, during Zia’s era when they were running the Punjab government. Among 
those who received such plots were 42 politicians, 22 journalists, 16 senior bureaucrats, 
and 9 judges of the Lahore High Court, including Justice Tarar who later became 
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President of Pakistan during PML’s second stint at the office. Same leaders were also 
allegedly involved in misappropriation of public funds, kept for distribution among the 
poorest section of society, to the extent of Rs. 200 million from the total allocation of 
Rs.1 billion for the year 1992-93. They were also accused of money laundering and 
siphoning off almost $70 million through loan defaults and tax evasion. In 1998 Benazir 
Bhutto filed references against Nawaz Sharif, in which he was accused of rescheduling of 
loans to the tune of Rs.180 million and misappropriation in wheat import causing a loss 
of Rs.230 million to the state. The care taker government after the dismissal of PML’s 
first government from the office in 1993, held their government responsible for arbitrarily 
reducing custom duties on the import of bundled scrap (used in the heavy machinery 
industry) from Rs1500 to Rs500 per metric ton causing a loss of Rs1,100 million 
(1.1billion) to the state while bringing a profit of Rs336 million to the family enterprise 
of certain leaders (Ibid: 152-154). During their first term Pakistan Muslim League, ran 
most of the municipal administrations in Punjab; resultantly local councillors kicked back 
millions of rupees to the ruling party for election campaigns. In 1992, PML leaders 
allegedly transferred Rs200 million from Punjab governments fund to a private account 
to be used as a slush fund for his constituents (Khan 2007:232). In a similar accusation it 
was reported that during his first term (1990-93), PML administration increased the 
discretionary fund of the prime minister from Rs0.8 million to Rs845 million through 
transferring money from various public funds (Waseem 2002:154). 
The decade of 1988 to 98 was the longest stretch of continuous democratic rule in 
Pakistan but unfortunately, this also proved to be the worst decade in terms of spread of 
corruption and bad governance. According to the national corruption perception survey of 
2006 commissioned by Transparency International Pakistan, the first terms of both 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in office were considered, as less corrupt as compared 
to their second stints at the helm of affairs, indicating a deteriorating trend in the political 
elite despite being thrown out of the office (Transparency International Pakistan 
2006:24). Discussing the political development of Pakistan, Mitra (2006:291), has 
described this decade as ‘marked by unprecedented corruption, law and order problems, 
economic instability, political victimisation and individual authoritarianism, laying the 
grounds for yet another military coup d’état in 1999’. Such were the circumstances under 
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which the military again, for the fourth time in the 52 years of the country’s history, took 
over the reins of state in its own hands under the command of General Pervez Musharraf. 
And yet again mega corruption, economic mismanagement and poor governance of the 
government were given as the major reasons for this takeover.  
 
4.8 Corruption in the new Millennium 1999-2008 
Taking a leaf out of the history of previous military governments in Pakistan, cleansing 
of the political and administrative machinery of the country was set as the foremost task 
by the new military government. Deviating from history, instead of out rightly sacking 
hundreds of bureaucrats and to strike terror into the heart of bureaucracy, military 
government of Gen. Musharraf created the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) under 
the legal aegis of National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 1999. This was the fifth 
major anti-corruption law legislation, and NAB was the fifth major agency created for 
this purpose, in the history of the country.101 This bureau was created to investigate and 
prosecute the cases of corruption and corrupt practices committed not only by public 
servants but also private individuals. Initially NAB enjoyed significant public support, as 
the results it produced were by far the best in the accountability history of the country; 
yet still they affected only the tip of the iceberg considering the enormity of the problem 
and gravity of the situation; ‘at the end of 2004 NAB had filed 740 references in the 
accountability courts and recovered $92 million’ (Mitra et al. 2006:304). NAB tried to 
target mega corruption of higher political and bureaucratic elites without catering for the 
causes of the widespread petty corruption.  
Initially NAB ruthlessly pursued the big shots of the corruption mafia, including 
influential politicians, top bureaucrats, senators, families of former presidents and retired 
generals. Nonetheless, with the passage of time the bureau started to become, like the 
already discussed anti-corruption drives of the past, more selective in its approach and 
was employed by the military government as a stick in its ‘carrot and stick policy’ in 
dealing with the corrupt political elites of the country. Even the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (NACS) document, prepared under the guidance of NAB, admits that ‘although 
                                                 
101 For a detailed list of all major and minor anti-corruption legislation in the country, refer to Annexure 8 
at the end of the dissertation. 
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corruption had declined in the first year of military rule, the deterrent effect of NAB in 
particular, seems to have diminished subsequently’ (NACS 2002:8). In the succeeding 
years, compromising out of political necessity, numerous corrupt political elites were 
allowed to ‘settle’ their cases with NAB, in return of their support for the military 
government, after giving a miniscule part of their ill-gotten wealth as plea bargain. 
Resultantly, several of the provincial and national assembly members and cabinet 
ministers of the ‘civilian government’ formed after the election of 2002, were the ones 
who had pending cases of huge financial mismanagement and corruption.102 Many of 
these were the one how were included in the list of “corrupt billionaires” prepared by 
NAB in its first year (Khan 2007:239). The current civilian government has considerably 
reduced the sting from the powers of NAB; and the conditions can be ascertained by the 
following extract written by one of the respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the national corruption perception surveys conducted by Transparency International 
Pakistan in 2002 and 2006 indicate, despite an extensive and much publicised anti-
corruption campaign by the military government, corruption is still persisting, pervasive 
and rampant in the public sector of Pakistan. In these surveys respectively three and four 
thousand households from all the four provinces of Pakistan were surveyed and were 
questioned about their perception of extent and causes of corruption. Police and power 
departments emerged as most corrupt in both of the surveys, while the image of Judiciary 
deteriorated further from 2002 to 2006 as it moved from fourth to third most corrupt 
institution in the country. The average annual expenditure per consumer on bribery in 
dealing with public institutions was Rs2,303 in the year 2006; rendering the  total 
                                                 
102 For a list of such politicians refer to Khan (2007).  
In the past, the government acquired a portion of land of a person 
for public use. The owner of the land filed a case in court for 
compensation. The court accepted his writ and ordered for 
compensation; and the party approached me for payment. At this 
stage somebody informed me that our field office has not properly 
defended the case and favoured the owner for bribe. 
 
A mid-level male officer of the anti-corruption agency in Islamabad narrated this 
incident during the survey of civil bureaucracy in May 2007. 
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estimated cost of petty corruption around Rs45 billion per year (assuming there are 20 
million households in the country). However, the average annual expenditure, per 
consumer, on bribes given to the police was much less (Rs694) as compared to Customs 
(Rs13,352), Land Revenue (Rs5,085) and Judiciary (Rs4,198). Prevalence of corruption 
in 2006 could be ascertained by the fact that when asked, whether they had to face any 
corruption in dealing with different public sector institutions the percentage of 
respondents answering ‘yes’ with regard to police was 90 per cent, power 70 per cent, 
judiciary 77 per cent, land revenue 91 per cent, taxation 84 per cent, and customs 88 per 
cent. While evaluating the performance of the military government on corruption and 
governance front, almost 68 per cent of the respondents in 2006 considered the first three 
years of the military government – a time period without farce democratic set up – as less 
corrupt than the later four years when a so-called democratic government was in place 
(Transparency International Pakistan 2006:23-55). This fact indicates a lapse of will on 
the part of military government in favour of ‘doctrine of necessity’ employed for gaining 
political support and legitimisation of the regime.  
Both vertical and horizontal corruption is pervasive and deep rooted in Pakistan.103 
Corruption in Pakistan is like traffic signboards in Europe, staring at your face on every 
turn. Corruption has become a part of the ordinary citizen’s daily transactions, to an 
extent that it is perceived as a part of life and has even become an expected behaviour. 
Commenting on the frequency of the corruption Khan (2007:226) states that ‘the average 
Pakistani encounters corruption every time they have any dealings with the bureaucracy: 
paying bills, registering births, reporting a crime, getting an electricity connection, trying 
to get their children admitted to a school or recording the sale of a house.’ He further 
laments about the all-pervasive corruption by indicating that ‘virtually every sector of the 
economy and every institution in the country is riddled with massive corruption and, 
unsurprisingly, their performance is often poor and many institutions are almost 
dysfunctional’ (Ibid: 234). According to the above mentioned Transparency International 
Survey (2002: 44,55) hundred per cent of respondents reported encountering corruption 
in their dealing with police and land administration. As TI’s latest corruption perception 
                                                 
103 According to Alemann Von Ulrich (1995), the term horizontal corruption refers to corruption within the 
various administrative units, agencies, organisations and departments of the government; while vertical 
corruption denotes to corruption at local, regional, national, and international levels. 
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survey of 2006 showed, corruption is still so widespread, deep rooted, and all pervasive 
in every public transaction that it’s more of a norm than an anomaly.  
Though top brass of the military government were not known for their financial 
corruption, and according to general perception were decidedly less corrupt than their 
predecessors, yet they kept their eyes closed to the financial mismanagement and 
corruption of the political elite as well as higher bureaucrats; probably because of their 
dependency on the former for winning legitimacy for the regime and on the latter for the 
effective running of the state machinery. Despite having a very promising start in the 
crusade against corruption, through the early successful years of NAB, the military 
government lost all the initiative in the later years owing to their desire and necessity of 
making political compromises without realising the long-term damage done to the 
economy and the nation for the short-term benefits of the ruling military junta. 
Discussing the perception of public office holders in Pakistan, Cohen (2004: 255-256) is 
of the view that ‘the reputation of politicians, bureaucrats, and increasingly the military 
for corruption is such that tax evasion and cheating are universal, and an attitude of 
cynicism pervades all discussion of economic policy’. While predicting a bleak future for 
Pakistan he asserts that ‘with its thin natural resources, high levels of corruption, 
dysfunctional bureaucracy, and political uncertainty at the best of times, Pakistan remains 
pretty far down the list for capital-seeking investment. However, the informal economy, a 
vast network of smuggling, trade, loans, and favours thrives’ (Ibid: 265-6). The 
underground or informal economy of the country was estimated to make up 20 per cent 
of the GDP in 1973, which, according to a report of Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics, reached up to 51 per cent in 1996 (Rais 2002:190). Estimating the current 
size of the unofficial economy, Cohen (2004: 248-249) is of the view that it is around 50 
to 100 per cent of the size of the regular economy; rendering revenue generation 
extremely difficult and placing a greater strain on salaried class Pakistanis including civil 
servants.  
Though this is not the place to lament about the opportunities lost, yet to emphasise the 
impact of corruption, I shall give a short account of what should or could have been the 
state of affairs in Pakistan, had it not been the victim to this malice of corruption and 
political opportunism. The State Bank of Pakistan’s governor while addressing a 
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conference in Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington in January 2004 presented a very 
vivid picture of what Pakistan might have been had its economy been guided in the right 
direction and resources were not misappropriated entirely or misplaced on wrong 
priorities. According to his analysis, with a well-funded educational system and properly 
attended human development, achieving 100 per cent literacy, Pakistan’s per capita 
income would have doubled to $1000 (Pakistan’s per capita income, as of year 2002, was 
reported as $410 by World Development Report 2004); with technical skills of the labour 
force up to that of East Asia, Pakistan’s export could have been $100 billion instead of a 
mere $12 billion; and with lower population growth, down to 2 or 3 per cent, Pakistan’s 
infrastructure could have been able to sustain higher health and educational levels (Cohen 
2004:257). Arguing on the same lines Burki and Robert have also concluded that 
Pakistan had the potential to become a middle-income country from low-income country 
even in the 1980s (Burki and Robert 1984:3). As already mentioned Pakistan was 
beneficiary of handsome development assistance (Pakistan was the third largest recipient 
of the official development assistance in the world for the period 1960-98), adjustment 
loans and lucrative Western alliances. Had Pakistan invested all the official development 
assistance from 1960 to 1998 at the real rate of 6 per cent, it would have stock assets 
worth $239 billion by the end of 1998 (Easterly: 2001:2). But in reality by the end of 
1998 Pakistan had foreign exchange reserves of less than $1 billion (which in fact 
depleted to $531 million in August 1998) and foreign debt of almost $ 38 billion. 
 
4.8.1 Current Situation  
General Musharraf made political compromises to ensure his personal rule, cut deals with 
the very segments of Pakistani politics, he once considered as bane of the political 
system. In the end, as his role was cut short in the war against terror, finally he had to 
resign leaving the state of affairs back in the hands of the same political elites of 1990s.  
After the dawn of the latest era of popular democracy, the socio-political and economic 
situation in Pakistan is far from being promising. On the economic front according to the 
budget for the year 2008-9, defence expenditure was increased, from 18 per cent for the 
last year, to 24 per cent of the total expenditure; while the public expenditure on 
education was still a meagre constant of 2 per cent. In the new fiscal year debt servicing 
 180
 
and defence would consume 62 per cent of the total public expenditure, while the rest of 
the whole public spending on activities like economic affairs, general public services, 
public order and education would be met from the remaining 38 per cent of the total 
expenditure. The economic plight of the general public could be ascertained by the fact 
that, during the last fiscal year, general inflation has risen from 7.8 to 10.3 per cent, while 
food inflation alone had gone up to 18 per cent in January 2008,104 however, the actual 
inflation is said to be much higher than the reported figures. The extent of inequality in 
the distribution of wealth could be judged by the fact that per capita income has increased 
from $925 to $1,085 per annum (a significant increase of 17 per cent), while 70 to 80 
million of the people are still living on a bare minimum of less than two dollars a day. 
Currently, after spending more than half of precious foreign reserves, present political 
government is contemplating to approach IMF for a financial bail out in the face of 
impending default on international financial commitments. The current economic picture 
can be summed up as suffering from: quickly depleting foreign reserves; very high 
inflation; devalued local currency; unprecedented shortfall of energy resulting in at 
average 12 hours of load shedding; closure of hundreds of industrial units; fast growing 
unemployment; and the ongoing war on terror spilling over to different regions of the 
country. On the political front, as far as the players are concerned, the scene differs only 
slightly from the time preceding the military takeover in 1999.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
In the preceding pages we have identified and analysed the genesis and evolution of 
corruption in case of Pakistan. However, considering that history is a continuous process, 
analysing Pakistani corruption from August 14, 1947 can hardly provide any 
comprehensive blue print of the socio-psychological and politico-economic factors 
involved in the growth of this phenomenon. Considering this, we have traced the 
evolution of corruption in the region back to the days of ancient India. We have seen that 
corruption, like in any other part of the world, is as ancient as the region itself; and 
Kautilya gave a very vivid description of the phenomenon in his fourth century BC 
                                                 
104 According to the reports of The Daily Time, available at: 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C02%5C12%5Cstory_12-2-2008_pg5_1  
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treaties on statecraft. However, the modern day public corruption started with the 
evolution of public office in the region. Arrival and stay of the British in India was 
facilitated through coordinated corruption of local elites benefiting the colonial masters. 
Though British rule in India was generally ‘cleaner’ than similar colonial reigns in some 
other parts of the world, yet its end was marred by an exponential growth in the 
corruption of public officials mainly due to the emergencies triggered by WWII. 
We observed that corruption was recognised as an ominous threat even at the time of 
partition, and Pakistan was born with this congenital deformity, which gradually spread 
to a degree leaving the pre-partition corruption far behind. Though Jinnah, the founder of 
Pakistan, was well aware of the multi dimensional hazards of this illness and emphasised 
on curbing this ailment with an iron hand, the corruption industry grew and flourished 
more than any other sector in Pakistan.  
In this chapter we analysed the role played by the troika of civil-military-bureaucracy and 
the landed aristocracy in the development of this malice in society as well as in the public 
sector of Pakistan. We also evaluated how the well-educated immigrated class dominated 
the civil bureaucracy in the initial phase of the country, which in turn subjugated the 
weak political institutions and initiated the over development of non-elected institutions 
at the expense of elected ones. Wrong priorities set from the very start, in terms of 
institution building, resulted in a permanent dent in the institutional structure of the whole 
state; a wrong which has not yet been corrected even after the lapse of half a century. We 
also analysed the nexus between the migrated business class and the mohajir-dominated 
bureaucracy and how it furthered the cause of corruption. 
The chapter further explained that despite the fact that initially both joined forces, the 
balance of power gradually shifted from the civil bureaucracy to the military. Then 
slowly the political canvass of the country was dominated by the khaki colour of the 
Pakistan army, which employed patronage, favouritism and nepotism for maintenance of 
its rule in the country. We also explored the doings of the first truly elected civilian 
government and drastic shift in the economics policies of the state and its simultaneous 
attempts to rein the wild horse of bureaucracy, paradoxically putting more power in the 
hands of bureaucracy through nationalising the private industries and by creating multiple 
public sector corporations. This provided more room to the bureaucracy to manoeuvre 
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and opened new avenues of corruption for public servants. Bhutto’s attempt to revamp 
the whole bureaucratic set up by abolishing the old cadre system, through civil service 
reforms of 1973, proved more of an attempt to harness the bureaucracy for his own 
political ends rather than having any long term impact on the honesty, integrity and 
efficiency of the institution.  
Moreover, we further analysed the second military reign, and how it contributed to the 
development of a culture of corruption in the country. How corruption turned from 
sporadic to widespread, individual to systemic, epidemic to endemic and an anomalous 
occurrence to an expected behaviour. We have seen how Zia’s regime, abundantly 
disposing of American dollars, bought support from various segments of society and 
different institutions of the state. He employed ruthless force and large sums of money to 
unscrupulous achieve his ends, establishing a tradition of repression and corruption in the 
country. In the guile of Islamization he sowed the seeds of religious fanaticism, 
sectarianism, and fundamentalism. In the backdrop of the Afghan war his association 
with and negligence towards the drug trafficking and narcotics expansion in the country 
resulted in creating such economic-power-centres in the political arena of Pakistan which 
made the whole political system hostage for the coming decades. His guileless use of 
allocating funds for the members of assemblies and extensive use of lateral entry into the 
ranks of civil bureaucracy created and nurtured an ethos of corruption in the public 
service, both elected and non-elected. He doled out millions to the political elites in 
search of legitimacy for his rule. This money, though apparently intended for the 
development of the constituencies, never reached them and was conveniently pocketed by 
the selfish political elites of Pakistan.  
We analysed in detail the longest stretch of democratic rule in Pakistan from 1988 to 
1999, which was also termed by critics as the most corrupt decade of Pakistan’s history. 
The volcano of corruption, which started to erupt in Zia’s reign, engulfed every 
institution of the state and every segment of society in the coming decade of kleptocracy. 
During this decade, ruling elite were repeatedly charged with and dismissed from office 
on account of mismanagement, bad governance and mega corruption; but every new 
government was more corrupt than the previous one. Political elite in collaboration with 
civil bureaucracy robbed the exchequer of billions of dollars.  
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Top political elites, who are supposedly the guardians of the public interest and overseer 
of bureaucracy, rather served as disastrous role models for it. Weberian character of 
bureaucracy, which was already tarnished during the unconstitutional rule of Zia, was 
completely destroyed during this decade of democracy. This unprecedented surge of 
corruption inculcated an apathetic attitude among the masses, removing the stigma 
associated with the phenomenon of corruption, and made it a tolerated social reality from 
which there is no escape. The society started to soften its disapproval of the phenomenon, 
making it easier for the perpetrators to live peacefully devoid of any social pressure or 
moral qualms and without even trying to hide their corruption. The most detrimental 
impact of this development was that some sections of society even started lauding 
corruption and looked derisively at honesty.  
Lastly, we have analysed the latest epoch of Pakistani history, which started with the new 
millennium, with reference to prevalence and control of corruption. We analysed in detail 
the reasons why, despite having a considerably good start, the military government of 
General Musharraf was unable to maximise the tactical advantage in its fight against 
corruption. Top military brass, despite being not known for financial corruption, was 
forced to make choices based on the clichés of political necessity, compromise, mutual 
co-existence, and accommodation. Like most of the praetorian regimes the quest for 
legitimacy, at the national as well as the international front, forced the military 
government to subside its across the board accountability drive. In the process it lost 
public confidence and trust in the ability and sincerity, of the military regime to bring the 
robbers of the national exchequer to justice and retrieving the looted money of the 
taxpayer. Resultantly, for a short time corruption in the highest echelons of the 
bureaucracy reduced a little bit but the corruption at middle and lower level of the 
bureaucratic ladder is still as rampant and ubiquitous as in the last decade. In view of 
some critics, the Musharraf administration, despite having relatively less-corrupt early 
years, was ‘as corrupt as the ones that preceded it’ (Khan 2007:240). Further in this 
chapter we have enumerated few of the lost opportunities and their impact on the over all 
socio-economic environment of the country, by listing some hypothetical projections 
made by different economists regarding the economic landscape of the country, had 
Pakistan used its resources efficiently and intelligently. Finally, we have analysed the 
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current political as well as economic indicators of the country and their significance from 
the perspective of governance and control of corruption in Pakistan. 
At the end of this chapter we have understood the genesis of corruption both as an 
academic concept and as a real world phenomenon widely prevalent in the developing 
world. We have seen how in different eras, various categories and modes of corruption 
were used by various actors and institutions in Pakistan to increase their power. We have 
analysed the situation from the perspective of general public as well the academia; in the 
next chapter, we will discuss the perceptions of the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan 
regarding the prevalence and cause of corruption in the public sector of the country. As 
perception of corruption is considered a reliable indicator of the original level of 
corruption in any country, this study also employs the perception of corruption as a 
reliable representative of the extent of corruption in Pakistan. This perception will be 
evaluated with the help of data collected through surveys and interviews of the civil 
bureaucracy of Pakistan. In the coming chapter we will also analyse the trends emerging 
from the data regarding the extent, and causes of corruption. The practical measures for 
effective control of corruption and improvement of governance, based on the qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of a ‘successful performer’ i.e. Motorway Police of Pakistan, 
will be presented in the Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 
Perception of Corruption: Prevalence and Causes 
 
This chapter deals with the vital question of perception of corruption in transitional 
societies or developing states. Perceptions regarding the prevalence, and causes of 
corruption, gathered during the fieldwork, have been presented and analysed in this 
chapter. Pakistan was taken as a model case, representing transitional societies and 
developing states, for the reasons explained earlier in detail,105 addressing questions like: 
cultural embeddedness of corruption as a phenomenon; institutional nature of corruption; 
role of institutions in spread of corruption; identification of both highly and least corrupt 
institutions and analysis of reasons for each; relationship between corruption and socio-
economic development of the state; and the most significant causes of corruption.  
The coming chapter examines and analyses all the above-listed issues, referring to the 
ideas and perceptions of the second stakeholders in any corrupt transaction, i.e., public 
servants. As the very notion of corruption germinates from the distinction between the 
private and the public, consequently, when it comes to identification of the real 
stakeholders of any corrupt transaction, things always boiled down to two parties: general 
public and their servants, i.e., public servants. Any meaningful inquiry addressing the 
issue of corruption should consider the views of both camps; however, what we see is the 
repletion of research from the general public’s perspective, and an equal negligence of 
the other side of the story.106 This research tries to fill this gap by assessing the views, 
sentiments, apprehensions, and recommendations of public servants, regarding the issue 
of corruption.  
This lack of serious research on corruption from the agent’s perspective can be attributed 
to the unavailability of data due to the inaccessibility of the public servants, as public 
servants are generally very sensitive as well as careful, while divulging any information 
about corruption. Mainly because of two reasons: first, if they are corrupt themselves, 
they do not want to explain their modus operandi and second, if they are not corrupt, they 
avoid washing dirty linen in public, according to the codes of camaraderie. However, in 
                                                 
105 Refer to Introduction and Chapter 1 for detailed explanation of the selection criteria. 
106 For a comprehensive view of the research on corruption, see Chapter 2. 
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the latter case, more important is the apprehension of provoking unwarranted negative 
sentiments amongst the colleagues, which could lead to consequences not very pleasant. 
 
5.1 Measuring Corruption: How valid are perceptions? 
 The obvious hurdles in the way of collecting empirical evidence regarding prevalence of 
corruption have forced researchers and practitioners to employ perception of corruption 
as a proxy indicator for the real level of corruption. Until very late in the 20th century, 
this problem of collecting tangible information about corruption kept the research on the 
topic on a bare minimal level. However, towards the end of last century, researchers 
opted to improvise and started using perception of corruption as an alternative indicator 
for prevalence of corruption. Since then plethora of research has been conducted using 
this indicator. 
Despite its authenticity being questioned by some scholars recently, this improvisation is 
generally accepted as a reasonably true representative of the original level of 
corruption.107 Presently, multiple data banks and indices like: World Economic Forum, 
Business International, Corruption Perception Index, and World Wide Governance 
Indicators, are using perception of corruption as a suitable indicator of real level of 
corruption. Johann Graf Lambsdorff (2005:1), the creator of CPI, considers the subjective 
perceptions and expertise as a good indicator of the real level of corruption; if not for any 
other reason, then because of its ability to bring corruption research beyond the anecdotal 
description that dominated the field earlier. It is important to mention here that this use of 
perception as a proxy of reality has instigated an array of empirical work on the subject, 
which was not possible earlier.108 Treisman, in his extensive empirical study of the causes 
of corruption, noted that if perception based ‘ratings reflect bias, it is a bias that is 
remarkably widely shared’ (2000:412). 
In a recent study Richard Rose and William Mishler (2007) have questioned the validity 
of perception of corruption as a proxy indicator of real level of corruption. Analysing the 
New Russia Barometer survey data, they have found out that ‘people are far more likely 
                                                 
107 For a latest criticism on the use of perception of corruption as a proxy for real level of corruption, see 
Rose Richard and William Mishler (2007). 
108 For a detailed view of the empirical work on corruption refer to the relevant sections in Chapter 2 
dealing with Literature review. Also see Lambsdorff (2005); Bardhan (1997); and Jain (2001). 
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to perceive the government as corrupt, than to experience it’ (2007:4). In case of Russia, 
the authors locate a huge gap between the 86 per cent of respondents perceiving the 
majority of public officials as corrupt and those 23 per cent who actually had to pay a 
bribe during the last two years. This gap, according to the authors, is attributable to the 
‘exposure to multiple channels of information about governance and fair treatment by 
public officials’ (ibid: 5). 
More interestingly, the authors report the same discrepancy on a larger scale by analysing 
the TI’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2006 data for 60 countries. The figures for 
perception of corruption and experience of corruption, according to their analysis, are an 
astounding 77 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. This glaring disparity can be 
attributed to the role of media in the present cyber age. Corruption cases are reported as 
juicy material, while anti corruption effort or honest conduct is overlooked. Each reported 
case multiplied the perception in terms of number of people who read about it. 
Resultantly a single case turns into a generalized perception for millions. 
On the other hand, the latest Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) survey of 2007 reports 
a significant congruence between the perception and experience of corruption. According 
to this report, ‘there is a strong link between people’s perception of corruption in key 
services and their experience with bribery when coming in contact with the same service’ 
(2007:11). The correlation coefficient for the above-mentioned relationship has been 
reported as 0.47 (p<0.01). In order to establish the link between perception and 
experience of corruption, a significant indicator could be the relationship between the 
CPI scores, which is based on perceptions of general public, business personal and 
country experts, and GCB score, which is based on experience of general public, business 
and entrepreneurial communities in selected countries. The following graph draws a 
comparison between the experience of corruption percentages and CPI 2007 scores for 
the countries belonging to various quintiles according to the GCB 2007. 
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Figure 1 Experience and Perception of Corruption 
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Source: Data obtained from CPI 2007 and GCB 2007 
 
A closer look at the graph reveals that for the countries reporting maximum experience of 
corruption, CPI score or the expert perceptions, regarding prevalence of corruption in 
those countries is also low. It could be seen from the above graph that generally the 
experience of corruption and perception of corruption scores are in congruence with each 
other; with the exception of Nigeria whose CPI score of 2.2 is lower then Pakistan’s score 
of 2.4 despite having a lower percentage for experience of corruption, which is 40 per 
cent as compared to Pakistan’s 44 per cent. Another similar disparity between the CPI 
score and GCB percentage exists in case of Switzerland and Denmark. 
The above results replicate and corroborate the findings of Mitra (2006: 146-148) where 
he shows, that in six different states of India, the actual incidence of riots and murders 
affects the perception of law and order in those states. According to his study perceptions 
seem to be influenced by experience and prove to be a good indicator of actual level of 
governance in various states. As in Mitra’s study perception and experience of law and 
order are positively correlated with each other similarly, in this study perception and 
experience of corruption are positively linked. Consequently, perception of corruption 
seems to be a sufficiently reliable indicator of the actual level of corruption, and we can 
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also claim like Mitra that ‘the fact that ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ measurements 
produce the same rank order is not entirely fortuitous’ (2006:146). 
 
5.2 Significance of Perception as a Proxy of Corruption 
Regardless of the debate, whether perceptions are a true representative of the real level of 
corruption in a society or not, it is evident that the perception of corruption is as harmful 
for any society as corruption itself. There are few social phenomena, whose perception, 
regardless of how true or wrong, has as much impact as the reality itself. Corruption is 
one of such phenomena. According to Treisman ‘the perception of corruption may have 
as serious consequences for economic development as corruption itself’ (2000:412). 
Though, in philosophical terms, reality exists independent of mind, yet in case of 
corruption it is generally observed that reality depends on whatever is in the mind.  
Corruption stems from insecurity about what one has, and the desire to have more. 
Frustration, repression and unequal distribution of wealth are concomitant by-products of 
corruption. The perception of corruption produces the same effects, sometimes even 
worse. It has the same impact on the socio-economic mindset of the individuals as the 
perception of political instability or uncertainty has on the stock exchange index. In the 
same way as even baseless rumours can bring the stock market down, even an 
exaggerated or unreal perception of corruption hampers the economic growth of the state 
and destroys the socio-psychological make up of the society.  
Perception of rampant state corruption trickles down very fast to the basic level of 
society. It reduces trust in the state and tarnishes the image of the public service, leaving 
the individual members of society dejected and helpless with a strong inclination towards 
pessimism coupled with selfishness. A general atmosphere of insecurity, social unrest, 
lack of trust, instability and opportunism are the natural corollaries of a high perception 
of corruption. The level of antipathy, cynicism and hopelessness produced by this 
perception of corruption can very well be ascertained by the following views of one of 
the respondents of the survey. 
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5.3 Perceptions of Corruption 
It is generally perceived that like in many transitional societies and developing states, 
corruption in Pakistan is rampant, pervasive, entrenched and deep rooted. It is almost a 
unanimous view amongst multinational corporations, international financial agencies, 
international and national non-governmental organisations, regional experts, foreign and 
national investors and the common Pakistani citizen. The World Bank in its country 
procurement assessment report notes, ‘there is no hard and fast evidence available to the 
Bank, showing that bribes are being paid… and that public officials are receiving them in 
exchange for undeserved awards or other favours. However, indicators are that these 
exchanges happen routinely… these indications are so strong that it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that corruption is alive and well in the public procurement sector of 
Pakistan’ (World Bank Report 2000:9). This depiction can be applied to almost all the 
public sphere dealings.  
There is hardly any issue in Pakistan on which there is such undisputed consensus, 
among the masses belonging to all walks of life and all parts of the country, than the issue 
of public corruption. These perceptions have been evaluated and assessed with the help of 
various surveys, reports, polls, and indices.109 However, there is one section of society, 
which is at the centre stage of every corruption debate and whose perspective has never 
been systematically assessed or empirically analysed. That section is the public servants. 
                                                 
109  Detailed description of such surveys and indices is given in Chapter 3. 
We are a society of hypocrites. It is our cultural influence. No one has 
the courage to call a spade a spade. We find scapegoats everywhere. 
Because our rulers historically never liked to have an independent 
bureaucracy, they kept the pay meagre, but rewarded the faithful with 
lucrative postings. Hypocrisy increased and thus corruption was 
induced in us. This is a corrupt system and is running since creation of 
Pakistan. It is not possible to eradicate it the way it exists at present. 
We need to revamp the whole system. Pays should be increased and 
powers curtailed, not only if it suits the rulers. 
 
One 39 years old mid level officer of Customs & Excise department recorded his 
views of Pakistani society during the survey of Central Board of Revenue in April 
2007.
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This research is seminal in this regard as it endeavours to assess, quantify, and 
empirically analysed the public servant’s perceptions on two vital aspects related to 
corruption: causes, and control of corruption.  
It is important to point out here that the perceptions of public servants are not only 
significant because of their association or knowledge of the corrupt transactions going on 
in their vicinity, but it is also important because, interestingly, very frequently public 
servants themselves are the target of this environment of corruption and malpractices. 
Corruption is so much institutionalised that even if one public servant has to deal with 
any other public department, he will have to resort to either his professional connections 
or bribe as a mean to get his work done. For example, if an officer from ministry of 
commerce has to obtain his house rent payment from the ministry of housing and works, 
it will be very difficult for him to achieve his objective without greasing the palms of the 
officials from the ministry of works. Public servants are both the perpetrators and the 
victim at the same time, giving much credence and value to their perceptions. This can 
very well illustrated by the following narration quoted by one of the respondents of our 
surveys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is worthwhile to reiterate here that this data was collected with the help of surveys and 
interviews of public servants in Pakistan. A total of 237 surveys conducted with the 
public servants of 32 different departments, institutions, and organisations of Pakistani 
civil bureaucracy were used for the data analysis presented in this and the coming 
chapter. The questionnaires were designed to obtain public servants’ perceptions 
regarding prevalence, causes, and control of corruption in the civil bureaucracy of 
Pakistan. The complete questionnaires (including one sample filled questionnaire) are 
The account office without commission passes no bill for 
contingencies, arrears of salary, medical, etc. Interestingly, during the 
survey campaign started by the current Army regime, I asked one of 
the officers to check the corruption at the account office. He helplessly 
remarked that the Controller Military Accounts (CMA) passes their 
own bills on commission. At personal level I received the medical 
claim for the birth of my child on her first birthday. 
 
A young mid-level male officer of Income Tax services Islamabad shared his 
personal experiences with the author during the survey of bureaucracy in May 2007. 
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placed at the end of this dissertation, in Appendices 1 and 2. Coming pages will be 
presenting the detailed analysis of the real stakeholders’ perceptions regarding 
prevalence, causes and control of corruption, collected through these surveys/interviews; 
this analysis will be corroborated with the help of graphic explanations wherever needed. 
 
5.3.1 Prevalence of Corruption 
 Public servants despite being an impersonal entity in Weberian sense are not insensitive 
to the views and apprehensions of the society of which they are a part; rather they display 
a relatively neutral critical judgment, when it comes to evaluating their own behavioural 
characteristics. Obviously, the fact that all respondents were asked to give their 
perception regarding the level of corruption in bureaucracy anonymously, made them 
relatively comfortable in expressing their views without any apprehension of retribution. 
Respondents, both from bureaucracy and Motorway Police, were asked in two different 
questions to rate Pakistan as a whole (including political as well as civil-military 
bureaucratic elite) and the bureaucracy as an institution in terms of prevalence of 
corruption. They placed Pakistan as a country at 6.9 in terms of prevalence of corruption, 
on a scale of 1-10 (where 1 was least and 10 was most corrupt), however, it is important 
to note that more than 60 per cent of the respondents placed Pakistan on a score 7 or 
above. Nevertheless, they displayed slightly preferential tendencies towards bureaucracy, 
which was rated as 6.0 on the same scale. 
An important inference, which could be drawn from the above results, is that either the 
public servant’s perception is influenced by the information channels available to them or 
the information available from various sources like CPI or WWGI is substantially 
accurate. Transparency International’s CPI is calculated on an opposite scale where 10 is 
corruption free and 1 is most corrupt; however if we convert our scale according to CPI 
scale we will find that Pakistani public servant’s perceptions regarding prevalence of 
corruption in the country is slightly better then what CPI has calculated. Latest CPI score 
for Pakistan was 2.5 and our converted score would be 3.1.  
 
 
 
 193
 
Figure 2 Comparative Perceptions of Bureaucracy and MP 
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The above chart indicates yet another interesting aspect: the bureaucratic view, 
(represented on the left side of the figure) regarding prevalence of corruption in Pakistan 
is almost in congruence with the views of Motorway Police, (shown on the right side of 
the figure), which rates Pakistan as 6.5. However, respondents from a structured 
institution like MP do not show any sympathetic consideration towards the unstructured 
inefficiency of the bureaucracy, which was rated by MP as more corrupt than Pakistan in 
general, with a score of 6.8. This difference in perception of MP and Bureaucracy is 
probably a good proxy for the popular perception regarding public service corruption in 
Pakistan.  
 
5.3.2 Variation in Perceptions  
Another very important distinction within the ranks of bureaucracy is the variations in the 
perception of agents with reference to their age and length of service, and their respective 
ranks. Results indicate a tendency on the part of lower rank agents, who are in service for 
a longer period of time, to underplay the existence of corruption within their institutions. 
There was a significant negative correlation reported between the age of the respondents, 
their length of service and their perception of corruption in Pakistan. Statistical result 
sheet placed at Appendix-4 shows respective negative correlation coefficients of 0.188 
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and 0.211 for age and length of service of the respondents. Significance of these 
correlations is established at p < 0.05. 
The following chart clearly shows a relatively low admission of prevalent corruption by 
the respondents who have served for more than twenty years. It can be observed that as 
the length of service increases from 20 years and beyond, the perception of corruption 
starts decreasing. On average the ranking given to the corruption in bureaucracy by 
agents with a length of service up till 20 years, is around 6, while the same score for 
agents who have served for more then 20 years is around 5.  
Figure 3 Variations in Perceptions of Corruption 
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This difference of one point on a scale of 1 to 10 is worth further analysis. It indicates 
that the older public servants’ views regarding prevalence of corruption are relatively 
milder than those of their younger colleagues. One inference could be that older public 
servants have a longer personal history of indulging in questionable transactions, and 
their softer view of prevalent corruption is part of their rationalisation-process; but 
current data is insufficient to prove this inference statistically. One obvious and logical 
explanation for this variation is the fact that frequent and persistent exposure to 
undesirable and unjustifiable situations gradually breads insensitivity and apathy among 
the respondents towards those situations. Fresh entrants to public service tend to be more 
idealistic in their views and critical in their judgments. However, with the passage of time 
they tend to get more practical in their views and lenient in their judgments. An 
additional explanation of this disparity is that a fresh entrant does not understand the 
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system fully and in the exuberance of youth and idealism judges every mismanagement 
or inefficiency as corruption. After newcomers have spent more time in the service and 
start understanding the system fully, they realise that not all the maladministration and 
mishandling is corrupt per se; consequently their perception of corruption reduces. 
Following views expressed by one of the younger officers, while filling the survey 
questionnaire, illustrate that in his idealism for overall change of society, he does not 
single out corruption from its environment of other shortcomings, but relates it to the 
dysfunctional system as a whole. . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An interesting paradox in this regard is the perception of higher rank public officers, who, 
despite having served for mostly more than 20 years, have a perception of corruption, 
which is on average higher than their junior colleagues. The following table indicates that 
the higher one climbs the ladder of bureaucracy, the more convinced one gets about the 
prevalent corruption, in the institution and the country. Perception of corruption in 
Pakistan as a whole grows with the official position of the respondents, with the 
exception of topmost position in civil bureaucracy of the country, i.e., Basic Pay Scale of 
22. However, the perception of corruption in bureaucracy as an institution is almost 
uniform among the public servants, regardless of their position on the covetous ladder of 
Pakistan needs change of perception about life. Life is different from 
living. Life involves contribution to existing good. A proper perception 
of life would lead to proper/appropriate targets. We need reform at all 
levels starting from judiciary to impart justice, to education, which 
should aim at character building. We have to give up all double 
standards, if we want to rise out of the quagmire of disgrace and 
corruption. Our perceptions about dominating others need to be 
replaced by facilitating others. Seeking power should be replaced by 
seeking liberty. We should try not to be the part of the problem by 
looting and plundering but a part of the solution by giving directions 
and becoming change agent. But that would take time… so we need to 
educate and school our future generations in a new paradigm, paradigm 
of rationality and honesty against emotions and corruption. It is the 
man behind the gun that matters so lets reform him, the institutions will 
be reformed thence, by a chain reaction. 
 
A young, single, male officer of ministry of information, who had joined civil service 
two years ago, recorded these views in Islamabad during the survey in May 2007.   
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seniority. This difference in perception regarding prevalence of corruption in Pakistan 
and the bureaucracy could be attributed to the blame-shifting aspect of human nature; 
public servants tend to hold politicians more responsible for the unenviable position the 
country is in.  
Table 7 Perception of Corruption According to the Hierarchy of Bureaucracy 
Basic Pay Scale 
Perception of Corruption in Pakistan Perception of Corruption in Bureaucracy 
BPS17 6.91 5.79 
BPS18 6.87 5.97 
BPS19 6.94 6.12 
BPS20 7.67 6.00 
BPS21 7.50 6.00 
BPS22 6.50 6.25 
 
One important factor to be kept in mind about the above analysis is that in Pakistani 
bureaucracy, longer length of service is not always synonymous with a higher official 
position. Any organisation, ministry, division, can be headed by an officer who has 
relatively shorter length of service as compared to many of his subordinate officers. This 
is possible because of the dual entry and promotion systems in place: one way is to 
become a direct officer, who joins the civil service directly on officer level (BPS 17) after 
going through the prestigious Federal Public Service Commission’s examinations; the 
other way leads through the promoting cadre, consisting of officers who joined civil 
service after going through departmental exams on relatively lower level and then reach 
the officer level after decades of experience. 
 
5.3.3 Cultural or Institutional Problem  
As already discussed in detail, there has always been a section of academia and 
researchers, which associated the cultural threads with the phenomenon of corruption. 
According to this school of thought, culture is a very strong determinant in the prevalence 
of corruption in transitional societies of Asia and Africa, and this cultural aspect of 
corruption renders its eradication from these societies almost impossible. This school of 
thought displays, at best, a condescending attitude towards the problem of corruption in 
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the changing societies of the developing world attributing it to the traditions of gift giving 
and to the familial and kinship associations deeply embedded in the cultures of 
transitional societies.  While discussing the issue of political corruption some scholars 
observed that ‘cultural theorist emphasised instead the set of normative bonds in which 
political action is embedded’ (Adsera et. all 2000: 5). However, the existence of similar 
practices like pharmaceutical marketing techniques prevalent all over the world, and the 
criteria for selection of presidential cabinets along with the election donation tradition in 
various developed states, suggest that corruption cannot be singularly specified as a 
condoned phenomenon in the transitional culture. Different cultures have various 
traditions, which might seem objectionable to an outsider but all the cultures understand 
corruption as an illegal and immoral phenomenon. 
Table 8 Cultural Vs Institutional Problem I 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Corruption a Cultural Problem 133 5.74 3.007 
Corruption an Institutional Problem 134 4.56 2.846 
Valid N 133   
 
As it is evident from the above statistics, there prevails a mixed view among public 
servants regarding the nature of corruption in Pakistan. But the level of agreement with 
the view of corruption being an institutional problem is slightly stronger than the view of 
corruption being a cultural problem (lower mean score indicates stronger agreement with 
the statement, which was rated on a scale of 1-10, where 1 was complete agreement and 
10 was complete disagreement). 
When the same question was placed to the members of a well structured, least corrupt 
and more efficient institution as is the Motorway Police, their level of agreement to the 
view of corruption, being an institutional rather than cultural problem, was significantly 
higher. The difference in the perception of a well-structured and badly structured 
institution can be ascertained by comparing the scores in the two tables.  
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 Table 9 Cultural Vs Institutional Problem II 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Corruption a Cultural Problem 98 5.38 3.751 
Corruption an Institutional Problem 99 3.89 3.419 
Valid N 98   
 
It is safe to assume from the above difference in perception that the institutional 
environment of the agent significantly influences his perspective, regarding the general 
nature of a common problem. It could also be inferred from the above comparison that 
agents placed in routine institutional structure of the general bureaucracy might find it 
easier to shift the blame on their culture as a whole; nevertheless, the actors placed in 
right institutional environment have a chance to experience themselves that they are not 
determined to act in accordance with an orientalistic prejudice, regarding any assumed 
culturally defined personality structure, but rather feel the difference that a good 
institutional environment can make on the lives of its members. 
Figure 4 Hiatus in Perception 
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5.3.4 Social Attitude towards Corruption 
Our data reveals that in public servant’s perception society treats the corrupt actors as 
normal, without agreeing to their actions. There is linguistic and attitudinal ambivalence 
in the societal use of corrupt as a noun and corruption as a verb. Response to the 
statement that society treats the corrupt individuals just as normal, was between strong 
agreement and agreement with a mean score of 3.7; while the response to the fact that, 
 199
 
society accepts and condones corruption, was in between agreement and disagreement 
with a mean score of 5. 
If the thesis of cultural embeddedness of corruption is taken as true, then society must 
accept and condone corruption; as it stems from the very basic social norms like gift 
giving, familial obligation, and tribal or ethnic associations. However, according to the 
perceptions of public servants in the traditional society of Pakistan, society does not 
accept or condone corruption nevertheless; it treats corrupt individuals not much 
differently. This paradox could be explained with social psychology. Being inherently 
hierarchical oriented it is a rational choice of the individual to submit easily to the will of 
the strong, or to acquiesce readily with the influential and powerful. Corruption brings 
undue money, which brings power and alters the social standings of a corrupt individual. 
The powerful stature of corrupt individuals, not only because of their ill-gotten wealth but 
also due to their social status as public servants, forces society to tolerate them despite 
disliking their source of power. 
 
5.3.5 Age, Gender and Geography 
An unexpected finding was that various factors like age, gender, geographical origin, 
number of dependents and marital status do not have any significant impact on agent’s 
perception of corruption in the country or the bureaucracy. Regarding age it was 
interesting to note that although the age of the agent has no direct bearing on his/her 
perception yet their length of service has some already explained relationship with their 
perceptions. Analysis also indicates that the number of dependents or the marital status 
does not effect the respondent’s perception regarding prevalence of corruption in the 
country or the bureaucracy; the mean score of married and single respondents for the 
earlier was 6.9 and 7.0 respectively, while regarding bureaucracy this score was 6.2 and 
5.9 respectively. Neither does the geographical origin of the respondent cause any 
significant trend in their perception; respondents belonging to all the four provinces of 
Pakistan displayed mixed trends in their perception of corruption in the country. 
Though gender also does not effect the perceptions in any significant manner yet one 
interesting aspect was that female respondents appear not to differentiate much in the 
level of corruption in the bureaucracy and the country in general. According to female 
 200
 
respondents (10 per cent of the total sample) the level of corruption in Pakistan and 
bureaucracy was 6.7 and 6.5 respectively, while the same score in view of male 
respondents were 6.9 and 6.0. These results indicate that male agents have a harsher view 
about Pakistan and a slightly lenient view of their own institution while their female 
counterparts have a relatively strict or objective assessment of the institutions they belong 
to. This result corroborates the findings of an earlier study (Swamy et al: 1999) on the 
relationship between gender and corruption, concluding that women are less involved in 
corruption and are less likely to condone bribery taking. The above-mentioned study 
further indicates that corruption is less in states where women make up a larger part of 
labour force or have greater share of parliamentary seats. 
 
5.3.6 Corruption Variance in Different Institutions 
Considering the basic theme of this research it is imperative to find out that whether there 
is any variance in the level of corruption in different institutions or not. Respondents 
were asked to identify the three most and the three of least corrupt institutions among a 
list of the 11 most important institutions. 
Figure 5 Most Corrupt Institutions 
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The result was very interesting as two similar institutions, belonging to the same genre, 
conspicuously stood out in both lists. As anticipated, the police was rated as the most 
corrupt institution in the whole bureaucratic set up, along with Land Revenue Authorities, 
Income Tax and Customs falling on the next three positions respectively. However, 
police outnumbered the rest of the institutions comfortably, when it comes to degree of 
prevalence of corruption in any institution. Corruption in police is pervasive to the extent 
of being an axiomatic reality. It is a common belief that, regardless of the nature of the 
encounter, any dealing with police is impossible without paying tea surcharge.110 The 
following incident quoted by a respondent substantiates the above assertion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the first two most corrupt institutions are basically administrative 
institutions, while the next two most corrupt institutions belong to the financial services; 
implying that administrative and financial sectors of the state are consummately 
malfunctioning and corrupt. This data corroborates the view of Pakistan as an ideal 
example of ‘growth without development’ (Easterly 2001), since the two most vital 
sectors for development are marred by under performance and institutional corruption, 
despite an overall above average growth of the economy. The common public feels the 
brunt of corruption in these two sectors most conspicuously, which inculcates 
                                                 
110 This refers to a common term in Pakistan and India known as money for Chaaye Pani (tea and water), 
which is demanded by the officials in lieu of any minor service they provide. 
The recent incident of corruption took place with me when I had to 
get a police verification certificate from SP office in Attock for my 
visa application to Austria. They made a very simple thing so 
complicated that one has to pay bribe to get rid of all troubles and 
get the certificate in one day. Otherwise one has to go personally 
with application in union council then local police station then DSP 
then security officer finally SP to get their signs and every time the 
big SAAB would be busy in meeting or on round etc. This whole 
process will take at least 2 weeks. Give them Rs200 under the table, 
no need for any thing; just collect your certificate in afternoon. 
 
A young, male, civil servant from Punjab, who was in Linz, Austria for pursuing 
higher education, shared these experiences during an interview with the author in 
December 2007. 
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despondency, a sense of helplessness, and repressed hostility against the state among the 
masses. 
Interestingly, on the other hand a sister institution of the police, i.e., Motorway Police 
was unanimously rated as the least corrupt institution in the country, followed by 
Education and Health respectively. The motorway Police stands out as the only non-
corrupt institution in the whole bureaucratic set up of Pakistan; almost 80 per cent of the 
respondents, from the bureaucracy, have selected MP as the least corrupt among the 
given list of eleven institutions. Number of N, both in case of most and least corrupt 
institutions, reaches to 400 because three observations, each for first, second, and third 
(most and least corrupt) institution were collected from every respondent. 
Figure 6 Least Corrupt Institutions 
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More over, almost hundred per cent of the respondents included MP as one of the three 
least corrupt institutions. This result empirically substantiated the general perception of 
the author along with the views of various newspapers, Transparency International 
Pakistan, NACS and NAB regarding MP being the only clear institution in the country. 
One respondent recorded his views about Motorway police as following: 
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As described in the start of this dissertation, if we establish the ranking of perceived level 
of corruption in various institutions within Pakistan on the lines of Corruption Perception 
Index of Transparency International, we see an astounding picture. The Motorway Police 
has a CPI score of 9.3 according to our data. Signifying that level of corruption or quality 
of being free from corruption in Motorway Police is exactly like Denmark, which is the 
least corrupt country in the world according to the latest CPI ranking.  
Table 10 Institutional Comparisons in Terms of Corruption 
Pakistani Institutions CPI 2008 Corresponding Country 
Motorway Police 9.3 Denmark (1) 
Education 6.0 Israel (33) 
Health 4.5 Namibia (61) 
NAB 3.0 Bolivia (102) 
Defence 2.6 Eritrea (126) 
Judiciary 2.1 Bangladesh (147) 
WAPDA 1.3 Iraq (178) 
Customs/Income Tax 1.0 Somalia (180) 
Land Revenue* 0.8 Somalia (180)∗ 
Police* 0.6 Somalia (180) * 
 
However, amazingly we have also seen a diverse trend among different institutions of the 
bureaucracy, according to which Education and Health are comparable with Israel and 
                                                 
∗  Two institutions in Pakistani Bureaucracy, Land Revenue and Police, scored below 1 according to the 
perceptions of the public servants. As the lowest score on CPI is 1, which signifies the most corrupt country 
in the world so, due to unavailability of a parallel, we have compared these two institutions with Somalia, 
which was the most corrupt country according to the CPI 2008, with a score of 1 on a scale of 1-10. 
There is already an ideal institution, in the form of Motorway Police, 
available in Pakistan, which can be taken as a milestone for all the other 
institutions. Apart from this it is necessary that the leadership in Pakistan 
should be reconsidered because in my view, all the politicians, either in 
government or not, are the most corrupt individuals in Pakistan, with 
only a few exceptions. Similarly if the leadership within an institution 
put their sincere efforts, with the support of employees, this may result in 
eradication of corruption from grassroots level. 
 
Another young, male, civil servant from Punjab, who was also doing his doctoral 
research in Linz, Austria, expressed these views during an interview with the author in 
December 2007. 
 204
 
Namibia respectively, while NAB, Defence and Judiciary, respectively, match Bolivia, 
Eritrea and Bangladesh in terms of transparency and corruption. WAPDA and 
Customs/Income tax equal the level of Iraq and Somalia respectively; Somalia was 
judged as the most corrupt country in the CPI of 2008. Interestingly, there was not any 
parallel available to the level of corruption in the departments of Land Revenue and 
Police in Pakistan. The figures in the parenthesis indicate its relative position on the CPI 
2008. These results corroborate the findings of 2006 survey of Transparency 
International, according to which 100 per cent of respondents, who had to deal with 
police and land authorities in Pakistan, had reported of being paid bribe. 
 
5.4 Causes of Corruption 
The literature on causes of corruption reveals a plethora of reasons for the spread of 
corruption, forwarded by various academics, researchers, practitioners, and the general 
public (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Treisman 2000; van Rijckeghem 2001; P 1997). Though 
these causes range from economic to social and from political to psychological, yet never 
has – to the best of our knowledge – any study been conducted to investigate the causes, 
impact or control of corruption from public agents’ perspective, as to what according to 
their perceptions are the reasons or consequences of corruption and what according to 
their understanding could be the effective modus operandi for controlling this 
phenomenon. Subject research tries to obtain ‘from horse’s mouth’ the views regarding 
the causes, consequences and control of corruption. 
Causes of corruption have a two-pronged significance in any corruption related study: 
firstly, they reveal the reasons for the presence of this malice in society and second, 
secondly, they provide a significant insight for combating corruption by removing those 
causes. Considering the vitality of the issue numerous questions have been incorporated 
in our survey questionnaire, exploring the agents’ true perceptions regarding causes of 
widespread public corruption in the country. Question no.8 to 18 were directed towards 
exploring the general as well as specific causes of corruption (questionnaire could be 
seen at Appendix 1). The respondents were asked both direct as well as indirect questions 
to ensure maximum information gathering. 
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Reported causes of corruption have been investigated through multiple sets of questions 
and the results derived from these have been divided into five broader categories. The 
first refers to the direct or primary causes, which respondents have chosen for rampant 
bureaucratic corruption in Pakistan (Q 11). To the second category belong the causes 
reported as the reasons for widespread corruption in certain institutions like Police (Q 8); 
adjacent with these, are the reasons reported for lack of corruption in certain institutions 
like the Motorway Police (Q 10). Third, financial aspects of causes of corruption have 
further been investigated by inferring conclusions from the answers dealing with the 
financial status and background of the agent (Q 12 & 13), along with their responses to a 
question offering hypothetical increase in salaries (Q 29). The fourth category refers to 
causes linked to the pace of development in the country, which tries to establish the link 
between corruption and development (Q 19, 20, & 21). The fifth category is aimed to 
look at moral and social causes, derived by the analysis of responses to the questions 
related to the role of the public, the image of bureaucracy, and the moral reasoning of the 
agents (Q 16, 17, & 18). 
In order to avoid sacrificing the clarity of understanding at the altar of brevity, wherever 
possible we have strived to group the major findings into two broader categories, 
according to their significance in the eyes of respondents. These categories will be 
denoted as High Frequency Causes (HFC), and Low Frequency Causes (LFC). In 
questions where significance of a certain response could be established by frequency of 
its appearance, HFCs would be the causes pointed out by more than forty observations; 
and similarly LFCs would be the one chosen by fewer than forty observations. The 
number of observations is referred to as significance score (SS) in the coming sections. In 
questions where respondents were asked to rate any statement on a scale of 1 to 10, HFCs 
would be the one achieving an aggregate score ranging from 1 to 3, while LFCs would be 
the one with aggregate score ranging from 4 to 6. 
 
5.4.1 Primary Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption 
The responses to most of the direct questions regarding causes of bureaucratic corruption 
could conveniently be divided into our earlier explained classifications of HFCs and 
LFCs. However the kind and nature of the causes falling into these two categories are 
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quite surprising and considerably deviant from the general expectations and from the 
earlier research on the subject.  
Figure 7 Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption 
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The above graph clearly reveals that causes like insufficient financial remuneration, lack 
of accountability, discretionary powers, and weak moral values are the ones falling into 
the classification of HFCs. While excessive bureaucratic regulations, institutional 
structures, weak judiciary, cultural influences, peer pressure, and lack of education 
belong to LFCs.  
 
5.4.1.1 High Frequency Causes 
It is interesting to observe that, contrary to general academic believe, in public servants’ 
opinion insufficient financial remuneration is the foremost cause of widespread 
corruption in the bureaucratic setup of Pakistan.111 Firstly, there are very few studies 
investigating the relationship between public service remuneration and prevalence of 
corruption; secondly, whichever few studies are available they note the financial aspect 
                                                 
111 Number of theoretical studies suggest that ensuring an honest civil service through increased financial 
remuneration might not be a cost effective strategy, some of these studies include: Besley and McLaren 
(1993), and Flatters and McLeod (1995); Mookherjee and Png (1995) derived a different conclusion saying 
that bribes may be less efficient than bonus payments for corruption law enforcers. 
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as one of the variables, affecting the level of corruption within any state (Swamy et al. 
1999; Treisman 2000; Mookherjee 1995). Interestingly none of these studies have 
attached such overwhelming significance to the variable of financial remunerations, 
except the study of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), but they also conclude that 
increase in civil service pays from 1 to 2 is associated with improvement in a country’s 
corruption index ranking of only 0.5 point. The authors have cautioned in the same breath 
that higher salaries do not lead to less corruption in the short run; moreover, cross country 
correlation does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship from remuneration to 
corruption (2001:324). But the current study reveals that public servants attach 
significantly more value to the level of remunerations, as compared to many researchers 
and practitioners studying their behaviour; as an astonishing significance score of (SS 97) 
was recorded in favour of insufficient financial remuneration, as one of the three major 
causes of corruption. Furthermore, respondents substantiated their emphasis on economic 
causes of corruption while answering the Q 12,13 and 29 (which are explained later in the 
section regarding financial status and probability to indulge in corruption). Most of the 
respondents while answering the open-ended question quoted various incidents indicating 
insufficient financial means as the most important reason for bureaucratic corruption.112 
Monetary causes were followed by lack of accountability (SS 68), discretionary powers 
(SS 66), and weak moral values (SS 46). Lack of accountability was also recorded as a 
HFC (with a SS of 85); by the respondents in answer to a question concerning the role it 
plays in spread of corruption (Q 15). Almost 85 per cent of the respondents rated lack of 
accountability as a major cause of corruption from 1 to 5 on the scale, indicating its 
significance from very important to important. Furthermore, it was also viewed as the 
most important cause (with SS 72) for widespread corruption in certain notorious 
institutes like the Police (see next section on institutional causes). Paradoxically, when it 
comes to causes of low corruption in certain institutions, effective accountability falls 
down to the level of LFC with a score of 35.  
Discretionary powers of the public agents, another important HFC, proves much more 
lethal, when coupled with the lack of accountability. This combination can result not only 
                                                 
112 For an example, one can refer to the views of one respondents quoted under the Heading No. 1.5.1.2 in 
Chapter 1. 
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in unnecessary delays but can also lead to unnecessary policy interventions. Studies 
conducted by Ades and De Tella (1999) and Treisman (2000) also report unnecessary 
policy intervention and policy distortion as a strong cause of corruption, conversely, they 
are ambiguous about the direction of the casual relationship. 
It is noteworthy that weak moral values were also reported among the HFCs (SS 46), 
while at the same time cultural influences (SS 16) were not considered as a significant 
factor in agent’s predilection towards corruption. This comparison reveals that in the 
respondents’ perception weaker moral values of agents are not influenced by their 
cultural surroundings rather they are independent of that. 
 
5.4.1.2 Low Frequency Causes 
The nature of causes falling in the category of LFCs was quite unexpected (because of its 
deviant from other studies/ general assumptions), especially the low priority given to the 
level of education, as it was given the last slot at an aggregated priority list. This might be 
because minimum level of education for entering the civil service in Pakistan is at least a 
bachelor degree. It is obvious that respondents did not think about the quality of 
education in Pakistan. This perception of agents shows a disagreement with the result 
achieved by Evan and Rauch (2000), in their investigation of relationship between merit-
based recruitment and the level of corruption in 35 developing countries. The authors 
found out a negative association between the prevalence of corruption and the 
recruitment index, which was based on the education level of the officers and their entry 
to civil service through a formal competitive examination. 
In public servants perception, institutional structures and the excessive regulations or the 
red tape have equal significance, as a major cause of corruption (both factors achieved SS 
of 31 each), closely followed by the role played by a weak and dependent judiciary (SS 
30). Contrary to a dominant academic belief (La Porta et al 1997; Treisman 2000; 
Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005) cultural influences (SS 16) were not given any prominent 
position in the core causes of corruption. Peer pressure (SS 14) was also given 
considerably low priority as major causes of corruption. 
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5.4.2 Institutional Causes of Corruption 
According to the following figure, lack of accountability, greater opportunities, weaker 
system of check & balances, corrupt leadership, and discretionary powers incompatible 
with financial remuneration of the public agents are the perceived HFCs for deep rooted 
and systemic corruption among Police, Land Revenue Authorities, Income Tax 
Department and Customs. Viewed closely, the data analysis reveals that most of the 
HFCs are the ones related with the institutional set-up of these organisations or 
departments. All the five major causes could be addressed by effective restructuring of 
these institutions on the lines of Motorway Police.  
Figure 8 Causes for Corruption in Most Corrupt Institutions 
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Lack of accountability, weak checks and balances, and discretionary powers are 
specifically the causes, which could be removed by administrative restructuring, without 
causing much extra burden on the national exchequer. Reduction of opportunities 
available to agents will demand a visionary approach, though procedural mechanisation 
could help considerably in this regard. Another major cause, corrupt leadership, could not 
be properly handled without political will and across the board and exemplary 
accountability. 
Interestingly, when viewed parallel with the reasons, recorded for the lesser level of 
corruption in certain institutions, it becomes evident that reasons could be divided again 
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into two broader categories of HFCs and LFCs. According to the following figure: lesser 
opportunities, discretionary powers compatible with financial remuneration, strong 
checks and balances, and lesser interaction with corrupt public are the perceived HFCs 
for lower level of corruption in Motorway Police, Education, and Health sectors. The role 
played by stronger and honest leadership in lower corruption of these institutions, just 
falls short of being a HFC with a total significance score of 39. LFCs for the same 
category include strict accountability, anticipation of public, efficient rules and 
regulations, mechanised procedures and others. 
Figure 9 Reasons for Lesser Corruption 
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It is important to note the difference between discretionary powers of the public agents, 
which were perceived as HFC in case of core causes of corruption, and the discretionary 
powers compatible/incompatible with the financial remunerations, which is reported as 
HFC in case of institutional causes of corruption. The latter tends to emphasise 
institutional policy and structures, which deals with the delegation of powers to different 
tiers of bureaucracy. It underscores the point that economic deprivation per se is a strong 
motivator for indulging in to questionable practices; and providing agents with the means 
to compensate their financial shortfall, by undue use of their discretionary power is not a 
wise policy. As in international politics, states with military might but without the 
backing of strong economy are bound to fail sooner or later; similarly, in domestic 
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politics excessive discretionary powers without sufficient financial support are bound to 
foster corruption. 
 
5.4.3 Economic Causes of Corruption 
Based on the personal observations of the author, three more questions (Q 12, 13 &29) 
were added in the questionnaire for deeper investigation of the economic causes of 
corruption. Respondents were asked, what percentage of individuals, with sufficient 
financial means and without adequate financial means, would indulge in corruption and 
corrupt practices. 
Figure – 10 Financial Status and Corruption  
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Their responses depicted in the above graph clearly show a significantly inverse 
relationship between the financial means of a public agent and the probability of his 
being corrupt. Almost 65 per cent of respondents think that 0 to 40 per cent of public 
agents will indulge in corruption, despite having sufficient financial means, while the 
same number of respondents feels that with insufficient financial means the number of 
individuals committing corruption would rise from 40 to 100 per cent. Interestingly only 
1.5 per cent of the respondents feel that despite having sufficient finances 80 to 100 per 
cent of the agents will indulge in questionable deals. 
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This trend of responses also indicates that respondents have given a realistic perception 
of the situation without being a prey to idealistic expectations forgetting the diversity of 
human nature. As a significant proportion of 41 percent thinks that even with sufficient 
means around 20 per cent of the public agents will indulge in corrupt practices. This 
shows that public agents in general agree with some of the leading scholar’s on the 
subject that ‘optimal amount of corruption will not be zero’ (Klitgaard 1988). One 
respondent, while quoting the various instances of corruption and substantiating the 
above point, expressed following views: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The validity of the hypothesis, regarding economics being a major cause of corruption, 
was further checked through Q 29, in which respondents were asked to rate the statement, 
on a scale of 1 to 10, that if salaries of public officials are sufficient to meet their basic 
needs they would not indulge in corrupt practices. The answers to this question again 
depict a consistency in the perceptions of public agents, regarding the significance of 
economics as a major cause of corruption. Once again almost 73 per cent of the 
respondents chose financial remuneration as a HFC in the spread of corruption. About 85 
per cent of the respondents ranked the above statement from 1 to 5 (where 1 was 
complete agreement and 10 was complete disagreement). 
 
5.4.4 Developmental Causes of Corruption 
At times it is difficult to establish causality between corruption and various aspects of 
development. Numerous economic studies of corruption have investigated the 
relationship between corruption and investment (Mauro 1995: 1997), corruption and 
economic growth (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), corruption and foreign direct investment 
(Wei 2000; Lambsdorff 2005), corruption and net capital imports (Lambsdorff 2003), and 
In financial institutions like Banks, despite drawing colossal salaries a 
number of officers were involved in trading of foreign currency, 
sanctioning financial limits on bribe, and accepting commission from 
insurance company for referring cases for insurance of hypothetical 
stock or import. 
 
A young mid-level officer from Central Board of Revenue quoted these views in 
Islamabad during the survey of bureaucracy in May 2007.  
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corruption and per capita GDP (Hall and Jones 1999; Mauro 1997; Mo 2001). When 
public agents were asked to define the relationship between corruption and development, 
35 per cent of the respondents considered corruption causing slow development and only 
9 per cent of the respondents considered lack of development as a cause of corruption. 
Interestingly the numbers of individuals thinking that corruption and lack of development 
have a bilateral relationship, means both cause each other, were considerably high; about 
45 per cent of the respondents agreed with the proposition. 
The analysis of these responses suggests that it is safer to assume that in majority of the 
agents’ view, lack of development or slow growth is not a cause of corruption. The 
majority of the agents rather believe in the presence of a vicious cycle of corruption and 
slow development, where both are reinforcing each other. It is noteworthy that 95 per 
cent of the respondents believe that the pace of development is slow in Pakistan but only 
35 per cent attributed this to corruption. This signifies the fact that agents try to underplay 
the impacts of corruption, at least its impact on the overall development of the state. 
 
5.4.5 Social Causes of Corruption 
An exhaustive study of social causes of corruption is not only beyond the scope of this 
research, but is also outside the parameters of political science; any such study will 
belong to the discipline of sociology or social psychology. Nevertheless, certain aspects 
of social causes, which are inevitably linked to the role of public sector corruption, were 
incorporated in the survey to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon on a deeper 
level. Questions no. 16, 17 and 18 were related to the social aspect of corruption, in 
which respondents were asked to: gauge the role the general public plays in the 
widespread corruption of the public sector (scenario A); comment upon their motivation 
to join civil service (scenario B); and to agree/disagree with a hypothetical statement, 
build to ascertain the moral standards of the respondents (scenario C) 
Regarding the involvement of the general masses in the public sector corruption, it was 
intriguing to find out that almost 59 per cent of the respondents believe that the public 
forces the officials to be corrupt by offering bribes for shady deals. This view was 
somehow in congruence with their perception that society accepts and condones 
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corruption (which was rated with a mean score of 5, indicating views falling between 
agreement and disagreement). 
Table 11 Social Causes of Corruption 
Scenarios N Mean Std. Deviation 
A- Public induces corruption by offering bribes 137 5.20 2.461 
B- Lack of transparency induces people to join bureaucracy 
136 4.90 2.798 
C- 99 per cent corrupt individuals are a justification for remaining 1 per 
cent 
136 6.27 3.461 
Valid N (list-wise) 135   
 
As is evident from the above table, the level of agreement to the statement that, lack of 
transparency induces people to join bureaucracy is the strongest, among all the three 
scenarios, as about 65 per cent of the respondents have expressed their agreement with 
the statement. The most astonishing result was regarding the third hypothetical scenario, 
in which respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement that 99 per cent 
corrupt individuals in an institution is a justification for the remaining 1 per cent to be 
corrupt as well. Though mean score of 6.3 shows a tendency towards an aggregate 
disagreement with the statement, a closer analysis of the responses reveals that more than 
44 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement. This speaks very clearly for the 
moral make up of the civil bureaucracy in the country.  
Another explanation for the results of scenario C could be that in a predominantly corrupt 
environment, individuals consider solo crusade not worth the risk; corruption would be a 
systemic problem for them, which demands rectification an a much broader rather than an 
institutional level. Showing resistance in such an environment would certainly be asking 
for trouble; secondly, individuals can have the impression that their solo fight would only 
make their lives miserable without resulting in any improvement of the institution. In 
agents’ perception, this enormity of the problem renders any individual resistance as 
useless. Above argument can further be supported by various incidents quoted by 
different respondents while narrating their experiences of corruption and corrupt 
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practices. The following extract, narrated by a respondent, clearly depicts the fate of 
various lone crusaders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.5.1 Co-relational Analysis of Social Causes  
 A co-relational analysis of the three scenarios revealed a significant result, indicating 
that all the three scenarios have strong correlations among themselves. A strong positive 
correlation was reported between the scenarios A and B, with a correlation coefficient of 
.222 where p< 0.01, and between the scenarios A and C with a coefficient of .284 once 
again with p< 0.01; this signifies that the respondents who believe that the public induces 
corruption by offering bribes, also believe that lack of transparency induces them to join 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, the respondents who believe that public induces corruption 
also believed that 99 per cent corrupt surroundings is a sufficient justification for their 
own corruption.  
The following commentary is an in-depth analysis of these correlations. A closer look 
brings forth a general trend among the civil servants of Pakistan, who believe that 
bureaucracy is an institution sans transparency or accountability with plethora of 
opportunities for making a fortune without much effort and risk. In an authoritarian 
society (which most of the traditional societies in general are and Pakistani society in 
particular is), the social status and prestige attached with public posts, coupled with 
enormous opportunities for making money, without any apprehension of social or 
institutional repercussions, make them much sought after positions. Most of the agents 
join public service not for serving the public, rather for serving their own ulterior 
motives.  
I was taxation officer at Faisalabad and at income tax office corruption was 
a matter of routine for the sake of running of the office, because from the 
above no fund was trickled down to run the office. Therefore, the officials 
used to ask for bribes from the taxpayers; in due course they (taxpayers) 
get their illegal activities done, i.e. tax evasion. I conveyed the message 
upward, and as a result I had to get myself transferred from Faisalabad to 
Islamabad. 
 
A young male officer from Faisalabad shared his personal experience with the author 
during the survey of Finance Division in April 2007. 
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For the majority of the fresh entrants to the corridors of power raison d’être of their 
joining civil service is: power, social status, and money. A small minority who joins 
public service for serving the public becomes a victim of laws of conformity. Conformity 
is a big human weakness and the social impact theory of social psychology delineates 
exactly when people are most likely to conform to normative pressures. According to this 
theory, conforming to social influences of other people depends on three factors: 
‘strength, means how important is the group of people to one; immediacy, referring to the 
closeness of the group to one in space and time; and number, meaning how many people 
are in the group who is trying to influence’ (Aronson et al 1994:267). Analysing fresh 
entrants of civil bureaucracy according to the criterion of social impact theory, we 
observe that all the three vital contributory factors, i.e. strength, immediacy and number 
of the influencers, are significantly strong and influential for a fresh civil servant to 
succumb to the norms of the system. Consequently, the glass of public service in most of 
the developing countries is filled to the brim with the liquor of maladministration, 
mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption.  
Another aspect of the above correlation, which needs further explanation, is scenario A. 
Why do public agents believe that the public induces corruption by offering bribes? The 
answer to this question again lies in the complexities of the human nature. Being a social 
animal, justifying ones action in order to feel good about one’s self is one of the basic 
human desires. According to social psychology, ‘one of the most powerful determinants 
of human behaviour is the need to maintain a high level of self-esteem (ibid: 112). Public 
servants feel good about themselves through various rationalisation and justifying 
techniques. As the data reveals, public servants rationalise and justify their actions by 
shifting the responsibility through believing and portraying that general masses induces 
corruption by offering them bribes. Secondly, they believe that the whole system is 
corrupt and if every one around me is corrupt, it’s a justification for me to be corrupt as 
well. In this way agents shift the blame from their shoulders to the shoulders of society 
and the system of which they are a part.  Another shade of human behaviour is important 
here; the account of the happily challaned columnist, in the coming chapter, clearly 
expresses that an ordinary citizen feels intimidated and fears the more humiliation the 
longer the encounter lasts. Offering him a bribe is not well described with  ‘treating this 
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as normal’, but can be a rational choice attempt, though a painful one, to get through all 
this as fast as possible. 
The above narration might have given the impression that public servants are corrupt 
inherently and they are adamant on indulging in corruption and corrupt practices; but this 
would not be a true representation of the reality. In next chapter we will see that how the 
same public servants who were corrupt and inefficient in general bureaucratic system 
turned into efficient, hard working, honest and true public servant, in the real sense of the 
word, when placed under slightly different circumstances. The same actors, in the same 
society, under similar social and traditional pressures start behaving so differently from 
the rest of their counterparts that they became almost an anomaly in the entire social and 
bureaucratic set up of the country. 
 
 5.5 Conclusion 
We have reported, discussed, and analysed, in the preceding pages, the perceptions of 
agents regarding prevalence and causes of corruption in a developing country like 
Pakistan. We saw that, though inherently the same, agents’ perception regarding 
prevalence of corruption in the public sector is slightly different from the general 
perception of the phenomenon. We also noticed that agents assign considerably different 
significance to various causes of public sector corruption, when compared with the 
generally perceived causes of the same phenomenon forwarded by the academic world. 
Initially we explained why it is difficult to measure the real level of corruption in any 
given state, and why perception of corruption is widely used and considered as a good 
proxy of the real level of corruption. We briefly discussed the divergent views on the use 
of perception as a proxy for real level of corruption, using the example of a study done on 
Russia to find out the difference in the perception and experience of corruption in the 
country. Besides, we also noted the claims of Transparency International regarding the 
authenticity and accuracy of perception based corruption indices.  
However, the raison d’être of this study is to evaluate the perceptions of agents, regarding 
causes and control of corruption in developing countries or transitional societies; and not 
to establish or verify the level of corruption in Pakistan or any other developing country. 
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Consequently, this debate of validity or invalidity of perceptions as a proxy of real level 
of corruption, does not affect the legitimacy or strength of the subject study. Nevertheless 
we have tried to establish the validity of perceptions as a useful base not only for deeper 
analysis and investigation, but also for an understanding of the setup, which any anti-
corruption policy must target. We also noted that perception is at times as deleterious as 
the real problem. 
During the process of data analysis we scrutinised and evaluated the perceptions gathered 
from 137 public agents belonging to 32 different departments of federal bureaucracy of 
Pakistan. We found out that federal agents’ perception regarding prevalence of corruption 
in bureaucracy and Pakistan is more or less in congruence with the perceptions of the 
local public as well as the international experts of the region. Conversely, we also noticed 
that agents belonging to a well-structured institution rate the bureaucracy as more corrupt 
than Pakistan in general. We also calculated that there is a significant negative correlation 
between the age and experience of the respondents and his/her perception of corruption in 
the country. Furthermore we noticed a paradoxical trend according to which the 
perception of corruption increases with the upward movement in the ranks of 
bureaucracy.  
To our surprise we discovered that agents’ perception regarding corruption being a 
cultural problem is mixed between agreement and disagreement with a significance score 
of 5.74 on a scale of 1 to 10. However, their level of agreement with corruption being an 
institutional problem is significantly stronger with a score of 4.56. Cross comparison of 
the data also suggests that agents belonging to a well-structured institution believe more 
strongly in corruption being an institutional problem, than their counter parts in normal 
bureaucracy. Examining the societal reaction to corruption, we discovered that despite 
rejecting and abhorring corruption, according to most of the agents, society tolerates 
corrupt individuals. However, toleration implies both: behaving in one way, but suffering 
from it or disapproving it at the same time We also realised that variables like: age, 
gender, marital status, number of dependents, or the geographical origin do not have any 
significant impact on the agents’ perception regarding prevalence of corruption in the 
country. 
 219
 
When it comes to indexation of most and least corrupt institution, we saw that the 
perceptions of agents are almost the same as those of the general public; as agents rated 
Police, Land Revenue and Income Tax as the three most corrupt institutions in the 
country. On the other hand a sister institution of the Police, i.e., the Motorway Police, 
was rated as the least corrupt institution in the country, distantly followed by the 
departments of education and health. It was interesting to note that police’s significance 
score for being most corrupt institution was 111, while the score for Motorway Police 
was 112 but in opposite direction, indicating that in agents’ view, the police is as corrupt 
as the Motorway Police is non-corrupt or vice versa. 
In terms of causes of corruption, this chapter delineated the perceptions of agents into 
five basic categories: primary causes, institutional causes, economic causes, 
developmental causes, and social causes. In order to facilitate understanding and simplify 
the analytical process, causes were divided into two basic categories: high frequency 
causes (HFCs), and low frequency causes (LFCs). Data analysis revealed that in agents’ 
view insufficient financial remunerations is the primary most HFC of widespread 
corruption in the public sector of the country. Lack of accountability, discretionary 
powers of the civil servants, and weaker moral values of the agents are other primary 
HFCs for rampant bureaucratic corruption. Surprisingly, factors like institutional 
structures, peer pressure, and lack of education were given significantly low priority 
among the list of primary causes of corruption. 
This chapter further analysed the institutional causes of corruption; under this category 
those causes were discussed which were selected by the agents as their reasons for 
rampant corruption in most corrupt institutes like the police. According to agents’ 
perception lack of accountability, greater opportunities, weaker system of check & 
balances, corrupt leadership, and discretionary powers incompatible with financial 
remuneration of the public agents are the major causes of corruption in institutions like 
Police and Land Revenue. 
As economic were quoted as the primary most reasons for extensive corruption, we 
further analysed the role financial causes play in the spread of corruption in bureaucracy. 
We noticed a consistency in agents’ perception regarding the vitality of economic causes 
of corruption. Almost 65 per cent of the respondents feel that 40 to 100 per cent of public 
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agents with insufficient financial means will indulge in corruption; while the probability 
of agents indulging in corruption despite sufficient financial means drops down 
drastically. 
Regarding the nexus between corruption and development, most of the agents believed 
that there exists a symbiotic relationship between the two, both thrive on and cause each 
other; moreover, lack of development is not necessarily a cause of corruption. However, 
most of the agents hold the paradoxical belief that despite having a very slow rate of 
development and perceived as a predominantly corrupt state, Pakistan still can be a 
developed country (Q 20). Such ambivalence could either be attributed to wishful 
thinking, or to the pigeon’s dilemma, according to which, closing your eyes to a clear and 
present danger will render the danger cease to exist.  
Finally, we analysed the social causes associated with rampant corruption in the state. 
During the course of analysis we discovered some very interesting correlations between 
the various aspects of social perception of the agents. We noticed that most of the public 
servants tend to shift the blame to an immoral public, which induces corruption by 
offering them bribes for settling illicit affairs. We further discovered that lack of 
transparency and accountability in the civil bureaucracy induces many people to join the 
institution. An astonishing finding was that almost 45 per cent of the agents considered 
overwhelmingly corrupt surroundings to be a justification for the remaining minority to 
be corrupt as well. 
We further analysed these correlations from a socio-psychological perspective and 
noticed that if a major part of any institution will be corrupt, it will render the minor part 
of the institution to be corrupt as well; the law of conformity will prevail over the 
minority. We also discussed at the end of the chapter that despite being corrupt, public 
servants want to feel good about themselves, and forwarded this as explanation for why 
they tend to shift the blame on internal as well as external factors.  
Approaching towards the end of this discourse we have so far learnt that: rational choice 
institutional approach can be utilised for arresting the surge of corruption in the 
developing world; and that corruption is more dysfunctional than functional for the socio-
economic development of a state; and despite a huge controversy about the meaning of 
the term, corruption signifies promotion of selfish self interest at the expense of collective 
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good. We have also seen how various institutions in a developing state and transitional 
society like Pakistan have contributed in the growth of this malice; and lastly we have 
discovered the causes of this widespread corruption with the help of public agents 
perceptions. In the process we have verified the one side of our institutional model and 
have seen how optimised decision out put of a rational actor in an unstructured 
environment will lead him to corruption. In the end we will empirically verify the validity 
of other side of our model and the neo institutional theory, developed in the start of this 
study, by applying it to structural institution in a developing state and transitional society 
like Pakistan. 
In the coming chapter we will see how similar agents, belonging to the same socio-
political environment and owing allegiance to the same traditional culture, behave, when 
placed in the Weberian style of bureaucratic set-up under a well-structured institutional 
environment. We will conduct an in-depth analysis of the institution of Motorway Police 
to find out the reasons for their anomalous behaviour in terms of efficiency, transparency, 
and lack of corruption. In addition to discourse analysis and observatory method we will 
further investigate the causes of such aberrant behaviour with the help of the perceptions 
of the agents belonging to the Motorway Police.  
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Chapter 6 
Controlling Corruption: An Institutional Approach 
 
This chapter will focus on the applied problem of how to improve governance and how to 
control the menace of corruption in transitional societies and developing states. While 
emphasising on the need to identify the best practices for controlling corruption, Robert 
Klitgaard suggested that knowing more about ‘successful performers’ could be much 
valuable from the perspective of theoretical research as well as the applied problems of 
the developing world (1988:202-203). I personally believe that there could be two 
possible approaches to embark upon this quest: first, to study some corrupt institutions 
and try to investigate why they are corrupt; and second, to identify some institutions 
which are not corrupt (successful performers in the words of Klitgaard) and try to unearth 
the reasons for why they are not corrupt.  
This study employs both of the above-mentioned techniques. In the previous chapter we 
have investigated and analysed the causes of widespread corruption in the civil 
bureaucracy of Pakistan. This analysis helped us in identifying an anomalously efficient 
and non-corrupt institution in an otherwise corrupt civil bureaucracy of Pakistan. 
National Highways & Motorway Police (briefly expressed as MP in this dissertation), 
despite being a sister institution of general police, has been empirically established as the 
least corrupt institution of Pakistan. This chapter will investigate the reasons for this 
unusual institutional behaviour, and will try to identify the factors, which are 
predominantly responsible for this ‘deviant’ behaviour on the part of Motorway Police. 
This professional force is such an anomaly, in otherwise extremely corrupt bureaucratic 
culture, that one cannot help wondering how existence and sustenance of such an 
institution is possible in a state like Pakistan. The exceptional character of MP can be 
easily ascertained by the following excerpt published in the leading English daily of the 
country, Dawn,:  
I sincerely believe like every Pakistani that the present government is genuinely 
committed to good governance and eradication of corruption. These are difficult 
tasks but achievable provided realistic and target oriented plans are made. There is 
hardly any model available to follow in the civilian set-up, except probably one 
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island of efficiency, integrity and public services. I am referring to Pakistan 
Motorway Police. It will be educative and beneficial to find out. (a) How serving 
traffic policemen inducted from all Provincial Police set-ups were made to shed 
chronically bad habits through just 6 months training and motivation? (b) Why in 3 
years there has not been any complaint of corruption against Motorway Police 
despite being under public eye day and night? (c) How a new culture of policing 
was evolved? (d) Why millions of motorists consider this force as a symbol of 
shelter, relief, integrity and conscientiousness? (e) Why this level of excellence has 
been sustained, rather improved over the last 3 years? When I inquired how this 
Motorway Police works on merit in this era with the same Police jawans who were 
taken from the district police, the answer given to me was very simple ‘there 
superior officers have no demand and always back them once they are not 
incorrect. They themselves are honest, conscientious and straight forward and do 
not compromise on principles. If one takes Motorway Police as model and tries to 
emulate it in reforming the ill reputed Police and all other avenues of civil 
administration success is bound to meet one half way. 
  (Soofi 1999)  
The questions raised in this article are the very questions, which come to every mind 
familiar with the ground realities of Pakistan in particular and the transitional societies of 
the developing world in general. This dissertation, in general, is the study of 
circumstances, which render one to be astounded on any display of professionalism, 
integrity and honesty from the public servants in the developing world; this chapter, in 
particular, provides answers to these questions with the help of an in-depth qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of the institution. The first part of this chapter will delineate the 
origin and institutional history of the MP, along with a detailed account of: the 
organisational make up of the institution; constituents of the institution; marked novelties 
inherent in the administrative and economic design of the institution; and the social 
image of the institution. This will help us in identifying the vital ingredients of a well-
structured institution, which play a major role in its exemplary and unusual performance. 
The second part of the chapter will analyse the views of the agents belonging to this 
institution, about the causes and the control of corruption, and will try to locate the 
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differences in the perceptions of MP and bureaucracy, regarding vital aspects of the 
campaign against corruption. The third part of the chapter will analyse the self-
perceptions of the MP’s agents regarding: the performance of the institution; the level of 
corruption in the institution; and the factors responsible for minimal corruption in the 
Motorway Police. 
 
6.1 National Highways & Motorway Police 
NH&MP is known as probably the only symbol of efficient, professional, dedicated and 
corruption free institution in Pakistan. The National Accountability Bureau as well as the 
National Anti Corruption Strategy termed the MP as perhaps the only corruption free 
institution in the country. The last prime minister of Pakistan, Shaukat Aziz, declared the 
MP as an ‘island of excellence’, and then president Gen. Musharraf called it a role model 
institution, and the government decided to extend this successful experiment to all 
national highways in 2001.  
 
6.1.1 Origin and History  
The Motorway Police was established in 1997 to cater for the policing needs of the first 
and newly built motorway of the country from Lahore to Islamabad. The objective was to 
raise a modern, competent, and dedicated police force meeting the international standards 
of professionalism. The project of raising this efficient police force was conceived, acted 
upon and completed in a record period of six months, by a dedicated team of few officers 
headed by Iftikhar Rashid, the Inspector General of the motorway police. It is pertinent to 
record his comments on this experience: 
Policing on the Motorway marked the advent of a new culture of assistance, shelter, 
integrity and efficiency in the police department. Of all the tasks, the most difficult 
is moulding human beings. This was achieved on the Motorway where serving 
police officers exposed to all kinds of misdemeanours were transformed into 
honest, dedicated, God fearing and efficient officers…. For me, raising this force 
from a scratch and operating it has been the most rewarding experience of my 35 
years career.                                                                                        (Rashid 2003:3) 
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One might have expected that very brilliant and dedicated new staff, with a promise of 
competitive financial compensation, was hired; but the most significant aspect about the 
creation of this new force was the fact that it was raised with the assistance of already 
available staff in the different provincial police departments without any fresh hiring. As 
is the custom in public departments, when one organisation has to lend some of its 
officers to any other organisation, the axe mostly falls on the undesirable and unworthy 
elements of the lending department. The Motorway report of 2003 highlights this fact as 
following: 
It will not be irrelevant to mention here that no fresh recruitment was made, and 
average and below average police officers from the provinces were taken on 
deputation and were put through intensive training and motivational programmes. 
All efforts were made to mould this force as public servant. The result of this 
great venture astonished everyone… it is also an astonishing fact that the officers 
who were allegedly indulging in heinous malpractices in provinces have become 
noble, honest and efficient. It has been established beyond any doubt that given 
the proper working conditions and good leadership, our provincial police force 
can perform wonders. 
(NH&MP Report 2003:4) 
This newly collected police force had gone through a rigorous training program both in 
Pakistan and abroad. International collaboration was also used for domestic training in 
which trainers from UK and Nordic countries were invited to help Pakistani trainers in 
building the new police force. In order to ensure international standards of 
professionalism foreign training courses with the South Wales Police, UK and German 
Police, Kiel were also conducted. It was this extensive training and subsequent highly 
professional performance of the MP staff, which forced the British Motorway Police 
Trainers to remark that the new force was even better than the British Motorway 
Police.113According to personal observation and experience of the author, this 
commendation is neither exaggerated nor out of place; as while dealing with the MP, it is 
difficult to convince oneself that one is dealing with the Pakistani police.  
                                                 
113 This fact has been reported in Motorway Police’s Award Ceremony Report of 2003 as well as their 
official website: http://www.nhmp.gov.pk/history.html ; sighted on 20th September 2008. 
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6.1.2 Organisational and Administrative Structure of the Motorway 
Police 
The Motorway Police started its operation as a medium range organisation, established to 
police around the 400 km long, newly constructed motorway joining Islamabad and 
Lahore. But with the passage of time, and largely considering the unprecedented efficient 
and honest performance of the institution, its sphere of influence has been increased 
gradually to monitor and police all national highways of the country. Consequently, in 
2001 the name of the organisation was also changed into National Highways & 
Motorway Police. Presently NH & MP’s area of jurisdiction spans over 2000 km of 
highways and motorways in all four provinces of the country.  
Organisationally an Inspector General of Police who has his head quarter in Islamabad 
heads the MP. Administratively the institution is divided into four zones: North, South, 
Central, and Motorway; each zone is headed by a Deputy Inspector General of Police. 
The total sanctioned strength of the department at the end of 2006 was 5295 personnel, 
while the total working strength was 4339. 
Legal jurisdictions or responsibilities of the MP involves: maintenance of law and order 
on highways and motorways, regulation and control of traffic, providing assistance to the 
commuters in case of need, inspection and installation of road equipment, and removal of 
encroachments from the highways and motorways.  
 
6.1.3 Institutional Features of the Motorway Police  
Institutional characteristics of any public sector institution could broadly be divided into 
two categories: administrative and economic characteristics. Though the MP is a part of 
civil bureaucracy and public sector institution, yet there are various factors, which could 
be identified as peculiar to Motorway Police only. These features of the MP render the 
department a unique institutional structure, contributing significantly to the efficient and 
honest output of the institution. Though, these features are basics of any public institution 
in many developed countries of the world, yet they are unique in case of Pakistan.  
The most significant of these features is the economic layout of the institution. Actors 
belonging to the MP receive around 75 per cent higher financial remuneration, as 
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compared to the normal public sector posts. Economic reasons are rated, to be the most 
significant contributor to corruption and corrupt practices, by most of the members of the 
civil bureaucracy as well as the Motorway Police. However, the important point is that, 
though higher than average, the remunerations of the MP are not that high – in a sense of 
fully compensating the fortunes missed by refraining from gains through corrupt 
behaviour –, to fully explain the ‘aberrant’ behaviour of the institution, in comparison to 
civil bureaucracy.  
The second distinguishing feature of the MP’s administrative structure is a transparent 
and strictly merit based recruitment policy. To ensure this, simultaneous written and 
physical tests, which are video covered, are held in the various cities of the country. After 
this initial screening, successful candidates are interviewed by a committee headed by the 
Inspector General of Motorway Police. To further ensure a transparent and merit based 
induction, the vigilance teams of Pakistan army monitor the recruitment process.  
After a qualified selection the most significant step in moulding a young graduate into a 
professionally capable and morally upright officer is the pre-job training. The next 
striking institutional feature of the MP is the role of training; as members of the force are 
regularly sent on national as well as international trainings in countries like UK, France, 
Germany and United States. Honest and professional output coupled with attitudinal 
change and inculcation of strong moral values, is the cornerstones of the MP’s training 
program. More importantly, quality instruction is assured through training of the trainers, 
who are trained within the country and are also sent on capacity building courses, 
conducted by International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program 
(ICITAP), USA.  
The fourth institutional novelty of MP is the availability of modern and reliable 
equipment like: patrolling cars, rescue vans, video and hand held radars, and arms and 
ammunition. Despite a limited budget all this has been made possible with the help of 
prioritised and professional resource allocation without any bias. As most of the other 
institutions, especially the police, suffer from lack of ‘hardware equipment and facilities,’ 
necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of the institutions.  
The fifth administrative characteristic is the reasonable working hours. Because the force 
works around the clock to ensure maximum efficiency, workload is divided into three 
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shifts so that every officer would be on duty for not more than 8 hours. This specially 
becomes important when compared with the working hours in the normal provincial 
police departments where an official could be on job up to twenty four hours a day.  
The sixth distinguishing feature of the MP is the reward for efficiency and honesty. Every 
year exceptional performers are socially commended, as well as financially rewarded, 
generating a positive sense of competition to perform well among the force members. 
This is a factor, which is dearly missing from most of the other public sector institutions, 
and which contributes significantly towards the non-corrupt institutional culture of the 
MP.  
The seventh administrative feature of the Motorway Police is the availability of adequate 
accommodation facilities for the members of its force. Actors belonging to MP are 
provided either with official accommodations at their posting stations, or they are 
provided with sufficient funds to secure private accommodation for themselves and their 
families. This feature, too gains significance when compared with normal police 
departments where most of the working force is provided with accommodation almost of 
sub-human level.  
The eighth important administrative distinction is that the MP tries to genuinely cater for 
the needs of its officers and officials, through different welfare programmes, designed to 
help the staff in case of need. Some of these programmes include: health policy, welfare 
policy, insurance policy, and compensation package for the families of officials who die 
in the line of duty. Though, similar programmes are available in other institutions, yet the 
difference is the implementation of designed policies, in their true spirit, without 
prejudice to any group or class in the institution.  
The above-explained institutional features are primarily responsible for a standalone 
professional and honest institution in an otherwise corrupt environment. The excellent 
professional performance and a positive social image of MP, explained in the following 
sections, could easily be attributed to these unique institutional features of Motorway 
Police as an institution. 
6.1.4 Performance of Motorway Police 
After 11 years of its inception and manifold increase in its workforce as well as 
responsibilities, the Motorway Police is still considered as the most efficient, 
 229
 
professional, public friendly, and non-corrupt institution in the country. It has introduced 
a hitherto unknown culture of friendly policing in the country. National Accountability 
Bureau and National Anti-Corruption Strategy both termed the MP as the only corruption 
free institution in the country. NACS report 2002, noticed that, ‘there is hardly an arm of 
government which does not suffer acutely from corruption, with the exception of 
Motorway Police’ (2002:6). National news and print media, non-governmental 
organisations, anti-corruption agencies and general public from all walks of life have 
lauded the MP’s performance alike. The Asian Development Bank called the success 
story of the Motorway Police a ‘miracle’ in a third world country like Pakistan.114 A brief 
summary is produced here to establish numerical evidence of the above-recorded 
opinions. All the figures presented in the summary are taken from official reports, briefs, 
and presentations of the Ministry of Communications as well as the National Highways 
& Motorway Police. 
The importance of traffic police in states like Pakistan could be ascertained by the fact 
that after homicide, the single factor responsible for highest number of injuries and deaths 
in Pakistan is road accidents.115 Motorway Police has made the highways and motorways 
safer and secure for the commuters, by round the clock, diligent surveillance. Crimes like 
robberies, car snatching, over loading of the good transporting companies, and over 
speeding by drivers causing fatal accidents have been reduced considerably. Secretary 
communications Mr Iftikhar Rashid, while discussing the role of NH and MP remarked 
that ‘the force has brought about a significant decrease in the accident rate, traffic 
violations, and serious crimes on our highways’ (2003:3).  
The number of accidents on national highways and motorways has been reduced 
respectively from 983 and 211 in 2005 to 699 and 155 in 2006. While the average helps 
per day, rendered to commuters in times of need, have been increased from 2155 in 2005 
to 2420 in 2006. Similarly, the number of tickets issued per day has also increased from 
8181 in 2005 to 10850 in 2006. That might be the sad part of the story for some: the 
                                                 
114 A latest report published on 12th July 2008 in Daily Times, and was viewed at: 
 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C12%5Cstory_12-7-2008_pg7_22 
; Sighted on 22nd September 2008. 
115 Fact given by, then, Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, on 28th January, 2006, at the inaugural ceremony of 
newly resurrected Islamabad Model Traffic Police; and reported by an English daily ‘The Dawn’, available 
at: http://www.dawn.com/2006/01/29/nat18.htm (sighted on 1st November 2008). 
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significantly increased number of tickets issued per day indicates that the majority of 
citizens are being coerced to give up their cherished but hazardous freedom of jumping 
red lights and over speeding.  
The MP has not only made possible smooth and secure travel but it has also helped a 
great deal in combating the criminal activities on the highways and motorways. During 
2005-6, the MP has arrested 352 criminals involved in various cases. The Motorway 
Police has also recovered illegal arms and ammunition from the possession of various 
criminal elements on the highways. During 2005-6, NH & MP successfully foiled 40 
attempts of dacoities and robberies on the national highways. Since the MP has taken 
charge of national highways, the law and order situation on the highways of the country 
has improved significantly, especially in southern Pakistan, which was most vulnerable to 
highway robberies. Moreover, NH & MP recovered 198 stolen and snatched vehicles 
during 2005-6. It is pertinent to mention here that, the recovery of a stolen vehicle in 
Pakistan is an anomaly, because most of the vehicle stealing gangs work with the 
collaboration and complete knowledge of the local police. Apart from this, the MP has 
also been doing a noble job of reuniting lost children, found on highways and motorways, 
with their families and legal heirs; only in 2006 MP had reunited 217 children, of various 
ages, with their parents. 
Improved security on the highways has contributed considerably to the economic 
activities in the areas around the highways, especially in southern Pakistan. Resultantly, 
industries, which were closed down because of unpredictable law and order situation, 
have started their operation again. In one district of Nooriabad in southern Pakistan, prior 
to 2006, only 33 industrial units were working, and after effective crime control by the 
MP, this number has increased to more than 80. Apart from these administrative 
activities, the MP has also helped in generating substantial revenue for the government, 
through effective and transparent penalisation of traffic violations on the highways. In 
this regard, MP collected, at an average, Rs.1,661,078 ($ 27,684 at the conversion rate of 
2005) as fine money per day. The total revenue collected during 2005 was, Rs.926, 
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605,647 ($15,443,427). According to the IG Motorway Police, this figure for the year 
2006 has crossed the limit of Rs.1.2 billion.116 
 
6.1.5 Training and Spreading the Right Ethos 
All the new inducted members of MP, as well as the existing force, regularly go through 
rigorous training under the supervision of professionally trained trainers. MP has 
established a whole new training institute for this purpose. Where training is imparted not 
only to the MP force but other institutions like the Punjab Police and various city police 
are also sending their officers/officials to get professional training. This institute has 
trained 129 trainers since 2006, out of which 40 were the senior officers of Punjab Police, 
who were trained as instructors to subsequently coach 6000 newly recruited Traffic 
Warden of Punjab Police.117 
Lately, in a major overhaul project of capital city administration, Motorway Police 
trained 400 officers of Islamabad Traffic Police. The result was a professional 
resurrection of city traffic police, which has turned into an equally efficient and 
corruption free work force. This revitalisation of capital traffic police has turned the force 
into a model traffic police armed with a new attractive outlook, increased numbers, 
modern gadgetry, better remunerations, and less duty hours. According to the author’s 
personal observation, which is corroborated by many social interactions and news 
reports, Islamabad traffic police has started working on the same lines as MP, after going 
through this restoration and training by MP. Resultantly, there is a mushroom growth of 
driving schools in the town and their clients are mostly women who now, thanks to the 
prevailing security on the roads are feeling more confident to master the formerly chaotic 
traffic of the city. This fact substantiates that the original experience of MP was not just 
an experiment or something to boast with, rather it demonstrates the spread of positive 
influence and the pride in a new ethos, inherited from MP, which is already being 
witnessed on the streets of Islamabad.  
                                                 
116 IG Motorway Police Mr. Muhammad Raffat Pasha told this figure to the author in a personal interview 
conducted on 6th June 2007 in his Islamabad office. 
117 Detailed training ethos of MP could be seen at Appendix 7. 
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6.1.6 Social Image of the Motorway Police 
Commuters on highways frequently use terms like ‘guardian angels’ for the patrolling 
staff of the MP. There are numerous incidents in which, local as well as foreign travellers 
on motorways, have commended the professionalism, cooperativeness, and civility of the 
Motorway Police force in national newspapers. Here I would like to quote sentiments of 
one well-known columnist from a famous daily newspaper of Pakistan, as the views 
consummately encompass the feelings of an ordinary citizen of Pakistan. 
  
Near Jhelum, the police stopped me. A smart officer got out of a beautiful 
highway police van, said hello to me and respectfully said, ‘Sir, you were going in 
the wrong lane, its illegal’. I smilingly replied, ‘I have just come to this lane’. He 
smiled back and said, ‘may be you are right, but I am watching you since last five 
kilometres’. I apologised laughingly. He shrugged, handed me the ticket and said 
in the same respectful tone, ‘ok sir, and please be careful next time’. I paid the 
fine, said good-bye to him, and resumed my journey; I remembered that he 
saluted me while leaving. 
It was an amazing experience. Before this, several times I had come across police; 
I was also stopped several times by the traffic police, but I don’t remember that 
ever any police officer had given me so much respect, so much honour. Whenever 
I came across the police, they robbed me of that self-respect, which makes an 
eating and drinking, sleeping and weeping living being, a human being. In every 
police encounter my very idea of freedom and freedom of thought, which is the 
distinction of free people, got ruptured. In front of policemen, I always felt like 
losing that sense of pride, which independent people feel in their country; every 
time in my own country, in my own self, and in my own mind I became a 
stranger.  
This happened for the first time that police and I were face to face, and neither my 
self-respect was ripped open, nor my sense of pride was hurt. For a long time I 
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was enraptured in a pleasant feeling, which seemed like a stranger to me; and for 
whom I was a stranger.118 
                                                                                                      (Chaudhary 2002) 
It is not only the polite and friendly attitude of the Motorway Police staff, which wins 
them public support and respect, it is also their efficiency, integrity and professionalism 
which the general public finds very novel in any public institution. Another columnist 
expressed similar feelings in his following article: 
 
First of all I was surprised to read the words ‘peoples friendly’ with the name of 
Motorway Police, but I was completely shocked when I read the whole content of 
the newspaper advertisement. It was written that Motorway Police has found a 
handbag from a bus, which met an accident on motorway on 18th August 1999. 
Apart from some medicines this bag contained various gold items including: one 
chain approximately 10 grams, a pair of earrings 5 grams, one pair of tops 3 grams, 
one ring almost 3 grams and two necklaces of various weight. Since then all these 
items are in the safe custody of Motorway Police. The advertisement was a request, 
asking the owner of these things to contact SSP Head Quarter with the proof of his 
ownership. This attempt of reaching the owner of this jewellery is worth enormous 
praise considering the fact that on such accidents, it frequently happens that prior to 
attending to the injured and dead, the so called ‘social workers’, gather on such 
occasions to firstly collect the luggage and valuables of the victims. 
This has never happened that some injured or the family of any dead passenger 
would have recovered the luggage, specially the valuable items in their luggage, 
completely. Considering such situations, the police’s efforts to find the owner of 
that lost jewellery are not only worth appreciation but also quiet surprising. I 
specially liked this act of Motorway Police because the department has not even 
cared for its own expenses in this effort of bringing this jewellery back to its real 
owner. 
                                                 
118  This excerpt was published in an Urdu daily, The Daily Jung, 4th June 2002, and has been translated by 
the author 
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Dear friends, in these times of free marketing and computer technology, when we 
are lagging far behind other countries, it is most important to build the corporate 
image of any institution. Some times, the good name and a positive image of any 
institution becomes the reason for bringing it forward in the line of successful 
institutions.119 
                                                                                                               (Shahid 2000) 
The social image of the Motorway Police can be ascertained from the above-narrated 
excerpts. Such an image is especially intriguing considering the social image of general 
police, which is exactly opposite of MP’s image. 
 
6.2 Perceptions of Motorway Police 
During the course of fieldwork, apart from surveying the federal bureaucracy, 
perceptions of officers/officials, belonging to the Motorway Police have also been 
obtained, facilitating an individual as well as institutional comparison, between a well-
structured MP and a non-structured bureaucracy with regard to the causes and the control 
of corruption. Considering the mutually ensconced nature of causes and control of 
corruption, we would start with the perceptions of the MP, regarding widespread 
corruption in certain public sector institutions, and its comparison with the reasons for 
lesser corruption in their own institution.  
As the number of respondents from the MP was 100, we have slightly altered the 
significance score, assigned for HFCs and LFCs; any category chosen by 30 or more 
observations will be considered as a HFC, otherwise, it would be termed as LFC. 
Secondly, wherever a comparison between general bureaucracy and Motorway Police has 
been given, to cater for the different sizes of the sample, numerical figures have been 
quoted in percentages instead of significance scores. 
 
6.2.1 Motorway’s Perceptions Regarding Institutional Corruption 
The following graph clearly shows that in view of the Motorway Police, corrupt 
leadership, (SS 63) and lack of accountability, (SS 50) are the primary most HFCs for 
                                                 
119 The excerpt was published in an Urdu daily, Rosnama Khabrain, 25th November 2000, and has been 
translated by the author. 
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widespread corruption in certain institutions; followed by weak checks & balances (SS 
45) and greater opportunities (SS 32) as the other two HFCs. 
 
Figure 10 Perceptions Regarding Institutional Corruption 
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We remember from the last chapter that the general bureaucracy had named the same 
causes for rampant corruption in some of the most corrupt institutions in the country, 
tough in a different order. According to bureaucratic perceptions, four primary HFCs for 
high level of corruption, in the priority order, were: lack of accountability, greater 
opportunities, weak checks & balances, and corrupt leadership. This comparison 
indicates that the MP assigns much more significance to the role of leadership, as 
compared to their counterparts in general bureaucracy. 
This variation in the perception of Motorway Police and bureaucracy is explainable if we 
analyse their institutional structure, which is based on strict accountability ensured 
through an honest leadership. Accountability and monitoring rules, at least in theory, are 
present in each institution; however, universal and objective application of those rules 
varies from institution to institution. The application of these rules largely depends on the 
will and willingness of the leadership; an honest leader, having nothing to hide, would 
not hesitate to invoke such rules whenever need arise.  
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Figure 11 Reasons for Lesser Corruption in MP 
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However, when it comes to the reasons of lower corruption in their own institutions, 
members of MP attribute - though sufficiently enough to the level of HFC - considerably 
less importance to the role of honest leadership (SS 35) when compared with the strong 
checks & balances (SS 52) and lesser opportunities (SS 43) as major reasons. The role of 
strict accountability (SS 37) also appears one degree below its position in the previous 
chart. Nevertheless, strong check & balances are also indirectly linked to the quality of 
leadership in any institution. 
Considering the emerging trends from the above pictures, we can divide the instruments 
for controlling corruption into two basic categories: indigenious and exogenous tools for 
fighting corruption in any institution. We will analyse these two categories in greater 
detail in the coming sections; presently we will see how effective different institutions 
can be in fighting against corruption. 
 
6.2.2 Institutions for Fighting Institutional Corruption  
There are always some institutions like mass media, civil society, or religious institutions, 
which could contribute effectively in the fight against corruption. Respondents from both 
bureaucracy and MP were asked to suggest the three most effective institutions for 
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fighting corruption. As the following chart shows, both the institutions differ 
considerably in the prioritisation of their choices. 
  
Figure 12 Institutions for Fighting Corruption 
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In the opinion of the general bureaucracy, amongst the institutions of the public sector, 
mass media, civil society, and judiciary could play the most effective role in combating 
corruption. Interestingly, the role of academic institutions was given relatively lesser 
importance for fighting corruption, as only 16 per cent of the respondents had included 
academic institutions in their three choices; while, in case of MP it was their top most 
priority for fighting corruption, with 21 per cent of respondents opting for it. This trend 
suggests that bureaucracy generally consider themselves to be sufficiently educated, so 
they do not attach much importance to education or academic institutions; on the other 
hand, members of MP being more self reflective know very well by experience that the 
kind of training needed for inculcating respect for law, justice, and moral probity can best 
be imparted at the younger age by academic institutions. 
Mass media and civil society were the top two most effective institutions, with respective 
chosen frequency of 27 and 18 per cent, in the eyes of bureaucracy for the eradication of 
corruption from society; however, the significance frequency of both these institutions 
was 15 and 14 per cent respectively, according to the MP’s priority list. It seems 
paradoxical how an illiterate society could be effective in the maintenance of rule of law, 
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abidance of justice and the superiority of moral probity. Looking from this perspective 
the priority list of MP seems more logical.  
An interesting feature emerging from this analysis was the lower level of significance, 
attached to the police and anti-corruption agencies, by both the bureaucracy and the MP; 
as only 6.5 and 7.8 per cent of the respondents, respectively, considered anti-corruption 
agencies of any value in the fight against corruption. It is important to mention that this 
opinion was recorded after almost eight years of an ongoing, well known, and well 
propagated anti-corruption campaign, of the National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan. 
Another important factor is the selection of religious institutions, as the secondly 
mentioned most important institution by the MP, for fighting corruption. Most of the 
MP’s respondents also included religious teachings as a part of their recommendation list. 
Members of the bureaucracy though recorded numerous recommendations in favour of 
employing religious teachings, as a means for improving moral standards and reducing 
corruption, yet only 10 per cent of them had chosen religious institutions as effective 
ones for fighting corruption.  
However, this religious factor when seen in the larger context seems to bear not much 
significance in the spread or curtailment of corruption. According to World Value Survey 
2001, 90 per cent of Pakistani considers themselves religious persons, while 100 per cent 
of them believe in God, in life hereafter, in heaven and hell. Moreover, almost 92 per cent 
believe that claiming undue government benefits is never justifiable, while almost 98 per 
cent say that accepting a bribe is never justifiable.120 And yet, quite paradoxically, 
Pakistan once again ranked at 134th position, according to the latest index released by 
Transparency International, with a CPI score of 2.5.121 Both the pubic servants and the 
public do not waste any opportunity of make some profit employing every possible 
means. 
A Prima facie contradictory position, perhaps, can better be understood, if viewed in the 
context of under developed and gravely illiterate societies like Pakistan, where actions 
                                                 
120 Figures taken from World Value Survey’s website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/happinesstrends/, 
sighted on 27th September 2008. 
121 Latest CPI was issued by transparency International on 27thSeptember 2008 in which 180 countries 
were surveyed. Information available at TI’s website: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008, sighted on 27th September 2008. 
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are predominantly influenced by the needs of the hour and not by the ideology or beliefs. 
Where, in folk wisdom, morality is believed to germinate from a full stomach. Maslow 
(1943) makes the same point in his famous theory of human motivation, arguing that:  
Another peculiar characteristic of human organism when it is dominated by a 
certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our 
chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simple as a 
place where there is plenty of food… Anything else will be defined as unimportant. 
Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as 
fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach.  
                                                                                              (Maslow 1943: 374-375) 
Consequently, it is clear that despite having opposite claims, not all are so religiously 
motivated to wait for the glory of hereafter and ignore the ignominy of then and there. 
Similarly, notwithstanding the strong predilection towards religious teachings as a mean 
to control corruption among the members of bureaucracy as well as the MP, one can 
safely assume that religiosity of the agents or society, has little do with their 
susceptibility to indulge in corruption or corrupt practices.  
Scientists have maintained for centuries that so called religious societies have a tendency 
to look for meta-physical solutions to physical or worldly problems. Resultantly they 
acquire a general negative attitude towards difficult situations or problems and tend to 
resign easily while leaving quest for solution on fate or nature instead of finding 
practical, logical and effective solutions for those problems. Despite the efforts of Eduard 
Said and others who have identified such generalisations as the orientalist view of 
western scholars,122 and despite the fact that the disciplines of social and cultural science 
have mostly overcome this bias through rigorous self-reflection and discourse analysis, 
unfortunately this view has survived until today in the academic world. Especially when 
                                                 
122 When ‘Orientalism’ was published first in 1978, Said referred to the view of western scholars who 
studied the orient, i.e. the Middle East. The reception of his thesis extended the scope of the orientalist 
view, which regards East and West as fundamentally different and assumes the latter’s cultural superiority, 
to the way non-western cultures and societies are generally being studied. Said describes Orientalism as 
followed: ‘Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined staring point Orientalism can be 
discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.’ (Said, 
2003, Page. 3) 
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politics and economics are concerned, such views are still applied as convenient solutions 
to explain the lack of development in the third world; whereas modern social psychology 
is able to explain most social phenomena regardless of the continent where they are being 
observed.  
Therefore it is necessary to mention briefly that Pakistani society suffers from what is 
called in social psychology’s term as learnt helplessness123, which is defined as ‘the state 
of pessimism that results from a negative event as due to stable, internal, and global 
factor; learnt helplessness causes depression, reduced effort, and difficulty in learning 
new material’ (Aronson, Wilson and Akerd 1994: 554). The population of most of the so-
called South, including Pakistan, suffers from this psychological mal adjustment acquired 
after centuries of oppression and deprivation, symptoms of which are desperation, 
resignation and lethargy. A victim of this disorder believes that there is nothing one can 
do to help his situation and increase his performance. 
If a strong predilection towards religious beliefs in general were the cause of fatalistic 
orientation leading to underdevelopment, then how could the ascent of the Roman 
Empire under Constantine, the strength of the Islamic Empire under the second caliph 
Umar in the sixth century, or the Protestant Work Ethic, which Max Weber held 
responsible for the evolvement of capitalism, be explained?  
However, it can be stated that this syndrome of learnt helplessness has indeed been 
painted with green colour of religion and spiritualism in Pakistan, since resorting to 
religious consolation helps ordinary people to put up with the harsh reality they are 
unable to change for the better. Notwithstanding the extent of this syndrome in many 
developing societies like Pakistan, it will be wrong, or at best misinterpretation, to infer 
                                                 
123 Learned helplessness is a theory based on the experiments of American psychologist Martin Seligman 
(1967). Seligman performed two series of experiments with three groups of dogs, in which dogs were given 
small electric shocks. Two groups of dogs had the means to avoid the shock while third group had no 
escape from it. In second series of experiment all the three groups could have avoided the shock if they 
jump over a small wall. Interestingly the dogs belonging to that third group did very little to avoid the 
shock while the dogs from first two groups jumped over the wall to save themselves from the pain. Later 
similar experiments were performed with different animals producing the same result. Lack of control over 
negative stimulus was seen as the strongest predictor of depressive or resigned response. Thus, learned 
helplessness is a psychological condition in which human beings or animals learn, from their past 
experience, to act as helpless even when they have the power to change their situation or avoid the pain. 
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that their potential of contributing to development is generally inhibited by their cultural 
or religious views, just because they are displaying their despair in these terms.124 
 
6.2.3 Indigenous Tools for Fighting Corruption  
Coming back to our analysis of MP there are certain elements in each institutional 
organisation, which are within the jurisdiction of the individual institution. This means 
that these elements are not imposed from the higher bureaucracy or the government itself, 
rather they are indigenous to the institutions; and their existence or level of application 
depends, mostly on the priority list of the institutional principals or heads. These are the 
elements, which could be applied, changed, controlled and monitored by internal 
institutional mechanisms. Three such elements, which were weighted very high by the 
respondents for controlling corruption, were strict accountability, increased 
mechanisation, and recognition of and reward for honest behaviour. 
Figure 13 Indigenous Tools for Fighting Corruption 
1 3 5 7 9
Strict
accountability
Increased
mechanization
Reward honesty
Scale of Effectiveness (N=546)
Motorway
Police
Bureaucracy
 
The level of accountability within any institution, by and large, depends on the will of the 
principals of the institutions. Honest principals or heads of institutions could ensure a cost 
effective system of accountability and monitoring, universally applicable to all the 
                                                 
124 I am extremely thankful to Dr. Ahmed Naseer and Jacqueline Naseer for their insights and help in 
building this and various other arguments. 
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members of the institution.125 Similarly the principal can ensure rewards for honest 
behaviour. The level of mechanisation within each institution is also mostly associated 
with the will and desire of the constituents of the institutions. According to the views of 
both Motorway Police and the general bureaucracy these indigenous tools are essential 
for controlling corruption within any institution. Both the groups assigned almost similar 
importance to the elements of increased mechanisation and the rewarding the honest 
behaviour; however, the MP has attached slightly more importance to strict 
accountability as a tool for fighting corruption.  
Strict accountability was given a mean effectiveness score of 8.4 by the MP, in 
comparison to 7.6 by the bureaucracy, on a scale of 1-10; however, interestingly 
rewarding honest behaviour was given a respective score of 6.7 and 6.8. Probably, being 
a rare phenomenon in general bureaucracy, reward to honesty has slightly more value in 
the perceptions of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the MP has rated increased 
mechanisation as 6.0 in comparison to 5.7 mean score given by the bureaucracy. 
Probably, the Motorway Police herself being a sufficiently mechanised institution, better 
realises the value of this factor in the effective control of corruption. 
 
6.2.3.1 Effective Accountability  
Almost hundred per cent of the respondents cited effective accountability as a major 
ingredient in answering to an open-ended question, asking their recommendations for 
controlling corruption. This is understandable considering the institutional culture of MP, 
where there is hardly any room for manipulation or exploitation of the clients. The head 
of Motorway Police in his interview to the author unequivocally quoted universal and 
effective accountability, along with better remuneration package, as the major causes of 
MP’s success. The absolute significance of accountability in control of corruption, and its 
level in Motorway Police can very easily be ascertained by going through the following 
incident narrated by a respondent belonging to MP: 
 
                                                 
125 A self-explanatory example of this phenomenon, Zubair Bhatti’s model for eradication of corruption, is 
recorded in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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Such were the strong signals given to the agents from the very start; resultantly, making 
the option of going corrupt an extremely perilous and unattractive one. The effectiveness 
of this accountability lies in its universality, impartiality and objectivity. In the long run, 
nothing could be more disconcerting and hazardous for the institution than selective, 
partial and subjective accountability. The author himself witnessed the level of vigilance 
and intolerance towards inefficiency and corruption in the MP, during his various visits to 
their filed and camp offices. Motorway Police has employed a mechanized system for 
processing any complaints against its officials; this ensures not only celerity, but also 
makes it incumbent upon the higher officers to take appropriate actions commensurate 
with gravity of the charges. This assertion is evident in the following incident quoted by 
another respondent of the Motorway Police: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, concurrently if we analyse the mechanism and level of accountability prevalent 
in the other departments of civil bureaucracy we realize that extent of corruption in 
bureaucracy is not surprising at all. The standards of accountability and transparency in 
civil bureaucracy are as merciful and corrupt friendly as it could be, creating a sense of 
brazen impunity among its members. Following incidents emphasising the lack of 
On Beat No.32, on GT road an incident of corruption by 
Motorway officials was noticed. Some officials gave penalty of 
Rs.500 instead of issuing tickets to the violators. It was timely 
noticed by the officers of MP. The said officials were given major 
punishments; one was dismissed and other was sent back to his 
parent department. 
 
 
One 30 years old officer of MP, belonging to Mianwali, narrated this incident 
during the survey of Motorway Police in June 2007.
When National Highway & Motorway Police started working in 1997 
on motorway, some of the senior petrol officials/officers, who were 
taken on deputation from district police departments, tried to make 
money from commuters. These officers were apprehended and 
penalized after a complete inquiry. They were dismissed from service 
not only from Motorway Police but also from the government 
service. 
 
A young, single, officer of Motorway Police from Punjab recorded this incident 
while filling the questionnaire for the survey of MP in June 2007. 
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accountability in civil bureaucracy present a perfect contrast to what we have above seen 
in case of Motorway Police. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following tables, based on the data compiled through the answers to open-ended 
questions in which respondents were asked to narrate any incident of corruption, which 
has been brought to their notice, and the steps taken for the redressal of the issue, will 
further substantiate the above made assertions. A comparison of tables related to general 
bureaucracy and the Motorway Police explains the significance of effective 
accountability in most unambiguous terms. 
Table 12 Incidence of Corruption in Bureaucracy and Actions Taken 
Frequency of Witnessing 
Corruption 
Case 
Reported 
Action 
Taken 
Result Penalty 
Yes 68 No 34 Successful 8 
No 2 Yes 10 Partly 
Successful 
10 
Not Sure 9 
No Response 58 
44 
Self 
Action 
14 Not Sure 6 
1(Transfer)
 
The above table based on the answers of respondents belonging to general bureaucracy 
indicates that out of 68 incidents of corruption 44 were reported, out of which action were 
taken on only 10, while 14 officers took action themselves. It is interesting that only 8 of 
these 24 actions were considered as successful and in terms of penalty only one transfer 
was reported. This proves the assertion of our theory that in non-structured institutional 
environment job security is rarely threatened in cases of corruption; thus considerably 
reducing the cost of corruption in case of being caught. However, as we shall see in the 
While serving as Deputy Commissioner Income Tax (DCIT), my 
staff was caught issuing fake notices; selling record to assesses that 
meant complete exemption of taxes. In Ministry of Women 
Development the amount dispersed for conferences was not the 
exact figure reported. The matters were presented before higher 
authorities but after suspension of six months all individuals were 
reinstated. This was treated as normal. 
 
 
A young, female, mid level officer of the Income Tax service who, got herself 
transferred from Income Tax due to prevalent corruption there, quoted these 
incidents during an interview with the author in December 2007. 
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following table, based on the answers of respondents from Motorway Police, that in 
structured institutional settings cost of corruption is very high in terms of job security. 
Table 13 Incidence of Corruption in Motorway Police and Action Taken 
Frequency of 
Witnessing Corruption 
Case 
Reported 
Action 
Taken 
Result Penalty 
Yes 7 No - Successful 7 
No 73 Yes 7 Partly 
Successful 
- 
Not Sure - 
No Response 20 
7 
Self 
Action 
5 Not Sure - 
3 Removal 
from Service 
2 Dismissal 
2 Transfer 
 
Respondents from Motorway Police have quoted only 7 incidents of corruption and 
successful action were taken on all of them, which resulted in removal from service, 
dismissal and transfer back to parent department. It is worth noting that more than 90 per 
cent of the respondents (who answered these questions) have categorically asserted not to 
have any experience or knowledge of corruption in Motorway Police, while on the other 
hand in case of bureaucracy more than 90 per cent of respondents, who answered these 
questions, had experienced some sort of corruption. It is evident from the success ratio 
and the extent of penalty in case of corruption in Motorway Police that the adventure is 
too costly for a rational actor to undertake. 
 
6.2.3.2 Rewarding Honest Conduct 
Notwithstanding the importance of accountability, rewarding honest behaviour is equally 
important for any sustained campaign against corruption. Effective accountability forces 
the agent to avoid corruption and reward motivates the agent to be honest; thus 
facilitating the decision making process of the agent in favour of the right options. In case 
of Motorway Police honesty is rewarded not only in shape of better salaries and 
privileges but also in terms of extra financial rewards for exceptionally honest and 
professional conduct on annual basis. These rewards are distributed in high-level annual 
meetings of the Motorway officers. 
The accountability of corruption and the reward for honesty are the two wheels for the 
cart of structured institutions; absence of one vitiates the effect of the other. Being a 
rational actor, the agent is bound to follow the route leading to the greener pastures; it is 
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up to the institutions to offer him these pastures in corruption or in honest conduct. The 
primary difference between a structured and un-structured institution is that the former 
offers these verdant meadows in honest and efficient conduct and a sure cancellation of 
the grazing permit in case of corruption; while the later provides excessive grazing 
opportunities of corrupt behaviour and offers dry hay as a reward for honest dealings. 
 
6.2.4 Exogenous Tools against Corruption 
Similarly like indigenous tools, there are some vital elements for fighting institutional 
corruption, which are beyond the jurisdiction of the institutions; these factors or tools are 
determined, controlled, and altered by the higher bureaucratic bodies, or the government 
itself. Institutions can, sometimes, request for change in some of these tools, but they 
cannot ensure or enforce the change, as bureaucracies follow the Weberian hierarchical 
approach in the conduct of their businesses. Such few exogenous elements, considered 
vital by the bureaucracy and the MP for controlling widespread bureaucratic corruption, 
were: sufficient salaries, honest leadership, institutional restructuring, and the element of 
social disapproval.  
Figure 14 Exogenous Tools for Fighting Corruption 
1 3 5 7 9
Honest leadership
Social disapproval
Restructuring
Sufficient salary
Effectiveness Scale (N=780)
Motorway Police
Bureaucracy
 
The above chart shows how much significance was assigned to each of these exogenous 
elements for a meaningful fight against corruption. It reveals that honest leadership was 
considered almost equally important, by both groups of respondents, while, social 
disapproval and institutional restructuring was given comparatively a higher priority by 
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the respondents belonging to MP, than by the one related to general bureaucracy. 
Similarly, sufficient salary was given considerably more importance by the bureaucracy. 
However, in terms of assigning significance to the role of institutional restructuring and 
to the higher social disapproval, as effective tools in fight against corruption, MP’s views 
were significantly stronger than the perceptions of bureaucracy. The MP had assigned an 
effectiveness score of 7.6 and 7.8 respectively, to the above-mentioned elements, as 
compared to a score of 6.6 and 6.8 respectively by the bureaucracy. Honest leadership 
was considered equally important by both groups and was given an effectiveness score of 
6.5 and 6.6 by MP and bureaucracy respectively. 
The MP has assigned more value to institutional restructuring, because they are working 
in a structured institution and understand fully the pros and cons of being part of a 
structured institution. Secondly, most of them, prior to joining the MP, have also worked 
in the unstructured environment of provincial police services, so they can feel the 
difference and realise its impact. 
Similarly, when MP agents see the impact of social approval, which they receive in 
abundance, they realise the importance of increased social disapproval in controlling 
corruption. Secondly and more importantly, as the basic needs of Motorway Police, 
physiological needs in terms of Maslow’s theory of human motivation (1943), are 
reasonably satisfied, they are and can be motivated to achieve and satisfy a higher degree 
of needs i.e., self-esteem needs.126  
 
6.2.4.1 Financial Remuneration 
Financial remuneration and leadership of the institution are the elements, which have 
significant impact on the outlook and performance of institutions; but both factors are 
external to the effective jurisdiction of the institutions. In the general bureaucratic setup, 
decisions regarding both of these elements are made at governmental level, but the 
repercussions of these decisions are felt at the institutional level. Regarding financial 
remuneration, this can be ascertained by the fact that respondents from bureaucracy had 
given an effectiveness scale of 6.7, as compared to 5.4 by those belonging to the MP, 
                                                 
126 For a detailed description of various stages of human needs and associated motivations, refer to 
Maslow’s theory of human motivation (1943) explained in chapter 1. 
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since the respondents from the former, receive lesser financial remuneration, as compared 
to the agents belonging to the later. However, almost all the respondents, both from 
bureaucracy and Motorway Police, who have given their recommendations for 
controlling corruption, have quoted increase in financial remuneration as a most vital 
ingredient for combating bureaucratic corruption. It is important to point out here that 
what agent asked for is not a very exorbitant increase in their salaries, but rather what 
most of them have proposed is a reasonable financial package, which should ensure 
provision of at least basic amenities, like food, shelter, health and education. 
Need based corruption, which is most frequent and equally deleterious from long term 
societal perspective, cannot be controlled without catering for the basic needs of public 
servants. A universal and ruthless accountability might achieve the purpose for a short 
time but it will be a forced change, which is unlikely to last long. Our study of Motorway 
Police shows that in order to make ‘no to corruption’ a willingly opted choice for the 
agent it is imperative that financial returns of the public agents are at least sufficient to 
meet their basic needs. Otherwise, in presence of incidents quoted under the heading 
1.5.1.2, it will be impossible to effectively combat corruption. 
 
6.2.4.2 Honest Leadership 
The role played by honest leadership in controlling corruption both at institutional as well 
as national level cannot be undermined. Leadership, both corrupt and honest, can be 
contagious; corrupt leadership promotes an individualistic approach among the 
subordinates while honest leadership fosters an ethos of collective good. Corrupt 
leadership not only promotes inefficiency, selfishness, and corruption, but even more 
dangerously it exasperates the honest and efficient agents and produces a feeling of 
helplessness and frustration in them; turning them into individuals filled with cynicism 
and repressed hostility. The role played by the leadership can very well be ascertained by 
the following extract narrated by a respondent from the bureaucracy sample when asked 
to narrate any incident involving corruption brought to his notice.  
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This clearly shows that even the willing and honest agents fail to follow their ideals in the 
face of a corrupt leadership. It does not happen infrequently that an honest subordinate of 
a corrupt boss finds himself posted every few months from one place to another. In 
extreme cases, like the earlier quoted one narrated by a female officer of Income Tax 
department, she was posted more than ten times in a span of three months because she 
refused to comply with unlawful orders of one superior. 
The significance of honest leadership in the honest and successful performance of The 
Motorway Police can also be judged by the extract quoted at the start of this chapter. 
According to that, the primary reason of MP’s exemplary performance is their leaders, as 
‘they themselves are honest, conscientious and straightforward and do not compromise 
on principal’ (Soofi 1999). 
 
6.3 Self-Assessment of Motorway Police 
As already mentioned, a separate section related to the various aspects of the institution 
was added in the questionnaire used for surveying the perceptions of the Motorway 
Police (Questionnaire is attached as Appendix 2.) The section targeted the perceptions of 
local agents regarding the institutional environment of the MP in terms of: corruption and 
efficiency, peer pressure, social expectations, professional cooperativeness, 
accountability, and job satisfaction. The following section will describe and explain the 
cumulative perceptions of the agents belonging to a well-structured institution, and will 
analyse what, according to them, are the major factors responsible for their unusually 
honest and efficient conduct within a web of inefficient and corrupt institutions. 
There have been many during my service. Mostly I succeeded in doing 
what I was supposed to do. I mostly took stand against corruption and 
succeeded where my superior officer was honest. Only once I failed, 
and that was because from Deputy Commissioner (DC) up to the 
provincial minister, all wanted payment to a contractor. I just could not 
fight the entire corrupt system! 
 
A mid level, male, officer from NWFP, posted in Establishment Division of federal 
government service, recorded these views during the survey of bureaucracy in May 
2007. 
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6.3.1 Performance of Motorway Police 
Multiple questions targeted towards obtaining a view of MP’s agents, regarding their own 
performance in terms of corruption and efficiency. Public observations and bureaucratic 
view regarding these factors have already been explained in the previous sections. Here 
we will analyse the MP’s own view about their performance, to countercheck the general 
impressions. The first assessment was obtained from a question in which respondents 
were asked to list three least corrupt institutes (Q 9); what we saw was a humble 
expression of self assessment: only 40 per cent of the respondents, as compared to 60 per 
cent of the bureaucratic respondents, listed the MP as the least corrupt institute in the 
country. However, when asked directly about, the level of corruption and efficiency (Q 34 
& 35) in the institutions their response was different and more in congruence with their 
public image. As the following chart shows, MP’s rating in terms of corruption was 
almost perfect with a score of 1.3 on a scale of 1-10 where 1 was completely clean and 10 
was thoroughly corrupt. 
Figure 15 Self-Assessment of MP 
1 3 5 7 9
Level of Corruption
Level of Effeciency
Level of Satisfaction
Scale (N=274)
 
The most significant aspect of this table is the rating of MP in terms of efficiency, as 
there exists a certain school of thought, in general bureaucracy, which does not go so far 
to indulge and justify corruption, but which has no objection towards inefficiency. 
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Though such agents are not corrupt, they are also not efficient by any standards. They opt 
to do minimal work in order to avoid any potential situation, which might force them 
towards corruption. The Motorway Police was rated at 8.3 in terms of an institution 
serving public interest efficiently (Q 35). 
Another heartening finding was the level of satisfaction of the respondents with their job 
in the Motorway Police; as the cumulative score for this particular question (Q 36) was 
7.9 signifying that almost 80 per cent of the respondents are reasonably satisfied with 
what they are doing, and how they are being reciprocated by the institution for their 
services. This becomes increasingly significant when viewed in the backdrop of the 
general trends prevailing in the country, as according to World Values Survey of 2001, 
almost 88 per cent of the Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the financial situation of their 
household, and 72 per cent are dissatisfied with their life in general.127 This implies that a 
large majority of the population is dissatisfied with not only what life has to offer them 
but also with what they do and what they get in return of their services. 
 
6.3.2 Societal Elements in Controlling Corruption 
 We have seen in the last chapter that the bureaucracy recorded paradoxical views about 
the role of society in the spread and control of corruption. We again obtained somewhat 
erratic views from the MP regarding the role of society in the expansion or curtailment of 
corruption. In answer to a question that whether public forces the official to be corrupt by 
offering them bribes (Q 16) almost 60 per cent of the respondents agreed to the statement 
as the cumulative score for this question was 6.2; however, when directly asked that, how 
often you come across the public that wants to bribe you (Q 40), the majority of the 
respondents answered it as rare or very rare signifying a converted score of 2.8 on the 
scale. 
Furthermore, when asked to comment on the effectiveness of social disapproval in 
discouraging corruption (Q28) most of the respondents placed it between very effective 
and effective with a cumulative converted score of 7.8. However, the most significant 
result was to a question, asking that how much public expectation from Motorway Police 
                                                 
127 Figures are taken from the World Values Survey website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/, sighted 
on 28th September 2008. 
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determines your conduct (Q 37); according to the responses to this question, public 
expectations plays a major role in determining the conduct of Motorway Police. The 
converted effectiveness score for this particular question was 8.3, indicating a very strong 
relationship between public anticipation and the conduct of the agents. If we remember 
from the last chapter, a considerable number of respondents from bureaucracy have 
suggested that public induces them for corruption and corrupt practices. This divergent 
views regarding public expectation from the two institutions suggest that the public 
builds its expectation discriminating between the institutions according to their past 
experiences. 
 
Figure 16 Societal Influences on Corruption 
1 3 5 7 9
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Frequency of Bribe Offered
to MP
Public Expectat ions
effecting MP's  Conduct
Effect iveness of Social
Disapproval 
Effectiveness Scale (N=367)
 
The impact of social expectations on the conduct of the MP is amazing, it indicates that if 
once an image – be it positive or negative – is established, agents tend to follow that 
image and try to live up to the expectations associated with it. Social image is a very 
important factor in determining the conduct of individuals as well as institutions, as 
individuals are the building block, out of which institutions are made. 
These results, once again re-establish the importance of perceptions in case of corruption; 
if the general perception is that some institution is not corrupt, it affects the conduct and 
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performance of the institutions significantly, to a degree that perceptions can work like 
self fulfilling prophecies. Somebody who is perceived to be corrupt, would not hesitate to 
indulge in further corruption, while, the one who is known and appreciated for being 
honest, would find it very hard to indulge in corruption and corrupt practices. This might 
also be a reason for rampant corruption in the police, because the representatives of this 
institution know that they are known for corruption. Since the public would not expect 
anything else than them being corrupt, they tend to think little while demanding illicit 
sums for the services they provide. 
 
6.3.3 Institutional Tools for Controlling Corruption 
Under this category, agents were asked to give their perceptions about the presence of 
various factors, like: accountability, peer pressure, professional cooperativeness in their 
institutions and the significance of each factor in determining their conduct. 
Figure 17 Institutional Features in MP 
1 3 5 7 9
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As is evident from the above chart, there was a consistent response to the questions 
related to the role of accountability. Initially, the MP respondents suggested with an 
effectiveness score of 6.8 that lack of accountability is a major reason of corruption in the 
bureaucracy. Later, when asked about the prevalent conditions within their own 
institutions, they again attributed higher significance to the role of accountability in the 
impeccable conduct of the institution. Responding to a question in which respondents 
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were asked to, rate the level of accountability within their institution (Q38), the majority 
placed it between very strong and strong with a cumulative score of 7.9. And when asked 
to describe, the role this strong accountability plays in determining their conduct (Q39), 
again the majority of respondents rated it between very strong and strong with a mean 
effectiveness score of 7.2. 
However, when asked about the role of professional consultation with the institution 
regarding the matters of organisational changes like efficiency improvement (Q42) most 
of the respondents gave a negative response, with a mean effectiveness score of 3.9, 
which signifies between rare to very rare occurrence of such incidences. This implies that 
despite being a well-structured institution the MP has not adopted the policy of consensus 
building within the institutions and has not delegated the decision-making process to the 
grass root level. The benefit of shared decision-making is that it makes the stakeholders 
responsible for the outcome of those decision and they strive harder to achieve the 
targets, set by the policy or any particular decision. 
Notwithstanding the lack of professional consultation or joint decision-making process in 
the MP, there exists a strong sense of peer pressure in doing things right. When asked to 
comment on, how much their conduct is determined by the expectations of their 
colleagues (Q41), a significant majority responded as very much, with a score of 6.5. 
Though, this response is less strong than their response to the role of accountability or 
public expectations in the determination of their conduct, yet, it shows that peer pressure 
plays a significant role in the decision-making process of the agent.  
The above analysis has revealed that in the view of the Motorway Police, social 
expectations is the strongest contributor in the honest and efficient discharge of their 
duties, closely followed by the strict accountability and peer pressure. It is evident from 
the data that the MP has repeatedly assigned significant importance to the role strict and 
impersonal accountability can play in the fight against corruption. Apart from this, 
rewarding honesty also plays a considerable role in the behaviour of agents; however, it 
appears that the MP has assigned relatively less importance to the role reasonable 
financial remuneration plays in the choices of the agents. Nonetheless, the MP has 
emerged as a strong supporter of institutional restructuring as a means to control 
corruption. 
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6.3.4 Structural Tools for Controlling Corruption 
The following table enlists ten major structural differences between the Motorway Police 
and the rest of the bureaucratic institutions working in Pakistan. These differences are 
listed in terms of the priority, assigned to each, by the respondents belonging to the 
Motorway Police. These structural differences are presumably the major reason of lesser 
corruption and higher efficiency in the Motorway Police. 
Figure 18 Institutional Features of MP 
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The primary most difference between MP and rest of the bureaucracy is the better 
financial remuneration, which according to most of the respondents belonging to 
bureaucracy as well as MP plays a most vital part in the spread or control of corruption in 
public sector institutions. With significance score of almost 70, better salaries was, by 
and far, the first of the top three structural differences chosen by the respondents. Apart 
from better salaries factors like level of education, strong moral values, and culture of the 
institution also fall within this category of Higher Frequency choices. Interestingly, 
factors like better training, strong accountability, favourable work environment, role of 
leadership and professional cooperativeness were given lower frequency significance by 
most of the respondents. However, it is important to remember, while viewing these 
scores, that these were the choices recorded by the respondents in answer to a question 
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asking them to enlist three most striking differences of the MP in comparison to rest of 
the public sector institutions (Q43). 
Though the MP has assigned significantly more importance to their level of education, 
the following graph (Figure-19) reveals that their level of education is not much higher 
than that of general bureaucracy; rather the level of education is higher in the 
bureaucracy.  
Figure 19 Level of Education 
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Almost 77 per cent of bureaucratic respondents were holding a master degree in 
comparison to 46 per cent of the MP respondents; however, the ratio of bachelor degree 
holders was 9 per cent to 43 per cent respectively. 
However, if percentages of bachelor and master degree holders are combined, the total 
score for MP, i.e., 89 per cent, grows relatively higher than the same figure for 
bureaucracy, i.e., 86 per cent (leaving PhDs out as exceptions). This impression of MP 
for having a better educational standard could be explained when viewed in comparison 
with the general police, which would have a relatively lower education standard between 
their file and ranks. 
Another important structural variation, in the views of MP respondents, was strong moral 
values of the constituents of the institution. An inference, which could be drawn from this 
statement, is that in MP’s view, moral values of the other public institutions are not very 
strong, or they are more susceptible to amoral activities. The genesis of this choice could 
be found in the very effective training program of the MP; as character building and 
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inculcating a new moral ethos, at the time of joining MP, as well as during the course of 
their progress, is a vital part of the MP’s training ideology. Resultantly, the trained 
officials display a stronger sense of moral probity, which is unique to the institution. Not 
only has this training made them professionally competent in handling all kind of 
situations, and responsible in their social behaviours. The Motorway Police indoctrinate 
in her agents, a unique sense of ‘soft policing’, with a focus on public service, while 
prosecution is the last mean of action on the priority list.  
 
6.3.5 Institutional Culture of Motorway Police 
A part of the structural differences, the institutional culture is too significant a factor to 
not being treated separately. The MP’s choice of the culture of the institution, being a 
major structural uniqueness of the organisation, indicates strongly towards our earlier 
stance that it is not the culture which determines the level of corruption in any society, 
but rather the culture of the institutions which determines it. Though, the Motorway 
Police and the rest of the public institutions reside in the same South Asian culture, yet 
their output and manner of conduct, in terms of efficiency and corruption is remarkably 
different; this is due to the culture of the institution, which considers transparency, 
accountability, efficiency and public service as sacred principles to be upheld at any cost.  
An important part of the institutional culture is the fact that authority and responsibility 
lies within the same agent; means, one who is authorised to make a decision, is also 
responsible for implementing that decision. This has been done through decentralisation 
of administrative and financial powers to the basic structural units. In order to make this 
decentralisation work, the sphere of influence of each officer has been limited to a 
manageable level. One Superintendent of Police (SP) has to monitor and supervise 250 
officials in total, with the help of four of his deputies (Assistant Superintendent of Police/ 
Deputy Superintendent of Police) who monitor 60 officials each.  
Besides, the MP as an institution has set very specific parameters for the officers to 
monitor their progress in terms of efficient discharge of duties. Some of the basic 
parameters, contributing to the success of the MP, include: universal assistance to 
commuters, integrity and dedication to service, universal application of law, public 
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friendly policing, and motivation and commitment towards public service (MP Brief 
2005:6). 
According to my observation, a remarkable difference in the institutional culture of the 
Motorway Police can be felt merely by visiting any of their offices. Public friendliness, 
alacrity, and the professional approach of the officials and officers alike, which dominate 
the atmosphere in the MP offices, is a rare phenomenon, in any other public sector 
institution. Professional cooperativeness, healthy competition, and team spirit among the 
officials of the MP are also very high, as compared to their counterparts in other public 
institutions. 
Trust with supervision, is a fundamental feature of MP’s institutional culture; officers 
trust their subordinates that they will perform their duties with efficiency, honesty and 
professionally without any personal consideration. Agents also feel the moral obligation 
not to betray the trust they enjoy, by performing to the best of their potential. 
However, only blind trust does not serve the purpose; agents know that they are regularly 
supervised and monitored by their superiors and know that any laxity in the discharge of 
their duties will lead to dire consequences. Regarding corruption, the MP has a very 
simple agenda, which reads: zero tolerance of corruption. Both official and officers are 
well aware of this policy and do not find it worth a try to risk their job for any illicit 
pecuniary gains. 
With simplified monitoring techniques the MP has proved the basic notion of agency 
theory completely wrong, which stipulates that the principal does not monitor the agent, 
as effective monitoring of the agent is very costly. Principals of the MP regularly and 
effectively monitor the workings of their agents, without incurring too much cost in the 
process. Continuous monitoring of the subordinates is a part of daily routine of MP 
officers: Every morning the SP of each sector is provided with the list of the cases and 
clients who were dealt with by MP officers during the previous day; he then spends one 
hour daily in contacting the persons by telephone and inquires about the standard of the 
services provided, and the client’s level of satisfaction with the job performed by the MP 
official. This apparently innocuous exercise has made the effective monitoring of the 
agents not only possible but also cost-effective for the principal.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
 On the preceding pages we have discussed two applied mechanisms for controlling 
corruption: studying corrupt institutions to ascertain the causes of corruption, and 
examining some non-corrupt institutions to determine the reasons for their honest 
behaviour. We applied the first approach in the last chapter when we analysed the reasons 
for widespread corruption and inefficiency in the general bureaucracy of Pakistan. In this 
chapter we have employed the second approach and have analysed the causes for non-
corrupt and efficient dealings of the Motorway Police in Pakistan, with the help of the 
data based on the perceptions of the agents belonging to the institution and 
data/information collected by the author about MPs internal procedures. 
In the first part of the chapter, we discussed the origin, evolution, administrative 
structure, institutional features, performance and social image of the Motorway Police. 
We saw that it was established, on a limited and controlled scale, almost a decade ago. 
Since the very inception, the institution has build up its reputation as an anomalously 
honest and efficient institution in the bureaucratic set up of Pakistan; and after the lapse 
of more than ten years and increase in the size, responsibilities and jurisdictions of the 
institution, its initial image has not only survived unscathed, but has also improved with 
the passage of time. 
The most significant aspect of this successful experiment was that the initial manpower 
of the MP constituted of police officers, obtained on deputation, from different provincial 
police departments. The initial force consisted of officers, who were used to and adept in 
an extremely corrupt police culture of Pakistan. However, when placed in the right 
institutional setup, after a rigorous training of only six months, the same officials, turned 
out to be worthy to represent the most efficient and most honest police force in the 
history of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. This research attributes such a transformation 
primarily to the institutional structure of the Motorway Police. Transparency 
International Pakistan commented on this successful experiment that ‘the experience with 
the newly established motorway police appears to demonstrate that sufficient pay, a well-
structured job, effective monitoring and the creation of pride in the job can be effective’ 
(TI Country Study Report 2003: 10).  
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We have also delineated the unique institutional features, based on administrative and 
financial structure of the Motorway Police. We have seen that the key aspects of 
administrative structure are: merit based recruitment; excellent pre- and on the job 
training; division of force into controllable sectors; devolution of financial and 
administrative powers; manageable numbers of staff under the supervision of each 
officer; convenient working hours; provision of adequate residential facilities; adequate 
equipment; and good job environment. Regarding the financial structure the most 
prominent feature is the salary structure of the Motorway Police, which is almost 50 to 75 
per cent higher than the equivalent pays of the bureaucracy. Besides, higher pay package, 
transparent and efficient resource allocation, financial decentralisation, financial reward 
for honest behaviour, and effective welfare schemes for the force members are the other 
conspicuous features of the MP’s organisational set up.  
The chapter further substantiates the argument that institutional structures could be 
imperative in controlling corruption, by providing a brief sketch of the performance and 
social image of the MP. We showed that the MP has been instrumental in: reducing the 
numbers of traffic accidents, making the highways safer, providing timely assistance to 
commuters, recovering stolen vehicles, foiling highway robberies, apprehending unlawful 
elements, and generating substantial financial receipt for the government in the shape of 
collected fines. During 2006, the MP had collected more than 1.2 billion rupees in terms 
of imposed fine for traffic violations on highways. The social image of the MP is such 
that its name evokes appreciation, respect and approbation from the public at large. 
The second part of the chapter deals with the perceptions of the actors belonging to the 
MP regarding the causes of rampant corruption in the bureaucracy of Pakistan, as well as 
the reasons for the lack of corruption in the MP. The analysis shows that leadership, 
accountability, and checks & balances are the three most important factors in determining 
the level of corruption in any institution. We have further seen that in MP’s view, 
academic and religious institutions could play an instrumental role in the fight against 
corruption; while according to the perceptions of the bureaucracy, mass media and 
judiciary are the two main pillars for arresting the surge of corruption. 
We analysed the effective tools for fighting corruption under the categories of indigenous 
and exogenous tools. We noticed that strict accountability and reward for honesty are 
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considered as the major indigenous tools, while social disapproval and institutional 
restructuring are viewed as the basic exogenous tools for fighting corruption. We have 
also analyzed the data, both from bureaucracy and Motorway Police, related with the 
reported cases of corruption and the actions taken on such incidents. We noticed that the 
frequency of such incidents is much higher, and imposed penalties are very far and few in 
bureaucracy; however, we have also seen a complete reversal of this trend in case of 
Motorway Police. 
The third part of the chapter deals with the self-assessment of the Motorway Police 
regarding their performance, level of corruption and the basic reasons for lack of 
corruption in the MP. This section shows that actors belonging to the MP rate the 
institution very high in terms of its performance, are generally well satisfied with their 
job, and consider corruption as almost non-existing in the institution. It further shows that 
the actors assign high weightage to social disapproval, for reducing corruption, and 
believe that, social expectations play a major role in determining their honest conduct. 
We also noticed that contrary to the common bureaucratic belief, incidents of offering 
bribes to members of the MP are rare; which shows a certain degree of respect and 
recognition among the public at large for the honesty of the institution. 
We further analysed the impact of various institutional tools on the behaviour of the 
agents belonging to the MP. We noticed that most of the actors believe that the level of 
accountability is very high in the MP and that this factor contributes heavily to the honest 
and professional discharge of duties. Apart from that, peer pressure also contributes 
significantly in the honest conduct of the force members. However, we also noticed that a 
broader consensus building and mutual consultation on the matters of institutional 
structure and administration is not very common among the members of the MP. 
We also analysed the actor’s perception, regarding the most significant structural 
differences between the MP and the civil bureaucracy. We established with the help of 
data that better salaries, better level of education, stronger moral values and institutional 
culture are considered as the most important distinctions of the MP. However, the 
significance of the educational level of the actors, in determining their susceptibility to 
corruption, gets weaker when the level of education in the MP is compared with the level 
of education in the civil bureaucracy. In the end we have described how the institutional 
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culture of the MP differs from the culture prevalent in the rest of the public sector 
institutions of the country, and how this contributes in promoting a professional and non-
corrupt environment. 
Further, we have examined and explored the factors responsible for a non-corrupt and 
efficient institution, existing side by side with a bureaucracy that is generally perceived to 
be corrupt and inefficient. We have investigated the reasons for this remarkable 
phenomenon and have tried to empirically establish the earlier stated thesis that it is not 
the culture in general, but rather the culture of the institutions, which determines the level 
of corruption in any given state and society.  
In the conclusion of this work, we will summarise the whole debate about the causes and 
the control of corruption in transitional societies and developing states, along with a 
policy recommendation, based on the results of our research about a generally corrupt 
bureaucracy and an anomalous honest institution, in a developing country like Pakistan
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this research was to enhance the understanding of the enigma of less 
governance and more corruption in the transitional societies of the developing world; and 
to investigate the possibilities to seize the unabated upward surge of corruption and 
concomitant downward slide of governance, through institutional restructuring. Hoping, 
en route to the above stated destination, to unravel the riddle of the ‘cultural 
embeddedness of corruption’; which maintains that, corruption is ingrained and 
ensconced in the culture of transitional societies; so, little could be done, till the cultural 
transition, from traditional to modern, is not complete. This research has demonstrated, 
with a reasonable degree of certainty, that: first, institutional restructuring can be 
instrumental in quenching the wild blaze of corruption in transitional societies and 
developing states; and second, the institutional culture, rather than the culture of 
transitional societies, is responsible for the unbridled corruption and decaying governance 
in such states and societies. 
This research establishes that economic and administrative factors are primarily 
responsible for wide spread bureaucratic corruption and lack of governance in the 
developing states, not any of the so-called cultural determinants. This research points out 
that it will be idealistic to expect from an agent, whose life is rotating around the axis of 
‘physiological needs’, to exhibit character motivated by higher degrees of needs like 
‘self-esteem’ or ‘self actualisation’. A higher level of existence, motivated by an urge to 
enhance ones self-esteem or pursue activities leading to the exalted state of self 
actualisation or transcendence, is most probable only for the individuals or societies 
whose essential needs: physiological, safety and social, are duly taken care of. 
Furthermore, it asserts that given the right institutional culture, agents have a propensity 
to follow the rules, regardless of the socio-political milieu. The same agents or actors, 
indulging in all sorts of corruption and corrupt practices in un-structured institutional 
settings, can, on grounds which are psychologically explained, become extremely honest 
and efficient public servants, given the right institutional environment.  
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These conclusions are underpinned by references to both qualitative and quantitative 
findings, through an in-depth investigation of a transitional society and developing state, 
i.e., Pakistan. The case selection was motivated by multiple reasons. Pakistan, having a 
society dominated by profuse familial, clique, and clan associations, and a state marred 
with economic instability, political uncertainty, regional and ethnic divisions, and 
religious fundamentalism, makes a worst case example of transitional societies and the 
developing states. Furthermore, Pakistan’s state suffers from a deteriorated degree of 
governance and a staggering level of corruption. Considering the generalisability of the 
theory and the model of this research, Pakistan was therefore, tactically a very valuable 
choice. Bearing in mind the perilous socio-political milieu of the country, one can safely 
assume that any restructuring or reformation framework, sustainable in case of Pakistan, 
would be equally applicable in any developing state or transitional society.  
This neo institutional theory for controlling corruption can be generalised, in particular, 
for the rest of the public sector in Pakistan and the developing world, of which Pakistan is 
an ideal example, in general. If one institution of more than 5000 employs, endowed with 
the policing powers, can work for more than a decade as efficiently, professionally and 
honestly as any institution of the developed world, then why this cannot happen in other 
institutions of the state? Public sector in Pakistan and most of the developing states 
belonging to Asia, Africa or South America suffer from similar structural deficiencies 
like: lack of effective monitoring, economic constraints, ineffective leadership, and 
inadequate training. These factors, coupled with a general atmosphere of insecurity, 
depravity, and inequality, render the decision to go corrupt an optimised choice for the 
actors of developing world’s public sector. If the fault were with the actors of the 
developing world or with the cultures of transitional societies, it would have not been 
possible for the same agents, who had previously been exposed to all sorts of corrupt 
practices in the unstructured environment of general police, to reincarnate themselves 
into a highly efficient, honest and professional force within six months. This 
unprecedented accomplishment has not only been sustained for more than a decade, but 
has also been expanded to other institutions like Islamabad traffic police; indicating, 
contrary to common belief, a willingness on the part of public agents to adhere to the 
rules of the game, provided they are simultaneously inspired and deterred by the effective 
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institutional incentives and constraints respectively. This research has established that the 
difference between the so-called developed and developing world lies in the institutional 
cultures and structures. Institutional incentives and structures prevalent in developed 
world, if imported to the public sectors of the developing world, can bring the level of 
corruption down to an acceptable level, as is the case with the developed world or 
established societies of today, and vice versa.  
The theme of this research was chosen considering a general lack in the body of 
knowledge concerning country specific studies of governance, apropos corruption; and 
secondly, an extreme dearth of exhaustive exploration about ‘successful performers’ in 
the field of corruption. One such successful performer namely, National Highway & 
Motorway Police of Pakistan was identified, and the reasons for her success were 
thoroughly investigated, along with a simultaneous comprehensive analysis about the 
causes of widespread corruption in the bureaucratic institution of the country.   
This research repeated the question asked by Mitra (2006: 2) ‘why do people follow rules 
in some situations and not in others?’ Contrary to Mitra’s employment of murders and 
riots as an indicator of low governance, this research used the level of corruption, as an 
indicator of the degree of governance. However, despite being asked in a different 
environment and in a different context, the answer to the above-stated question is in 
congruence with the findings of Mitra. The question was analysed, in the context of civil 
bureaucracy of Pakistan, where agents tend to defy the rules with consummate impunity; 
and concurrently within the Motorway Police, where agents are collectively predisposed 
to abide by the rules. The results show that agent’s decision to follow the rules is 
determined by his or her perception of gains and losses, associated with the available 
alternative choices, and not in any way influenced by his culture or context.  
Primarily a theory driven case study, this research employed the rational choice neo-
institutional approach for developing an institutional model for controlling bureaucratic 
corruption. This model asserts that agents prefer to follow the rules, when placed in a 
structured institutional setting. The research used Weberian characteristics of bureaucracy 
as the standard, against which, the structured-ness of any institution could be measured. 
Employing those characteristics, this model maintains that: universal accountability as a 
corollary of the hierarchical makeup of bureaucracy, reasonable pecuniary compensation, 
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an institutional environment associating social esteem with the level of integrity and 
professionalism, and purposeful professional training are vital for any institution to be 
efficient and corruption free. Though not a primary concern of Weber, yet his 
characterisation of bureaucracy proved instrumental, in the process of developing this 
institutional model for controlling bureaucratic corruption. Honest and efficient 
leadership, though not included in the Weberian characterisation, was also incorporated 
as a significant feature of this model for controlling corruption.  
Building on the agency theory and rational choice approach, this research asserts that the 
principal and the agent are rational entities, whose behaviour is shaped by collective 
choices, determined by their perception of reward and punishment associated with each 
choice. The decision-making process of the agents is at the core of the institutional 
model, with a special focus on increasing the cost of corruption, as well as the gains of 
rejecting corruption. The underscored theme to make ‘no to corruption’ a rational and 
willingly opted choice for the agent, underpinned the significance of this model. 
Rationalising that, the revolutionary forced change is a transient phenomenon, while the 
evolutionary, willing and conscious modification in behaviours is an enduring feature.  
Considering the obvious problems, associated with authentic information gathering about 
corruption, perception of corruption is generally employed as a good proxy for the real 
level of corruption. Without exception, all the perception-based research regarding 
corruption draws on the perceptions of general public, businesspersons, country experts, 
or the views of international business conglomerations. Though, this research also 
employed perceptions of corruption, yet its unique feature is that it collected and used, for 
the first time, the perceptions of stakeholders, i.e., members of civil bureaucracy of 
Pakistan, regarding the prevalence, causes, consequences, and control of corruption in the 
country.  
The instruments of data collection consist of survey and interviews, which were 
conducted in 32 different ministries, divisions, departments, and organisations of federal 
bureaucracy of Pakistan. Besides, views of the members of national bureaucracy, 
working with various international organisations, were also included in the data. In total 
around 250 survey and interviews were done, out of which, 137 belonging to general 
bureaucracy and 100 belonging to the Motorway Police, were used for the purpose of 
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data analysis. Results derived from this research are based on the archival research, 
personal observations of the author and the perceptions of the public servants, gathered 
through analysis of the collected data. 
This dissertation is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the review of 
theoretical foundation and the existing body of knowledge; the second part extensively 
evaluates the concepts of corruption and governance, and its practical demonstration in 
the case of Pakistan; and the third section, corroborates the theoretical arguments with the 
empirical evidence collected from the bureaucracy of Pakistan. 
Chapter 1 builds the theoretical foundation of the research, while drawing on the rational 
choice neo-institutional approach of governance and the agency theory of corruption. 
Building on the already explained theory, we formulated an institutional model for 
controlling corruption, which depicts the dual way of decision-making process of an actor 
or agent, in two different institutional settings: structured and un-structured. 
The second chapter analysed the existing body of knowledge on the issue. It starts with 
evaluating the ‘diplomacy in research’ regarding the issue of corruption in developing 
countries and goes on to analyse the two fundamental schools of thought on corruption: 
functionalist and moralist. While the former school believes in the possible positives of 
corruption for the underdeveloped societies and states, the latter out rightly rejects the 
possibility of any such outcome. We argued that though functionalist’s ideology is 
inherently flawed and based on erroneous assumptions and at best, subjective evidence, 
yet an unqualified endorsement of moralists, who propagate zero tolerance for corruption, 
is also not much rewarding for the policymakers of the developing world.  
This chapter also assessed the myriad of empirical research, on the causes of corruption 
and analysed the multiple variables, which have been studied as a cause of corruption. 
These variables include: size and kinds of government, political systems, institutional 
quality, competition in the market, excessive regulations, recruitment and salaries, role of 
judiciary, and the cultural determinants like trust, reaction to authority and the role of 
religion. The chapter also underlined the absence of any mentionable scholarly work on 
the problems of low governance and high corruption in Pakistan.  
Chapter 3 dwelled on the concept and measurement of corruption. As effective 
measurement, whose results can be generalised, depends on consensus about what really 
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constitutes as corruption, we analysed the evolution and definitional debate of corruption 
and recorded the reasons for employing, ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’, as 
the definition of corruption. Apart from the definitional debate the chapter elaborated the 
basic characteristics, which render any transaction corrupt, and separates it from general 
criminal behaviour, subterfuge, maladministration, chicanery and ineptitude. Analysing 
the characteristic of corruption we asserted that contrary to common belief, corruption 
could even happen sans any involvement of a second party. While analysing four 
different modes of corruption, bribery, extortion, nepotism and kickbacks, we dilated 
upon the value of each, in different types of corruption, and further explained and 
differentiated between the three basic categories of corruption: political, bureaucratic, and 
judicial corruption. Various models of corruption like: agency model, resource allocation 
model, and demand-supply models, have also been critically evaluated, during the course 
of this chapter. In the end of the chapter we described and evaluated various techniques 
and tools employed for measuring corruption. 
In chapter 4, the evolutionary trajectory of corruption in the sub continent in general and 
Pakistan in particular were presented. We maintained that for understanding the reasons 
for wide spread corruption in the region it is imperative to locate the genesis of 
corruption, in the early history of the region. Building on history, we learnt that the 
Indian sub continent was as corrupt as any other region of the world under the colonial 
rule. Analysing the impact of colonialism on the future level of corruption in the region, 
we stated that the colonial era, though, comparatively cleaner than other contemporary 
colonial systems, turned exponentially corrupt towards the end, mainly due to the 
emergencies of the WWII, as expediency, instead of transparency, became the criterion 
of bureaucratic efficiency. 
This chapter further provided an evaluation of the post-independence patterns, of socio-
political development in the region, and investigated the reasons, for differing political 
development despite inheriting similar political, military, and bureaucratic institutions in 
the newly born states of India and Pakistan. We identified the weak political parties, 
leadership vacuum after Jinnah, inefficient and predatory political elite, professionally 
competent civil bureaucracy, and a general atmosphere of insecurity in Pakistan as the 
major reasons for this gradually different development in these neighbouring states. The 
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chapter further explored the role civil-military bureaucracy played in the subversion of 
elected institutions to the non-elected institutions of the state and how it contributed in 
the gradual spread of corruption in society. The 60 years history, of socio-political 
development of Pakistan under the categories of alternate decades of civilian and military 
rule in the country, has been recounted.  
We asserted that though corruption existed even at the time of independence, yet in the 
early stages of Pakistan’s history, its rate of incidence was sporadic, its extent was 
minimal and the social disapproval was at the maximum. However, this wave of 
corruption of the early decades, changed into a hurricane, with highly concentrated spiral 
clouds and a well defined centre of the storm, in the times of third military rule (1977-
1988), which was preoccupied with fighting the war of Soviet curtailment in Afghanistan. 
Subsequently, culmination was reached in the decade of civilian rule, which witnessed an 
unprecedented tornado of corruption, which engulfed the whole political and 
administrative set up, and destroyed the very moral ethos of society, aggravating 
economic disparity, social apathy, public inefficiency and extreme frustration in the 
masses. Apparently, inspired by these abysmal conditions, the ensuing fourth military 
rule tried to arrest the surge of corruption, but after initial success it sacrificed the 
initiative at the altar of political expediency. The quest for international legitimacy, once 
again – like the 1980s – forced the regime to concentrate on the ‘war on terrorism’, at the 
expense of grim domestic socio-political situation, which resulted in even further 
deterioration of these conditions, in terms of spread of the war into the North western 
region of the country. 
 
Hypotheses Revisited 
In the last two chapters of this dissertation, we presented the empirical validation of the 
theory build in the earlier sections. These chapters, with the help of perceptions of the 
agent and the structural features of the Motorway Police, empirically validate the earlier 
made hypotheses. In Chapter 5 the empirical data based on the perceptions of the civil 
bureaucracy were analysed with a focus on prevalence and causes of bureaucratic 
corruption, according to the perceptions of real stakeholders in the quagmire of 
corruption. Though, the chapter established the veracity of perception, as a valid proxy of 
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the real level of corruption, yet it maintained that the question of validity or invalidity 
does not effect the scientific worth of this research, because the primary concern of this 
research is to investigate the causes and the control of corruption in the developing states, 
and not to ascertain the level or extent of corruption in any state.  
The study showed that agents have a reasonably objective opinion, about the prevalence 
of corruption in bureaucracy and the country. Agents were asked to rate Pakistan as a 
whole and bureaucracy as an institution, in terms of level of prevalent corruption, on a 
scale of 1 – 10, where 1 refers to completely corruption free and 10 signifies extremely 
corrupt. On this scale agents rated the level of corruption in the civil bureaucracy at 6 and 
in Pakistan as a whole at 6.9. This perceived level of corruption is almost the same as 
indicated by the well-known Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. 
Thus validating the hypothesis 1, which maintains that if asked, Agents are willing to give 
their objective perception regarding the prevalence of corruption. We affirmed that 
agents belonging to well-structured institutions more strongly believe in the assertion, 
that corruption is more of an institutional than the cultural problem. The analysis 
surprisingly indicated that variables like: age, gender, marital status, number of 
dependents, or the geographical origin do not influence the agent’s perception regarding 
prevalence of corruption in the country; however the experience of the respondent or 
length of his service has a negative effect on his perception of corruption. This proves the 
hypothesis 2, stating that length of experience of the public servants has a negative 
correlation to their perception of corruption in the state and bureaucracy. In terms of 
most and least corrupt institutions the perceptions of the agents showed a categorical 
impression of the general police being the most, and the Motorway Police being the least 
corrupt institution.  
Along with evaluating the causes of corruption, the perceptions of the agents, according 
to five basic categories of causes were analysed: primary, institutional, economic, 
developmental, and social causes. Data analysis revealed that in agents’ view, insufficient 
financial remunerations, lack of accountability, discretionary powers, and weaker moral 
values of the agents, are the major causes of rampant bureaucratic corruption. Agents 
consistently quote economic, as the major cause of corruption; 65 per cent of the 
respondents think that 40 to 100 per cent of public agent’s, with insufficient financial 
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means will indulge in corruption, partially proving the hypothesis 4, asserting that if 
provided with reasonable financial remuneration, agents will prefer to avoid corrupt 
dealings. This hypothesis was further substantiated, when respondents belonging to MP 
quoted, sufficient financial remunerations and effective monitoring, as the most 
significant reason for lack of corruption in MP. In the category of social causes, the study 
forwarded various interesting trends among public servants: firstly, agents tend to shift 
the blame to immoral public; secondly, lack of transparency and accountability in the 
bureaucracy motivates many people to join the institution; and thirdly, almost 45 per cent 
of the agents consider overwhelmingly corrupt surroundings to be a justification, for the 
remaining minority to be corrupt as well. 
The last chapter forwarded empirical validation of the institutional approach for 
controlling corruption, through exhaustive qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
only non-corrupt institute of the country, i.e., Motorway Police. We discussed the origin, 
evolution, administrative structure, institutional features, performance and social image 
of the Motorway Police, and the role all these factors play in the transparency of the 
institution. The chapter further evaluated the reasons of, why generally corrupt and 
inefficient agents have been converted into highly efficient and honest public force after 
joining the MP. Institutional culture built on the right ethos, work ethic, and social 
pressure for being honest emerged as the major reasons for that; validating the claim 
made in hypothesis 3 suggesting that, if given the right institutional incentive, probability 
of reducing corruption is very high. 
The analysis indicated that the Weberian characteristics of a well structured institution, 
i.e., hierarchy, accountability, sufficient pecuniary compensation, social esteem attached 
with integrity and efficiency, effective training and honest leadership, all are present in 
the Motorway Police. This renders the MP as a perfectly structured institutional setting, 
which significantly contributes to the efficiency and transparency of the institution.  
The analysis showed that according to the agents’ perception, leadership, accountability, 
and checks & balances are the three most vital factors in determining the level of 
corruption in any institution. While analysing indigenous and exogenous tools for 
fighting corruption, we maintained that strict accountability and reward for honesty 
belong to the former, and social disapproval and institutional restructuring relate with the 
 272
 
latter classifications of such tools. According to the MP’s agents, level of accountability 
is very high in the MP, which contributes significantly to the honest and professional 
discharge of duties by the actors; proving the hypothesis 5, which states that if faced with 
credible threats of dire repercussions, agents will not indulge in corrupt practices. 
Apart from that, according to the views of the respondents belonging to the MP, peer 
pressure also contributes significantly in the honest conduct of the force members, 
substantiating the assertion made by hypothesis 6, that if peer pressure is high, it will 
induce self-policing and self-censorship among the agents leading to low incidence of 
corruption. Analysing the structural differences of institutional design this chapter 
forwards better salaries, better level of education, stronger moral values, and institutional 
culture, as the unique distinctions of MP’s institutional structure. The chapter also 
showed that the level of corruption within the MP, according to its members, is almost 
non-existent and secondly, the members of the force have an overwhelmingly higher 
level of satisfaction with their work and the institution they are working for. Hence 
validating the hypothesis 7 maintaining that, if any organisation has a positive general 
image and if corporate identity is higher within that institution, likelihood of corruption 
would be low in that institution. 
 
Contribution of the Study  
This research contributes something new to all the three vital aspects of social science 
research: theoretical, empirical and methodological. This study proposes a neo 
institutional theory for controlling corruption and enhancing governance in the 
transitional societies and the developing states. It stipulates the vital factors responsible 
for making any institution structured and un-structured. Our theory claims that by 
adopting the features of structured institutions, developing states can control the 
whirlwind of bureaucratic corruption and can introduce, honest, impersonal, and efficient 
public service ethos, resulting in enhanced level of governance in society. Above claims 
have been substantiated with the help of empirical evidence collected from a structured 
institution in the bureaucratic set up of Pakistan.  
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This research furthers the claims, forwarded by rational choice neo-institutional approach 
of governance, proposed by Mitra (2006), and corroborates his core postulation that, 
actor’s perceptions of allied risks and rewards instead of his culture or context are 
responsible for the choices he makes. Hence, this research espouses the assertions of 
Mitra, while employing a fundamentally different environment, i.e., the bureaucratic 
setup of Pakistan, instead of political environment of various Indian states, and a different 
aspect of governance, i.e., corruption instead of maintenance of law and order.  
Another theoretical contribution of this research is its challenge to an a priori judgment, 
regarding, the prevalence of corruption in transitional societies of the developing world, 
which asserts the ‘cultural embeddedness of corruption’. This research forwards a 
posterior argument, with the help of examples from the field: maintaining that the level of 
corruption is not determined by the culture of society per se; it is rather influenced by the 
culture of the institutions. The conducted research shows that actors belonging to the 
same socio-political milieu behave very differently in various institutional settings. The 
rational actors under the influence of a well-organised institutional milieu, very swiftly 
abandon their old habits and traditions of corruption acquired in a lax administrative 
setup, and acquire the new/stricter norms of the institutions, provided, they perceive these 
norms to be favourable for themselves. This research maintains and proves that to argue 
that traditional cultures of transitional societies are inherently corrupt is a misleading or 
bias representation of the reality. 
Besides the theoretical contribution, this research forwards valuable empirical findings, 
which question some of the basic assumptions in the field of corruption research. The 
first of such assumptions is based on the well-known agency theory of Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) and Klitgaard (1988), claiming that in a Principal-Agent-Client framework, 
principal’s failure in effective monitoring of agent’s activities is a major reason of 
corruption. This inability according to agency theory stems from the expensive nature of 
the supervision and monitoring; the principal cannot and do not effectively monitor the 
agent as it is not cost effective (1988:72). This research proves, with empirical evidence, 
that effective monitoring of the agent by the principal is neither very difficult nor very 
expensive; moreover, such monitoring is very well rewarding in terms of controlling 
corruption. 
 274
 
Another example substantiating the above assertion regarding effective and least 
expensive monitoring of the agents by the principal recently came from Pakistani public 
sector. According to widely reported national media news, an honest and dedicated 
District Controlling Officer (DCO), Zubair Bhatti, in the central Punjab district of Jhang, 
brought the level of corruption surprisingly down in the district just by ordering all the 
public servants in the district to submit him a daily report containing the names, 
addresses and cell phone numbers of the clients, they have dealt in the day. The DCO 
used to call those numbers at random and asked the persons about the quality of service 
they received from the public servants and whether they were asked to pay any extra 
money beyond government fees, taxes or duties. Only this small act proved sufficient 
deterrent for the public officials in the district. A widely published newspaper quoted this 
story as following: 
This mid-career bureaucrat has done wonders in a Punjab district by remarkably 
reducing corruption in the otherwise most corrupt revenue department’s registry 
offices, amongst the Patwaris (land revenue official dealing with the record of 
ownership, sale and transfer of land)128, in the government hospitals etc., by simply 
asking the concerned officials to submit daily the list of all property transactions 
registered with mobile numbers of both sellers and buyers, the total amount of 
taxes due and other basic details of transactions. 
Similar orders were given to Patwaris in cases where fard (document establishing 
the ownership of land)129 were given. The clerks of the revenue department were 
told that the officer would personally call all these citizens on their mobile phone to 
find out if they were asked to pay any bribe or commission above and beyond the 
taxes due, if any. He did the same and within a few weeks’ time, things changed 
miraculously as far as getting of a fard or intiqal (transfer of land)130 done and the 
registration of property was concerned. Bhatti talks to different buyers of the 
property or those getting fard or intiqal in the district or those treated/ operated in 
the government hospital or those getting domicile/ birth/death certificates etc. on 
                                                 
128 Description added by the author. It is pertinent to mention here that Patwaris are generally believed to be 
the most corrupt officials of the land revenue department in Pakistan.  
129 Description added by the author. 
130 Description added by the author. 
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their mobile numbers to know if they had paid only the taxes due or were also 
forced to grease the right palms. The threat of personal and intimate feedback 
communicated directly to the DCO and the possibility of anti-corruption action had 
a massively deterrent effect, the DCO said, adding that when he made calls and 
asked about the quality of service, he generally found out that petty hassles had 
mostly been eliminated. 
(Abbasi: 2008) 
This example further substantiates the assertions of this study that if there is political will, 
it is neither very difficult nor very expensive for the principal to effectively monitor the 
agents. Principal’s inability in effectively monitoring the agent is more indicative of his 
incompetence, lack of will, or corruption than costliness of this activity. In developed 
societies there is neither dearth of political will nor resources, therefore, monitoring 
mechanisms are so effective that it becomes almost irrational to defy them under normal 
circumstances. These mechanisms are established and working so smoothly that they are 
hardly visible. While in the developing world, though in place, lack of will coupled with 
insufficient remunerations and resources have rendered these mechanisms the status of 
vestigial organs.    
The second theory, which is questioned by this research, is the theory of corruption 
forwarded by Tirole (1996), stating that ‘collective bad reputation’ of the individuals and 
the institutions proves instrumental in the persistence of corruption in those institutions. It 
further elaborates that ‘collective bad reputations’ are very hard to get rid of, resultantly, 
reducing the incentives for the agents to leave corruption even if they are willing to do so. 
This research unequivocally demonstrates that it is not the case. Agents known for 
corruption and inefficiency, when placed in a structured environment, forgot about their 
‘collective bad reputation’ and turned into highly professional and honest public servants 
within a span of six months.  
This research also challenges the result of the theory of Van Rijckeghem and B. Weder. 
(2001), which claims that a hundred per cent increase in the pay of public servants will 
improve their corruption index position by only 0.5 point. However, we have seen, during 
the study of Motorway Police that less than 100 per cent increase in the salary of agents, 
results in an enormous leap in the level of transparency in the institution. It is important 
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to reiterate here that the financial remuneration of the Motorway Police is around 75 per 
cent higher than that of the normal civil bureaucracy. This research empirically proves 
that given the right institutional setting, even less than 100 per cent increase could 
establish a previously non existent transparency, which is up to the level of a developed 
nation’s standards.  
On the methodological front, this research can boast to be seminal in the usage of 
perceptions of the real stakeholders in the field of corruption research. Prior to this, all 
the perception-based research about corruption is based on the perceptions of clients, i.e., 
general public, businessmen, area experts, or international business organisations. For the 
first time the perceptions of serving civil servants regarding the prevalence, causes, and 
control of corruption, have been collected. This underscores the vitality of understanding, 
the real reasons of corruption and the methodology to control it, according to the 
perpetrators or the stakeholders. This opens up a new methodological route in the field of 
empirical research on corruption and governance.  
 
Policy Recommendations  
We have seen that the bulk of research on corruption is related to the question, whether 
corruption is harmful for the socio-political as well as economic development of the state 
or not. Of late a significant amount of research has been conducted on the causes and the 
consequences of corruption. The most neglected field of research is: how to control 
corruption? This research provides the following answer to this question: by employing a 
two pronged strategy, i.e., investigating the causes of corruption, and then finding the 
ways to remove those. We analysed the general causes of corruption and then moved to 
the specifics, by studying an institution, where corruption is under control. Our archival 
research, data from the field, personal observation, and experience suggests following 
recommendations; policymakers should keep them in mind while devising any 
governance strategy or anti-corruption campaign. 
The idea of inculcating social responsibility in society, which is at the core of any long 
term meaningful drive for eradication of corruption is hard to materialise, until the state 
takes the first step in that direction. Considering human nature, it is unlikely for any actor 
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to feel responsible towards the state or society at large until the actor feels that the 
institution or society has done or is doing something for him, for which he owes 
something back to them. The distinction between state and society is very blurred in the 
eyes of common man, and he holds the state responsible for the plight he is in. Therefore, 
it is difficult for him to realise that his actions or non-actions will undermine the society, 
of which he is also a part, as a whole rather than the state. The common man feels being 
left alone by the state, which was created to take care of his interests; resultantly, he has a 
conscious or sub conscious feeling of resentment towards the state and will try to 
undermine the state whenever and where ever he gets an opportunity, not realising that 
what he is avenging against is society and not the state. In most of under developed or 
developing world, individuals or the actors fail to realise any such thing as social 
responsibility, because the feeling of not being taken care of is very strong. Their stream 
of thought will proceed rationalisation of this kind: why should I feel any responsibility 
towards state or society, as they have done nothing for me except making my life more 
miserable by each passing day? 
If the idea of social responsibility is strong among the societies of the first or developed 
world, its origin can be traced back to the fact that individuals or actors feel that the state 
is making efforts and expenses to render their lives comfortable. They know that they are 
receiving numerous benefits from the state so it is logical to feel responsible for their 
actions as a social being. Secondly, they have a confidence, owing to their past 
experience, that their pecuniary contribution as a social actor will be utilised for the well-
being of society as a whole and not for the adornment of a small section of society alone. 
This confidence is dearly missing from the societies of less developed or developing 
countries, and rightly so, because of their past experiences. So, if this idea of social 
responsibility has to be ingrained in the mindsets of such societies, the state must take the 
first step of reassuring the individuals this institution is responsible for their well-being, 
and fulfilment of their wants is among the top priorities of the state. Such reassurance 
would have to be followed by the actions, at least some action, in the promised direction 
otherwise it will only enhance the antipathy and passive aggression of the social actors 
towards the state and society. 
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Furthermore, Policymakers should avoid moralising about the issue of corruption or 
honesty, as moralisation demands universal eradication of corruption, which is neither 
possible nor desirable (considering the cost involved). Corruption is an economic and 
social problem and should not be made a moral one. Attention should be paid to bring the 
level of corruption down to an optimal level, and as Klitgaard (1988) has pointed out that 
the ‘optimal level of corruption is not zero’ (1988: 24). 
Most anti corruption policies emphasise on catching the big fish and controlling mega 
corruption cases, probably due to political considerations, media coverage, for the sake of 
sending a message to the corrupt quarters in a state. However, petty and routine 
corruption, being lower in value and weaker in getting media attention, is neglected; 
which proves fatal for the whole campaign, in particular and for society in general. Since 
the normal citizen of a state comes across petty corruption at each and every corner, 
according to his perception corruption is rampant and nothing could be achieved, without 
greasing the palms of public officials. This perception of corruption is equally dangerous 
like the real level of corruption, because it prohibits the development of a right ethos of 
efficiency and hard work in the entire society.  
Policymakers should ensure not to neglect petty corruption for fighting mega corruption, 
because in the long-term, the cumulative negative impact of the former could be much 
greater than the latter.  
Moreover, maximum efforts should be made to improve the perception of society, 
regarding prevalence of corruption. Instances of public servants, punished for corruption 
and rewarded for rejecting corruption, should be highlighted in the print and electronic 
media and the simple incidence of corruption should not be given more than necessary 
coverage, lest it might infuse an exaggerated perception of corruption in the masses. If 
agent’s behaviour is described in length, this can give the impression that without 
corruption nothing can be achieved in the state. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to 
report the cases of corruption with care and caution; emphasis of the media should be on 
the punishment meted out to the perpetrators and not on their modus operandi or the 
prevalence of such activities.  
Different forms of corruption have different effects, for example corruption in levying 
import duty on the import of a dozen 500 SEL Mercedes Benz from Germany to 
 279
 
Pakistan, would have a different impact than corruption in the award of a contract for 
building a primary school in a village, or corruption in finalisation of exams results or 
admission to a school/college, or corruption in admitting a poor man’s mother to a 
hospital. In the first example the economic cost of corruption to the state might be 
relatively high, but the social cost of such corruption would be low; while in rest of the 
examples, economic costs might not be very high but the social cost will be enormous.  
Scenario two, will result in depriving the village children of education; scenario three, 
will inculcate a wrong moral ethos in the youth making them believe that right 
connections and money pays better than hard work; and scenario four will result in anger, 
hatred, frustration, and repressed hostility in the poor sections of society. 
Policymakers must keep these considerations in mind, while developing governmental 
policies and should prioritise their allocation of energy and resources according to the 
deleterious impact of different kinds of corruption. They should develop a social 
detriment index (based on the social cost in terms of instilling wrong ethos, frustration, 
apathy and hostility, which could disturb the very fabric of society) and every case of 
corruption, should be weighed accordingly. Maximum resources should be allocated for 
curbing the kind of corruption, which scores high on the social detriment index. 
Apart from prioritisation among the kinds of corruption, policymakers should also 
prioritise the organisations or departments in the fight against corruption. An across the 
board anti-corruption drive is hard to yield any noticeable dividends, as was the case with 
NAB of Pakistan. Priority should be given to the departments which: could have bigger 
potential cost for the state and nation, are more directly linked with provision of public 
services, come more frequently in direct contact with public like police, health and 
education. 
The state should maximise the utilisation of efficient human resource. Efficient human 
capital, like economic capital, is also a scarce commodity in developing states, and 
should be employed with great care. Our study of the case of the Motorway Police has 
proved that even a team of four efficient, intelligent, honest and hard working public 
servants could envisage, recruit, train, and build the most efficient and honest work force 
of around 5000 personnel. Considering this, public servants known for their integrity and 
efficiency should be appointed and trained for the most sensitive posts, where their 
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capabilities and potential should be put to maximum use. Best utilisation of limited 
human resources, will not only enhance the resource generating capacity of the state, but 
also ameliorate the image of state and government in the eyes of the general public. 
Policymakers should emphasise on neutral and objective merit based selection 
recruitment, rotation and promotion criterion for public servants. Nothing harms the 
professionalism of the service and the moral of the hardworking youth more than the fact 
that recruitment and selection for jobs are not strictly merit based. Furthermore, mere 
induction should not guarantee a life long tenure in public service; rather length of tenure 
and promotion in the service should be strictly performance based. Performance criterion 
should give equal importance to the ability, efficiency and integrity of the public 
servants. 
Carrot and stick policy should be employed to its maximum for ensuring low corruption 
and high performance among public servants. Like in the Motorway Police, public 
service positions should be made attractive for their holders. Adequate financial 
remuneration coupled with sufficiently equipped office conditions, practical working 
hours and good institutional environment should be ensured in each institution. The 
above factors along with the knowledge that in case of inefficiency and corruption all 
could be taken away will make the job dearer to public servants and will ensure a 
maximum effort to maintain their positions. Accountability should be visible, strict, 
transparent, and objective. Agents should be all the time cognizant of the fact that they 
are being monitored and should have no doubt in their mind that any lapse in efficiency 
and integrity can result in loss of their position. 
Accountability without reward serves only half the purpose; it forces the agents to abide 
by the rules, but any change brought about by sheer force is deemed to fail. However, 
accountability accompanied with reward for honest and efficient discharge of duty can 
make the decision much easier for the agent. Social recognition and pecuniary reward 
will make the proposition of being honest and efficient much more worthwhile for the 
agent and he will willingly opt for that choice, as is the case in Motorway Police. 
According to the recommendations of the agents, collected through open-ended questions 
during the course of field research, an independent and honest judicial system is the 
primary most prerequisite for establishing transparency and rule of law among the public 
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institutions and public servants. The second most frequent recommendation for 
combating corruption is an effective media and public awareness campaign, while 
incorporation of religious teaching, merit based recruitment and promotion and ensuring 
qualitative education are the other more frequently quoted recommendations. 
Policymakers should also be careful about the appointment of leaders to the institutions 
under restoration, since honest and efficient agents under a dishonest and inefficient 
principal are hard to find. Mainly because leaders with questionable integrity, will neither 
monitor the activities of their agents nor can they question objectionable actions of the 
agents. 
Introducing a culture of positive competition, between the different departments and 
institutions of the state, can have the same effect on the level of corruption, as the 
competition between the different suppliers has on the price of a commodity. States could 
introduce such positive competition, by means of a national corruption index, like the one 
we presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Public perceptions, regarding the 
performance of different institutions should be collected, and an annual index of all the 
important institutions/departments should be developed, on the lines of CPI of 
Transparency International; indicating the level of corruption in various institutions. This 
index should be announced each year in a well-publicised high-level ceremony, inviting 
all the heads of departments included in the index. Good performers should be given 
generous accolades, while there should be a severe reprimand of poor performers, which 
may even include dismissal from service, in case of consistently poor leadership. This 
will not only produce a fear of public disgrace and embarrassment among the leaders, but 
would also produce a positive sense of competition among different institutions for doing 
well.  
Above all, this research proves that the tempest of bureaucratic corruption in developing 
states or traditional societies, can be brought under control, provided, the principal is 
willing to act with objectivity, sincerity, and purposively. Agents are rational actors and 
they make rational choices, it is up to the principals to make ‘No to Corruption’, a 
rational choice for the agents. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1   
Sample Filled Questionnaire 
 
 
P code P 
                                            A 
 
Problems of Governance in Pakistan 
 
Introduction: 
 
My name is Muhammad Tahir Noor. I am currently pursuing my PhD research at the 
University Of Heidelberg, Germany. I am focusing on the problems faced by our 
country, the most crucial being the problem of corruption. I would like to ask you 
certain questions for the same. Your answers will help me ascertain the validity of 
my arguments. The interview will last approximately 15 minutes. The information 
extracted from this interview will remain strictly confidential and will under no 
circumstances be attributed to your name. I would like to take the opportunity of 
thanking you in advance for your time and cooperation. 
Section A 
Please provide some general information 
Age 31 Marital status Married 
Education MS Current department PAEC 
Length of service 6 years BPS 18 
Total dependants 3 Domicile Punjab 
 
Education: BA=1, MA =2, PHD=3, others =9 
Domicile: Punjab =1, NWFP =2, Sindh =3, Baluchistan = 4, FATA/NA/Kashmir =5 
Marital status: Married =1, Unmarried =2, Divorced/widowed =3 
Section B 
Q.1  
     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|    
Least                                                              Most 
On a scale of 1-10 how would you rank Pakistan amongst the countries 
of the world in terms of corruption (1 being the least and 10 being the 
most corrupt) 
8 
Q.2 
On a scale of 1-10 how would you rank Pakistan’s bureaucracy 
according to normal standards of conduct (1 being the least and 10 
being the most corrupt) 
9 
Please rank the following statements from 1 to 10 according to your perceptions 
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     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|    
Fully agree                                                  Fully disagree 
Statement Perception 
Q.3    Corruption in Pakistan is a cultural problem. 10 
Q.4    Corruption in Pakistan is an institutional problem. 1 
Q.5    Known corrupt individuals receive just as normal treatment in the 
society. 
10 
Q.6    Society fully accepts and condones the corruption. 5 
Section C 
Q.7  
Which of the following you think are the three most corrupt institutions in Pakistan 
(please number them from A to C) 
A     3 B     9 C   4 
 
Income tax =1, customs =2, police =3, land revenue and administration=4, WAPDA =5, 
health =6, education =7, motorway police =8, Defence =9, judiciary =10,NAB=11 
Q.8 
 In your opinion what are the three top most reasons for rampant corruption in above 
mentioned institutions (selected by you) 
A   1 B    3 C    5 
 
Greater opportunities for corruption=1, greater interaction with corrupt public=2, corrupt 
leadership within the department=3, weak checks and balances=4, lack of 
accountability=5, anticipation of public=6, excessive rules and regulations=7, lack of 
mechanised procedures=8, discretionary powers incompatible with financial 
remunerations=9, others =10 
Q.9 
Which of the following you think are the three least corrupt institutions in Pakistan 
(please number them from A to C) 
A    8 B     7 C    10 
 
Income tax =1, customs =2, police =3, land revenue and administration =4, WAPDA =5, 
health =6, education =7, motorway police =8, Defence =9, judiciary =10,NAB=11 
Q.10 
 In your opinion what are the three top most reasons for less or no corruption in above 
mentioned institutions (selected by you) 
A   1 B    3 C     1 
 
Lesser opportunities for corruption=1, lesser interaction with corrupt public=2, honest 
leadership within the department=3, strong checks and balances=4, strict 
accountability=5, anticipation of public=6, efficient rules and regulations=7, mechanised 
procedures=8,discretionary powers compatible with financial remunerations=9,others=10 
Q.11 
What in your opinion are three main causes of bureaucratic corruption in Pakistan?  
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Please rank them in your priority order. 
A    5 B      7 C       2 
 
Weak judiciary=1, insufficient pay=2, excessive regulations =3, discretionary powers of 
public officers =4, lack of accountability =5, lack of education =6, institutional structures 
=7, cultural influences =8, peer pressure=9, weak moral values = 10 
Q.12 
What percentage of individuals do you think will indulge into corruption 
and corrupt practices despite having sufficient financial means? 
4 
 
0-20% =1, 20-40%=2, 40-60%=3, 60-80%=4, 80-100%=5 
Q.13 
What percentage of individuals with poor economic background, do you 
think will indulge into corruption and corrupt practices? 
3 
 
0-20% =1, 20-40%=2, 40-60%=3, 60-80%=4, 80-100%=5 
Q.14 
In your opinion how life would be for an individual, who is part of this 
system and does not want to be corrupt? 
2 
 
Impossible =1, very difficult =2, difficult =3, slightly easy =4, very easy =5 
Please rank the following statements from 1 to 10 according to your perceptions 
 
     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|   
Fully agree                                              Fully disagree 
Statement Perception 
Q.15    Lack of accountability plays a major role in the spread of 
corruption. 
1 
Q.16    General public forces the officials to be corrupt by offering 
them bribes for shady deals. 
5 
Q.17    Lack of accountability and transparency within bureaucracy 
induces people to join bureaucracy. 
7 
Q.18    99% corrupt individuals in an institution is a justification for the 
remaining 1% to be corrupt as well? 
10 
Section D 
Q.19  
Do you agree that rate of development in Pakistan is slower than what it should have 
been? 
                                                                                                                                        -----
1-- (Yes=1, No=0) 
Q.20  
Do you think that Pakistan still can be a developed country despite being perceived as 
very corrupt? 
                                                                                                                                        ---0-
--- (Yes=1, No=0)  
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Q.21  
What in your opinion is the relationship between corruption and 
development? 
1 
 
Corruption is the cause of slow development=1, lack of development is the cause of 
corruption=2, both cause each other=3, there is no relationship between the two=4 
Please rank the following statement from 1 to 10 according to your perceptions 
     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|   
Fully agree                                              Fully disagree 
Statement Perception 
Q.22    Corruption is one of the major hindrances in the development of 
the country. 
3 
Q.23    Widespread corruption causes unequal distribution of wealth in 
the society. 
1 
Q.24    Corrupt people tend to destroy the value system in the society to 
legitimise themselves. 
1 
Section E 
Q.25 
Please rate three most effective institutions, which in your opinion could be useful in 
combating corruption? (Number them from A to C) 
A)    3 B)    7 C)     2 
 
Religious institutions=1, mass media=2, civil society=3, academic institutions=4, anti-
corruption agencies=5, police=6, judiciary=7, parliament= 8, Army=9 
Q.26 
What is your opinion about strict accountability as an effective tool 
against corruption? 
2 
 
Most vital=1, partially effective =2, little effective =3, plays no role =4 
Q.27 
How much do you think increased social disapproval of corrupt 
behaviour could be effective against corruption? 
1 
 
Very effective=1, effective=2, little effective =3, not effective at all=4 
Q.28 
In your opinion how much institutional restructuring on the lines of 
Motorway Police could be effective in other institutions for combating 
corruption? 
2 
 
Very effective=1, effective=2, little effective =3, not effective at all=4, not possible =5 
Please rank the following statements from 1 to 10 according to your perceptions 
     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|    
Fully agree                                                 Fully disagree 
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Statement Perception 
Q.29    If salaries of public officials are sufficient to meet their basic 
needs they would not indulge in corrupt practices. 
6 
Q.30    Honest leadership within an institution can reduce corruption in 
that institution. 
2 
Q.31    Increased mechanisation (computerisation) in an institution can 
reduce chances of corruption. 
6 
Q.32    If honest behaviour and practices are well rewarded and 
acknowledged, it would help in reducing corruption. 
3 
Q.33 
     1       2      3     4      5     6     7      8     9     10 
     |------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|    
Least                                                              Most 
If all the steps mentioned in questions 26-32 are taken, how would you 
perceive the standing of Pakistan amongst the countries of the world in 
terms of corruption on a scale of 1-10 (1 being the least and 10 being the 
most corrupt) 
2 
 
Q.34   Can you please narrate any incident involving corruption, which has been brought 
to your notice? 
The recent incident of corruption took place with me when I had to get a police 
verification certificate from SP office in Attock for my visa application to Austria. They 
made a very simple thing so complicated so that one has to pay bribes to get rid of all 
troubles and get the certificate in one day, otherwise one has to go personally with 
application in union council then local police station then DSP then security officer 
finally SP to get their signs and every time the big SAAB would be busy in meeting or on 
round etc. which took at least 2 weeks. Give them 200 Rs. under the table no need for any 
thing, just collect your certificate in afternoon. 
 
Q.35   What steps were taken to address the issue? 
Police department is for serving the people; they should take some practical steps to ease 
the people. First they should have full access to database (like NADRA database) of a 
persona through computer; so that they can check information about a person 
immediately, secondly they should computerize crime record, and thirdly the immediate 
officer seated there should have issuing authority. Less people involved in process less 
chances of corruption. 
 
Q.36    Can you please enlist your general recommendations for eradicating corruption 
from Pakistan? 
• Strict and fair accountability inside the institutions and also form concerned 
accountability departments. 
• Strengthened the institutions not persons.  
• Automated, computerized the whole processes so that people have less and less 
interaction with persons. 
• Free and fair judiciary. 
• Increase the govt. employee’s pays. 
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Appendix – 2 
 
Additional Section for the Motorway Police’s Questionnaire  
 
Questions Perception 
Q.34  How would you rate motorway police in terms of corruption? (1 being the least 
and 10 being the most corrupt) 
 
Q.35  How would you rate motorway police as an institution serving public interest 
efficiently? (1 being the most and 10 being the least efficient) 
 
Q.36  What is your level of satisfaction being part of motorway police? (1 being the 
most and 10 being the least satisfied) 
 
Q.37  How much public expectation from motorway police determines your conduct? 
(1 being very much and 10 being very little) 
 
Q.38  How strong are accountability mechanisms in motorway police? (1 being very 
strong and 10 being very weak) 
 
Q.39  What is the role of accountability in determining behaviour of motorway police 
officials? (1 being very much and 10 being very little) 
 
Q.40  How often you come across public that wants to bribe you? (1 being very often 
and 10 being very rare) 
 
Q.41  How much your conduct is determined by the expectations of your colleagues 
and bosses? (1 being very much and 10 being very little) 
 
Q.42  How often you are consulted in matters of organisational changes like improving 
efficiency of the department? (1 being very often and 10 being very rare) 
 
Q.43 
What are top three structural differences in motorway police in terms of other government departments? 
A B C 
 
Strong accountability=1, Better training=2, Better salaries=3, Strong leadership=4, Better level of 
education=5, Culture of the institution=6, Strong moral values=7, Professional cooperativeness=8, 
Conducive work environment=9, Others= 10 
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Appendix-3 
 
List of Departments Surveyed 
 
• Ministry of Defence 
• Ministry of Defence Production 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Commerce 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Military Finance 
• Planning and Development Division 
• Central Board of Revenue 
• National Accountability Bureau 
• Economic Affairs Division 
• Ministry of Housing & Works 
• Ministry of Petroleum 
• Federal Investigation Agency 
• Earthquake Rehabilitation Authority 
• Accountant General of Pakistan 
• National Reconstruction Bureau 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Health  
• Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
• Establishment Division 
• Agricultural Development Bank 
• United Nations Development Program 
• Ministry of Women Affairs 
• Ministry of Law 
• Ministry of Education 
• Income tax Bureau 
• Department of Customs 
• Ministry of Culture & Sports 
• Ministry of Communication 
• Ministry of Agriculture 
• Ministry of Water and Power 
• National Highway & Motorway Police 
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Appendix – 4 
 
Correlations: Age, Length of Services and Perception of 
Corruption  
 
  
Age in 
years 
Length 
of 
service 
in years 
Perception 
of 
Corruption 
in Pakistan 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .929(**) -.188(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .031 
Age in years 
N 133 131 132 
Pearson 
Correlation .929(**) 1 -.211(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .014 
Length of service in 
years 
N 131 135 134 
Pearson 
Correlation -.188(*) -.211(*) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .031 .014   
Perception of 
Corruption in Pakistan 
N 132 134 136 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix - 5 
 
Correlations: Social Causes of Corruption  
 
  
Public 
induces 
corruption 
by 
offering 
bribes 
Lack of 
transparency 
induces 
people to 
join 
Bureaucracy 
 99 per cent 
corrupt 
individuals 
are a 
justification 
for 
remaining 1 
per cent 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .222(**) .153
Sig. (2-tailed)  .009 .076
Public induces 
corruption by offering 
bribes 
N 137 136 136
Pearson 
Correlation .222(**) 1 .284(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .009   .001
Lack of transparency 
induces people to join 
Bureaucracy 
N 136 136 135
Pearson 
Correlation .153 .284(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .076 .001  
 99 per cent corrupt 
individuals are a 
justification for 
remaining 1 per cent N 
136 135 136
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 6 
 
Salient Features of Motorway Police 
• Manageable span of control - SP manages 250 officers and an ASP/DSP (Chief 
Patrol Officer) about 60 officers. 
• For optimum efficiency, force functions in three shifts. 
• Force comprises of Educated Officers. 
• Emphasis is given on smart turnout and professionalism. 
• Effective accountability and senior command accountable for misdeeds of 
subordinates. 
• No documents seized during any violation of traffic rules by the commuters. 
• No interference from any quarter. 
• Complete delegation of authority and responsibility. 
• Only moving violations checked. Force responsible for traffic discipline, safety of 
commuters and initial action in crimes. 
• Better pay, conducive working conditions, dependable mobility, intensive 
professional training and induction of foreign trainers are critical factors for the 
success of NH&MP department. 
• Officer cadre for enforcement. 
• Close supervision and effective command. 
• Distinct uniform and smart turn out. 
• 50 per cent of fine collected on the Motorways/Highways utilised for road safety, 
rewards and welfare of the force. 
• SOPs for all operational activities.  
• Adoption of Ticketing System.  
• Welfare Projects including Scholarships, financial assistance for daughter’s 
marriage, burial assistance, welfare petrol pumps and special quota in jobs for 
Shaheed’s Children.  
Source: http://www.nhmp.gov.pk/salient.html 
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Appendix 7 
 
Mandate of Motorway Police’s Training Institutes 
 
i) To train the newly selected Officers on basic police course. 
ii) To organise NH&MP orientation training of already trained Officers. 
iii) To organise Driving Training for fresh recruited Officers. 
iv) To organise advance courses for Drivers to make them Driving Instructors. 
v) To organise Wireless training courses for Wireless Operators. 
vi) To organise short courses on SOPs & functioning of NH&MP. 
vii) To organise technical courses on use of Misc. Equipment (Provida, Wireless Sets 
etc). 
viii) To organise courses on Physical Fitness. 
ix) To organise Fire Shooting Course. 
x) To organise First Aid Training Course. 
xi) To conduct promotional exams for different cadres. 
xii) To conduct refresher courses for senior officers. 
xiii) To act as a platform for provision of training by foreign experts. 
  
Source:http://www.nhmp.gov.pk/training.html  
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Appendix 8       
 
Anti-corruption Laws in Pakistan Since 1947 
 
1. Relevant Offences under Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 
2. Criminal Amendment Ordinance, 1944 
3. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 
4. The Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1948 
5. List of Orders & Notification under Anti-Corruption Laws, 1948 
6. The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950 
7. The Sindh Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act, 1950 
8. The Civil Services of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954 
9. Prevention of Corruption Act (West Pakistan Extension) Ordinance, 1958 
10. Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 
11. The Police Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958 
12. The West Pakistan Departmental Inquiries (Powers) Act, 1958 
13. Anti-Corruption Establishment Ordinance, 1961 
14. Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Rules, 1962 
15. Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Rules, 1962 (pb. Amendment 16.6.1980) 
16. The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964 
17. Anti-Corruption Laws (Application to Tribal Areas) Regulation, 1966 
18. The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1966 
19. The West Pakistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1966 
20. The Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 
21. The Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 
22. The All Pakistan Services (Change in Nomenclature) Rules, 1973 
23. The Civil Services (Change in Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of Classes) 
Rules, 1973 
24. The Sindh Civil Servants Efficiency and (Discipline) Rules, 1973 
25. The North-West Frontier Province Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) 
Rules, 1973 
26. Rules for Appointment to the Cadre Post, 1973 
27. Punjab Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1974 
28. The Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 
29. The Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 
30. The Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1974 
31. The Punjab Civil Servants (Change in Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of 
Classes) Rules, 1974 
32. The Railway Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 
33. The Federal Investigation Agency Rules, 1975 
34. The Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and transfer) Rules, 
1975 
35. The Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 
36. Instructions issued under Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 
37. The Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975 
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38. The Balochistan Police Disciplinary Rules, 1975 
39. The North-West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1975 
40. Martial Law Orders Against Bribery & Corruption, 1977 
41. The Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 
42. The Pakistan Railway Police Act, 1977 
43. The Members of the Federal Investigation Agency (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 
1978 
44. Punjab Administrative Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1979 
45. Punjab Administrative Commission Rules of Business, 1979 
46. The Balochistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979 
47. Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1979 
48. The Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980 
49. The Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980 
50. Balochistan Civil Servants Appeals Rules, 1983 
51. Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment (Punjab) Rules, 1985 
52. Punjab Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985 
53. The North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986 
54. The North-West Frontier Province Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1987 
55. The Sindh Police Efficiency and (Discipline) Rules, 1988 
56. The North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and 
Transfer) Rules, 1989 
57. The Balochistan Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1989 
58. Sindh Enquiries and Anti-Corruption Rules, 1993 
59. The Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999 
60. National Accountability Ordinance 1999 
 
Source: National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2006
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